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Abstract 
With the rapid development of technology, we are entering a New Industrial Revolution – 
many believe disruptive technology will change the manufacturing industry, ushering in the 
new ‘Age of 3D printing (3DP)’. D’Aveni (2013) once pointed out that ‘businesses all along 
the supply, manufacturing, and retailing chains [will need] to rethink their strategies and 
operations’. Indeed, on the one hand, 3DP technology is changing the competitive dynamics 
of production based on traditional economies-of-scale into production based on economies-
of-one. Meanwhile, 3DP technology can effectively help consumers to fulfil their 
personalized requirements with regard to the final product. Therefore, 3DP as a disruptive 
technology creates new opportunities and challenges for our supply chain system in product 
design, production, distribution, and logistics procecces. Although a great deal of existing 
research pays attention to 3DP technology adoption from a case study perspective, little 
research has been directed at how to adopt this disruptive technology – 3DP technology – to 
improve product customization and overall supply chain performance. Therefore, this PhD 
research addresses the gap that exists between the 3DP adoption market and the 3DP adoption 
research. The result of this PhD research offers the new insight about 3DP adoption strategies 
to the 3DP technology adopter (target at the manufacturer and the logistics vendor in this 
research), along with access to 3DP products and users which still have not widely adopted 
this new technology. This research investigates the question, ‘What are the impacts of 3DP 
adoption on the supply chain?’ via three different quantitative research models. 
Firstly, this research studies the impact of the logistics vendor’s 3DP adoption on a single 
two-layer supply chain with one traditional manufacturer and one logistics vendor. The main 
results are as follows: (1) that the logistics vendor can benefit from 3DP adoption to better 
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restructure the supply chain. At the same time, there exists a situation in which the traditional 
manufacturer also benefits from this kind of 3DP adoption. (2) There exist conditions under 
which the logistics vendor can use this 3DP adoption as a threat to influence the traditional 
manufacturer’s decisions in order to gain financial benefits. (3) The cost reductions and 
product customization improvements of the 3DP product do not always contribute to a better 
financial performance or higher consumer satisfaction. 
Next, based on the first two-layer supply chain model, we investigate the traditional 
manufacturer’s manufacturing strategy in terms of traditional manufacturing, traditional 
flexible manufacturing and 3DP, and explore the impacts of different strategies on the 
manufacturing decisions of the traditional manufacturer and on the logistics vendor’s profit. 
Through numerical examples, we show that: (1) Adoption of 3DP is not always able to bring 
more profit to the logistics vendor. Specifically, if the traditional manufacturer has already 
used flexible manufacturing technology (traditional flexible manufacturing and/or 3DP), the 
logistics vendor can gain more profits if s/he provides a product delivery service only. (2) 
When it comes to cost reduction and product customization improvement, the traditional 
manufacturer should not use both traditional flexible manufacturing technology and 3DP 
manufacturing technology together for high value products. (3) Full 3DP product adoption is 
still not yet a beneficial strategy for the integrated supply chain. 
Lastly, we explore and compare the logistics vendor’s optimal models of collaboration with 
third-party 3DP professionals and the traditional manufacturer, obtaining optimal pricing 
strategies for both the traditional manufacturer and the logistics vendor, and maximized 
profits under different scenarios. The key findings are as follows: (1) Traditional 
manufacturer cannot always gain more profits under a self-3DP production model – it 
depends on the 3DP product cost, product design quality, and the product design 
  iii 
authorization fee. (2) The logistics vendor cannot gain more profits if s/he chooses to produce 
the 3DP product using third-party 3DP product design while the traditional manufacturer 
already has 3DP production line. This finding implies that for those 3DP enabled logistics 
vendors (for example, UPS), it is not profitable to participate in the market competition where 
the traditional manufacturer already has TM (traditional manufactured) production and 3DP 
production (e.g. GE). (3) Although some research points out that 3DP is the future of some 
industries, our findings here indicate that compared to the hard-revolution (replace the whole 
TM production with 3DP production), adding 3DP production into the manufacturing system 
is a more profitable soft-landing plan for integrated supply chain development. 
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 Introduction 
The de facto standard terminology – ‘3D printing’,  also known as ‘additive manufacturing’ 
– has been defined by ISO/ASTM 52900:2015 (ASTM F2792) as the subtractive and 
formative manufacturing process of joining materials, layer upon layer, to make a wide 
variety of customized objects from 3D model data through the deposition of a material by 
‘printing’ technologies (fusing, extruding, jetting, photo-curing, laminating materials) 
(ISO/ASTM 52900:2017, 2017). This disruptive manufacturing technology was once 
primarily used for modelling, prototyping and tooling. Therefore, early research in this 
domain called it rapid prototyping technology.  
Supply chain has been defined as a network between a system which try to produce a product 
or service to the end consumer, it including all the involved organizations, activities, 
informations, and resources (Zangiacomi, Fornasiero, Franchini, & Vinelli, 2017; D. Zhang, 
2006). Thus, in the supply chain management research, the improvement of the supply chain 
is an enhancement activity to change the performance of a system (including raw material 
purchasing, product design, production, logistics, customer order fulfilment, after-sale 
service, etc.) from the status quo to a new level (Evans, 1993; Handyside, 1997).  For the 
purpose of sharpen competitive advantage, supply chain improvement is becoming more 
important and therefore it is always essential in supply chain management (Wohlers 
Associates, 2018). The importance of making improvements in supply chain management 
has also been highlighted by several previous studies from increase production efficiency 
(e.g., low cost/high quality) (Womack and Jones, 1996) to improve customization (e.g. high 
customer service/short product delivery). The improvement of production and service are 
two key competitive weapon (Boyaci & Gallego, 2010; Waller & Fawcett, 2014; Xiao & 
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Yang, 2008). In particular, bringing improvements in product and service are essential for 
meeting the market challenges (Farahani, Rezapour, Drezner, & Fallah, 2014) and a central 
topic to ensure the competitiveness of the supply chain management (Farahani et al., 2014). 
Due to its short production time, low cost and high quality, 3DP technology is the new 
manufacrturing technology which can improve the product and service (Gao et al., 2015). 
Thus, it stars to be widely adopted by the commercial market for the production of parts 
going into the final products (e.g. jewellery, footwear, and personal accessories) (Wohlers 
Associates, 2018). This disruptive 3DP technology continues to offer tremendous untapped 
potential for the improvement of manufacturing, especially in terms of production 
customization. Therefore, there has been gradually increasing research focusing on 3DP 
technology development. However, study of the impact of 3DP adoption on the supply chain 
is lacking and what exists is mainly concentrated on 3DP and manufacturing industry reports 
and academic quantitative analysis on this topic remains insufficient. 
What are the impacts of the disruptive 3DP technology on the traditional logistics industry? 
Due to the complexity of the impact of this disruptive technology on the supply chain, a great 
deal of related research has been conducted to evaluate the impacts of 3DP adoption on the 
traditional supply chain, such as in terms of product design and technology (Gao et al., 2015; 
Long, Pan, Zhang, & Hao, 2017; Ross et al., 2018; Strange & Zucchella, 2017; Thompson et 
al., 2016), production cost models (Baumers, Dickens, Tuck, & Hague, 2016; Ruffo & 
Hague, 2007; Ruffo, Tuck, & Hague, 2006; Westerweel, Basten, & Houtum, 2018), supply 
chain management (Hannibal & Knight, 2018; Holmström, Holweg, Khajavi, & Partanen, 
2016; Khajavi, Partanen, & Holmström, 2014; Long et al., 2017; Mellor, Hao, & Zhang, 
2014; Thompson et al., 2016; Weller, Kleer, & Piller, 2015), and 3DP intellectual property 
issues (IP) (Bradshaw, Bowyer, & Haufe, 2010; Esmond & Phero, 2014; Wilkof, 2016). The 
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advantages of 3DP technologies have created new opportunities and challenges. However, 
most of the previous studies are limited to individual quantitative conceptual case study 
analysis, and little research has provided a comprehensive qualitative review on the actual 
impact of 3DP and its potential future impact on the supply chain.  
In addition, many existing studies have demonstrated that 3DP could be used to improve the 
manufacturer’s production performance, but most fail to explore the possibility of a non-
manufacturer’s 3DP adoption and the impact of this possibility (Attaran, 2017; Baumers et 
al., 2016; S. Ford & Despeisse, 2016; Khajavi et al., 2014). Moreover, reports by both 
Wohlers Associates (2018) and Ernst & Young (2016) concluded that 3DP technology will 
cause manufacturing production in low-cost countries (e.g. China, Vietnam, Turkey) to 
return to North America and Europe for the purpose of saving logistics costs and locating 
production near to the market. In the long term, this strategy will result in decline in the 
requirement for shipments and air cargo. Lower demand for shipment and warehousing will 
force logistics to transform. Integrating the 3DP service into the traditional logistics service 
is a possibility and this possibility has not been fully assessed yet, whilst quantitative analysis 
of the impact of the logistics vendor’s 3DP adoption is rare. Therefore, the prime motivation 
of this study is to fill this research gap by systematically assessing the possibility of 3DP 
adoption by the logistics vendor as well as the impact of this kind of 3DP adoption on the 
supply chain. 
After the logistics vendor adopts the 3DP technology, with the customer’s increasing 
requirement for product customization, what would be the best manufacturing strategy for 
the traditional manufacturer? Product customization has been recognized as one of the most 
important attributes of business success since the early 1980s (Macchion, Fornasiero, & 
Vinelli, 2017; Shamsuzzoha et al., 2013; Zangiacomi et al., 2017). With the rapid 
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development of technology, product customization has become progressively more complex 
over the last few decades. The reasons for the complexity of customization can be grouped 
into three major streams: Firstly, to rapidly respond to dynamic customization needs and 
satisfy changing customer preferences with regard to customization, many companies are 
outsourcing their product design or high-customization production to professional product 
design/manufacturing companies in order to ensure high product design quality and 
customization levels (Ernst & Young, 2016; Hannibal & Knight, 2018; Wohlers Associates, 
2018). Thus, modern products with high customization require the manufacturer to show 
more flexibility and to have capabilities for high-customization product design. Secondly, 
customization is also extremely dynamic and difficult to forecast, due the fact that a 
consumer’s requirements and standards for customization are fully unpredictable (Liechty, 
Ramaswamy, & Cohen, 2003; Takagoshi & Matsubayashi, 2013). Thirdly, as a consequence 
of manufacturing technology development, there are more strategies available to improve 
product customization and fulfil the consumers’ customization requirements (e.g. flexible 
manufacturing strategy, agile manufacturing strategy, etc.) (Dong, Shi, & Zhang, 2017).  
Meanwhile, the development of 3DP technology also provides possibilities to those non-
manufacturers (the logistics vendor, the retailer) to be the ‘maker’ of high-customization 
products (Grandhi, Magar, & Roberts, 2013; Wohlers Associates, 2018). But, the adoption 
of 3DP technology does not force the traditional manufacturer to fully replace his/her current 
traditional manufacturing production with 3DP production. Khajavi et al. (2014) used the 
case of a spare part supply chain and explored the strategy of combining 3DP and traditional 
manufacturing technology. Dong et al. (2017) and Rehnberg & Ponte (2018) also conducted 
research on the combination of new 3D printing production and traditional production and 
suggested that the future of manufacturing production should be dynamic, reconfigurable, 
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and innovative. For the aforementioned reasons, it is becoming increasingly important to 
assess the impact of 3DP technology on the traditional manufacturer’s manufacturing 
strategy  (Ernst & Young, 2016; Ryan, Eyers, Potter, Purvis, & Gosling, 2017; Wohlers 
Associates, 2018).  
Therefore, this PhD research focuses on the question, ‘What is the impact of 3DP adoption 
on the supply chain?’ More specifically, this research seeks to develop three stylized models 
to assess the impact of 3DP adoption. The project 1) explores the possibility of the logistics 
vendor’s 3DP adoption; 2) helps the manufacturer to evaluate different manufacturing 
strategies to improve product customization; and 3) investigates and compares the logistics 
vendor’s different 3DP adoption strategies and, in turn, aims to produce some insights into 
the future development of manufacturing strategy and 3DP adoption. 
This chapter presents an introduction to the research and the rationale for the methodology 
used in this study. The following section presents the research background (Section 1.1), and 
then the research motivations are given in Section 1.2. These are followed by the research 
objectives and research questions in Section 1.3, research contributions in Section 1.4, and 
research structure in Section 1.5. 
1.1 Research background  
This section will introduce the research background of the 3DP industry and its adoption 
status. 
1.1.1 The 3DP Industry 
3DP is fast evolving into a capability employed to manufacture unique and highly customized 
product designs and tools. Its impact ranges from incremental capability and financial 
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improvements to radically new customer value propositions. The 3DP market is rapidly 
maturing as the myriad of 3DP technologies evolve, disrupting traditional business models 
in a wide variety of industries. According to (Wohlers Associates, 2018), the 3DP industry 
has continued to grow over the past decade: the average growth rate of the worldwide 
revenues generated by all accounted products and services over the last 29 years is 26.6%. In 
2017, the 3DP industry grew 21% to $7.336 billion compared to 17.4% growth in 2016 
($6.063 billion) and 25.9% growth in 2015 ($4.816 billion). This represents a bounce-back 
of industry expansion after a slight softening of industry growth in 2016. The 3DP industry 
is expected to continue to show strong growth over the coming years (Ernst & Young, 2016; 
Pooley, 2013). Wohlers Associates (2018) forecasts that the sale of 3DP products and 
services will exceed $11.7384 billion worldwide in 2018 and it is expected to reach $27.3026 
billion in 2023 (Figure 1-1). 
 
Figure 1-1 Worldwide 3DP Annual Revenue ($ Billion) (Wohlers Associates, 2018) 
The 3DP industry is both multifaceted and dynamic. It is made up of a diverse ecosystem of 
designers, material suppliers, design tool creators, system manufacturers, consumers, and 
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other groups. The ever-changing consumer requirements and market needs drive the 
development of new products, materials, processes, and standards. Constant innovation 
results in perpetual motion in the 3DP industry. Drivers of 3DP industry development 
constantly tailor the tools at hand to satisfy their needs and push boundaries to meet new 
market requirements with new business models (Ernst & Young, 2016). As the capabilities 
of the technology continue to grow, 3DP applications are spreading to previously untouched 
industries and regions, such as the cornea (Newcastle University, 2018) and housing (Cowan, 
2018). 
1.1.2 The 3DP Adoptions 
The following section gives introduction about the current status about 3DP adoptions. 
3DP Adoption by Industry 
 
Figure 1-2 2017 3DP Adoption by Industry (Wohlers Associates, 2018) 
According to the survey conducted by (Wohlers Associates, 2018) (which included 64 3DP 
system manufacturers, 19 materials and desktop 3D printer producers, and 92 3DP service 
providers), as shown in Figure 1-2 the leading industrial sector for 3DP adoption is still 
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industrial/business machines (20.00%) for the fifth consecutive year, having grown by 1.2% 
since 2015. 3DP adoption under this category includes office equipment (e.g., computers, 
printers and routers) and industrial automation equipment (e.g., CNC machines and robots). 
The aerospace industry, as an early adopter of 3DP, is the runner-up growing by 0.7% in 
2017, whilst 3DP adoption in motor vehicles grew by 1.2% since 2016 and ranks third place. 
Interestingly, the consumer products/electronics category, which covers a wide range from 
small kids’ toys to all kinds of home electronics, is reaching the tipping point of adoption 
growth. 3DP technology actually accelerates product development by enabling rapid design 
iteration and optimization for the companies in those industries. For example, Hewlett-
Packard’s Jet Fusion 500/300 series 3D printers offer highly customized multi-colour 
protective phone covers (Figure 1-3) (Hewlett-Packard, 2018).  
 
Figure 1-3 HP 3D Printed Mobile Phone Covers (Hewlett-Packard, 2018) 
Although the volumes in the automotive and the consumer products/electronics industries 
are typically too high for the series production of most parts, some exceptions are beginning 
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to emerge. For examples, Daimler Trucks is now producing spare parts by 3DP for its large 
trucks (Watkin, 2017) and Mini Cooper is starting to offer highly customized car parts for 
numerous MINI models over the course of 2018 via its ‘MINI Yours Customised’ project 
(Overall, 2017). In addition, individual consumers can order various final part products, 
including jewellery, home decorations, art, footwear, and all types of accessories from online 
3DP providers, such as Shapeways, i.materialize, and Thingiverse. According to Wohlers 
Associates (2018), 3DP final part production is a topic of interest worldwide, and momentum 
is experiencing impressive growth (Figure 1-4). Therefore, 3DP technology can be used to 
facilitate the incorporation of small features and to consolidate many parts into one, offering 
a new market development opportunity in sectors with high product customization.  
 
Figure 1-4 Market Development of 3DP Final Parts Production (Wohlers Associates, 2018) 
3DP Adoption by Region 
From the comprehensive 3DP adoption data tracked from 1988 to 2017 by Wohlers 
Associates (2018) (Figure 1-5), the U.S. continues to lead in 3DP adoption by a large margin, 
followed by China, Japan, and Germany. The U.S. segment decreased from 36.8% in 2016 
to 35.9% in 2017 while China’s segment grew from 10.3% to 10.6% over the same period. 
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Although North America is still leading in 3DP adoption and technological research, 3DP in 
the Asian Pacific is growing at a high speed.  
 
Figure 1-5 3DP Adoption by Region (Wohlers Associates, 2018) 
Indeed, the 3DP industry is receiving ever-increasing active government support for the 
development of 3DP technologies and implications, as they realize the potential and 
importance of 3DP development to the new industrial revolution, as well as for sustainable 
development (Gebler, Schoot Uiterkamp, & Visser, 2014; Kellens, Mertens, Paraskevas, 
Dewulf, & Duflou, 2017). For instance, the U.S. government has established funding for 3DP 
research projects by several national organizations, including the National Science 
Foundation (NSF), National Institutes of Health (NIH), Department of Defense (DoD) and 
Department of Energy (DOE). The European Union also sets up 3DP research project 
funding as far back as the late 1980s and this funding has successfully support 3DP related 
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research (e.g. 3DP database for the management of product design, 3DP virtual support 
platform for small or medium-sized enterprise on 3DP facility management) with more than 
€220 million funding from 2007 to 2017 (Wohlers Associates, 2018). Meanwhile, Asian 
countries have also put much effort into 3DP research and development. For example, the 
Chinese government treats 3DP as one of the vital supporting industries in its 13th Five-Year 
Plan for Economic and Social Development (Central Compilation and Translation Press, 
2016). Therefore, 3DP has become an established set of technologies and is on the cusp of 
having broad impacts across most regions, industries, supply chains, and even end markets. 
New Trend of 3DP Adoption 
First of all, the market for individual 3DP products is increasing and custom/semi-custom 
products are gaining in popularity. According to Wohlers Associates (2018), both sales of 
low-priced desktop 3D printers and the market for 3DP services have increased significantly. 
Figure 1-6 illustrates the sales of 3D printers priced less than $5, 000 from 2007 to 2017. The 
growth in unit sales continued at a substantial rate, increasing by 24.7% to an estimated 
528,952 machines, representing $610.5 million with 31.5% growth from 2007 to 2017. The 
growth rate of unit sales in 2016 was 49.9%, and the revenues were $464.2 million.  
Meanwhile, the scope of 3DP services has expanded tremendously. The estimated market for 
this sector was $2.690 million in 2017, which represented an increase of 23.8% from $2.173 
million in 2016 (Wohlers Associates, 2018). It includes conventional service providers that 
have been in business since the early 1990s, 3DP marketplaces and communities such as 
Shapeways, i.materialise, and Sculpteo, online print networks such as 3D Hubs, and 
independent 3D print shops (e.g., UPS 3D printer shops). The 3DP service provider may be 
an individual with one desktop 3D printer selling parts locally. At the other end of the 
spectrum are 3DP system manufacturers and ‘mega’ service providers known as service 
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bureaus, jog shops, or contract manufacturers. They have more than 100 industrial machines 
and maintain a global selling and service network. In summary, how to integrate personal 
3DP market demand with the ‘mega’ 3DP services is a new question for the further 
development of the 3DP industry. 
 
Figure 1-6 The Sales Quantity of Desktop 3D Printers (Wohlers Associates, 2018) 
Another point needing attention is that not only traditional manufacturers, but also other 
supply chain players are exploring the possibility of 3DP adoption strategies. Among 500 
buyers surveyed by UPS, 42% would like to switch business to a supplier with 3DP service 
in the next 3-5 years (UPS, 2017). The leading companies eager to be first movers in the 3DP 
race have begun leveraging this potentially disruptive manufacturing technology. This 
leveraging activity is evident in a variety of industrial sectors, especially consumer goods, 
such as the personalized running shoes pioneered by Adidas AG and Nike Inc, the 
personalized headphones manufactured by Normal Earphones, and the customized 
chocolates produced by Hershey (Pooley, 2013; Sher & Tutó, 2015). More interesting, even 
some logistics vendors among these companies are adopting this technology; for example, 
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the global logistics vendor UPS launched 3DP service for small plastic products in the U.S. 
market in early 2014 and extended this business to the Asian and European markets in 2017 
(UPS, 2015, 2017). On the one hand, logistics vendors can use 3DP as a game-changer to 
redefine their roles as not only deliverers but also makers. Not only does the 3DP service’s 
built-in logistics network create a new revenue stream, but by giving the end consumer more 
flexibility in product customization, it attracts more attention to itself. On the other hand, 
logistics vendor can use 3DP as a threat to upset traditional manufacturers, meaning that its 
adoption equips them with a powerful bargaining tool to strengthen their logistics business. 
In summary, 3DP is evolving and/or revolting the traditional manufacturing industry. 
However, how to adopt 3DP or how to combine 3DP into traditional manufacturing system 
are questions needing assessment. 
1.2 Research Motivation  
The rationale behind this thesis is of twofold: the needs of assessing the impact of new 3D 
printing manufacturing technology adoption on the supply chain and the limited number of 
studies looking into this topic. The needs of assessing the impact of new 3D printing 
manufacturing technology adoption on the supply chain generate from various perspectives. 
Firstly, the 3DP industry has continued to grow over the past decades. According to Wohlers 
Associates (2018) 3DP industry report, the average growth rate of the worldwide revenues 
generated by all accounted products and service over the last 29 years is 26.6% and the 3DP 
industry grew 21% to $7.336 billion in 2017. The sale of 3DP products and services is be 
expected to reach $27.3026 billion in 2023. This is a huge and fast developing industry under 
today’s slack economic environment. Besides, some governments are continue to investment 
the new development of the 3DP industry, such as US, China, Germany, and Japan. There is 
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a need to provide some industry insights to them to help make more suitable laws and 
regulations (such as IP law). 
Secondly, apart from the economic development of 3DP industry, from the technology 
perspective, the new development of the 3DP manufacturing technology is changing the 
competitive dynamics of production from traditional economies-of-scale into economies-of-
one. For example, GE is using 3D printing manufacturing technology for some of their engine 
parts production instead of traditional manufacturing production (Kellner, 2018). Because 
the 3DP manufacturing technology provides the possibility of develop high-customized 
engine parts and it allows any design changes before or during the ‘printing’ process. Most 
importantly, the applications of 3DP are spreading to previously untouched industries, 
especially consumer product industry, like shoes (Adidas), toys (Toys ‘R’ Us), and fashion 
accessories industry (earrings, rings) (Ernst & Young, 2016; Wohlers Associates, 2018). 
Therefore, 3DP is providing more and more new production possibilities to the supply chain 
development, not only limited to medical or aerospace industry. Thus, there is a need to 
review 3DP industry based on the new updated 3DP industry developments. 
Thirdly, the product customization is an increasingly important factor on manufacturing 
production and it reflects the consumer shopping behaviour. 3DP can effectively help 
consumers to fulfil their personalized requirement on product function or product preference 
(Despeisse et al., 2017; Gebler et al., 2014). Therefore, 3DP drives manufacturing innovation 
by rethinking product design optimizing production and logistics for a new type product 
customization. For example, if you want to use your dad as the model to create a new small 
super hero statue as your dad’s birthday gift, 3DP might be the most convenience and fastest 
technology for you to do this. How to use 3DP manufacturing technology to improve the 
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product customization and what is the impact of the 3DP adoption on the supply chain and 
product customization are two important questions which need to be addressed. 
Fourthly, the introduction of 3DP has proven to be a ‘game-changer’ to the supply chain 
structure. For instance, the 3DP technology enabled less-assembly concept, which means, by 
using 3DP, some product could be ‘print-as-one’, therefore, the product delivery 
requirements would be reduced (Halassi, Semeijn, & Kiratli, 2019; Wohlers Associates, 
2018). This is a big challenge to those delivery service companies, such as UPS and DHL. 
However, from another perspective, the 3DP has less requirements on production setups, for 
example, to some plastic product production, one printer and one produce design are the only 
things needed for production. Therefore, 3DP can enable everyone to be a new 
‘manufacturer’, those logistics vendors who fears the threat of 3DP on their traditional 
delivery service are starting to explore the possibility of to be 3DP adopter. For example, 
UPS is already doing 3DP business since 2015 (UPS, 2015). Therefore, what is the actual 
impact of the logistics vendor’s 3DP adoption on the supply chain? How about the 
performance of such adoption? Should the other logistics vendors start to engage the new 
3DP service and how? What should the manufacturer to cope with such competition from the 
new ‘manufacturer’? Those are interesting questions need to be evaluated as well. 
Lastly, despite the importance of assessing the new 3DP adoption attracted by the sector, 
most of the existing research on 3DP, however, is limited on qualitative study or case study 
for a specific 3DP technology (see details in Chapter 2). Besides, for those studies about topic 
mass customization and technology disruption, they have ignored the uniqueness of 3DP 
manufacturing technology on customization disruption.  There are still some gaps in this 
research domain. First, numerous studies have concentrated on individual 3DP technology 
adoption by the traditional manufacturer. However, little research has focused on 
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investigating the possibility of the non-traditional manufacturer (e.g. logistics vendor) 
adopting 3DP technology, how the non-manufacturer could adopt 3DP, and what is the 
impact of non-manufacturer’s 3DP adoption on the traditional manufacturer and the supply 
chain. In addition, the 3DP technology, as a disruptive technology, could be used to improve 
the product customization. However, little research has focused on integrating the mass 
customization theory and technology disruption theory to analyze what is the impact of the 
3DP adoption on the supply chain and the traditional manufacturing system. Last, in the 
related 3DP adoption research domain, a great deal of research has employed a qualitative 
research methodology to analyze the 3DP adoption performance, such as a case study or 
empirical study approach (R. Huang et al., 2017; Ivan & Yin, 2018; Niaki & Nonino, 2017b). 
This thesis has been focused on possibility analysis for different types of 3DP adoption. 
Therefore, it would provide a different analysis about the 3DP adoption on the supply chain 
from a quantitative research perspective. In view of the aforementioned research gaps, there 
is a need to explore the question: ‘What is the impact of 3DP adoption on the supply chain?’  
Therefore, the prime motivation of this research is the need to deeply understand the current 
situation, in order to find insights and analysis tools that will assist in maximizing the 
potential of this 3DP market. The immediate derivatives from the prime motivation were 
secondary motivations relating to the factors influencing 3DP adoption by the logistics 
vendor and the traditional manufacturer, including cost, price, market demand, and the level 
of customization of the 3DP production. The actions that were set for examination of these 
factors were: 
1. To review the current industry status of 3DP, in order to know inside-out its potential 
as a new value added service for the logistics vendor; 
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2. To study mass customization methods and paradigms as a reference for advancing 
approaches to strategies in the products market; 
3. To evaluate the adoption plans for the logistics vendors and traditional manufacturer; 
and 
4. To study the impact of 3DP adoption on the supply chain structure. 
1.3 Research Objectives and Questions 
This PhD thesis proposes analytical models to investigate the impact of 3DP adoption. 
Developing models for consumer product and purchase choice processes is a prevailing 
research method in supply chain and operational management. According to Blackwell, 
Miniard, & Engel (2006), there are five stages of consumer product choice processes, 
including recognizing need, searching for information, evaluating product alternatives, 
making a purchase decision and the post-purchase stage. Our models incorporate the first 
four steps. We follow existing theoretical models in the dual product competition research 
domain by considering that parameters such as production cost and product price determine 
consumers’ choice of final product. Note that these models have been proved by previous 
studies. Basically, the consumer’s decisions are a trade-off between the consumer surplus 
and the product price (González-Maestre & Granero, 2018).  
In particular, this study focuses on assessing the impact of 3DP adoption on the supply chain. 
One of the main starting points concerns the possibility of 3DP adoption by the logistics 
vendor. The overall major research questions in the pervious study focuse on why and how 
the logistics vendor adopts 3DP as a part of their business. Further study and exploration 
naturally revealed that different adoption plans exist in this market, and each one of them has 
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different impacts on the supply chain structure. The primary objectives of this thesis, 
therefore, are:  
1. To develop an analytical model to investigate the supply chain following a logistics 
vendor’s adoption of 3DP – one that explicitly models customization; 
2. To explore the impact of the logistics vendor’s use of 3DP on the supply chain; and  
3. To examine potential 3DP service adoption plan for the logistics vendor. 
Besides the primary research objective, this thesis also seeks to study what kind of actions 
the traditional manufacturer could take:  
4. To develop another analytical model to evaluate the supply chains of traditional 
manufacturer who also adopts 3DP or adopts a highly flexible and customized 
manufacturing line in view of the market competition; and  
5. To explore the impact of each manufacturing strategy on the supply chain. 
Out of an initial spatial understanding of the possibility of 3DP adoption by the logistics 
vendor and the traditional manufacturer, these vendors’ use of 3DP thus poses many 
challenges in the supply chain and raises several unanswered questions and sub-questions 
that warrant empirical investigation: 
Q1. What are the impacts of a logistics vendor’s 3DP adoption on the supply chain? 
Q1.1. Under what conditions will a logistics vendor use 3DP as a game-changer to compete 
directly with the manufacturer? 
Q1.2. Under what conditions will a logistics vendor use 3DP as a threat to bargain with the 
manufacturer? 
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Q1.3. What is the impact of a logistics vendor’s 3DP adoption on the consumer? 
Q2. What kind of manufacturing strategy should the traditional manufacturer take to cope 
with 3DP adoption by the logistics vendor? 
Q2.1. Under what conditions will the traditional manufacturer also adopt 3DP? 
Q2.2. Under what conditions will the traditional manufacturer use flexible manufacturing to 
compete with 3DP? 
Q2.3. What are the impacts of the traditional manufacturer’s different manufacturing 
strategies on the supply chain structure? 
Q3. What is the best 3DP adoption plan for the logistics vendor? 
Q3.1. Under what conditions will a logistics vendor choose to outsource the product design 
to a third-party 3DP design company? 
Q3.2. Under what conditions will a logistics vendor choose to purchase the product design 
from the original traditional manufacturer? 
Q3.3. What are the impacts of different logistics vendor’s 3DP adoption strategies on the 
relationship between the logistics vendor and traditional manufacturer? 
1.4 Research Contributions 
Turning to the existing research on 3DP, mass customization and technology disruption, 
compared to the existing studies, this thesis is among the first to draw on those two theories 
to develop analytical models to assess the impact of different 3DP adoption strategies on the 
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supply chain. This thesis thus provides a different perspective on the disruptive 3DP 
technology adoption literature on the following highlights.  
Firstly, although pervious studies (such as (Dong et al., 2017; Song & Zhang, 2018)) show 
that the 3DP manufacturing could be used to improve the manufacturing performance on 
flexible production and supply chain inventory management, this thesis indicated that there 
are also encouraging signs in logistics vendor’s 3DP adoption. Thus, this thesis extends the 
findings from previous studies, which are more or less focus on the traditional manufacturer’s 
3DP adoption strategies. 
Secondly, following a serial of critical model analysis on the logistics vendor’s 3DP adoption, 
the traditional manufacturer’s 3DP adoption and the logistics vendor’s 3DP adoption 
strategies, this thesis argues from the extension of the current 3DP research to include the 
logistics vendor and the traditional manufacturer’s collaboration and competition 
relationship analysis on 3DP adoption (product, service, product design). This is borne out 
of the fact that when the logistics vendor or the traditional manufacturer starts to consider the 
3DP adoption, the production cost of different type of manufacturing technology, the product 
customization level, the cost of logistics delivery, the product design cost, and the product 
pricing strategies should be the critical internal considerations. Most importantly, the 
collaboration and competition relationship between the logistics vendor and the traditional 
manufacturer should be another important external consideration. This is an echo to our 
technology disruption theory. Thus, for the purpose of improving the supply chain efficiency 
and effectiveness, the existing 3DP research, mass customization, and technology disruption 
research need to be extended.  
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Lastly, since 3DP is a continued developing manufacturing technology, the possibility of 
adopting this technology can be very complex. There is a need to review and assess this 
research topic based on the new development and changes in 3DP adoption. This thesis 
proposes a series of different 3DP adoption strategies for the logistics vendor and 
manufacturer to follow in order to achieve a better 3DP adoption.  
In addition, it also generates several practical contributions by providing the following 
managerial insights. 
The first model develops a stylized quantitative model that incorporates the logistics vendor’s 
adoption of 3DP technology, identifies the conditions under which the logistics vendor will 
use 3DP as a game-changer or threat, and analyzes the impact of this adoption on both supply 
chain partners and consumers. It derives the observation that although the logistics vendor 
benefits from 3DP adoption, the cost reduction on 3DP products cannot always contribute to 
the logistics vendor’s overall revenue because a portion of his/her revenue still derives from 
shipping the TM product for the manufacturer. This finding helps the logistics vendor on 
deciding which 3DP product should be provided and which 3DP product should do cost 
reduction. 
The second model develops another analytical model to evaluate how the traditional 
manufacturer can adopt 3DP technology, defines the conditions 1) under which the traditional 
manufacturer should fully replace traditional manufacturing technology with 3DP and 2) 
under which the traditional manufacturer should combine 3DP with its traditional flexible 
manufacturing technology. It points out that although 3DP technology can be used to improve 
product customization, it cannot always increase the traditional manufacturer’s profit; under 
some conditions, the traditional manufacturer’s flexible technology can bring more profit 
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than the 3DP manufacturing technology. These findings help the traditional manufacturer on 
the decision of flexible manufacturing technology strategy. 
The third model develops another theoretical model to define the best 3DP adoption plan for 
the logistics vendor, and it compares the logistics vendor’s potential 3DP engagement 
strategies and identifies the conditions under which the logistics vendor should provide a 
‘printing’ and product design service as opposed to ‘printing’ only but with outsourcing of 
the product design service to a 3DP professional or traditional manufacturer. It concludes 
that collaboration with the traditional manufacturer for 3DP product design is sometimes the 
best 3DP adoption strategy for the logistics vendor. Most interestingly, we also demonstrate 
that the dictum that high customization and low-price leads to more consumers does not 
always hold true. This model gives the guidelines to the logistics vendor on the detailed 3DP 
adoption strategy. 
Most importantly, those managerial insights also provide guidelines to those policymakers 
to develop the 3DP industry-related policy or regulations. In particular, this thesis shows the 
need for the policymakers and the 3DP companies/developers to have an understanding on 
the 3DP industry in order to mitigate the complexity and clean the barriers of further 3DP 
industrialized adoption. 
1.5 Research Structure 
Chapter 1 is introduction, which introduces the research background, motivations, and 
contributions of this research. Meanwhile, it also states the research objectives and outlines 
the specific research questions. 
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Chapter 2 reviews the different forms of research on 3DP, mass customization and 
technology disruption that have been conducted already. It provides a more detailed 
understanding of 3DP technology, mass customization and technology disruption, and then 
discusses in a deep discussion about the uniqueness of 3DP adoption. It also critically 
evaluates previous research on the problems, issues and challenges of 3DP adoption. 
Chapter 3 introduces the methodology for the study. In order to select the most appropriate 
research method, this chapter first describes the classic quantitative and qualitative research 
methodology and then gives the reasons for the selection of analytical modelling for this 
research. 
Chapter 4 focuses on adoption of 3DP by the logistics vendor. It studies the first analytical 
model to investigate the possibility of 3DP adoption by the logistics vendor. It also provides 
a more detailed model analysis and interpretations of the findings. 
Chapter 5 illustrates the adoption of 3DP by the traditional manufacturer. It discusses the 
second model concerning the traditional manufacturer’s 3DP adoption strategy. It compares 
different 3DP adoption strategies and then gives the recommended 3DP adoption strategy for 
the traditional manufacturer. 
Chapter 6 proposes logistics vendor’s 3DP engagement strategies. It explores and compares 
the logistics vendor’s different 3DP engagement strategies. It also lists the suggested 3DP 
adoption models for the logistics vendor under different market structures.  
Chapter 7 is the conclusion. It outlines the conclusions of the research and provides answers 
to the research questions. It also lists the limitations of this research and highlights 
recommended avenues for future studies. 
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 Literature Review 
This chapter discusses the literature and theoretical context performed in the research 
domain, which underpin this thesis. The review aims to highlight the important gaps within 
this body of literature. To achieve this, this chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.1 
outlines the existing studies on supply chain improvement managemenet research, especially 
on the proposed research area – 3DP supply chain research. Given that mass customization 
and technology disruption have been integral to the development of the  supply chain. Section 
2.2 provides a brief review of mass customization in the context of manufacturing industry 
and then presents an analysis on how the technology disruption influence the supply chain 
development in Section 2.3. Finally, Section 2.4 provides the conclusions of this literature 
review and summarizes the research challenges and gaps.  
Overall, this chapter concludes that while the 3DP adoption has brought uncertainty to the  
supply chain development, the analysis in this chapter provides evidence to the necessity of 
assessing the impact of 3DP adoption in the supply chain.  
2.1  3DP Supply Chain Research 
After 3DP was first pioneered by Charles Hull in the late 1980s (Rylands, Böhme, Gorkin, 
Fan, & Birtchnell, 2016), the impressive development on 3DP technology and 3DP industry 
had inspired and informed the 3DP research, and equally the research findings offered 
insights on this development.  
Despite the fact 3DP supply chain research is important to the supply chain development, a 
large number of existing studies in this domain in the past decades (list in Appendix A) were 
sporadic, and it is amongst the most under-researched areas in various 3DP manufacturing 
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processing technology analysis and case. The focus of this section narrows to have an 
overview of the existing 3DP research and to identify the research gaps. After reviewing 37 
related research articles in 3DP research domain (Appendix A), we have found that the 
majority of the studies focus on product technology (Section 2.1.1),  production cost (Section 
2.1.2), supply chain management (Section 2.1.3), and Intellectual Property (Section 2.1.4). 
Moreover, there are few works in the literature related to business models and industry review 
for 3DP (Figure 2-1).  
  
Figure 2-1 Classification of Related Studies by Research Perspectives 
Although different perspectives of the 3DP have been identified and discussed by pervious 
studies, the impact of 3DP adoption in the supply chain remains unclear. In particular, at least 
four main perspectives of the 3DP research which have been identified by previous studies. 
They are outlined in following sub-sections. 
16%
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2.1.1 Product Technology  
Different 3DP technology processes build and consolidate layers in different ways, but in 
general, 3DP manufacturing technology consists of three basic processes: (1) computerizing 
the 3D solid model based on the different design requirements and then converting into a 
standard 3DP file format; (2) sending the 3DP file to a 3D printer; and (3) ‘printing’ the 
product layer by layer on the 3D printer (Woodson, Alcantara, & Nascimento, 2019).  
With the ever-increasing number of raw materials and technologies that 3DP could use, 3DP 
emerges as a potentially disruptive technology which is very likely to replace the traditional 
manufacturing technology in long term. Therefore, this gives rise to a growing concern over 
how to using the new 3DP technology and how to combine the new 3DP technology into 
current manufacturing system.  According to Berman (2012), because there is no tooling 
constraints, 3DP enables small quantities of highly customized goods to be manufactured 
with relatively low production cost. The product design can also change and update anytime 
and small batch production is also economical. Berman (2012) has also indicated that the 
manufacturer might have huge change-over costs on productions time, production costs, and 
materials. In particular, from Berman’s perspective, the concern is that as 3DP technology 
can improve certain characteristics of the product (quality, product customization level, etc.) 
and help the traditional manufacturer to fulfil the consumers’ increasingly complex and 
dynamic product customization requirements. But adopting the new 3DP technology which 
would in turn brings more challenges on manufacturing and production management to the 
traditional manufacturer.  Arguably, Berman (2012) concludes those ideas by literature 
review methodology which need more cases or data support. 
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This perspective was later popularized by a number of research herein and they tried to  
examine it by empirical study, case study. or conceptual study, comparing the 3DP 
technology with the traditional manufacturing technology and then identifying the 
advantages and disadvantages of the 3DP technology. 3DP manufacturing technology has 
the following perceived advantages in terms of Flexibility and Efficiency: 
(1) Flexibility: By using 3DP technology, it is possible to design and produce a product 
with varying and complex property components (Hofmann et al., 2014; Mohammed, 
Cadd, Peart, & Gibson, 2018). The new achievement of technology helps 3DP 
technology to couple it with other constituent technologies in the wave of industry 
4.0 (Strange & Zucchella, 2017). For example, web 2.0 applications, the platforms 
where customers can purchase and share data, help the consumer generate new joint 
value-add through co-creation (Gao et al., 2015). In comparison to the traditional 
manufacturing design process, 3DP has the potential to enhance the capability to 
produce geometrically more complex components (Hofmann et al., 2014; 
Mohammed et al., 2018). 
(2) Efficiency: Traditional manufacturing technology requires different resources such as 
cutting machines, assembly machines, and coolants (Ernst & Young, 2016; Strange 
& Zucchella, 2017; Wohlers Associates, 2018). 3DP manufacturing does not require 
those additional resources, which effectively reduces the initial investment for multi-
location start-ups and product design (Long et al., 2017; Ross et al., 2018; Thompson 
et al., 2016; Xu, Meteyer, Perry, & Zhao, 2015). Furthermore, 3DP can use raw 
materials efficiently by building product layer by layer with little leftover materials. 
However, during the traditional manufacturing processes, a large amount of material 
might need to be removed (Mohammed et al., 2018). In addition, because the 3DP 
  44 
process has less requirements on assembly, and thus, the production lead time could 
be reduced (Ross et al., 2018; Sanchez, Boudaoud, Muller, & Camargo, 2014). 
However, 3DP manufacturing technology still cannot fully replace the traditional 
manufacturing technology yet, especially in product quality and mass production.  Hofmann 
et al. (2014) provide an empirical study on the 3DP gradient metal alloys production, by 
comparing with the traditional manufacturing technology. This research concludes that 
although the new 3DP technology demonstrates a better performance over the traditional 
manufacturing technology on less unwanted phases and high product quality, the 3DP 
manufacturing technology has drawbacks in unit product cost and design complexity. Studies 
comparing the traditional manufacturing with the other 3DP manufacturing technology 
provide similar findings showing the studied 3DP manufacturing technology has the potential 
to (1) reduce the energy consumption and improve the design of parts geometry but it requires 
more resource on layer thickness and drying control (Xu et al., 2015); (2) reduce process lead 
time, cost, and steps, but it has strict requirements on consumer engagement in product design 
phase (Mohammed et al., 2018); and (3) reduce the need for highly skilled prosthetists, lower 
the production costs and improve the product customization level. However, it still needs a 
further development on production accuracy (Ross et al., 2018).  
Following this perspective, a 3DP-enabled supply chain is more profitable and its has the 
flexibility to produce a higher customization level product with high product quality at low 
cost (Ernst & Young, 2016; Strange & Zucchella, 2017; Wohlers Associates, 2018).  
Meanwhile, the advantages of the 3DP product technology pointed out the possibility of the 
non-manufacturer’s possibility of adopting 3DP but the backwards highlighted the necessity 
for analysis on the 3DP adoption which help to achieve an optimal system performance.   
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2.1.2 Production Cost 
However, the 3DP research under production cost perspective findings has showed a different 
review of the impact of 3DP adoption. The research under this sub-stream investigates the 
production costs required by 3DP manufacturing, compares with traditional manufacturing 
production costs and then proposes a new cost model for the new 3DP manufacturing 
technology. Therefore, this perspective consideres that cost might be the most crtical 
consideration of 3DP adoption. The most classic studies are conducted by Ruffo et al. (2006) 
and Ruffo & Hague (2007). Both studies use the previous Hopkinson-Dickens model as the 
base and then build up a new cost model for the new 3DP production. Different from the 3DP 
research on the technology perspective, these two study focused on the cost element analysis. 
The first study finds out that the indirect costs plays an essential a role in modern 3DP 
production cost models. The later one reports that apart from of the direct and indirect costs 
for the production, the simultaneous production strategy for different parts is also an critical 
consideration to the 3DP production cost model. As Figure 2-2 shows, this approach of work 
mainly aims to identify the breakeven point of the traditional manufacturing technology and 
current 3DP manufacturing technology and then forecast the future breakeven point for the 
new developing 3DP manufacturing technology. At last, the research uses the breakeven 
points analysis as a reference to reshape the supply chain structure and plan the development 
of the next 3DP manufacturing technology in view of the cost model of the 3DP. This 
perspective has also received a considerable amount of recognition (Holzmann, Breitenecker, 
Soomro, & Schwarz, 2017; Khajavi et al., 2014).  
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Figure 2-2 The Effect of Lower Unit Product Cost on the 3DP Breakeven Point, adopted from 
Basiliere (2017) 
Apart from building up the cost model, researchers under this perspective also focused on 
conducting the impact analysis of one or several detailed cost element(s) on the total cost 
model, such as the energy consumption and environmental impact, the economies of scale, 
the production lead time, etc (Gebler et al., 2014; Gutowski et al., 2009; S. H. Huang, Liu, 
Mokasdar, & Hou, 2013). 
As for energy consumption and environmental impact analysis for the 3DP production, 
manufacturing processes requires energy, and the average industry energy demand of  the 
U.S. is one-third of the total consumption (S. H. Huang et al., 2013). Although the 
manufacturing industry is successful in reducing energy intensity in the past decades, the 
analysis about energy consumption on the manufacturing technology is a challenging but 
necessary task. Gutowski et al. (2009) have conducted an analytical study on this topic for 
the purpose of having a closer look at electricity usage of the manufacturing processes. The 
results of their study have showed that by comparing with the traditional manufacturing 
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processes, the new manufacturing process has a better performance on producing finer 
dimensions and smaller scales, but the electricity consumption during the production phase 
is larger. However, the authors also acknowledges that the product produced by the new 
manufacturing processes requires less energy consumption during the use phase. Later, 
Gebler et al. (2014) also examine this matter by using cost model to evaluate the 
environmental impacts of the 3DP manufacturing technology quantitatively. Their results 
show that 3DP manufacturing technology has the potential for the cost reduction and 
decouple energy and CO2 emissions during the production process. Most importantly, this 
research reveals that there is no a uniformly quantitative tool to help the 3DP manufacturing 
technology adopter to evaluate the impacts of new 3DP manufacturing technology on the 
manufacturing system. Therefore, although the new 3DP technology is perceived to have less 
production cost, it is still necessary to conduct a more thorough analysis.  
The new development of the 3DP manufacturing technology is changing the competitive 
dynamics of production from traditional economies-of-scale into economies-of-one. 
However, many researchers and companies argue that the new economies-of-one 3DP 
manufacturing technology could only provide the high-customization to the consumer and it 
has shortcoming on achieving the competition advantages of economies-of-scale, such as 
high volume, low unit cost, and high variety (Ernst & Young, 2016; Wohlers Associates, 
2018). Baumers et al. (2016) once study this research topic by analysing the enablers and 
barrier of the 3DP manufacturing adoption. Their research has observed that economies-of-
scale is not a barrier of the 3DP manufacturing technology adoption, but it is achievable with 
the new 3DP manufacturing technology. The authors also identify that the how to 
successfully transform the manufacturing technology from traditional to 3DP is an important 
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issue. Thus, more scientific evidence and sophisticate tools are needed to determine the 3DP 
manufacturing technology’s performance, correctness, and practicality. 
Although the new 3DP manufacturing has the clear advantages on the production lead time 
(less assembly, less delivery between processes), academic research still shows the interests 
on investigating this matter. Westerweel et al. (2018) have developed a decision-making 
model to test and compare the lifecycle costs of two different components. The outcome of 
their model shows that the by using the 3DP manufacturing technology, the production lead 
time is reduced which also contributes to the cost reduction on logistical costs, product design 
costs, and production costs. It is possible that the 3DP manufacturing can reduce the 
production lead time and contribute to the cost reduction within the manufacturing processes, 
but, once the entire supply chain system is considered, 3DP manufacturing technology might 
not have an edge over the traditional manufacturing technology in terms of production cost.  
In this sense, which is different from product technology research perspective, cost model 
analysis of 3DP adoption should be implemented with an emphasis on the detailed cost 
elements, as they can be improving continuously and always have longer-lasting outcomes. 
As such, no firm conclusion can be drawn at this time and the research under this perspective 
is limited. Thus, there is a need to conduct such research to assess the performance of 
production cost on the manufacturing system level, the logistics system level, and the supply 
chain system level. 
2.1.3 Supply Chain Management 
In a supply chain, material flow forward from suppliers through various stages toward the 
end consumer requires the effort of various companies that form the manufacturing supply 
chain. Those companies might include raw material suppliers, original equipment 
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manufacturers, distributors, retailers, and logistics vendors. Several studies have confirmed 
that the new 3DP manufacturing technology has the potential to reduce the number of stages 
in the traditional manufacturing supply chain (Holmström, Partanen, Tuomi, & Walter, 2010; 
S. H. Huang et al., 2013; Petrick & Simpson, 2014). In detail, 3DP manufacturing technology 
could improve the supply chain efficiency from two perspectives: (1) to improve the product 
design with less components and less material consumption and (2) to manufacture the 
product near to the end consumers (Ernst & Young, 2016; Wohlers Associates, 2018). Thus, 
the new 3DP manufacturing technology has the potential to simplify the supply chain to be 
shorter (less assembling, warehousing, shipping, and packaging processes) and efficient (less 
production/transportation lead time, less material consumption, and higher product 
customization level). Several studies listed below have examined the actual effect of using 
3DP manufacturing in the supply chain.  
Tuck, Hague, & Burns (2007) have once investigated how the new 3DP manufacturing 
technology could reshape the supply chain management paradigms and integrate with 
traditional lean and agile supply chain management strategy with three different case studies. 
Their research points out that the new 3DP manufacturing technology could improve the 
performance of traditional lean and agile supply chain. Firstly, the new 3DP manufacturing 
technology could improve the efficiency of a lean manufacturing supply chain through Just-
In-Time (JIT) and waste elimination. The 3DP manufacturing only requires the product 
design and raw materials in order to produce a complex component. Thus, the need of 
machine setup and changeover, assemblies, and material transportation will be reduced. This 
in turn results in a reduction of material distribution and inventory holding. Secondly, the 
new 3DP manufacturing technology also can improve the responsiveness of an agile supply 
chain. The 3DP manufacturing technology pushes the supply chain transfer to the production 
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model to be ‘Made-to-Order’ and ‘Near-to-Market’, which makes it economical to customize 
product to meet individual consumer’s requirements in a short lead time of production and 
product delivery. 
This perspective of study is further extended by the studies with focused on testing the what 
is the impact of the 3DP manufacturing technology on the a particular supply chain process, 
including product design (Gibson, Rosen, & Brent, 2015; Liao, Wu, Huang, Kao, & Lee, 
2014), manufacturing process (Holmström et al., 2010; Hsiao, Lorber, Reitsamer, & Khinast, 
2018; Mellor et al., 2014; Oettmeier & Hofmann, 2016), logistics (Song & Zhang, 2018), 
manufacturing distribution design (Bogers, Hadar, & Bilberg, 2016), product and service 
customization management (Berman, 2012; Niaki & Nonino, 2017a; Rehnberg & Ponte, 
2018), transportation (Attaran, 2017; Song & Zhang, 2018), sustainability management 
(Gebler et al., 2014; S. H. Huang et al., 2013), and manufacturing strategy (Dong et al., 2017; 
Hannibal & Knight, 2018; Long et al., 2017; Rayna & Striukova, 2016; Ruffo, Tuck, & 
Hague, 2007; Weller et al., 2015).  
Literature reviewed by Ruffo et al. (2007), Huang et al. (2013), Niaki & Nonino (2017a), 
(Long et al., 2017) argues that although the 3DP manufacturing technology has not been 
widely adopted by industries yet mainly because of the concern of the manufacturing system 
changeover cost, the new developed 3DP manufacturing technology has the potential to 
overcome this difficulty by delivering highly customized products with low costs in terms of 
production, inventory, and transportation. Likewise, conceptual studies by Holmström et al. 
(2010), Petrick & Simpson (2014), Waller & Fawcett (2014), Bogers et al. (2016), Attaran 
(2017), Hannibal & Knight (2018), Hsiao et al. (2018), and Rehnberg & Ponte (2018) have 
suggested that the new 3DP-enabled manufacturing supply chain could improve system 
visibility and reduce the number of factors affecting the quality of the supply chain, such as 
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freight, delivery lead time, and inventory levels. For example, Holmström et al. (2010) have 
suggested that the 3DP manufacturing could improve the service level and reduce the 
inventory holdings by either centralized the 3DP production by the Original Equipment 
Manufacturer (OEM) or distributed the 3DP production near the final market. In addition, 
several other empirical analyzes have used surveys or case studies to assess decision making 
for sourcing (Ruffo et al., 2007), logistics (Petrick & Simpson, 2014; Song & Zhang, 2018), 
inventory (Liu, Huang, Mokasdar, Zhou, & Hou, 2014), and manufacturing (Dong et al., 
2017; Oettmeier & Hofmann, 2016). However, most of them only focus on a specific aspect 
of the supply chain process cost. For example, Liu et al. (2014) have made a case study 
comparison of a TM versus a 3DP supply chain and focused only on inventory cost. This 
study concludes that 3DP supply chain can provide more flexibility on the inventory 
management. Furthermore, there are a few studies investigating 3DP development for a 
particular country. For instance, based on a series of business case analyzes, Long et al. 
(2017) revealed that under a continued and centralized manufacturing structure, TM has 
advantages with economies-of-scale whereas 3DP has advantages with economies of one 
(high customization). Finally, Ernst & Young (2016) and Wohlers Associates (2018) are two 
research groups who timely produce a comprehensive review of the current status of 3DP 
technology development, 3DP supply chain management and future trends of 3DP industry, 
which provide the industry background information to all the 3DP technology developers, 
3DP technology adopters, 3DP industry researcher and relevant policymakers. 
Although the 3DP technology has increased in popularity in recent years, most of the 
literature on this research perspective remains limited to examine its potential adoption by 
the traditional manufacturers through qualitative studies methods (literature view, conceptual 
study, and empirical study). Meanwhile, the 3DP manufacturing technology is constantly 
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evolving and the 3DP technology is expanding to other pervious untouched industries, so it 
is necessary to revisit and explore the 3DP manufacturing technology and its adoption 
strategy periodically – in light of the fact that it provides the foundation that guides on 
development and adoption of the new 3DP technology in the supply chain (Walter, 
Holmström, & Yrjölä, 2004; Wohlers Associates, 2018). Compared with the previous 
literature, our thesis provides several quantitative decision-making tools and yields new 
insights into the impact of the different 3DP adoption on supply chain management. To the 
best of our knowledge, this study is the first to investigate the 3DP adoption strategies of the 
logistics vendor and the traditional manufacturer. 
2.1.4 3DP and Intellectual Property 
With an increasing amount of 3DP adoption, primarily by small firms and individuals, how 
to protect IP is becoming an increasingly important research topic. 3DP makes it easy for 
customers to copy and reproduce products. For example, 3DP technology makes it easy to 
copy the product design (a CAD file) and ‘re-print’ it anywhere (Wilkof, 2016). Bradshaw et 
al. (2010) have analyzed the current IP legislation and case law related to 3DP, including 
copyright, patents, trademarks, and passing off. They find that the majority of the UK’s 3DP 
individual users use 3D printers only for personal use without the constraints of IP. But still 
some commercial users might use 3DP printing technology to re-make the product. 
Therefore, the authors acknowledge that the current regulations and laws are out of date, so 
there is a need to fully analyze the current 3DP related IP usage and then set up standard IP 
constraints for the 3DP industry specifically.  
Later on, Esmond & Phero (2014) have noted that the 3DP actually presents the new and 
unique challenges to the IP protection. After a review on the current 3DP related legal 
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landscape, the authors conclude that the it is grateful that 3DP technology brings the 
opportunities to the 3DP inventors and designers to innovatively design and create innovative 
complex products, but the 3DP technology also potentially provides the possibility of wide 
spreading ‘IP theft’. Wilkof (2016)  also carries out a study to explore the 3DP related IP 
issues by a conceptual study.  He analyzes the 3DP industry revolution and the related legal 
developments on this area and then proposes two different principle components of patent 
protection. The first principle component is the creation of the patent right. The author 
summarizes and reviews the various components within the 3DP system, including materials 
manufacturers, developers, end users (private and commercial), creators and aggregators of 
3DP design file, fulfilment platforms, 3DP service providers, and printer/scanner 
manufacturers. Then, he points out the key issue for the creation of the patent strategy is 
whether or not all the patentable subjects are claimed. The second principle component, 
enforcement of a registered patent, is focusing on the IP protection issue between the IP 
owner and the third-party users. The advantage is that this strategy can protect the patent 
owner’s IP right. But it is difficult to identify the why the third-party uses the patent, for 
commercial purpose or for private purpose. For example, the third-party only use the patent 
for private propose, and this is an exception of IP protection scope. Therefore, how to protect 
the IP right in the 3DP adoption is still, and well remain, a work-in-progress that merits a 
detailed assessment. 
2.1.5 3DP Research - Summary 
Today’s marketplace is competitive and dynamic. The development of breakthrough 
technologies and customers’ different expectations towards product and service 
customization are changing the type of market competition from competitive independent 
firms to competitive supply chains (Boyaci & Gallego, 2010; Rezapour, Farahani, Dullaert, 
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& Borger, 2014; D. Zhang, 2006). The 3DP technology is a crucial factor that makes it 
possible for different companies to be able to compete as an integral part of the supply chain. 
Naturally, efficient coordination by an individual company of the form of its supply chain 
requires better management of its manufacturing strategy throughout the supply chain 
structure. 
According to Ernst & Young (2016) and Wohlers Associates (2018), experts from different 
industries believe that 3DP technology with its many advantages over traditional 
manufacturing technology (Table 2-1) will become an essential manufacturing technology in 
the manufacturing process for both industrial and commercial products in the near future. 
Therefore, there is a need to analyze 3DP adoption and assess the impact of different types 
of adoption on the supply chain from a strategic, tactical and operational perspective. 
Table 2-1 Comparison between Traditional Manufacturing and 3DP Manufacturing 
  TM 3DP 
Product 
Design and 
Technology 
Time to Market Long Short 
Customization Standard design, but 
the raw material 
range is large 
Mass personalization, 
but the raw material 
range is small 
Design Improvement Limited to 
production settings 
Complex design 
Cost High, especially for 
moulding  
Low 
Supply Chain 
Management 
Flexibility Need retooling No tooling 
Speed Low, manufacturer-
centric 
High, reduced 
assembly process and 
consumer-centric 
Productivity High volume, mass 
production 
Low volume ramps up 
production 
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Cost Economics of scale Economics of one, 
eliminates raw 
material waste 
Quality Relatively high for 
certain products 
Eliminates the 
bottleneck of manual 
operations 
Distribution Closer to production Zero distribution, 
closer to market, low 
inventory risk 
Logistics Depends on the 
supply chain 
network, centralized 
On-demand logistics 
decentralized 
Marketing Push Pull, expanded 
customer base 
Much of the 3DP research in the literature can be characterized as case study research 
focusing on analyzing the potential advantages of 3DP as a manufacturing technology and 
outlining some typical costs and trade-offs associated with the systems and investments. 
Despite the extensiveness of the investigations in the literature and the industry reports, most 
of them are still limited to qualitative conceptual studies and case studies. For instance, 
Berman (2012) has evaluated the impact of 3DP technology on separate product designs for 
manufacturing as well as the possibilities with regard to setting up 3DP production sites near 
to the end-user market via decentralization. More recently, Oettmeier & Hofmann (2016) 
have identified absorptive capacity and compatibility as the most influential factors 
determining the outcome of the 3DP adoption decision in 195 firms, but observed no 
significant concerns among these companies about 3DP adoption. Hence, this research 
stream has produced many studies on 3DP, which offer insights into 3DP’s potential for 
enabling non-manufacturers to enter the product competition arena as new manufacturers, 
and the factors influencing their adoption decision could be classified into three categories: 
technological, organizational, and internal/external (Figure 2-3) (Saberi, Yusuff, Zulkifli, & 
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Ahmad, 2010). On the one hand, 3DP has not yet reached a mature level, so it is still unclear 
whether it is a worthwhile investment to disrupt TM, especially for non-manufacturers that 
use 3DP to reduce manufacturing and logistical costs. On the other hand, because 3DP 
technology is continuously evolving, adoption strategies need to be revisited periodically. 
Therefore, there is a need of conducting a comprehensive and updated research about the 
impact of 3DP on the supply chain. 
 
Figure 2-3 Factors Affecting the Adoption of 3DP (Saberi et al., 2010) 
In addition, all of the studies discussed point out that 3DP, being assembly free, might pose 
a threat to traditional logistics, and especially to the upstream supply chains, although some 
argue against this conclusion. For instance, as we state above, 3DP service adoption might 
not need distribution infrastructure. If a company considers 3DP adoption, it could piggyback 
onto the efficient in-country infrastructure. Consequently, delivery between facilities is 
reduced (Rezapour et al., 2014; Wohlers Associates, 2018). On the other hand, manufacturers 
can also use the distribution infrastructure built by e-commerce leaders like Amazon and 
Alibaba or outsource to in-country logistics vendors like UPS and DHL (O’Toole, 2014; 
Pooley, 2013; UPS, 2016, 2017). 3DP might be a game-changer for companies with delivery 
capability, especially logistics vendors, because for some kinds of product, the retailers either 
cease to exist or become ‘shop windows’ for the manufacturer. Thus, the logistics vendor 
emerges as a means of raw material delivery for the manufacturer only. However, at the same 
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time the logistics vendor  can transform himself/herself into a 3DP-enabled manufacturer and 
delivery service provider (Manners-Bell & Lyon, 2012). Thus, 3DP is not necessarily solely 
a threat to logistics vendors – an aspect on which the research is still underdeveloped.  
Table 2-2 Benefits of Adopting 3DP 
Key Criteria  Consumer Manufacturer 
Digitalized System Eased communication More consumer data, 
predictable market forecasts 
Simplified Production Improved availability Reduction in complexity and 
unnecessary stock 
Increased Configurability Improved flexibility and 
customization 
Consumers trading up; 
enhanced consumer loyalty 
and satisfaction 
The common denominator of all the reviewed references is that 3DP is reshaping the 
supply chain and provides benefits to consumers and manufacturers (Table 2-2). To our best 
knowledge, there is limited operations research analytically assessing the impacts of 3DP 
on the supply chain. Song & Zhang (2018) study the effect of 3DP adoption on spare part 
logistics management, and their research focus on the decision to ‘stock or print.’ Dong et 
al. (2017) compare the impact of 3DP and traditional flexible manufacturing technology on 
assortment and capacity strategy. Their results suggest that 3DP has excellent performance 
with regard to product variety and can always provide different implication strategies. 
Meanwhile, Westerweel et al. (2018) use lifecycle cost analysis to test the impact of 3DP 
on product design in a set of numerical experiments and cases from two different companies. 
Their results show that component reliability and production costs are two factors which 
outweigh the design cost in specific supply chain structures.  
Unlike the above research, our research explores the scenario of a non-manufacturer (in our 
case, a logistics vendor) beginning to offer 3DP services. Instead of limiting to the 
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discussion about how the manufacturer adopts the 3DP technology, we also discuss the 
possibilities and potential strategy for the logistics vendor that considers 3DP adoption as 
well. 
2.2 Mass Customization 
As discussed in the previous subsection, 3DP is a powerful technology which could satisfy 
the consumer’s unique and personalized requirements with regard to the product. Therefore, 
once a company starts to consider 3DP adoption, one crucial question is how to select an 
efficient 3DP adoption strategy to improve the consumer’s experience of customization. 
2.2.1 Background of Mass Customization 
The development of supply chain management system in production can be summarized from 
the Craft Production to Mass Production, and then during the last few decades to Mass 
Customization and 3DP supply chain (Figure 2-4). In pre-industrial period, craft production 
is the main manufacturing method. The Craft Production is small-scale and mainly involved 
manual work with or without the aid of tools (Patty & Denton, 2010). It requires highly 
skilled and experienced workers (Clarke, 2005). Craft Production has the advantages of 
manufacturing highly customized and flexible products but its main shortcomings are how 
to reduce the production cost, improve production lead time (Farahani, Rezapour, & Kardar, 
2011). For example, before the introduction of Mass Production, the Ford only could build 
no more than 1, 000 cars every year and each of those cars is produced individually and 
separately by numbers of costly skilled workers (Koren, 2010), Later, Craft Production is 
replaced by Mass Production which could manufacture products in large quantity, short 
production time, and consistent quality (Hobbs, 2004). Therefore, in contrast to Craft 
Production, Mass Production is a high-quantity production system which uses large and 
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dedicated machines which was first developed for high-quantity car assembly-line (Tuck et 
al., 2007). In late 1913, Ford Motors introduced a moving assembly-line at the Highland Park 
Plant to reduce the production lead time and maintain the product quality by standardized 
processes (H. Ford, 1926). It was the new milestone of mass production development. By 
using the mass production line, the Ford’s model-Ts’ output increased to 500, 000 in 1915 
(H. Ford, 1926). Later, in 1940s, Toyota Production System was the new development of the 
mass production, which combined the advantage of craft production and the mass production 
(Slack, Chambers, & Johnston, 2007). However, mass production also has major short-
comings. For example, the mass production machines are large and expensive, and the 
machine change-over time is long and the relative cost is expensive (Hu, 2013). Therefore, 
the drawbacks of mass production highlighted the necessity for improvements which could 
achieve an appropriate balance among cost, quality, and flexibility (Ohno, 1988).  
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Mass customization emerged in the 1980s.  It is a continuous improvments at Toyota 
Production System which has the ability to provide individually designed products and 
services to every consumer through high process flexibility, agility, and integration (Da 
Silveira, Borenstein, & Fogliatto, 2001; Davis, 1989). Therefore, by using information 
technology, flexible processes, and organizational structures, the mass customization has the 
ability to mix cusonumers’ individualization with product/service variety and process 
standardization (Westbrook & Williamson, 1993). A major point of orientation in the mass 
customization debate is determining the level of individualization characterizing the mass 
customized product or services. According to Hart (1995) ‘the solution of this contention lies 
in careful determination of the range in which a product/service can be meaningfully 
customized, and how individuals make options upon this range’. Several researchers 
developed a continuous framework to ‘measure’ the level of mass customization in 
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Figure 2-4 The Timeline of Manufacturing System Developments 
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product/service design, fabrication, assembly, and delivery processes (Gilmore & Pine, 1997; 
Lampel & Mintzberg, 1996). Gilmore & Pine (1997) used empirical study to identify four 
customization levels as: collaborative (communication between designers and consumer), 
adaptive (product design can be modified), cosmetic (the final product can be packaged for 
individual consumer’s specific requirements), and transparent (the products are adapted to 
individual needs). While, Lampel & Mintzberg (1996) proposed five mass customization 
strategies based on the level of customization in design, fabrication, assembly, and 
distribution processes, namely, pure standardization, segmented standardization, customized 
standardization, tailored customization, and pure customization (Figure 2-5). Later, by using 
case study research method,  (Spira, 1993) developed a similar study on defining the 
customization level in four processes: packging, services, custom work, and assembly. At the 
same time, Westbrook & Williamson (1993) used the literature review method to 
summarized those mentioned work and proposed eight generic levels of mass customization 
ranging from pure strandardization to pure customization, including standardization, usage, 
package and distribution, additional custom work, assembly, fabrication, and design. All of 
those studies built up the foundation of the mass customization research. 
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The literature on mass customization has significantly evolved over the last decades. The 
major studies focused on analyzing the economics of mass customization, success factors 
(customer demand, markets, value chain, technology, etc.), and enablers (methodologies, 
processes, order elicitation) of mass customization, as well as the consumer-manufacturer 
interaction (Fogliatto, Da Silveira, & Borenstein, 2012). These factors and enablers of mass 
customization were detailed investigated by Cavusoglu, Cavusoglu, & Raghunathan (2007), 
Jiang, Lee, & Seifert (2006), and Novshek & Thoman (2006) through modelling studies and 
case studies. In summary, studies under this perspective suggested that the manufacture can 
improve the level of mass customization by premium prices for customized products, 
postponement the differentiation activities, gather more updated market information (Z. Chen 
& Wang, 2007; M. Zhang & Tseng, 2007). Meanwhile, the consumers also improve their 
willingness-to-pay by having more access in design and production phase (Fiore, Lee, & 
Kunz, 2003, 2004; Xu et al., 2015).  
 
Design Design Design Design Design 
Fabrication Fabrication Fabrication Fabrication Fabrication 
Assembly Assembly Assembly Assembly Assembly 
Distribution Distribution Distribution Distribution Distribution 
Pure 
Standardization 
Segmented 
Standardization 
Customized 
Standardization 
Tailored 
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Customiztion  
 Standardization  Customization 
Figure 2-5 Mass Customization Strategies (Lampel & Mintzberg, 1996) 
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The  most current literature on this topic only qualitatively emphasizes the need to set up the 
right supply chain systems for customization (see (Macchion et al., 2017; Shamsuzzoha et 
al., 2013; Zangiacomi et al., 2017), as well as references herein). For instance, (Shamsuzzoha 
et al., 2013) focused on identifying the proper ICT (information and communication 
technology) to help SMEs’ (Small and Medium Enterprises) collaboration on customized 
product design. They selected two SMEs, one textile and apparel company and one footwear 
company, and then implemented a proposed innovative methodological approach for 
facilitating the processes of creating and managing the collaborative networks on them. Their 
case studies results indicated that information sharing plays in critical role in improving the 
overall mass customization level. Besides, Zangiacomi et al. (2017) designed a footwear 
industry supply chain that combines orthopedic fashion footwear with custommization 
design to test the importance of consumer engagement in production design, while 
Shamsuzzoha et al. (2013) focused on identifying the proper balance between the product 
design and manufacturing processes. Macchion et al. (2017) then used historical data on a 
shoe producer to assess the impacts of the different supply chain configurations (e.g., 
production quantities and order delivery lead time) used by this company during the transition 
from traditional to customized production. The majority of the work, however, is still limited 
to discussions of how and when the manufacturer should involve customization in its 
production design. Because of the development of manufacturing technology, a broader 
organizational and economic implications of new mass customization should be discussed at 
a timely manner. 
2.2.2 Mass Customization vs. 3DP 
Some studies have compared and contrasted 3DP technology with traditional mass 
customization (Azadian, Murat, & Chinnam, 2015; Baumers et al., 2016; Berman, 2012). 
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According to (D. Eyers & Dotchev, 2010; Rangaswamy & Wind, 2001), unlike 3DP, mass 
customization is mainly archived by either using a different combination of pre-assembled 
products or using a particular delayed differentiation strategy (postponing the final process 
of production). Table 2-3 lists some examples. Take shoes as instance, mass customization 
for shoes focuses on providing different choice of colours for customer. However, by 3DP 
technology, the customer not only can have a pair of personalized shoes, s/he also can be 
involved into the design phase and provide his/her own ideas. 
Table 2-3 Examples of Mass Customization and 3DP  
Product Mass Customization 3DP 
Shoes  Different choice of colours 
and materials 
Personalized shoes design 
fits to individual’s feet size 
Milk Tea Different choice of topping, 
sugar level, and ice level. 
Personalized vitamins fit to 
individual nutritional needs 
Smart Phone Different choice of colours, 
size of hard drive, and 
keyboard language 
Personalised colours and 
graphics design fit to 
individual’s preferences 
Car Different choice of colours, 
seats, accessories, etc. 
Personalized colours, 
artwork, and body shapes fit 
to individual’s preferences 
and measurements 
Medical Treatment Different drug combinations  Personalized medicine fits to 
individual’s DNA 
Furthermore, this perspective is further extended to the supply chain integration study, as 
supply chain integration requires process changes (Fahimnia, Farahani, Marian, & Luong, 
2013; Tuck et al., 2007). For instance, Berman (2012) draws a sharp distinction between 
mass customization and 3DP (Table 2-4). He compares the differences between mass 
customization and 3DP and concludes that mass customization requires a high supply chain 
integration but the 3DP is readily available for supply chain integration. A very similar 
finding can be found in one of (Song & Zhang, 2018)’s studies. They argue that mass 
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customization indeed relies on a high degree of supply chain integration because mass 
customization requires short system change over time, low product inventory levels and fast 
goods delivery. Also, it requires expensive tooling in small batch production. In contrast, 
3DP neither requires tooling nor imposes the pressure of minimum batch sizes, but rather 
uses CAD digital files to print objects through melting a variety of materials by different 
printers. Therefore, 3DP can support mass customization with regard to design, materials and 
even location.  
Table 2-4 Comparison between Mass Customization and 3DP  (Berman, 2012; Song & Zhang, 
2018) 
Characteristic Mass customization 3DP 
Manufacturing Method Different combination of pre-
assembled parts 
Product based on different 
designs (CAD file) 
Supply Chain Integration High integration 3D printer readily available 
Product Range Computers, shoes, watches Prototypes, dental crowns 
However, on the other hand, not only do 3DP and mass customization share specific 
economic characteristics, such as the aim to minimize inventory risk and improve capital 
management (Berman, 2012), but 3DP technology also integrates customization and 
manufacturing processes (Y. Chen, 2016) as an all-in-one solution. It thus enables direct 
communication between the manufacturer and final consumer by digital design files. Most 
important, 3DP technology also provides freedom of production design which could benefit 
the whole supply chain system. That is, in addition to allowing consumers to design and 
produce their design-to-need products (Rayna & Striukova, 2016), 3DP can help 
manufacturers gain more competitive advantages by continuously improving on 
customization and personalization (Wohlers Associates, 2016). Design-to-point 3DP supply 
chains, in contrast, together with digital technology (e.g., the Internet of Things (IoT), the 
Cloud), provide more possibilities for manufacturing customized products at a reasonable 
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cost (Cai et al., 2014). The latter can provide the supply chain with a cost-effective option 
for fulfilling consumers’ sporadic and unique demands. Therefore, all the relevant literature 
states that, based on a digital platform, 3DP helps the manufacturing paradigms move 
forward towards personalization by personalized product and service design and achieving 
manufacturing-to-demand goals (Figure 2-6). 
 
Figure 2-6 Mass Production, Mass Customization, and Personalization (3DP) (Cai et al., 2014; 
Rayna & Striukova, 2016; Wohlers Associates, 2016) 
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2.2.3 Mass Customization - Summary 
 
Figure 2-7 Revolution of Manufacturing Paradigms (Hu, 2013) 
Due to the uniqueness of the processes, 3DP is driving the next wave of mass customization 
(Figure 2-7). 3DP together with other new technologies (e.g., IoTs, Block Chain, Cloud, etc.) 
is enabling further levels of mass customization to deliver attractive growth and margins to 
those companies that are pioneering new market opportunities or rejuvenating the stagnant 
industry (Cai et al., 2014).  
Most mass production products are manufactured by one or few pre-defined product 
characteristics and the mass customization products are set upon combining pre-determined 
choices from a finite set of options. Compared to mass production and mass customization, 
3DP-enabled personalization mainly focuses on value differentiation for the individual 
consumer. But all three paradigms with their different strengths (Table 2-5) co-exist in the 
current supply chain. For example, mass production focuses on direct production for some 
stable market demand, and so it utilizes the economy of scale. However, mass customization 
not only focuses on the economics of scope by providing more differentiated outputs but also 
tries to achieve economies of scale to maximize profits. In addition, personalized 3DP not 
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only tries to achieve all of the goals mentioned, but it even seeks to decentralize its production 
and involve consumers in the product design process to tailor its product and satisfy 
individual consumer needs.  
Table 2-5 Mass Production, Mass Customization, and Personalization (3DP) (Hu, 2013) 
 Production 
goals 
Strengths Consumer 
involvement  
Production 
methods 
Mass Production Economy of 
scale 
Quality, cost Buy  Different type of 
manufacturing 
technology, push 
Mass 
Customization 
Economy of 
scale and scope 
Quality, cost, 
variety 
Buy and Choose Reconfigurable 
manufacturing, 
pull 
Personalization 
(3DP) 
Economy of 
scale, scope, 
and value 
Quality, cost, 
variety, 
efficiency 
Buy, choose and 
design 
Manufacturing-
to-demand, 
manufacturing-
to-market 
Combined with our discussion in the 3DP Research section, it can be seen that 3DP-enabled 
personalization is set to reshape the current supply chain from manufacturer-centric to 
consumer-centric (Figure 2-8) (Bogers et al., 2016; Koren, 2010). Following the literature, 
personalization should be built into the course of the 3DP adoption, but not treated as the 
only one consideration. Both personalized product and service can improve the customization.  
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Figure 2-8 From Manufacturer-centric to Consumer-centric (Bogers et al., 2016; Koren, 2010) 
These three different manufacturing technologies provide different options to the 
manufacturer. However, how to make decisions with regard to choosing and mixing the right 
paradigms for the right product is still an open question so far. As seen earlier, the literature 
throws a serial of frameworks describing different levels of customization/personalization 
might contributes to the overall supply chain performance (Berman, 2012; Franke, Schreier, 
& Kaiser, 2009; Hu, 2013; Takagoshi & Matsubayashi, 2013). However, these studies do not 
provide enough knowledge on how to determine the appropriate level of 
customization/personalization or 3DP for a specific product or service. High level 
customization/personalization or 3DP usually helps the manufacturers gain the competitive 
benefits but also results in high operational and investment cost (Da Silveira et al., 2001; 
Fogliatto et al., 2012). Also, it is evident that most of the research mentioned above is limited 
to quantitatively evaluating the possibility of the manufacturer including 3DP or mass 
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customization into its current manufacturing system for a specific product, such as footwear 
in (Zangiacomi et al., 2017) and cloth in (Richardot, 2018). Therefore, there is a need to use 
a methodology for determining the appropriate level of customization/personalization or 3DP 
for a product or a service at generic level, e.g. involving customization/personalization or 
3DP for production process only or production+ delivery processes together. The literature 
review on this section reveals that there is little contention on theoretical aspects concerning 
the practical implementation of mass customization/personalization and 3DP for 
manufacturer and most of them are drawn from limited case study or empirical study. There 
is a need to use a quantitative approach to assess this with hard evidence and data. Most 
importantly, the majority of the mass customization research is limited to analyze the 
manufacturer’s strategies of improving mass customization performance, assessing the non-
manufacturer’s (in this study, the logistics vendor) mass customization/personalization or 
3DP strategies and assessing the manufacturer’s different combinations of mass 
customization choices (mass customization and/or 3DP) would be relevant contributions to 
the mass customization literature. 
2.3 Technology Disruption 
With accelerated developments of information technology, supply chains span the world with 
unprecedented complexities and uncertainties. These complexities and uncertainties not only 
increase the complexities of operation management, but also reduce visibility, which, in turn, 
makes technology disruption ‘more vulerable to unforeseen disruptions’ (Park, Min, & Min, 
2016). Therefore, it is vital for companies to stay at the top of their business when 
technologies or markets change (Christensen, Raynor, & McDonald, 2015).  Apple Inc. 
entered the personal computer industry quite late but successfully created the user-friendly 
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portable computer market. However, IBM, which once dominated the mainframe computer 
market, missed the opportunity of emerging minicomputers. Recently, Marks & Spencer and 
House of Fraser announced the closure of many stores across the UK because they missed 
the excellent opportunity to enter the online shopping market (BBC, 2018a, 2018b). 
However, Amazon has taken advantage of online shopping and become one of the most 
successful companies in the world. All these cases highlight the necessity of adoption of the 
right technology at the right time, especially disruptive technology. Therefore, selecting the 
right 3DP adoption technology to improve consumer customization is one of the key issues 
for supply chain improvement. Although there is a body of theoretical papers on technology 
disruption strategy listed in below subsections (Section 2.3.1, 2.3.2, and 2.3.3), this paper 
adds to the extensive body of literature on 3DP printing disruption. 
2.3.1 Disruption of Manufacturing Strategy 
Manufacturing strategy could be identified as a critical research domain as lots of research 
rallies the actual benefits of the techniques in manufacturing systems (Dangayach & 
Deshmukh, 2001; Kim & Lee, 1993; Voss, 2005). Back in the late 1960s, Skinner (1969) is 
among the very first in this research domain. His work suggests that manufacturing strategy 
could be used to develop the competitive advantages by exploiting the manufacturing 
functions (e.g. the inventory management, logistics management). Later, Thomas, Hayes, & 
Wheelwright (2006) also give the definition of manufacturing strategy: it is a ‘consistent 
patter’ of decision making for how to improve or change the manufacturing function which 
also cohere with the overall company’s business strategy. Their theory points out that those 
companies that could bridge their competitive and manufacturing strategy attain superior 
performance. Therefore, manufacturing strategy reflects the organization’s business strategy 
and it brings advantages to the company’s competitiveness and business performance in long-
  72 
term (Goldhar & Jelinek, 1985; Hill, 2009; Skinner, 1969; Swamidass & Waller, 1990). 
However, it is not easy to grasp the interrelationship between the business strategy and 
manufacturing strategy (Skinner, 1969). 
Based on previous research, Thomas et al. (2006) propose a framework for manufacturing 
strategy by defining the business objectives first and then setting the manufacturing 
objectives accordingly, and lastly making structural and infrastructural decisions (Figure 
2-9). Their research identifies several factors influencing the manufacturing strategy, 
including the cost, quality, dependability and flexibility. For example, the manufacturing cost 
has impact on the investment strategies (corporat/ebusiness objectives) and it also could 
influence the facilities/capacity planning (structural decisions) and workforce/production 
planning (infrastructural decisions). 
 
Figure 2-9 Manufacturing Strategy Framework (Thomas et al., 2006) 
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After this, (Frohlich & Dixon, 2001) revisit manufacturing strategy and analyze case studies 
from all over the world, proposing three new manufacturing strategies according to different 
business focus: 
• Idlers: a lack of business strength on any competitive capabilities (mainly in South 
America) 
• Servers: focus on service-based capabilities (mainly in Western Europe) 
• Mass customization: focus on the competitive capabilities of low-price and 
production flexibility (in Asia Pacific) 
(Voss, 2005) once comprehensively studies the paradigms of manufacturing strategies and 
how they can be applied to manufacturing processes and management. Three paradigms are 
proposed in his study: Competing through Manufacturing (key success factors, capability, 
order winners, etc.), Strategic Choices in Manufacturing (choice of process, approaches, 
infrastructure, etc.), and Best Practice (benchmarking, Total Quality Management, 
Continuous improvement, etc.). His study also concludes that a manufacturing strategy is an 
approach to business competition based on a company’s capability, marketing strategy, and 
market demand. 
2.3.2 Disruption of Supply Chain Management 
Among all kinds of risks faced by companies, the supply chain disruption mainly arises from 
the inter-connected net flow of material, information, technology and cash. To a certain 
extent, all companies do not only link with those inter-connected net flow, but also rely on 
all the external sources and relationships. Therefore, they are consequently exposed to the 
risks of supply chain disruption (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  (Mitroff & Alpaslan, 2014) state 
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that, among all Fortune 500 companies, there are only between 5% and 25% of them are 
prepared to manage disruptions. Therefore, how to effectively prevent and handle supply 
chain disruption has drawn increasing attention in both academia and industry.  The research 
related to supply chain disruption can be categorized into two categories: conversion and new 
technologies.  
In detail, the conversions include all kinds of traditional supply chain disruptions: poor 
communications, product quality issues, operational issues, delivery issues, and accidents or 
natural disasters (Chapman, Christopher, Jüttner, Peck, & Wilding, 2002; Levy, 1995; 
Mitroff & Alpaslan, 2014; Rice & Caniato, 2003; Riddalls & Bennett, 2002; Wu, Blackhurst, 
& O’Grady, 2007). More specifically, Levy (1995) once investigates physical flows in 
international supply chains with disruptions in the market demands and his research shows 
that disruption in a global supply chain can cause unexpected costs when the lead time of 
logisitcs delivery is long. Riddalls & Bennett (2002) simulate a production and inventory 
system and find that because of disruption the system became unstable and costly. Their 
research lists out disruptions can lead to a variety of costly issues to the supply chain systems, 
such as stock-outs, long lead time, and the poor consumer order fulfilment rate. In this area, 
some research has been conducted. For example, Rice & Caniato (2003) use a company 
survey and estimate the cost impact for a substantially disrupted supply chain network. 
Additionally, Wu et al. (2007) point out that in the supply chain system, any disruptions 
originating at a certain point might have the potential to pass such perturbations onto a wider 
range (including subsequent tiers or branches) with a possible amplifications. However, 
many companies, especially some small and medium enterprises (SMEs), are unable to 
forecast or quantify the relevant cost of supply chain disruptions. 
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The literature related to the supply chain disruption of new technologies indicates that 1) the 
evolutionary technological system is punctuated by discontinuous changes, and 2) the 
significant breakthrough in technological progress is relatively rare (Christensen et al., 2015). 
As shown in Figure 2-10, products/services improve over time with customer demand 
trajectories in order to chase higher business performance. The incumbent companies 
introduce more top performance products/services for the high-end market for higher 
profitability (Wohlers Associates, 2018). However, they lose the low-end market. This leaves 
an opportunity for the entrants on a disruptive trajectory to have a better offering and to move 
upmarket with better financial performance. Therefore, the right disruptive technology at the 
right time leads to a new change in the supply chain structure as well. 
 
Figure 2-10 Disruptive Innovation Model (Christensen et al., 2015) 
Nowadays, technological supply chain disruption includes the Internet of Things (IoT), 3DP, 
self-driving vehicles, collaborative robotics, the urbanization or airbnb’ing of delivery, and 
drones. ‘Logistics currently is ripe for technology-driven disruption.’ says Greg Hewitt, CEO 
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of DHL Express U.S., which provides door-to-door transport of international express 
documents and goods to and from 220 countries and territories (Gresham, 2016, P. 2). 
• Internet of Things (IoT): IoT is a physical-objects-based network which could be used 
to collect, monitor, and exchange real-time data/information. Currently, IoT is one of 
the most disruptive technologies in supply chains. It drives unprecedented visibility 
and remote operation, and influences logistics decision-making on production, 
storage, and shipment.  
• 3DP technology: 3DP provides the possibility of printing any product once the design 
file is ready. Due to 3DP technology, the complexity of the supply chain could be 
dramatically simplified. For instance, GE adopts 3DP for producing fuel nozzles for 
jets. The nozzles contain more than 40 components. This adoption changes the 
previous extensive supply chain into a single factory based supply chain (Kellner, 
2018). 
• Self-driving vehicles: Driverless cars have the potential to reduce labour costs and 
increase efficiency, and this is a new game-changer for the logistics industry. 
• Collaborative robotics: This is a breakthrough for the supply chain through the use of 
artificial intelligence and sensors. These robots can handle automated tasks or work 
alongside humans, for example by unloading trucks or packing and shipping goods 
within the warehouse. 
• Urbanization or shared delivery: The urbanization of delivery is currently a favoured 
technique for utilizing space among innovative startups that want to provide same-
day service at a cost that can compete with traditional logistics vendors. Shared-
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delivery can also use space in the rooms as the delivery site. 
• Drones: Drones could deliver goods to the dedicated destinations by pre-set routings. 
Thus, technological supply chain disruption is a threat to the logistics industry (e.g. allowing 
reductions on delivery) and the manufacturing industry (e.g. cost reductions on traditional 
production and high efficiency of the new manufacturing technology). Besides, technological 
supply chain disruption results in new power changes within the supply chain. 
2.3.3 Strategy Selection for Technology Disruption 
Skinner (1969) summarized the critical criteria in manufacturing strategy, including facility 
administration, plant and equipment, product design, production planning and control, labour 
management and schedule, etc. After that, Hayes & Wheelwright (1979) conducted similar 
research on this topic and detailed the key selection criteria and proposed a new decision-
making matrix based on the process/product and quality/cost (Figure 2-11). For example, 
automobile assembly belongs to connected line flow in the process phase and few major 
products, higher volume in the product phase. Therefore, automobile assembly is a high 
dependability-cost process. 
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Figure 2-11 Product-Process Matrix for Strategy Selection (Hayes & Wheelwright, 1979) 
Later on, approaches to strategy selection were developed by many researchers. One classic 
work was a taxonomy model proposed by Kim & Lee (1993). They evaluate the decision to 
select different manufacturing strategies by technical flexibility and complexity and group 
the production systems into four categories: intermittent, concurrent, degenerate, and 
continuous (Figure 2-12).  
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Figure 2-12 Product Systems Analyzed for Technical Flexibility and Complexity  (Kim & Lee, 
1993) 
2.3.4 Technology Disruption - Summary 
In the whirlwind of technological advances, however, it is easy to lose sight of where the 
value lies’, notes Doug Waggoner, CEO of Echo Global Logistics, a Chicago-based logistics 
service provider (Gresham, 2016, P. 2). Therefore, technology disruption equals to 
breakthrough, there has to be purpose and strategic design – actual usefulness – for the 
technology to take hold and influence business strategy.  
Despite the fact that the awareness among practitioners and academies is increasing and the 
external environment, especially the technological environment, is changing, the concept of 
disruption is still mainly limited to cost-related research analysis(Park et al., 2016; Riddalls 
& Bennett, 2002; Wu et al., 2007; Xia, Yang, Golany, Gilbert, & Yu, 2004). Meanwhile, the 
rapid development of breakthrough 3DP technology emphasizes the importance of research 
on technological disruption, especially for the logistics and manufacturing industry. 
However, due to the uniqueness of 3DP technology, 3DP technology disruption is not limited 
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only to process change: it provides opportunities not only for the manufacturer but also for 
other supply chain players (e.g. the logistics vendor) to rethink their 3DP adoption strategies 
and options. 3DP technology brings more options to the supply chain to improve the overall 
system customization and profitability. This research area has rarely been touched upon. 
Therefore, this study focuses on analyzing the possibilities of different disruptive 3DP 
technology adoption strategies and seeks to update research in this stream. 
2.4 Chapter Summary 
 ‘Technology is easy; high-school students can build mobile apps at night, and they're pretty 
darn good,’ Waggoner (CEO of Echo Global Logistics) says. ‘But technology for 
technology's sake is not enough.’ (Gresham, 2016, P. 2). 
A company’s competitive determinants are not only limited to quality, efficiency, and 
flexibility. Now, customization or personalization are new competitive dimensions. 
Consumers are becoming much more discerning and selective when purchasing. For any 
product to be successful, high attractiveness to the consumers is a new key factor. Therefore, 
how to provide the right product to fulfil the consumers’ existing and unspoken wishes, needs 
and requirements and how to delight consumers are becoming critical issues for supply chain 
development. A term that has been coined to describe such supply chains is ‘bespoke’, which 
focuses on rapid ‘manufacturing-to-order’ with greater choice and more customized features 
(Figure 2-13) (Asiabanpour, Mokhtar, & Houshmand, 2008). 
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Figure 2-13 Types of Customization (Asiabanpour et al., 2008) 
In addition, a new production supply chain that would always start and end with customers 
and be focused on them throughout is required. Therefore, companies do not only need to 
assess the trade-offs among cost, quality, efficiency, and flexibility, but also need to analyze 
the impact of the customization and new technology disruptions upon them (Figure 2-14).  
 
Figure 2-14 Company Competitiveness (Upton, 2008) 
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As we have discussed above, the disruptive 3DP technology is a potential approach to 
improve companies’ competitiveness from the perspective of technology and customization 
(Wohlers Associates, 2018). But because of the uniqueness of 3DP technology and the new 
development in this area, how to adopt 3DP is becoming a critical question to all the supply 
chain members – not only the ‘makers’ and ‘customers’, but also the ‘middle-men’ (e.g. the 
logistics vendor).  
This chapter reviews existing literature to scope the research domains and identifies both the 
need and the gap for assessing the impact of 3DP adoption on the supply chain.  
Section 2.2 reviews the current studies related to 3DP adoption. These studies mainly 
concentrate on the advantages and cost structure of individual 3DP technology.  
From the research methodology perspective, many studies are still limited to quantitative 
conceptual studies and case studies. In addition, little 3DP research has focused on examining 
the possibility of 3DP adoption by ‘non-manufacturer’ in particular.  
In order to explore why customers want to use new 3DP technology, Section 2.3 investigates 
some more details about mass customization and also compares the mass customization with 
3DP technology. Based on the review, several useful research which highlights key 
differences between the mass customization and the 3DP, such as manufacturing method, 
supply chain integration, and product range (Berman, 2012; Y. Chen, 2016; Rayna & 
Striukova, 2016; Wohlers Associates, 2016). However, there is still a need to evaluate the 
possibility of how to use 3DP technology to improve the overall product customization level 
and what are the impacts on the supply chain accordingly are.  
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Subsequently, Section 2.4 presents technology disruption on manufacturing and supply chain 
management. This section of literature review helps us understand the methodology of 
technology disruption and how to strategically select the right disruptive technology. 
Numerous criteria have been found: 1) flexibility, 2) quality, 3) dependability, and 4) cost. 
However, due to the uniqueness of 3DP technology on manufacturing production and 
process, there is a need to comprehensively review the adoption strategy for the new 
disruptive technology – 3DP technology. 
To summarize, our study contributes to the literature by comprehensively analyzing 3DP 
adoption strategies and the impacts on supply chain management in the context of both mass 
customization and technology disruption. In addition, this study also extends the existing 
literature on manufacturing strategy choice (traditional manufacturing, traditional flexible 
manufacturing, and 3DP manufacturing) and collaboration between traditional 
manufacturers and logistics vendors.  
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 Methodology  
The first two chapters outlined the scope and background of this research and also presented 
a review of relevant works. Although the previous studies have explored the possibility of 
3DP adoption, very few studies have concentrated on the quantitative assessment of the 
possibility of 3DP adoption by the logistics vendor or the impacts of 3DP adoption by the 
logistics vendor on the supply chain. To this end, this research attempts to develop three 
different models to assess the 3DP adoption strategy, not only for the logistics vendor but 
also for the traditional manufacturer. 
According to (Robson & McCartan, 2015), identifying the research methodology is one of 
the most important base stones for conducting any piece of research. Methodology could be 
a set of detailed tasks or procedures which are designed to meet the research aims (Easterby-
Smith, Thorpe, & Lowe, 2002). This chapter is designed to provide a review on the 
methodological basis for this research. Therefore, in the following sections a comprehensive 
overview of the classical research methodology is provided and the specific research 
methodologies which was selected for this thesis is explained in detail. In detail, this chapter 
begins with a brief analysis of the all types of research methodology in operation and 
management research in Section 3.1. The focus then shifts to have an in-depth discussion and 
comparison among the qualitative and quantitative research methods in Section 3.2. Next, 
game theory is introduced in Section 3.3 as a theoretical perspective from which to explore 
the role of game theories in 3DP adoption, and then attention is also paid to identifying the 
most suitable game theories for this thesis. Section 3.4 describes the research method selected 
in this research. The final Section 3.5 gives an summary of this chapter. 
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3.1 Research Methodology  
Research methodology could be defined as a tactics of probes, and normally, it contains 
research design and data collection plan (Luczun, 1989). The means of setting the research 
design and choosing research methodologies has huge impacts on the research framework, 
process design and data collection methodology. In additon, selecting appropriate research 
methodologies for the particular research project influences the reliability of the research 
outcomes (Patten & Patten, 2018). Therefore, selecting a suitable research methodology 
plays a critical role in the research development stage. Thus, this chapter tries to go through 
related research methodology theories and, in turn, choose appropriate research 
methodologies for exploring all the designed research questions.  
In general, research methodologies could be splited into qualitative methodologies and 
quantitative methodologies (Creswell, 2013). Qualitative methodologies are those used by 
researchers to  develop a theory or pattern by making knowledge claims from constructivist 
perspectives (i.e., the different meanings of individual experiences and thoughts). Conversely, 
quantitative methodologies are those used by researcheres primarily claims to develop 
knowledge from post-positivist perspectives (such as the testing of theories and sophisticated 
analyzes), and the researcher sually use different strategies of methodologies (such as 
experiments, observations, questionnarios, etc.) to collect data for analytical analysis 
(Creswell, 2013). In the subsections below, more details concerning qualitative and 
quantitative research methodologies are provided.  
3.1.1 Qualitative Methodology 
Traditionally, qualitative methodologies can be defined as research strategies that usually 
attempt to describe or translate certain natural phenomena in our daily life; they are not only 
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quantification of the data collected and analysis (Maanen, 2018; Neuman, 2005). Qualitative 
methodologies have been widely used in academia because they can be used to explore and 
investigate the deeper meaning of any discoveries. More precisely, qualitative methodologies 
tend to investigate the importance of the research subjects and our experiential social life 
(Patten & Patten, 2018). Also, qualitative methodologies can capture individuals’ behaviours 
and reactions in a complex world as the research results (Sugawara & Nikaido, 2014). 
Consequently, the results assist researchers to gather further understanding from the different 
participants’ perspectives. Therefore, qualitative methodology could be used to identifying 
and summerize the possible relationships, direct/indirect causes and effects, and dynamic 
processes in the research design development stage (Brannen, 2017). The most classical and 
widely adopted qualitative methodologies are interviews, observations, focus groups, case 
studies, and simulations. 
3.1.2 Quantitative Methodology 
Quantitative methodology usually involves the enumerative induction processes and it can 
be regarded as a research strategy that emphasizes the quantification of data (Creswell, 2013; 
Neuman, 2005). The key advantages of quantitative methodology are ease of control and data 
precision. The ease of control could be achieved through the sampling and data collection 
design, and accuracy of data could be improved through quantitative and reliable 
measurement (Tashakkori, A. & Teddlie, 1998). Meanwhile, quantitative methodologies can 
help the researcher to get statements about causation, because the researcher could 
demonstrate the direct causal effect of a variable on the other variables by removing or 
controlling the value of that variable (Brewer, Newman, & Benz, 2006). 
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In addition, quantitative methodologies provide the service of the deductive test for 
assumptions and the collected quantitative data also could be used for stable statistical 
analysis (Brannen, 2017). Therefore, quantitative methods produce knowledge based on a 
much scientific and solid basis, comparing to qualitative methodologies. The most 
fundamental and common quantitative methodologies are questionnaire surveys, interview 
surveys, and experiments.   
3.1.3 Comparing  Qualitative and Quantitative Methodologies 
According to Brennen (2018), qualitative research methodologies are usually used to get an 
in-depth understanding of a particular social phenomenon, whereas the quantitative 
methodologies are employed to make quantifiable ‘easy-to-generalize’ statement. For 
instance, the former research methodologies (qualitative) are used if the research target is not 
clearly defined and the questions of respondents are open (e.g. interviewing). By contrast, if 
the research target is clear-cut and the questions used to collect research data require 
systematic and clear answers, quantitative methodologies might be more appropriate (e.g. 
close-ended questionnaire). In summary, qualitative methodologies are usually associated 
with analytic induction, but quantitative methodologies are linked with enumerative 
induction. Table 3-1 lists out the key differences between the qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies (Brannen, 2017) 
Table 3-1 Differences between Qualitative and Quantitative Methodologies (Adapted from 
Brannen, 2017) 
 Qualitative Methodologies Quantitative Methodologies 
Objects Theory emergent for contextual 
understanding 
Theory testing for generalization 
Research setting Natural Artificial 
Data Words, rich and deep data from the 
understanding of meaning 
Numbers, hard and reliable data 
from the system behaviour 
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3.1.4 Mixed Methodology 
Although both qualitative and quantitative methodologies have distinct advantages, they also 
have undeniable limitations. The primary criticism of qualitative methodologies is related to 
the concern of adequate validity and reliability. Because of the nature of qualitative data and 
its origin in contexts, it is difficult to adopt traditional standards of reliability and validity. 
Meanwhile, qualitative methodologies also have the limitation on the time requirements of 
data collection and analysis. In addition, many researchers are concerned that their 
behaviours during data collection could influence participants’ individuality (Brannen, 2017; 
Brewer et al., 2006; Tashakkori, A. & Teddlie, 1998). Quantitative methodologies, on the 
other hand, they could successfully play as philanthropic endeavours that try to explore the 
system behavior and human condition. However, they fails to consider such as human’s 
unique ability of interpreting their own experiences, constructing their own thoughts and 
reactions (Brannen, 2017). Therefore, because of the original restriction and the human 
control of variables, quantitative methodologies are often used to 1) produce common and 
trivial findings of consequence under defined scenarios and 2) predict the future trends based 
on the analysis of current practices.  
Because of those afore-mentioned limitations of qualitative and quantitative methodologies, 
mixed methodologies have been applied as a combined method to overcome these limitations. 
Researchers usually use mixed methodologies to claim base knowledge on practical cases 
(and is thus, for example, consequence-oriented, problem-centered, and pluralistic) (Creswell, 
2013). They employ strategies that include concurrent or sequential data collection for the 
purpose of assessing the research problems. The research results of mix methodologies 
consist both qualitative and quantitative information because the data collected for the mix 
methodologies involve both numeric information and text information (Sugawara & Nikaido, 
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2014). Figure 3-1 displays how the quantitative methodologies approach has been employed 
in this study. The next section will offer introductions and understandings of the fundamental 
research methodologies in more detail. 
  90 
 
Figure 3-1 Framework of Quantitative Methodologies Used in this Thesis 
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3.2 Research Methods 
As described in previous sections, various qualitative and quantitative methodologies could 
be applied for different research purposes. The subsections below illustrate features of related 
research methods in the 3DP research and then explain the reason about the selection of the 
research methods used in this research.  
According to Croom (2009), the academic research process is a approach which methodically 
involves procedures to design research, gather or generate data, interpret and analyze the data, 
and then make conclusions. Different research process might have different sequence of 
procedures and different patterns (Maanen, 2018).  The 3DP research as a part of the supply 
chain management research, it is a broadd field and may cover many issues and can be carried 
out using different research designs to collect and analysis the data (Hensley, 1999; Yin, 
2003). Based on the source of data used and the approach taken to generate knowledge, the 
reviewed 3DP supply chain research listed in Appendix A could be broadly classified as 
empirical research, interpretive research and axiomatic research (Figure 3-2) (Croom, 2009).   
 
Figure 3-2 Classification of Related Studies by Research Method 
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3.2.1 Interpretive Research  
Interpretive research is a reality-driven approach which uses the data collected from case 
studies, previous studies, and industry reports to descriptively summarize or improve existing 
knowledge about the defined research topic (Craighead & Meredith, 2008; Croom, 2009; J. 
R. Meredith, Raturi, Amoako-Gyampah, & Kaplan, 1989). Therefore, this kind of research 
is more inductive and subjective (J. Meredith, 2002; J. R. Meredith et al., 1989). The most 
used tools for the interpretive research in 3DP supply chain research are interview, 
questionnaire, and case study. 
Interview is one of the most common and popular methods for data collection. It helps 
researchers to gather the accurate and inclusive data from interviewees’ personal experience 
and then have a deeper understanding on a particular problem (Akeroyd & Burgess, 2006). 
It is particularly appropriate for research which targets to evaluate or summarize a group of 
people’s thoughts and attitudes towards a particular issue or phenomenon (Easterby-Smith et 
al., 2002). Also, an interview provides flexibility to gathering large amounts of data regarding 
a wide range (Stanton, Salmon, Walker, Baber, & Jenkins, 2013). It can either be conducted 
through face-to-face chat or by other communication tools (e.g. by telephone, face-time, or 
Skype). Meanwhile, interview could be used for elicitation of information from one 
interviewee or a group of individuals. Group interview (also called focus group interview) 
can provide an efficient approach to investigate and compare different people’s experiences, 
attitudes, reactions and opinions under the same scenario (Akeroyd & Burgess, 2006). 
According to the forms of the interview, Edwards & Holland (2013) categorize interviews 
into four different types: structured interviews, unstructured interviews, standardized open-
ended interviews, and semi-structured interviews. Interview offers a flexible way to the 
academia to collect data regarding a wide range of subjects (Stanton et al. 2013). For example, 
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(Wohlers Associates, 2018) interviewed more than 100 3DP companies to gather the data 
about the current situation of the 3DP supply chain development.   
However, interviews also have some limitations. First, interview is time-consuming. For 
example, the interview construction, data collection and transcribing data processes are 
laborious. Second, it is difficult to access the reliability and validity of the interview 
methodology. Third, the quality of the collected data is entirely upon the interviewer’s 
individual skill and the interviewees’ individual quality (Stanton et al., 2013). Last, because 
the interviewer can fully direct and control the whole process of interview. Thus, they cannot 
ensure the data collected during the interview can be treated statistically (Dickinson, 2015). 
Questionnaire is another most common research methodologies used in academic studies on 
3DP supply chain research (Bogers et al., 2016; Esmond & Phero, 2014; Wohlers Associates, 
2018). Because the research about the 3DP supply chain research is rare, questionnaire is one 
of the best method to collect data from the reality. Fink (2015) defines questionnaire as ‘a 
structured schedule of questions which is usually self-completed by the respondent’. 
Therefore, questionnaires are widely preferred by the researchers who try to gather people’s 
preferences and opinions on particular events or cases. Traditionally, questions listed in 
questionnaires could be differentiated into two types: question of fact and question of opinion 
(Brewer et al., 2006). Question of fact contains biographical details, such as age, gender, 
occupation. However, question of opinion usually targets on gathering respondents’ opinions 
and/or attitudes toward a particular issue. In addition, questions can also be categorized as 
closed-ended and open-ended questions (Table 3-2 lists out some examples). Regarding 
open-ended questions, they cannot be answered with a direct ‘yes’ or ‘no’, or with a specific 
piece of information. Stanton, Young, et al. (2013) summarise the types of both closed-ended 
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and open-ended questions including multiple choice, rating scales, ranking orders, pair 
associate, open-ended questions, open questions, and filter questions.  
Table 3-2 Comparison of Closed-ended and Open-ended Questions 
 Question of Fact Question of Opinion 
Closed-ended 
Question 
Question: What is your occupation? 
Answer: Student 
Question: Are you satisfied with 
your current employer? 
Answer: Yes / No 
Open-ended 
Question 
Question: Could you please give an 
introduction about your hometown? 
Answer: a paragraph 
Question: What do you think about 
3DP manufacturing? 
Answer: a paragraph 
Fink (2015) once summarizes the advantages of the questionnaire into four major points: 1) 
the overall cost of conducting questionnaire is cheap, comparing with other methods; 2) the 
data collection process is less time-consuming; 3) the respondents are more likely to express 
their opinions and attitude under the anonymous style; and 4) by using a questionnaire, the 
researcher can direct the respondents to focus on the research objective and questions. In the 
same vein, Stanton, Young, et al. (2013) point out that a questionnaire also provides the 
flexibility and possibility to gathering large scale data from large participant population. For 
example, Ernst & Young (2016) and Wohlers Associates (2018) are two industry report, 
questionnaire is the best research method for both to dervie the industry data from more than 
one hundred 3DP companies globally. 
The main limitations of the questionnaire can also be outlined as following. First, if the 
number of valid responses is low, questionnaire results may be distorted. For example, 
participant might not return the questionnaire because they are unable to complete the 
questionnaire (Fink, 2015). Second, although the data collection process is less time-
consuming, the questionnaire design, questionnaire pilot, and raw data analysis are quite 
time-consuming. Last, questionnaires sometimes can only offer limited output because of the 
limited scope of the designed questions (Dickinson, 2015). 
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Normally, a case study is a preferred research method when the researchers want to 
understand some ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions, and/or when the researchers have little control 
over events, or when the researchers target to assess a contemporary real-life phenomenon. 
Yin (2003) defines case study as an investigation which studies a ‘contemporary 
phenomenon’ of a particular real-life event. Thus, we can define a case study as an inquiry 
that retains the holistic and meaningful data of the complex reality for inspection. In addition, 
a case study can also be applied to investigation processes, relationships or experience of a 
particular phenomenon and offers an in-depth understanding of the case in a specific instance 
(Kane, 2002). More importantly, a case study can also combine with other research 
methodologies to gather the various sources of data from real-life events for study. Thus, the 
case study approach can provide more reliable results. Also, documentation, archival records, 
interviews, direct observations, participant-observations, and physical artefacts are six 
commonly used resources to carry out case studies (Yin, 2003). By using case study research 
methodology, the researchers can focus on one or few cases and get the opportunities to 
understand the subtleties and intricacies. Also, the case study methodology encourages the 
researchers to embrace a variety of other research methodologies to enhance the reliability 
of the research outcomes. Furthermore, when the researcher has less control over the event, 
case study is an appropriate research method for investigating natural phenomena. In Berman 
(2012)’s research, he involves questionnaire, interview into the case study method to help 
gather data from the reality. On the other hand, the case study methodology also has some 
drawbacks. By using case study, it is difficult for researchers to produce fair results based on 
the investigated cases. Because case study research tends to analyae protracted elements over 
a certain period, therefore, the presence of a study could lead to the observer effect. 
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3.2.2 Empirical Study 
Although empirical research is also a reality-driven research approach, different from 
interpretive research, it uses deductive methods with data collected from real external cases 
(e.g. observation data derived from the field) to describe phenomena and test if the assumed 
causal relationships between relevant variables hold in reality (Craighead & Meredith, 2008; 
Creswell, 2013; Yin, 2003). Therefore, empirical study research can be both descriptive and 
normative (Wacker, 2002).  
A descriptive empirical study is initially used to create a model which can adequately present 
the actual relationships between objectives in the real world. Thus, a descriptive empirical 
study leads to an understanding of the processes going on in reality. Examples include 
product modularity strategy research (Hofmann et al., 2014; Mohammed et al., 2018; Ross 
et al., 2018; Sanchez et al., 2014) and multiobjective (MO) search (Holmström et al., 2016; 
Liao et al., 2014; Liu et al., 2014; Tuck et al., 2007). Normative empirical study research is 
primarily used to develop strategies, guidelines, and policies to improve the performance of 
current system. The existent amount of this type of research method is minimal. The classical 
example of this type of research is Mellor et al. (2014) and Oettmeier & Hofmann (2017). 
Comparing to the other research methods, the verification procedure of a normative empirical 
study is usually not very strong. For any study with a longitudinal design, if a specific change 
occurs during the verification stage, it is difficult to investigate the changes. In the other word, 
control on all relevant variables all the time is impossible for a normative empirical study. 
Traditionally, empirical studies can be classified into experimental research, empirical 
statistical research, and empirical case studies. Table 3-3 lists some details about these three 
sub-categories. 
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Table 3-3 Differences and Similarities between the Empirical Study Sub-Categories (Wacker, 2002) 
 Experimental Design Statistical Sampling  Case Studies 
Definition 
Development 
The conceptual 
definitions usually 
require new, more 
measurable concepts 
The conceptual 
definitions come from 
the literature; new 
constructs are 
developed to represent 
the theoretical concept 
The conceptual 
definitions come 
from the literature; 
new relationships 
need new definitions 
Domain 
Limitations 
Experimental design 
with specified and 
limited settings 
Experimentally 
developed analytical 
statistical models 
Developed from 
certain cases studies 
Relationship 
Creation 
Proposing limited 
relationships between 
variables for experiment 
Using the theories 
suggested by the other 
statistical studies 
Combining 
connections 
discovered from the 
case under study 
Theory 
Predictions 
Prediction from the 
experimental design and 
statistical experimental 
results 
Prediction based on 
other studies results; 
samples statistical 
analyzes for relevance 
Supported by case 
studies 
Contributions Investigates and verifies 
causal relationships 
between variables 
Tests the theory by 
studying the statistical 
relationships and 
validates the existence 
of those relationship in 
larger populations or 
different circumstances 
Investigates and 
develops complex 
relationships between 
variables and try to 
propose a new 
model/theory 
Empirical experimental research tries to study relationships between variables by 
‘manipulating controlled treatments to determine the exact effect on specific dependent 
variables’ (Yin, 2003). This research method mainly targets on capturing the causality 
between variables, and it is also known as ‘field experiments’ (Bertrand & Fransoo, 2002; J. 
Meredith, 2002). However, this research method is rarely used in our research since it has 
strict requirement on the case environment that it shall eliminate contamination effects (J. R. 
Meredith et al., 1989). As we all know, unusually, the 3DP adoption system is an open system, 
and it does not seem possible to place controls in some specific experiments to assess if one 
change could cause a particular result. For instance, measurements of production line 
performance might be different for different product production lines. 
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The second sub-category of research method is empirical statistical research, and this 
research method aims to empirically validate the propsoed theoretical relationships or models 
in larger size samples from actual business cases or in another circumstances. Therefore, the 
researchers would prefer this research method if the research issues are complex. An example 
could be Liu et al. (2014). They use empirical statistical research to evaluates the impact of 
AM in the aircraft spare parts industry (including conventional supply chain, a centralized 
AM supply chain, and a distributed AM supply chain). Generally, this research method uses 
interviews (structured/unstructured) or surveys to collect primary data or directly uses 
company’s historical secondary data/information for statistical analyzes. Each of these 
research methodologies tends to statistically analyze the data collected from relevantly large 
size external samples. Thus, the empirical statistical research methodology offers empirical 
support for developing and testing the theoretical relationships between variables in large 
samples or different empirical cases (Meredith et al., 1989). 
The last sub-category is the empirical case study which initially tries to explore and 
investigate insightful relationships within a limited size of empirical cases. Because the 
number of the test empirical case is limited, researchers can use this method to identify new 
empirical relationships by using a large number of different variables.  In general, empirical 
case study is an appropriate research method for analyzing organization performance across 
time and offers new dynamic dimension to the development of relevant theory. It includes 
field research and action research (Walker, Chicksand, Radnor, & Watson, 2015; Zanardini, 
Bacchetti, Zanoni, & Ashourpour, 2016). A typical example of the empirical case study is 
Mohammed et al. (2018). In this study, the authors observe a patient’s process of using 3DP 
technology to create prosthesis and then try to identify the best manufacturing strategy 
procedures of manufacture and purchase this kind of product. 
  99 
3.2.3 Axiomatic Research 
Last, axiomatic research is a model-driven method (Stigum, 1990) using mathematical 
models and ‘abstract’ data (i.e., assumptions or manipulated data rather than empirically 
observed data) to improve existing knowledge or try to find out an optimal solution for the 
defined problems (Swamidass, 1986; Swamidass & Waller, 1990; Wacker, 2002). Thus, it is 
different from an empirical study in that it uses deductive methods to arrive at theories 
(Croom, 2009). The most commonly used methods are analytical modelling and simulation 
(Wacker, 2002). 
Analytical modelling is different from an empirical study because it uses deductive methods 
to arrive at theories (Swamidass, 1986; Swamidass & Waller, 1990; Wacker, 2002). The most 
commonly used methods are logical, mathematical, and/or mathematical-statistical tools, as 
shown in Table 3-4.  
Table 3-4 Differences and Similarities between the Analytical Research Sub-Categories (Wacker, 
2002) 
 Conceptual Mathematical  Statistical 
Definition 
Development 
Conceptual definitions or 
new definitions 
Conceptual definitions 
from the relevant 
literature 
Conceptual 
definitions from the 
relevant literature 
Model Creation Logically developed 
model  
Mathematically 
developed model 
without stochastic error 
terms 
Create mathematical 
statistical models 
based on the other 
relevant studies; 
limited error terms 
Theory 
Predictions 
Based on logical 
analysis; uses empirical 
evidence from case 
studies 
Mathematically 
deduced predictions; 
predictions based on 
mathematical 
calculations or 
simulated results 
Mathematically and 
logically derived 
predictions from the 
model and then use 
empirical evidence 
from other relevant 
case studies  
Contributions Develops new logical 
relationships for 
conceptual models  
Investigate the 
mathematical 
conditions and explore 
the proposed 
theoretical relations 
Integrate the other 
methods to assess a 
single empirical 
theory 
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First, analytical conceptual research attempts to provide new insightful findings to traditional 
research issue through developing a logical relationship model. In detail, it comprises new 
insights which derived from the process of logically developing relationships between the 
focused concepts and then systematically builds up an ‘internally consistent theory’ 
accordingly (Arns, Fischer, Kemper, & Tepper, 2002). Usually, it uses case studies to 
illustrate the researchers’ conceptualizations. For example, the researcher might use his/her 
own experience to formulate concepts and describe and explain relationships from 
experiences to develop theory – we call this introspective research. Gutowski et al. (2009) 
adopt this research method in their study, and they use their previous experience in 
thermodynamics to help them form the framework to characterize and analyze the material 
and energy resources in the supply chain process. Another example is conceptual modelling. 
In the case, firstly, researcher usually posits a deduced relationship mental model. Next, this 
research methodology uses a framework to capture the essence of the system for investigation. 
A typical example for this research is Muir & Haddud (2018). They first set up the research 
framework to build up the internal relationship between the 3DP product and the consumer’s 
willingness to pay, and then they use questionnaire to collect data to test their assumed 
framework. The last example is hermeneutics analytical conceptual research which infers 
facts from observation (Maskell, Heath, & Walker, 2014). 
The second sub-category is analytical mathematical research which focuses on identifying 
and developing sophisticated relationships between narrowly defined concepts through a new 
mathematical model, and also studying how the model’s behaviour under different conditions 
and scenarios. The analytical mathematical models are usually built on formal or pre-tested 
logic and tested by artificially generated data (Croom, Romano, & Giannakis, 2000). The 
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research in this sub-category usually translates the relationships in to mathematical models 
and gives derivatively or computably numerical examples. Thus, analytical mathematical 
research does not need any external data for theory testing; it normally uses deterministic or 
simulated data instead. It includes reason/logical deductive theorem proving, normative 
analytical modelling, prototyping and physical modelling research, experimentation and 
simulation (Luczun, 1989; Mula, Peidro, Díaz-Madroñero, & Vicens, 2010; Voudouris & 
Consulting, 2003). Ruffo et al., (2006, 2007) use this research method to compare the 3DP 
production with the traditional manufacturing production, which helps them to easily conduct 
a serial of comparisons among all the involved cost elements for analysis. 
The last sub-category is analytical statistical research, which integrates analytical 
mathematical research and empirical statistical research into a single combined theory 
(Moorthy, 2006). It is different from the mathematical method, because its explicated models 
are built for future empirical studies. Meanwhile, because it uses external data, the random 
variability of those data might bring the measurement errors to the relationship investigations 
for the considered variables. Thus, this research method serves larger and more integrated 
models studies (Wacker, 2002). In Dong et al. (2017)’s study, they develop analytical 
mathematical research to compare the performance of different assortment and capacity 
decisions. While, in  (Song & Zhang, 2018)’s research, they use this research method to 
analyze the impact of 3DP adoption on the logistical cost and product variety. 
In summary, analytical modelling has been widely applied in most of the initial research in 
operations. It normally is regarded as typical operational research method, and it is also the 
basis of initial management consulting and operations research. Initially, analytical 
modelling was used to solve real-life problems in management and operations research rather 
than develop scientific knowledge. Later, from the 1960s to the 1990s, analytical modelling 
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focused on more idealized problems. Therefore, it is in line with a more theoretical research 
stream and departs from an empirically-orientated research stream. After that, analytical 
modelling shifted in its research direction to explanatory and predictive theory development 
(Arns et al., 2002; Bertrand & Fransoo, 2002; Gross, Erkal, Lockwood, Chen, & Spence, 
2014).  
Simulation is labeled as one of the most popular research methods for analyzing complex 
and dynamic processes and systems by academic researchers (Axelrod, 1997). It offers 
possibilities to the researchers to study an actual case/system and then predict its future 
performance under foresighted artificial scenarios (Vorst, Beulens, & Beek, 2000). 
Simulation could be built up on the assumed inherent complexity of a given research issue. 
Therefore, simulation is the most appropriate research method if the researchers intend to 
investigate the different system behaviour under different fabricated scenarios. Meanwhile, 
simulation also offers the channel to the researchers if they concentrate on research issues by 
looking backword across history and then exploring the ‘moving forward’ research issues 
(Dooley, 2002). In detail, the purposes of using simulation as research method could be 
categorized into: system performance analysis, system future trends prediction, academic 
theory exploration and proof, business case study, even entertainment (Axelrod 1997). By 
composing a model with structure and rules, simulation modelling tries to compare different 
system outputs which derived from different system settings (e.g. different structure and 
rules). Based on those output comparisons, researchers can deduce what might happen in the 
reality if they change one small element or rule. For example, some simulation studies tends 
to explore the most cost-less and efficient scheduling of logistic delivery, assembly shops, 
and production flow lines combinations (Deal, 2012). Meanwhile, when it is costly or 
impossible to conduct experimentation on the actual system, simulation is a substitute 
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method (Axelrod, 1997).  Therefore, we do usually find out that simulation is widely used 
by the business companies as a decision-aid on investment analysis, business performance 
diagnosis, and business strategy decision-making assessment. Simulation could be used to 
mimic all the uncertainty and randomness of the project into the model for exploring, which, 
in turn, may reduce the risk of investment to the company.  
There are several advantages of using simulation as the research method. First of all, 
simulation allows the researchers to understand a system or an issue by simulating the system 
behaviours, interactions and potential conflicts. Second, the simulation provides the accesses 
to the researchers to define the correctness and improvement of a system design; therefore, 
the researchers could imitate the different strategy choices in a convenient and safe way. 
Moreover, simulation can also provide the practical feedback of any system changes. This 
helps researchers to gain further understanding of the system. Last but not least, simulation 
can also be used to explore the possibilities of certain potential solutions of a particular issue 
and even conduct comparisons among them. Despite some advantages of simulation outlined 
above , simulation, like other research methods, does have defects. For example, simulation 
cannot fully well fit into a specific dynamic system, and it is difficult for the simulation to 
capture and simulate all those unexpected and/or new raised issues which might occur in 
reality.   
3.3 Game Theory 
Game theory has been widely used as a mathematical and logical tool for analyzing situations 
involving conflict and cooperation. Since the game theory developed by (von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1944), it has been widely applied in diverse research domain, such as politics, 
sports, business, management, and auctions, etc. (Bräuer & Buscher, 2018; H. Huang, He, & 
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Chen, 2018; Muggy & Heier Stamm, 2014; Xiao & Yang, 2008). Based on those new 
applications, game theory has enjoyed a significant development, including the non-
cooperative static games and dynamic games  (Nash, 1949), and cooperative games (Aumann, 
1959) etc.  
This research is designed for the supply chain management research on the competition game 
between the logistics vendor’s 3DP product and the traditional manufacturer’s product. After 
reviewing the relevant paper on this topic, we find out that although there are many game 
theories, Nash equilibrium, Bertrand and Cournot equilibrium, and Stackelberg equilibrium 
are the most used game theories to discuss two-player competitions (Cachon & Netessine, 
2004; Leng & Parlar, 2005; J. Li, Wang, & Cheng, 2010; Taleizadeh, Noori-Daryan, & 
Tavakkoli-Moghaddam, 2015; Taylor, Kwasnica, Reilly, & Ravindran, 2019; Xiao & Yang, 
2008). Thus, in following sub-sections, we focus on the introduction of these three game 
theory concepts.  
3.3.1 Nash equilibrium 
In a supply chain system, when each players would choose a feasible strategy to maximize 
value (called best response function), ‘an outcome appears as the specific payoffs to all 
players’(Leng & Parlar, 2005). Here, if the players could choose their strategies at the same 
time, a Nash equilibrium applies (Nash, 1949). Nash equilibrium is also applicable when the 
players cannot communicate (Shubik, 1985). Consider a two-palyer game where Player 1 
and Player 2 attempts to maximize their respective objective function !!(#!, #")  and !"(#!, #"), #! ∈ '! and #" ∈ '". Under the Nash equilibrium, the player 1 and player 2’s 
strategies (#!# , #"#) are satisfied: 
!!(#!# , #"#) ≥ !!(#!, #"#)	*+,	!"(#!# , #"#) ≥ !"(#!# , #") 
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Where, #!# = max$!∈&! !!(#!, #"#) and #"# = max$"∈&" !"(#!# , #") (Nash, 1949). 
Thus, when #! = #!# and #" = #"#, the players’ strategy must satisfy, 
%!!(#!, #"#)%#! = 0	*+,	 %!"(#!# , #")%#" = 0 
Nash equilibrium is a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ (Cachon & Netessine, 2004). In detail, a 
player tries to guess another player’s strategy with payoff maximization. The best scenario 
is that strategies can be used to maximize every single player’s payoff. If the such Nash 
equilibrium does not exist, at least one player has to choose non-payoff maximizing strategy 
(Nash, 1949).  
3.3.2 Cournot Competition and Bertrand Competition 
Cournot and Bertrand competition models are usually used to simulate and analyze the 
homogenous product competition under the Nash equilibrium, where the players set up their 
strategy in production quantity or product price simultaneously (Sulber, 1995; Wambach, 
1999). In detail, the Cournot game assumes that each players in the game decide the his/her 
production quantities, taking as given quantity to the competitors (Cournot, 1897). The 
resulting equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium in product quantity and the resulting price is the 
competitive price which is above the marginal cost (Sulber, 1995). Thus, take the two players 
competition game as example, under the Cournot competition, /!  and /"  denote the 
production quantities chosen by the player 1 and player 2, the players’ strategy shall satisfy,  
%!!(/!, /"')%/! = 0	*+,	 %!"(/!' , /")%/" = 0 
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However, the Bertreand game assumes that each players sets up his/her product price first 
and the resulting equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium in product price (Walras, 1883). Here, 
the price equals to the marginal cost (Cachon & Netessine, 2004). So, under the Bertrand 
competition, 0! and 0" denote the product price chosen by the player 1 and player 2, when 0! = 0!( and 0" = 0"(, the players’ strategy shall satisfy,  
%!!(0!, 0"()%0! = 0	*+,	 %!"(0!( , 0")%0" = 0 
3.3.3 Stackelberg Equilibrium 
Stackelberg is a duopoly model for the competition analysis in a leader-follower environment, 
the player who has more power over the downstream players in the system and then chooses 
the strategy before others, a Stackelberg equilibrium applies (von Stackelberg, 1935). For 
example, if a company can launch a product with new functions before the other competitors, 
we assume that company has the market leader position. Therefore, 1) the leading company 
sets the marketing strategy first; 2) then the followers chooses their best response to the 
leading company’s strategy; 3) in return, the leading company optimizes his/her objective 
functions (e.g. profit). Take a two-player game as an example again, Player 1 is the leader 
and Player 2 is the follower. Their objective functions are !!(#!, #") and !"(#!, #"). First, 
Player 1 choose a strategy #!; then Player 2 tries his/her best response function to determine 
the response #")(#!); last, Player 1 optimizes his/her objective function !!(#!, #") with the 
constraint #" = #")(#!), that is, 
!!(#!*, #") ≥ !!(#!, #")  
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In other word, the follower’s strategy must satisfy #")(#!): +"($!,$")	!$" = 0, and then the leader’s 
strategy could be determined by 
&!!(#!, #")(#!))&#! = %!!(#!, #")(#!))%#! + %!!(#!, #")%#" %#")(#!)%#! = 0 
So, under this game, the leading player can always can have Nash equilibrium with a better 
payoff. 
3.3.4 Game Theoretical Applications in Product Competition Research 
As mentioned in the front of this subsection, the emphasis on market competition and 
cooperation in supply chains make game theories become a primary tool for analyze the 
interactions among the decision makers (Cachon & Netessine, 2004).  The  Cournot, Bertrand, 
and Stackelberg games discussed above are the most applicable and efficient approaches used 
to model the defined problems in the supply chains in terms of obtaining the optimal 
strategies under a non-cooperative game scenario (Leng & Parlar, 2005). The game 
theoretical applications in product competition research include inventory management 
(Parlar, 1988; Xiao & Yang, 2008), production and pricing competition (Song & Zhang, 
2018), product/service quality management (Cohen & Whang, 1997), advertising problem 
(Z. Huang, Li, & Mahajan, 2002), and new product introduction strategy (Dong et al., 2017). 
In supply chain management problems involving competition arise in either horizontal (e.g. 
duopoly channel for two players channel) or vertical channels (Leng & Parlar, 2005).  
In an early work conducted by Parlar (1988), he used the Cournot game theory to  develop a 
model to simulate and analyze the market competition between two retailers. In his model, 
he found out the Nash equilibrium and suggested that cooperation between these two retailers 
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can share more profit together (Cohen & Whang, 1997) applied Stackelberg game theory for 
product life cycle analysis in the vertical competition between the manufacturer and 
independent service operator. Later, both Z. Huang et al. (2002) and Xiao & Yang (2008) 
use Stackelberg game theory to analyze the co-op advertising game in a two-layer (one 
manufacturer and multiple retailers ) and the inventory management problem in a three-layer 
(a distributor, a manufacturer, and a retailer). Recently, Dong et al. (2017) considered a 
Cournot game for making the production strategies of two different flexible manufacturing 
technology. While, Song & Zhang (2018) also used Cournot game theory to develop a 
mathematical model to discuss the problems in product purchasing and delivery. 
In summary, under a non-cooperative game scenario, the Cournat game and Bertrand game 
could be used to simulate and analyze the product competition in horizontal channels, 
because both game theory have constraints on ‘make the strategy at the same time’. However, 
when one player has certain more market power over the other the players or the players have 
upstream and downstream relationship (vertical channel, duopoly channel), Stackelberg 
game the most suitable game theory for competition and cooperation analysis. 
3.4 Research Method Selection 
In the afore-listed sections, both research methods and game theories have been reviewed 
and discussed. For the selection of the most suitable research methods for this research, there 
were four stages in the research method selection process (Figure 3-1). Firstly, the research 
background, research objectives, and research questions were assessed and conceptualized. 
Secondly, research gaps in the literature were identified. Thirdly, the research method was 
selected according to the specialties of the 3DP technolgy adoption status. Fourthly, the most 
appropriate game theories were selected. Lastly, the research was planned and executed.  
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Based on our introduction in Chapter 1 and literature review in Chapter 2, we have identified 
three different research topics: 
• the impact of 3DP adoption by the logistics vendor; 
• the possibilities of the traditional manufacturer’s 3DP adoption strategy; and  
• the logistics vendor’s 3DP engagement plan. 
These objectives aim to explore the management strategy for 3DP adoption and compare the 
predicted 3DP adoption strategies. Although the advantages of 3DP can immensely benefit 
supply chain development, the use of 3DP is not industrialized yet. Therefore, it is difficult 
to carry out qualitative research for this thesis if we aim to produce a forecast for a future 
business model or analyze a new business strategy. This leaves us to choose quantitative 
modelling research. Quantitative modelling can be used to obtain solutions within a 
structured model and derive management insight from a defined model. Based on some 
assumptions, it also produces knowledge about the behaviour of the specific variables in the 
models. In addition, quantitative modelling can also use other mathematic, statistic, or 
computerized tools (e.g. system optimization or queuing theory) to get an understanding 
about 1) how to manipulate certain variables in the model and 2) what are the behaviour of 
the target variables in the model (Bertrand & Fransoo, 2002). 
Furthermore, at this stage, an empirical study is not an appropriate approach for our 3DP 
adoption research here, because we aim to derive a new 3DP adoption strategy and its 
relevant impacts on supply chain management. Therefore, this thesis uses the analytical 
mathematical modelling method. This method can help us to simulate and predict the system 
behaviour and test the variables accordingly. However, empirical and simulation research 
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both rely on the actual case information and data. Empirical study research aims to develop 
a model based on the observations in reality. In addition, simulation research is used in cases 
where the model or the research question is too complicated for formal mathematical analysis 
(e.g., wider variety). This thesis not only seeks to adequately describe the causal relationships 
associated with 3DP adoption and improve the current 3DP adoption strategy but also to 
investigate possible 3DP adoption strategies and test the effects of relevant variables. 
Therefore, analytical modelling is the selected research method for this thesis. 
In this research, we focus on analysis of the situations in which the strategies of two players 
(the traditional manufacturer and the logistics vendor) affect each agent’s payoff. In each 
model, we discuss the non-cooperative and cooperative relationship between the two players 
-- the traditional manufacturer and the logistics vendor. Thus, under the non-cooperative 
situation, depending on the channel power of the traditional manufacturer’s and/or the 
logistics vendor’s in the market, they could choose the strategies (set up the product price in 
this research) by different order. When they share the same channel power, they might choose 
the a feasible strategy simultaneously, we use Bertrand equilibrium for this scenario. In 
addition, as the 3DP product is produce-by-demand, Cournot equilibrium is not suitable to 
use here. When the traditional manufacturer is still the market leader and the logistics vendor 
is the follower in the product market, the strategy for each player can be determined by the 
Stackelberg solution. 
According to the standard research procedure developed by Mitroff, Betz, Pondy, & Sagasti  
(1974) (Figure 3-3), the basic research approaches are 1) Reality, Problem, Situation, 2) 
Conceptual Model, 3) Scientific Model, and 4) Solution. Meanwhile, the general steps 
between them are:  
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1) Conceptualization;  
2) Modelling;  
3) Model solving; and  
4) Implementation. 
 
Figure 3-3 Modelling Approaches (Mitroff et al., 2008) 
The first step is conceptualization; based on the relevant cases, we made a conceptual model 
of the systems which we select to study. Then, according to the study of the related literature 
and industry reports, we made decisions about which variables needed to be included and 
considered in the model, and what was the scope of the research and model to be addressed. 
Then, we built up the quantitative model and defined a causal relationship between the 
variables at step 2. The next step was model solving. Based on the selected game theory, we 
used mathematics to find out the optimal solution for the system and a system sensitive and 
comparative analysis was conducted. The last step was the implementation cycle; in this step, 
we summarized our proposed strategy for 3DP adoption and how a new research model might 
be built up based on the proposed model. Moreover, the feedback flow between the 
Conceptual Model and the Solution approach was used to improve the conceptual model and 
Reality, 
Problem, 
Situation
Scientific 
Model
Conceptual Model
Solution
Conceptualization
Feedback (Narrow Sense)
Implementation
Modelling
Model Solving
Validation
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the solution, whilst the information about the ‘Reality, Problem, Situation’ was used to 
improve and validate our ‘Scientific Model’. 
In line with the research objectives of this thesis, the modelling steps for each research 
objective were mapped onto five steps for the modelling part: 
1) Conceptual model of the research problem; 
2) Mathematical model of the research problem; 
3) Solution; 
4) Proof of the solution (sensitive and comparative); and 
5) Managerial insights. 
Below further details of the research procedure are provided for Stage 4 (Figure 3-4).    
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Figure 3-4 Detailed Research Procedure 
  114 
3.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has focused on selecting the most adequate methodology for this research. Both 
qualitative and quantitative methodologies have been systematically reviewed and discussed 
for selecting the suitable research methodologies for the research objectives and research 
questions. More specifically, this chapter has concentrated on the importance of the research 
methodology selection and design for this research. The research methodology selection is 
considered to be appropriate for this study; analytical mathematical modelling is selected to 
provide understanding of the impacts of 3DP adoption on the supply chain. More precisely, 
this research uses mathematical modelling to find an optimal solution for different 3DP 
adoption strategies. In addition, by comparing these different 3DP adoption strategies, this 
research seeks to identify what kind of strategy, actions, and policies should be implemented 
to improve supply chain performance. 
The following chapters present three different models which address objectives 1 - 3 in this 
research: 
• a model for investigating the impact of 3DP adoption by the logistics vendor; 
• a model to explore the possibilities of the traditional manufacturer’s 3DP adoption 
strategy; and 
• a model for evaluating the logistics vendor’s 3DP engagement plan. 
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 Adoption of 3DP by the Logistics Vendor 
This chapter proposes a model for studying the impact of 3DP adoption on a supply chain by 
a logistics vendor. Specifically, this model considers a two-layer supply chain with one 
logistics vendor and a traditional manufacturer. Here, the logistics vendor, the goods delivery 
provider of the TM product, who simultaneously sells a 3DP product with a high level of 
customization to compete with the traditional manufacturer. By comparing the TM system 
and the new 3DP manufacturing system, this model finds that the logistics vendor can benefit 
from 3DP adoption to better restructure the supply chain. At the same time, there exists a 
situation in which the traditional manufacturer also benefits from this kind of 3DP adoption. 
This model then identifies the conditions under which the logistics vendor can use this 3DP 
adoption as a threat to influence the traditional manufacturer’s decisions to gain financial 
benefits. After that, an analysis of the impact of this 3DP adoption on consumer surplus is 
presented together with additional insights on how both the manufacturer and the logistics 
vendor can better manage this 3DP adoption to maximize cost reduction and product 
customization level selection. Interestingly, the comparisons show that cost reductions and 
improvements in customization options for the 3DP product do not always contribute to 
better financial performance or higher consumer satisfaction. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.1 presents the introduction; 
Section 4.2 describes the problem and develops the model; Section 4.3 analyzes the model 
with regard to the impact of 3DP on supply chain members’ optimal business decisions; After 
that how the logistics vendor can use 3DP adoption as a threat to influence the manufacturer’s 
decisions and the actual impact of 3DP on consumer surplus is presented in Section 4.4; 
Section 4.5 concludes by discussing the practical implications of the findings. For readability, 
all the proofs are listed at Appendix A. 
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4.1 Introduction  
According to the report issued by Wohlers Associates (2018), the 3DP industry has continued 
to grow with an average annual growth rate of 26.6% over the past 29 years and its revenue 
for 2017 was $6.063 billion, having grown 21% since 2016. 3DP is making significant 
progress towards becoming a mainstream option for series production. Without the 
requirement for tools (e.g. moulds and dies), 3DP is capable of producing items with complex 
shapes and geometric features in small batch sizes. It allows production of highly customized 
and complex features, as well as the consolidation of many parts into one. Moreover, of the 
1,500 buyers surveyed by UPS, 42% would like to switch to a supplier with 3DP service in 
the next 3-5 years (UPS, 2017). As a result, companies become increasingly aware that TM 
technologies may be replaced by 3DP, and leading companies that have begun leveraging 
this potentially disruptive manufacturing technology are eager to be the first movers to switch 
their manufacturing mode to 3DP.  
3DP technology has been adopted in a variety of industrial sectors, including aerospace, 
automation, medical supplies, as well as in production of some consumer goods, such as the 
personalized running shoes pioneered by Adidas AG and Nike Inc., the personalized 
headphones manufactured by Normal Earphones, and the customized chocolates produced 
by Hershey (DHL, 2016; Sher & Tutó, 2015). Even some logistics vendors among these 
companies are adopting this technology. For example, the global logistics vendor UPS 
launched 3DP service for small plastic products in the U.S. market in early 2014 and extended 
this business to the Asian and European markets in 2017 (UPS, 2014, 2017). Meanwhile, as 
we discussed in the Literature Review chapter, 3DP technology also potentially reduces 
product shipment needs, and this puts pressure on the logistics industry. Therefore, the new 
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3DP adoption by the logistics vendor (like UPS) puts the logistics industry in the centre of 
the ring.  
 
Figure 4-1 Number of Desktop 3D Printer Sales (Wohlers Associates, 2018)  
The logistics vendor is both referee and corner. On the one hand, the market demand for 
desktop 3D printers is continually growing at a strong rate (Figure 4-1). In 2017, unit sales 
of desktop 3D printers (priced lower than $5, 000) increased by 24.7% to 528,952 machines 
and the average unit sales over the past 3 years has increased by 49.7%. The non-industrial 
and decentralized market demand for 3DP has dramatically increased, which offers a great 
opportunity for logistics vendors to use their built-in logistics networks to centralize these 
3DP commercial market demands and create a new revenue stream just like UPS did. More 
importantly, this kind of 3DP service based on the delivery network of logistics vendors can 
improve the customization and flexibility of the product (UPS, 2016). Logistics vendors 
will compete with traditional manufacturers in the market, as 3DP adoption equips them 
with a powerful bargaining tool to strengthen their logistics business. However, the adoption 
of 3DP also poses many challenges in the management of supply chains and raises several 
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unanswered question ‘what are the impacts of a logistics vendor’s 3DP adoption on the 
supply chain?’ and the sub-questions as below. 
Q1.1. Under what conditions will a logistics vendor use 3DP as a game-changer to compete 
directly with the manufacturer? 
Q1.2. Under what conditions will a logistics vendor use 3DP as a threat to bargain with the 
manufacturer? 
Q1.3. What is the impact of a logistics vendor’s 3DP adoption on the consumer? 
The primary goals of this model are (i) to develop a stylized model to investigate the supply 
chain following a logistics vendor’s adoption of 3DP – one that explicitly models product 
customization; and (ii) to explore the impact of the logistics vendor’s use of 3DP on the 
supply chain. The supply chain we consider comprises a single manufacturer who provides 
a TM product directly to the end consumers and a logistics vendor who handles all associated 
delivery services. At the same time, however, because of 3DP adoption, the logistics vendor 
can also provide the end consumers with a 3DP product having the same function but a higher 
level of customization. In this scenario, both the traditional manufacturer and the logistics 
vendor need to determine the prices of their products (traditional product, logistics service, 
and 3DP product) to maximize their overall profits. This model simulates the problem using 
both a Bertrand and a Stackelberg game so as to cover different market powers. Although in 
practice the traditional manufacturer is usually the leading company with more bargaining 
power, the increasing importance of the customization provided by 3DP technology could 
give the logistics vendor equal or more bargaining power than the traditional manufacturer. 
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This model makes four major contributions to the literature: it develops a stylized model that 
incorporates adoption of 3DP technology by the logistics vendor, identifies the conditions 
under which the logistics vendor will use 3DP as a game-changer or threat, and analyzes the 
impact of this adoption on both supply chain partners and consumers. It also generates several 
managerial insights, including the observation that although the logistics vendor can always 
benefit from game changing 3DP adoption, the cost reduction on 3DP products cannot always 
contribute to the logistics vendor’s overall revenue because a portion of his/her revenue still 
derives from shipping the TM product for the manufacturer. In fact, even though the logistics 
vendor can increase profits by using 3DP adoption as a threat to influence the traditional 
manufacturer’s business, a supply chain structure is possible in which the logistics vendor’s 
3DP adoption helps the traditional manufacturer gain greater profits. The results of this model 
also demonstrate that the dictum that high customization and low-price lead to more 
consumers does not always hold true. 
4.2 Problem Description 
This section introduces the consumer choice, channel pricing decisions, as well as the 
notation, for the benchmarking model when a TM product is sold by the traditional 
manufacturer, and the 3DP model when a TM product is sold by the traditional manufacturer 
and a 3DP product is sold by the logistics vendor simultaneously (Figure 4-2). The 
interactions between the traditional manufacturer and the logistics vendor are modeled using 
the classical Bertrand and Stackelberg game theory.  
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4.2.1 Traditional Manufacturing System – Benchmarking Model 
 
Figure 4-2 Model Structure 
As our benchmark, this model simulates a TM system in which one manufacturer provides 
TM products to the consumer and one logistics vendor takes responsibility for product 
delivery (Figure 4-2). It thus begins as a typical supply chain in which the manufacturer sells 
products directly to the consumer. Following Agrawal et al. (2012) and Ferguson and Toktay 
(2006), for analytic simplicity, this model assumes that consumers are heterogeneous in the 
valuation of the product and the willingness-to-pay (or consumption value) is 3  and 
uniformly distributed within the market size (or consumer population) from 0 to 1, with a 
density of 1 (Figure 4-3). Because the product customization level of the TM product is lower 
than that of the 3DP product (Baumers et al., 2016; Gibson et al., 2015), the consumer values 
the former less, designated by 43, where the value of parameter 4 is the consumer’s value 
discount for the customization level of the product. For simplicity, the product customization 
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level of the 3DP product has been set to 1 and the product customization level is developed 
with 0 < 4 < 1.  
 
Figure 4-3 Distribution of Willingness-to-Pay 
Given the assumptions and the definitions in Table 4-1, therefore, in the Benchmarking 
model, the traditional manufacturer offers the TM product with production customization 
level 4 at price 00. Then, a consumer with valuation 43 would derive a net consumer surplus 
of 43 − 00 by buying the TM product. This model also assumes that the TM product is not 
available for sale elsewhere, so when willingness-to-pay satisfies 80 = 43 − 00 ≥ 0, the 
consumer will buy the TM product. Therefore, all consumers with willingness-to-pay in the 
interval 91#2 , 1: buy the TM product. In summary, consumer demand for the TM product in 
the Traditional Manufacturing system is /0 = 1 − 1#2 , for 0 ≤ 00 ≤ 1 . Meanwhile, the 
logistics vendor provides all the relevant delivery services for the TM product at price 03.  
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Table 4-1 Definitions of Parameters 
Parameter Definition < Consumer value discount for the TM product customization level, 0 <4 < 1. =4 > ∈ {@, 3B, C}, the unit selling price for a TM product or a 3DP product, 
and the price charged by the logistics vendor to deliver a TM product for 
the traditional manufacturer, 0 < 05 < 1. E4 > ∈ {@, 3B, C}, the unit manufacturing cost for a TM or a 3DP product, 
and the associated unit cost for the logistics vendor to deliver a TM 
product, 0 < F5 < 1. G4 > ∈ {@, 3B}, the sales quantity for the TM and 3DP products, 0 < /5 < 1. HI > ∈ {@, C}, the manufacturer’s or the logistics vendor’s profit, ∏ ≥5 0. 
To simplify the analysis without loss of generalizability (Mussa & Rosen, 1978), we consider 
two kinds of cost in the TM system: TM production cost and logistics delivery cost, meaning 
that the profit for each can be expressed as 
 H @(00)67# = (00 − F0 − 03)/0 = (00 − F0 − 03) K1 − 004 L (4.1) 
 H C(03)67# = (03 − F3)/0 = (03 − F3) K1 − 004 L (4.2) 
where 00 − F0 − 03 > 0 and 03 − F3 > 0 respectively, to ensure that both parties obtain 
positive margins. 
The logistics vendor sets its delivery price first (e.g. fixed delivery charges by parcel size, 
weight, and requirements for delivery time), after which the traditional manufacturer prices 
the TM product. The traditional manufacturer sets the predetermined TM price and 
maximizes his/her profits given in Equation (4.1) with the consideration of the delivery price. 
The logistics vendor gives his/her response from the traditional manufacturer’s pricing 
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strategy and maximizes the logistics profits given in Equation (4.2). Thus, each firm tries to 
get the maximized profit independently.  
PROPOSITION 4-1. In the traditional manufacturing system, under Nash-equilibrium, the 
maximum profit for the traditional manufacturer is ∏ @(00)∗67# = (92:;$:;#)"!<2  and the 
maximum profit for the logistics vendor is ∏ C(03)∗67# = (92:;$:;#)"=2  and the maximum 
profit for the supply chain is ∏ N@O(00 , 03)∗67# = 6(92:;$:;#)"!<2  . These profits are 
maximized by 00∗ = !> (34 + F3 + F0),  03∗ = !" (4 + F3 − F0) and /0∗ = 29;$9;#>2 . 
Previous studies have discussed whether the higher price, sales volume and profits are lower 
than that of vertically integrated channels, also known as ‘double marginalization’ (Chiang, 
Chhajed, & Hess, 2003; Spengler, 2002). This model explores double marginalization by 
new disruptive technology – 3DP, which is different from the previous studies in this research 
domain (which focus on supply chain interaction and design, profit sharing, quantity 
discounts, promotions, etc.) (Chiang et al., 2003; Desiraju & Moorthy, 2008; Gerstner & 
Hess, 2008; Jeuland & Shugan, 2008; Lal, 2008). 
Thus, in the 3DP manufacturing system, if the two firms are vertically integrated, the profit 
of the supply chain could be determined by 
 H N@O(00)67# = (00 − F0 − F3)/0 = (00 − F0 − F3) K1 − 004 L (4.3) 
where 00 − F0 − F3 > 0. 
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PROPOSITION 4-2. In the traditional manufacturing system, under Nash-equilibrium, the 
maximum profit for the supply chain is ∏ N@O∗67# = (92:;$:;#)">2 , which is maximized by 00∗ = !" (4 + F3 + F0) and /0∗ = 29;$9;#"2  . 
This proposition gives the optimal decisions of the traditional manufacturing system. 
4.2.2 3DP Manufacturing System 
Before the complete analysis of this 3DP manufacturing system, the question of how to model 
consumer choice when there are two different product customization levels but the same 
product function needs to be discussed first. In the 3DP manufacturing system (Figure 4-2), 
the logistics vendor adopts 3DP and provides a customized 3DP product at price 067 to the 
market, thereby competing with the traditional manufacturer’s TM product. Therefore, the 
consumer receives utilities 80 (80 = 43 − 00) from the TM product and 867 (867 = 3 −067) from the 3DP product. A consumer buys a product if and only if the received unit utility 
is positive.  
Market Demand in the 3DP Manufacturing System 
If a new type of 3DP product is also sold in the market by the logistics vendor at price 067, 
then the consumer surplus for the 3DP product is 3 − 067. If consumers can buy either the 
TM product or the 3DP product, their decision depends on the comparison of the consumer 
surplus derived from the TM and 3DP product, 43 − 00  versus 3 − 067 . All consumers 
whose willingness-to-pay satisfies 43 − 00 ≥ 0  would consider buying the TM product 
from the traditional manufacturer. The marginal consumer whose valuation 30 equals 1#2  is 
indifferent to buying from the traditional manufacturer and may not buy at all. Equivalently, 
consumers whose valuation meets 3 − 067 ≥ 0  would choose the 3DP product. The 
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marginal consumer whose valuation 367 equals 067 is indifferent to buying the 3DP product. 
Lastly, if 43 − 00 ≥ 	3 − 067 , then the consumer prefers to buy the TM product. The 
consumer whose valuation 37 equals 1%&91#!92  is indifferent between the two products, and if 
the valuation greater than this value, the consumer switches and buys the 3DP product. 
Therefore, in the case where 30 < 367 , then 30 < 367 < 37 . All the consumers with 
valuations in the interval [37 , 1] would like to buy the 3DP product, and all those in the 
interval [30 , 37] would choose the TM product, and those consumers whose valuations are 
located in the interval [0, 30] leave the market. In the case where 30 > 367, no consumers 
want to buy the TM product and all consumers whose valuations locate in the interval [367 , 1] buy the 3DP product. 
Because the consumers’ valuation is uniformly distributed, the TM and 3DP product 
demands correspond to pricewise-liner demand functions: 
/0 = R4067 − 00(1 − 4)4 								if	067 ≥ 004 ,0																														067 < 004 , (4.4) 
/67 = R1 − 067 − 001 − 4 					if	067 ≥ 004 ,1 − 067																				067 < 004 . (4.5) 
Figure 4-4 illustrates the demand functions of these two products. The 3DP product’s price 
becomes more price elastic when the 3DP product is less than 1#2  as demonstrated in Figure 
4-4(b), because the logistics vendor can lose consumers to the TM product delivery. The 
value of  1#2  corresponds to the broader price in the 3DP manufacturing system, which is also 
influenced by the product delivery price. If the price of the 3DP product is high, some price 
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sensitive consumers will choose the TM product although they cannot enjoy some of the 
value associated with product customization (1 − 4)3. 
 
Figure 4-4 Demand Function of the TM and 3DP Product 
Optimal Decisions in the 3DP Manufacturing System 
In the new 3DP system (Figure 4-2), the logistics vendor adopts new 3DP technology and 
offers the 3DP product on the market. With the advantages of 3DP technology, this vendor 
can fully utilize its delivery capacities and integrate them with 3DP service. Because UPS 
delivery tracks are likely to be equipped with 3D printers in the near future (Grazia Speranza, 
2018; Manners-Bell & Lyon, 2012; Wohlers Associates, 2018), this model assumes the 
delivery charge of a 3DP product to be zero. However, because in practice most 
manufacturers are still outsourcing their goods delivery process to third-party logistics 
vendors (Pooley, 2013), the manufacturer’s and logistics vendor’s profits could be 
formulated respectively:  
0
1
1 0
1
1
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 H @(00)67 = (00 − F0 − 03)/0 (4.6) 
 H C(067 , 03)67 = (03 − F3)/0 + (067 − F67)/67 (4.7) 
Meanwhile, the profit for the vertically integrated supply chain is  
 H OV(00 , 067 , 03)67 = (00 − F0 − F3)/0 + (067 − F67)/67 (4.8) 
To ensure that both have non-negative margins, we again set 00 > F0 + 03, 03 − F3 > 0 
and 067 − F67 > 0. 
Compared to the TM product, if the 3DP product shows significant advancements not only 
in the product customization level but also in the product price (067 < 1#2 ) , then the 
consumers will choose to buy the 3DP product without any doubt. Because this model aims 
to determine whether adding a new 3DP business is a profitable new business strategy for 
the logistics vendor under a product competition and service cooperation environment, this 
scenario is excluded in this model. 
 
Figure 4-5 Pricing Sequence in the Bertrand and Stackelberg games  
pM
Logistics Vendor
Manufacturer
pM
Logistics Vendor
Manufacturer
Bertrand
Stackelberg
pL p3D
pL p3D
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Therefore, if 067 ≥ 1#2 , to model the different decision sequences in the new 3DP 
manufacturing system, there are two types of game to consider, the Bertrand (we use letter 
‘B’ as the index for Bertrand game throughout the thesis) and the Stackelberg game (we use 
letter ‘S’ as the index for Stackelberg game throughout the thesis)  (see Figure 4-5). The 
games have the following sequence of moves. As discussed above, the third-party logistics 
vendors usually have predefined standard delivery service charges for different weights, 
sizes, and delivery lead times. Therefore, in the first step, the logistics vendor always 
determines the logistics price 03 for the TM product – no matter the game. 
In the Bertrand game, this model assumes the traditional manufacturer and logistics vendor 
have equal market bargaining power, so in step 2, they set up 00  and 067  separately but 
simultaneously to maximize their own profit. 
In the Stackelberg game, in contrast, the traditional manufacturer acts as Stackelberg leader, 
and taking the logistics vendor’s behaviour into consideration, sets the product price 00 to 
maximize its profit in the second step. In the last step, the retailer, as a follower, decides the 
3DP product price 067 to maximize its profit, given the traditional manufacturer’s decision. 
To be certain that the game is perfect, this model uses backward induction to first analyze 
the decisions at the final step followed by the decisions at earlier steps. This model does not 
consider a scenario in which the logistics vendor sets 067 first because of its later entrance 
into the market. 
Bertrand 
PROPOSITION 4-3. In the decentralized 3DP manufacturing system, under Bertrand-
Nash-equilibrium, the maximum profit for the traditional manufacturer is ∏ @(00)∗67( =− (":2)"(92;%&:;$:;#)"(9!:2)2(=:2)"  and the maximum profit for the logistics vendor is 
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∏ C(067 , 03)∗67( = !>(29!)2(=:2) ((−1 + 4)4(8 + 4) + 4(−8 + 4(3 + 4))F67" −24F67(−8 + 74 + 4" − 4F3 − 4F0) − 4(F3 + F0)") , which are maximized by optimal 
price 00∗ = 2(=:2):2(>:2);%&:>;$:>;#"(=:2) , 03∗ = 2(=:2)92";%&:"(>:2);$9=;#"(=:2) 	 and 067∗ ==:2:(=:62);%&9";$9";#"(=:2) . The optimal market demand for the TM and 3DP product is /0∗ =− (":2)(2;%&9;$9;#)(9!:2)2(=:2) 	 and /67∗ = 9=:?2:2"9(9=:2:2");%&9<;$9<;#"(9!:2)(=:2) . 
In the integrated 3DP manufacturing system, under Bertrand-Nash-equilibrium, the 
maximum profit for the supply chain  is ∏ OV(00 , 067)∗67( =− 9(9!:2)2:2;%&" :(;$:;#)"9"2;%&(!92:;$:;#)>(9!:2)2 ,  which is maximized by optimal price 00∗ =!" (4 + F3 + F0) and 067∗ = !" (1 + F67). The optimal market demand for the TM and 3DP 
product is  /0∗ = 92;%&:;$:;#"(9!:2)2 	 and /67∗ = !929;%&:;$:;#"9"2 . 
 
Stackelberg 
PROPOSITION 4-4. In the decentralized 3DP manufacturing system, under Stackelberg-
Nash-equilibrium, the maximum profit for the traditional manufacturer is ∏ @(00)∗67* ="(9":2)(92;%&:;$:;#)"(9!:2)2(=:(9@:2)2)"  and the maximum profit for the logistics vendor is ∏ C(067 , 03)∗67* =!>(9!:2)2(=:(9@:2)2) ((−1 + 4)4(8 + (−5 + 4)4) + 4(−8 + (9 − 24)4)F67" − (−2 +4)"(F3 + F0)" + 24F67(−(−1 + 4)(8 + (−5 + 4)4) + (−2 + 4)"F3 + (−2 + 4)"F0)) . 
They are maximized by optimal price 00∗ = 2(=:(9@:2)2)9(9>:2)2;%&:(9":2)";$:(9":2)";#"(=:(9@:2)2) ,  03∗ = 2(=:(9@:2)2)92";%&:(=:(9>:2)2);$9(9>:2)(9":2);#"(=:(9@:2)2)   and 067∗ ==:(9@:2)2:(=962);%&:(9":2);$:(9":2);#"(=:(9@:2)2) . The optimal market demand for the TM and 3DP 
product is  /0∗ = (9":2)(2;%&9;$9;#)(9!:2)2(=:(9@:2)2)	  and /67∗ =(9!:2)(=:(9@:2)2):(=:(9?:2)2);%&9<;$9<;#9(9@:2)2(;$:;#)"(9!:2)(=:(9@:2)2) . 
In the integrated 3DP manufacturing system, under Stackelberg-Nash-equilibrium, the 
maximum profit for the supply chain  is ∏ OV(00 , 067)∗67* =− 9(9!:2)2:2;%&" :(;$:;#)"9"2;%&(!92:;$:;#)>(9!:2)2 ,  which is maximized by optimal price 00∗ =!" (4 + F3 + F0)	and  067∗ = !" (1 + F67). The optimal market demand for the TM and 3DP 
product is  /0∗ = 92;%&:;$:;#"(9!:2)2 	 and /67∗ = !929;%&:;$:;#"9"2 . Therefore, it is the same as the 
Bertrand-Nash-equilibrium – the channel power has no impact here. 
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Full Adoption of 3DP 
If 067 < 1#2 , then all the consumers only purchase the 3DP product, which means /67 = 1 −067 and /0 = 0. Therefore, the profit of the logistics vendor under a fully 3DP-based supply 
chain is  
 H C(067)A67 = (067 − F67)/67 (4.9) 
Meanwhile, the optimal decisions under Nash-equilibrium are  
067∗ =	12 (1 + F67) (4.10) 
/67∗ = 12 (1 − F67) (4.11) 
H C(067)∗A67 = H OV(067)∗A67 = 14 (−1 + F67)" (4.12) 
All the equilibrium optimal solutions for different supply chain systems have been 
summarized in Table 4-2.  
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Table 4-2 Equilibrium optimal solutions for Different Supply Chain Systems 
Optimal 
Solution
s 
Decentralized 
Traditional 
Manufacturin
g System 
Integrated 
Traditional 
Manufacturin
g System 
Decentralized 3DP Manufacturing System (Individual 
Decision) 
Integrated 3DP 
Manufacturing 
System 
(Vertically 
Integrated) 
Fully 3DP-based 
Manufacturing 
System 
Bertrand Stackelberg Bertrand/Stackelb
erg !!∗  12 (% + '#− '$) - 12(8 + %) (%(8 + %)− %%'&' + 2(4+ %)'# − 8'$) 
12(8 + (−5 + %)%) (%(8 + (−5+ %)%) − %%'&' + (8+ (−4 + %)%)'#− (−4 + %)(−2+ %)'$) 
- - 
!(∗  14 (3% + '#+ '$) 12 (% + '#+ '$) 12(8 + %) (%(8 + %)+ %(4 + %)'&'+ 4('# + '$)) 
12(8 + (−5 + %)%) (%(8 + (−5+ %)%) − (−4+ %)%'&'+ (−2 + %)%('#+ '$)) 
12 (% + '# + '$) - 
!)*∗  - - 12(8 + %) (8 + %+ (8 + 3%)'&'− 2('# + '$)) 
8 + (−5 + %)% + (8 − 3%)'&' + (−2 + %)('# + '$)2(8 + (−5 + %)%)  12 (1 + '&') 12 (1 + '&') 
.(∗  − 14% (−%+ '# + '$) 1− 12% (% + '#+ '$) 
−(2 + %)(%'&' − '# − '$)(−1 + %)%(8 + %)  (−2 + %)(%'&' − '# − '$)(−1 + %)%(8 + (−5 + %)%) −%'&' + '# + '$2(−1 + %)%  - 
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.)*∗  - - 12(−1 + %)(8 + %) (−8+ 7% + %% − (−8+ % + %%)'&'− 6('# + '$)) 
12(−1 + %)(8 + (−5 + %)%) ((−1+ %)(8 + (−5 + %)%)+ (8 + (−7+ %)%)'&' − 6'#− 6'$ − (−5+ %)%('# + '$)) 
1 − % − '&' + '# + '$2 − 2%  12 (1 − '&') 
12 116% (−%+ '# + '$)% - − 1(−1 + %)%(8 + %)% (2+ %)%(−%'&' + '#+ '$)% 
2(−1 + %)%(8 + (−5 + %)%)% (−2+ %)(−%'&' + '#+ '$)% 
- - 
13 18% (−% + '#+ '$)% - 14(% − 1)%(8 + %) ((−1+ %)%(8 + %)+ %(−8 + %(3+ %))'&'%− 2%'&'(−8 + 7%+ %% − 4'# − 4'$)− 4('# + '$)%) 
14(−1 + %)%(8 + (−5 + %)%) ((−1+ %)%(8 + (−5+ %)%) + %(−8 + (9− 2%)%)'&'%− (−2 + %)%('#+ '$)%+ 2%'&'(−(−1+ %)(8 + (−5 + %)%)+ (−2 + %)%'#+ (−2 + %)%'$)) 
- 14 (−1 + '&')% 
156 - 14% (−% + '#+ '$)% - - − 14(−1 + %)% (−(−1+ %)% + %'&'%+ ('# + '$)%− 2%'&'(1 − %+ '# + '$)) 
14 (−1 + '&')% 
  133 
4.3 Model Analysis 
This section comprehensively compares the TM and 3DP manufacturing systems from the 
perspective of optimal decisions and maximized profit and presents some interesting 
observations with regard to the research question: Under what conditions will a logistics 
vendor use 3DP as a game-changer to compete directly with the manufacturer?  
4.3.1 Sensitivity Analysis 
In this subsection, the impact of different costs and product customization on the optimal 
decisions is examined. 
The Impact of Costs 
PROPOSITION 4-5. In a 3DP-enabled decentralized market, no matter whether in 
Bertrand or in Stackelberg, 
(1) The optimal price of the logistics service decreases in the cost of the TM and 3DP 
product but increases in the cost of the logistics service; 
(2) The optimal price of the TM product increases in all kinds of cost; 
(3) The optimal price of the 3DP product increases in the cost of the 3DP product but 
decreases in the TM and logistics service cost;  
(4) The optimal market demand for the TM product decreases in the cost of the TM 
product and the logistics service but increases in the cost of the 3DP product; 
(5) The optimal market demand for the 3DP product increases in the cost of the TM 
product and the logistics service but decreases in the cost of the TM product. 
PROPOSITION 4-5 indicates that if the associated cost of the TM product decreases, the 
TM price decreases for the purpose of increasing the market demand by attracting more price-
sensitive consumers. This pushes the logistics vendor to use a high price regime to reduce its 
profit loss. However, if the cost of the 3DP product decreases, because the product 
customization level of the TM product is low, the traditional manufacturer has to set the price 
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of the TM product as low as possible to keep its key competitive advantage on pricing. This 
result is congruent with the finding of other studies indicating that the lower product 
customization level, the lower consumer willingnesss to pay (Piller, Moeslein, & Stotko, 
2004; Pine, 1993; Syam & Kumar, 2006). Meanwhile, the logistics vendor can increase the 
price of the logistics delivery at the beginning to reduce the traditional manufacturer’s pricing 
advantage. Therefore, cost reduction of 3DP seems a good tool for the logistics vendor to use 
to leverage the market competition. In addition, the cost saving on the delivery service has a 
positive impact on the TM product pricing strategy but not on the logistics vendor’s 3DP 
product pricing strategy. Therefore, the latter should be careful with regard to whether to 
reflect its cost saving in its logistics delivery service pricing. 
PROPOSITION 4-6. In a 3DP-enabled integrated market, no matter whether in Bertrand 
or in Stackelberg, 
(1) Only the cost of the logistics delivery and the TM product can influence the TM 
product price, and the price of the TM product increases in both of them; 
(2) The price of the 3DP product increases in the cost of the 3DP product; 
(3) The market demand for the TM product decreases in the cost of the TM product and 
the logistics service but increases in the cost of the 3DP product; 
(4) The market demand for the 3DP product increases in the cost of the TM product and 
the logistics service but decreases in the cost of the TM product. 
Most of the findings of PROPOSITION 4-6 are the same as PROPOSITION 4-5, because 
the traditional manufacturer and the logistics vendor are vertically integrated in this system. 
The only difference is that the cost reduction of the TM or 3DP product cannot influence the 
pricing strategy of the competitor. 
PROPOSITION 4-7. In a 3DP-enabled decentralized supply chain,  
(1) The traditional manufacturer’s profit decreases in the cost of the logistics delivery 
and the TM product but increases in the cost of the 3DP product; 
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(2) The logistics vendor’s profits decrease in the cost of the logistics delivery and the TM 
product; but, in the Bertrand-market, 
a. If !!"!"# < "$% < ('("#)(*"#)'+(!!"!")'*"#($"#) , #$ decreases in "$%; 
b. If ('("#)(*"#)'+!!'+!"'*"#($"#) < "$% < 1, #$ increases in "$%; 
Meanwhile, in the Stackelberg-market, 
a. If !!"!"# < "$% < '('("#)(*"(',"#)#)"('-"#)#(!!"!")*"#('."-#) , #$ decreases in "$%; 
b. If '('("#)(*"(',"#)#)"('-"#)#(!!"!")*"#('."-#) < "$% < 1, #$ increases in "$%. 
In a 3DP enabled integrated supply chain, the total supply chain profit also decreases in the 
cost of the logistics delivery and the TM product; but, 
a. If  !!"!"# < "$% < 1 − ' + "/ + "0, it decreases in "$%; 
b. If 1 − ' + "/ + "0 < "$% < 1, it increases in "$%. 
 
Figure 4-6 The Impact of the 3DP Cost in the Logistics Vendor’s Maximized Profit and the 
Integrated Supply Chain (given c1 = 0.01, c2 = 0.01) 
PROPOSITION 4-7 demonstrates that 
(1) Reductions of the TM product’s associated cost have positive impacts on the 
traditional manufacturer’s profits as well as those of the logistics vendor and the total 
supply chain profitability. This finding is similar with the findings derived from the 
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research by Dong et al. (2017) and Berdine, DiPaola, & Weinberg (2019). The 
reasons behind this are obvious: when the product cost and/or the goods delivery cost 
reduce, the manufacturer tries to use a lower price to attract more price-sensitive 
consumers. As a result, the traditional manufacturer can gain more profits generated 
from the increased number of consumers despite those lost due to the unit price 
dropping. At the same time, the logistics vendor (who is without price advantages) 
finds that the reductions of the TM product cost and/or delivery service push it to use 
a high-price regime to compensate for its loss due to the decreased market size. 
Eventually, the logistics vendor can earn more profit from the increased unit price 
than the profit loss from the reduced market demand. Overall, the whole supply chain 
can achieve more profits. Therefore, cost reductions of the TM product and the 
logistics delivery are a win-win strategy for the traditional manufacturer and the 
logistics vendor and also a profitable strategy for the whole supply chain. 
(2) (Liao et al., 2014) argue that the cost reduction of the 3DP production always can 
bring advantages to the 3DP user, However, our analysis here suggest that cost 
reduction of the 3DP product has a negative impact on the traditional manufacturer’s 
profitability and its impact on the profitability of the logistics vendor and the supply 
chain depends on the cost level of the 3DP product. 
(3) i) If the cost of the 3DP product is relatively high (Region III and IV for the 
decentralized Bertrand market, Region IV for the decentralized Stackelberg market, 
and Region II, III and IV for the integrated supply chain in Figure 4-6), cost reduction 
of the 3DP product offers some pricing advantages to the 3DP product and it pushes 
the traditional manufacturer to lower its TM product price as well. Therefore, some 
customization-sensitive consumers switch and buy the 3DP product, which results in 
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a decrease in the traditional manufacturer’s profit and the logistics vendor cannot 
generate more profits from the increased consumer market than the loss of the low-
price strategy. Overall, the supply chain also loses profit. ii) If the cost of the 3DP 
product is at a low level (Region I and II for the decentralized Bertrand market, 
Region I, II and III for the decentralized Stackelberg market, and Region I for the 
integrated supply chain in Figure 4-6), more customization-sensitive consumers 
switch to the 3DP product. Consequently, the traditional manufacturer loses more 
profit and the logistics vendor can gain more profits from the increased market 
demand than the loss of the low-price strategy. However, overall, the integrated 
supply chain benefits from this situation. Therefore, with this kind of cost structure 
(where the 3DP product cost is cheap), continued cost reduction of 3DP can help the 
logistics vendor to gain more profits by cannibalizing the TM product market, and 
the whole supply chain can be improved in this way. 
PROPOSITION 4-8. In a fully 3DP-enabled market, the price of the 3DP product increases 
in the cost of the 3DP product; the market demand for the 3DP product and the profit of the 
logistics vendor and the supply chain all decrease in the cost of the 3DP product. 
The findings in the above proposition are intuitive for one certain product market. Cost 
reduction helps the logistics vendor to use a low pricing strategy to increase market demand, 
but the overall profits decrease due to the low unit margin. 
The Impact of Product Customization Level 
Unfortunately, the structure of the optimal decisions in Table 4-2 and the maximized profit 
functions for the traditional manufacturer and the logistics vendor are too complex to allow 
us to obtain direct insights into the impact of customization level on these optimal decisions. 
In this section, numerical tests are conducted to determine the relative performance of 
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product customization sensitivity with regard to the optimal decisions under different market 
structures. To achieve this, a full factorial design was created with three different values for 
3 different costs ("$%, "/, "0) – namely, low, medium and high as Table 4-3 shows, followed 
by a depiction of the optimal prices and quantities for each parameter for different scenarios.  
Table 4-3 Parameter Values in the Numerical Testing for the Impacts of Customization on Optimal 
Decisions in the 3DP as Game-changer Market 
 -34 -5 -6 
Low 0.3 0.01 0.01 
Medium 0.6 0.01 0.01 
High 0.9 0.01 0.01 
 
PROPOSITION 4-9. In a 3DP-enabled decentralized market,  
(1) The optimal price of the logistics service, TM product, and the 3DP product increase 
in the TM product customization level; 
(2) The optimal market demand increases in the product customization level of the TM 
product but the market demand of the 3DP product decreases in it; 
(3) Both the traditional manufacturer’s and the logistics vendor’s maximized profit 
increase in the product customization level of the TM product. 
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(a) (b) 
  
(c) (d) 
  
(e) (f) 
 
 
(g)  
Figure 4-7 Impact of Product Customization on Optimal Decisions – Bertrand 
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(a) (b) 
  
(c) (d) 
  
(e) (f) 
 
 
(g)  
Figure 4-8 Impact of Product Customization on Optimal Decisions – Stackelberg 
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Figure 4-7 and Figure 4-8 demonstrate that no matter what the cost structure of the supply 
chain is, if the logistics vendor chooses to adopt a higher customization level 3DP technology 
(the difference between the customization level of the TM and 3DP product is larger, ' is 
smaller), the optimal price of goods and services and the market demand for the TM product 
decreases, but the market demand for the 3DP product increases. On the one hand, due to the 
disadvantages of product customization, both the logistics vendor and the traditional 
manufacturer use a low-price regime for the logistics service and the TM product for the 
purpose of attracting more price-sensitive consumers. On the other hand, considering the low 
TM price, the logistics vendor also sets the price of the 3DP product as low as possible in 
order to increase market demand. Consequently, the market demand for the TM product 
reduces and the market demand for the 3DP product increases conversely. The traditional 
manufacturer loses profits on the low pricing strategy and low market demand. For the 
logistics vendor, although the market demand is increased by low pricing, the loss from low 
pricing cannot be compensated for by the new profit generated from the increased market 
demand. Therefore, surprisingly, in a decentralized market, increased customization cannot 
help either the traditional manufacturer or the logistics vendor to achieve better financial 
performance. 
PROPOSITION 4-10. In a 3DP-enabled integrated market,  
(1) The optimal price of the TM product increases in the TM product customization level 
and there is no direct relationship between the TM product customization level and 
the price of the 3DP product; 
(2) The optimal market demand increases in the product customization level of the TM 
product but the market demand for the 3DP product decreases in it; 
(3) The overall supply chain’s maximized profit increases in the product customization 
level of the TM product. 
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(a) (b) 
 
 
(c)  
Figure 4-9 Impact of Product Customization on Optimal Decisions – Integrated Supply Chain 
The findings in PROPOSITION 4-10 (Figure 4-9) echo the findings in PROPOSITION 4-9 
and show that the improvement of the customization of the 3DP product ('  becoming 
smaller) results in decreased market demand for the TM product but increased demand for 
the 3DP product, but the overall profitability of the supply chain is not improved as expected. 
This finding highlight that for the development of 3DP adoption by logistics vendors, some 
extra industrial level financial support is needed. This study explores what kind of support 
should be implemented below. 
4.3.2 Comparative Analysis 
As discussed in the introduction, the cost of the 3DP product is one of the most critical 
considerations to those companies that are currently thinking about 3DP adoption. Therefore, 
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taking the cost of 3DP as a key consideration, this section tries to determine whether adding 
a new 3DP business is a profitable business strategy for the logistics vendor, while also assess 
the impact of 3DP adoption on the manufacturer’s business by comparing the profitability 
and optimal decisions of the TM and Bertrand-3DP manufacturing systems.  
PROPOSITION 4-11. In a decentralized Bertrand market, compared to the traditional 
manufacturing system, engaging a new 3DP service has  
(1) A positive impact on the logistics vendor’s profitability; 
(2) Its impact on the traditional manufacturer’s business performance differs depending 
on the cost of the 3DP product. If the cost of the 3DP product is relatively low 
( !!"!"# < "$% !!"!"# + (#"*)(#'!!'!")√('#+#(-"#) ), the impact on the traditional 
manufacturer’s profitability is negative; otherwise, if the cost of the 3DP product is 
higher, the traditional manufacturer can also gain more profits.  
The impacts on the optimal decisions of the traditional manufacturer and the logistics vendor 
are 
(3) The optimal price of the TM product in the traditional and the new Bertrand 3DP 
manufacturing system show the following respective relationships:  
a. The optimal price of the logistics service decreases; 
b. The optimal price of the TM product decreases under the condition !!"!"# <"$% < *"#"!!"!"*"-# , otherwise it decreases;  
c. The market demand for the TM product decreases only under the condition !!"!"# < "$% < '('("#)(*"#)"((("#)(!!"!")+(-"#) . 
 
Figure 4-10 Decision Regions for the Comparison between the TM and Bertrand 3DP Systems 
(given c! = 0.01, c" = 0.01) 
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PROPOSITION 4-12. In a decentralized Stackelberg-market, compared to the traditional 
manufacturing system, engaging a new 3DP service has  
(1) A positive impact on the logistics vendor’s profitability; 
(2) Its impact on the traditional manufacturer’s business performance differs depending 
on the cost of the 3DP product. If the cost of the 3DP product is relatively low 
( !!"!"# < "$% < !!"!"# − √-(*"(',"#)#)(#'!!'!")8('-"#)('("#)*('-"#)# ), the traditional 
manufacturer cannot also benefit from it, but if the 3DP product cost is higher, the 
traditional manufacturer can also benefit. 
The impacts on the optimal decisions of the traditional manufacturer and the logistics vendor 
are 
(3) The optimal price of the TM product in the traditional and the new Bertrand 3DP 
manufacturing system have the following respective relationships:  
a. The optimal price of the logistics service decreases; 
b. The optimal price of the TM product decreases under the condition !!"!"# <"$% < '*'(',"#)#"('$"#)(!!"!")-('+"#) , but otherwise it increases;  
c. The market demand for the TM product increases only under the condition − '('("#)(*"(',"#)#)"('$"#)#(!!"!")+('-"#) < "$% < 1. 
 
Figure 4-11 Decision Regions for the Comparison between the TM and Stackelberg 3DP Systems 
(given c! = 0.01, c" = 0.01) 
PROPOSITION 4-11 and PROPOSITION 4-12 show the same result. In a decentralized 
market, offering a 3DP service is a beneficial strategical move for the logistics vendor but 
the impact of the new 3DP manufacturing service has different impacts on the traditional 
manufacturer’s profits. Therefore, there exists a situation where the new 3DP adoption cannot 
bring more profits to both the logistics vendor and the traditional manufacturer, although the 
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majority of the 3DP research suggested that 3DP adoption always contributes to the supply 
chain development (Despeisse et al., 2017; Dong et al., 2017). 
In the new 3DP manufacturing system, the logistics vendor introduces a new 3DP product 
into the market. For the purpose of maximizing the profitability of the delivery service, the 
logistics vendor sets the price of the logistics delivery service with the expectation of 
increasing the TM market demand by a low TM product price strategy.  
If the cost of the 3DP product is low (Region I and II in Figure 4-10 and Figure 4-11) the 
traditional manufacturer cannot gain more profits: 1) in Region I, the traditional manufacturer 
uses a low price-regime to keep its competitive advantages on price. However, the market 
demand for TM in this scenario decreases because some customization sensitive consumers 
switch and buy the 3DP product instead. Consequently, the low-price strategy results in 
financial loss for the traditional manufacturer. However, although the TM product delivery 
requirement reduces, the logistics vendor still benefits from the new 3DP business and 
achieves greater profitability. Overall, the whole supply chain gains more profits. 2) In 
Region II, for the same reason, the logistics vendor still uses a low-price regime. However, 
in this scenario, the cost of the 3DP product is slightly higher than in Region I, and so the 
price of the 3DP product is higher. Thus, the market demand for the TM product increases 
because the new price-sensitive consumers who previously entered the market to buy 3DP 
change and buy the TM product. Overall, the traditional manufacturer still loses profit with 
the low pricing strategy. But the logistics vendor benefits from increased profits from the 
high delivery requirement and the new 3DP product business. Therefore, for the whole supply 
chain system, profitability improves. 
  146 
If the cost of the 3DP product is high (Region III and IV in Figure 4-10 and Figure 4-11), 
both the logistics vendor and the traditional manufacturer can benefit from 3DP adoption. 1) 
In Region III, although the cost of product delivery is low, since the cost of 3DP is high, the 
traditional manufacturer uses a low-price strategy for the purpose of increasing market 
demand. Therefore, the traditional manufacturer gains more profit through the increased 
market demand and the logistics vendor generates more profits on the new 3DP product and 
the increased product delivery requirements. 2) If the cost of the 3DP product is in Region 
IV, which is extremely high, the manufacturer uses a high-price regime to maximize its profit. 
In this region, the price of the 3DP product is extremely high (for high production cost 
products, the manufacturer usually uses a high price to ensure its margin is positive), some 
consumers previously intending to buy the 3DP product shift and buy the TM product. 
Therefore, both the traditional manufacturer and the logistics vendor enjoy the increased 
market demand for the TM product through product selling and goods delivery. Therefore, 
the whole supply chain gains more profits. In these kinds of market structures, adopting a 
new 3DP service is a win-win strategy for both the traditional manufacturer and the logistics 
vendor. 
PROPOSITION 4-13. In a decentralized 3DP-enabled system, the logistics vendor can gain 
more profits in the Bertrand market than the Stackelberg market, but conversely the 
manufacturer can gain more profits in the Stackelberg market. Under system equilibrium, 
the optimal price of the logistics service and the market demand for the TM product is higher 
in the Bertrand market, but the optimal price of the TM and 3DP product, and the market 
demand for the 3DP product, are lower in the Bertrand market than the Stackelberg market.  
This proposition shows that the channel bargaining power plays an important role here. This 
result is somewhat consistent with the finding of D. R. Eyers & Potter (2015) indicating that 
channel power helps the company get market advantages (e.g. consumer prefer to buy the 
product manufactured by great brand). The logistics vendor can achieve greater profits by 
introducing a 3DP product into a market where he has equal bargaining power to the 
  147 
traditional manufacturer. But in market which is led by the traditional manufacturer, the 
logistics vendor’s new 3DP business cannot bring him/her more profits. The reason behind 
this is straightforward: both of them use a low-price regime if they set the product price 
simultaneously which results in higher demand for the TM product. And under the 
Stackelberg game, the logistics vendor prices the 3DP product later and s/he uses a higher 
price for the purpose of maximizing market demand and the total profits but loses the profit 
generated from the conversional goods delivery service. Therefore, the logistics vendor can 
gain more profits from the logistics delivery service in the Bertrand market. 
PROPOSITION 4-14. In an integrated supply chain, compared to the traditional 
manufacturing system, engaging a new 3DP service has a positive impact on total supply 
chain profitability; the optimal price decreases; the market demand for the TM product 
increases only under the condition '('("#)#"(("#)(!!"!")-# < "$% < 1.  
For the supply chain, after introducing the 3DP product to the market, the traditional 
manufacturer has to use a low-price strategy to keep its competitive advantage on price. 
When the cost of the 3DP product is high ('('("#)#"(("#)(!!"!")-# < "$% < 1), considering 
the price of the 3DP product, more price sensitive consumers choose to buy the TM product. 
Therefore, the supply chain benefits from the increased market demand for the TM product 
and the newly introduced 3DP business. However, if the 3DP product cost is low ( !!"!"# <"$% < '('("#)#"(("#)(!!"!")-#  ), the logistics vendor can use a low-price strategy for the 3DP 
product. Consumers sensitive to product customization choose to buy the new 3DP product 
instead of the TM product. Thus, the supply chain loses profit from the TM product, but it 
can generate more profit from the new 3DP product service.  
In the above section, this model investigates the scenarios in which the logistics vendor 
adopts 3DP technology and competes with the TM product in the market. However, in 
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addition, the proposition below considers whether full adoption of the 3DP product by the 
logistics vendor is an option for him (.$% = 1 − /$%  and .0 = 0 ) by comparing the 
profitability of the logistics vendor in the traditional manufacturing system, a 3DP-enabled 
Bertrand and Stackelberg decentralized manufacturing system, and full 3DP by the logistics 
vendor. 
PROPOSITION 4-15. In a decentralized supply chain, compared to the traditional 
manufacturing system, fully engaging a new 3DP service has a positive impact on the 
logistics vendor’s profitability if 0 < "$% < (- (2 + √-(#'!!'!")√# . The whole supply chain can 
achieve greater profits through the full 3DP strategy only if  0 < "$% < 1 + #'!!'!"√# . 
 
Figure 4-12 Decision Regions for the Full 3DP Strategy (given c! = 0.5, c" = 0.5) 
In this subsection, this model uses c1 = 0.5, c2 = 0.5 as an example to simulate the decision 
regions in Figure 4-12. It indicates that when the cost of the 3DP product is low, not only the 
logistics vendor (Region II and III) but also the integrated supply chain (Region III) can gain 
greater profits due to the new 3DP business creating new market values. 
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4.3.3 3DP Adoption as a Threat 
All the analysis so far have assumed that.$% ≠ 0, indicating that the logistics vendor offers 
the new 3DP product in order to compete with the traditional manufacturer in the market, 
and the results do in fact show that the vendor can use 3DP adoption as a game-changer to 
restructure the market and generate increased profits. This model therefore investigates what 
will occur if the logistics vendor simply uses 3DP adoption as a strategic threat and introduces 
no 3DP product onto the market. In our model we do not consider the cost of 3DP printer 
investment, because currently, the logistics vendors like UPS only focus on the low-cost 3DP 
printer business (UPS, 2015; B. Zhang, 2016). The logistics vendor needs only to claim it is 
going to launch 3DP products to threaten the manufacturer’s TM product pricing strategy. 
Hence, in the next subsections, this model assumes .$% = 0 and tests whether the logistics 
vendor can still earn more profit using this threat. 
Optimal Decisions 
PROPOSITION 4-16. In a decentralized Bertrand market, the maximum profits for the 
traditional manufacturer and the logistics vendor are  ∏ 5(/0)∗(:$%∗ ;<,>) =− ('("#)(-"#)#('#"!!"!")##('*"#"##)#  and∏ 7(/$% , //)∗(:$%∗ ;<,>) = − ('+"#)(-"#)('#"!!"!")##('*"#"##)# ; they are 
maximized by /(:$%∗ ;<,/>)∗ = ('+"##)!!"('+"#)(#'!")'*"#"## , /(:$%∗ ;<,0>)∗ =#('?"#(-"#))'(-"#)(!!"!")'*"#"## , and /(:$%∗ ;<,$%>)∗ = − *'#($"-#)"(-"#)(!!"!")'*"#"## . The optimal 
market demand for the TM product is .(:$%∗ ;<,0>)∗ = − (-"#)(#'!!'!")#('*"#"##) . 
In a decentralized Stackelberg-market, the maximum profits for the traditional manufacturer 
and the logistics vendor are  ∏ 5(/0)∗(:$%∗ ;<,@) = -('-"#)('("#)('#"!!"!")##(*"('A"#)#)#  and ∏ 7(/$% , //)∗(:$%∗ ;<,@) = − ('-"#)$('#"!!"!")##(*"('A"#)#)# ; they are maximized by /(:$%∗ ;<,/@)∗ =(+'$#)!!"('-"#)#(#'!")*"('A"#)# , /(:$%∗ ;<,0@)∗ = #(?"('?"#)#)'('-"#)!!'('-"#)!"*"('A"#)# , and /(:$%∗ ;<,$%@)∗ =*"#('."-#)'('-"#)!!'('-"#)!"*"('A"#)# . The optimal market demand for the TM product is .(:$%∗ ;<,0@)∗ = − ('-"#)(#'!!'!")#(*"('A"#)#) . 
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In an integrated supply chain, no matter whether a Bertrand or Stackelberg structure, the 
maximum profit for the supply chain is   ∏ 9:∗(:$%∗ ;<) = ('#"!!"!")#+# , which is maximized by 	/(:$%∗ ;<,0@B)∗ = (- (' + "/ + "0) and /(:$%∗ ;<,$%@B)∗ = (- (2 − ' + "/ + "0), and the optimal 
market demand for the TM product is .(:$%∗ ;<,0@B)∗ = − '#"!!"!"-# . 
Sensitivity Analysis  
In this part, this study investigates the impacts of different costs and product customization 
levels on the new optimal decisions and the maximized profits. 
Impact of Costs 
PROPOSITION 4-17. If the logistics vendor uses 3DP as a threat, in a 3DP-enabled 
decentralized market, no matter whether in Bertrand or in Stackelberg, 
(1) The optimal price of the logistics service decreases in the cost of the TM product and 
the cost of the logistics service; but the optimal price of the TM and 3DP product 
increases in them; 
(2) The optimal market demand for the TM product decreases in the cost of the TM 
product and the logistics service; 
(3) The traditional manufacturer’s and the logistics vendor’s maximized profits decrease 
in the cost of the logistics service and TM product. 
In a 3DP-enabled integrated market,  
(4) The optimal price of the TM and 3DP product increase in the cost of the TM product 
and the cost of the logistics service;  
(5) The optimal market demand for the TM product decreases in the cost of the TM 
product and the logistics service; 
(6) The whole system’s maximized profits decrease in the cost of the logistics service and 
TM product. 
The above proposition demonstrates that the different costs involved have the same impacts 
on the optimal decisions as PROPOSITION 4-5. Therefore, although the logistics vendor 
uses the 3DP service as a threat for the purpose of market competitiveness, the impacts of 
the cost reduction on the equilibrium system are the same. 
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Impact of Product Customization Level 
Due to the complexity of the optimal decisions, closed-form solutions investigating the 
impact of product customization level are not achievable under this kind of supply chain 
system. Thus, in this section, this model uses numerical tests for analysis by creating three 
different values for 2 different costs, ("/, "0) namely low, medium, and high (Table 4-4), 
followed by a depiction of the optimal prices and quantities for each parameter for different 
scenarios.   
Table 4-4 Parameter Values in the Numerical Testing of the Impacts of Customization on the 
Optimal Decisions for 3DP as a Market Threat 
 -5 -6 
Low 0.2 0.1 
Medium 0.3 0.4 
High 0.7 0.6 
 
PROPOSITION 4-18. If the logistics vendor uses 3DP as a threat, in a 3DP-enabled 
decentralized market, no matter whether in Bertrand or in Stackelberg, 
(1) The optimal price of the logistics service and the TM product increase in the product 
customization level of the TM product, but the optimal price of the 3DP product 
decreases in it; 
(2)  The optimal market demand for the TM product increases in the TM product 
customization level; 
(3) There exists a threshold value of the TM product customization level; the traditional 
manufacturer’s maximized value first increases and then decreases; 
(4) The maximized profit of the logistics vendor increases in the TM product 
customization level. 
In a 3DP-enabled integrated market,  
(5) The optimal price of the TM product increases in the product customization level of 
the TM product and the 3DP product price decreases in it; 
(6) The optimal market demand for the TM product increases in the TM product 
customization level; 
(7) The whole system’s maximized profit increases in the TM product customization level. 
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(e) (f) 
 
Figure 4-13 Impact of Product Customization on the Optimal Decisions – Bertrand 
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(a) (b) 
  
(c) (d) 
  
(e) (f) 
 
Figure 4-14 Impact of Product Customization on the Optimal Decisions – Stackelberg 
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Figure 4-15 Impact of Product Customization on the Optimal Decisions – Integrated Supply Chain 
The properties described in (1), (2), (5), and (6) are straightforward. Because lowering the 
TM product customization level results in a higher relative customization level of the 3DP 
product, the logistics vendor raises its 3DP product price for the purpose of creating a product 
image emphasising its uniqueness. Therefore, the traditional manufacturer has to use lower 
price to enhance its market competitiveness. Because there are some consumers sensitive to 
product customization who switch and buy the 3DP product, the actual equilibrium market 
demand for the TM product declines. Consequently, the logistics vendor loses its profits from 
traditional goods delivery. However, if the product customization level of the TM product is 
similar to that of the 3DP product, introducing a new 3DP product has a positive impact on 
the traditional manufacturer’s profits. Although the traditional manufacturer uses a low-price 
regime and the market demand for the TM product drops, the logistics vendor also charges 
less for product delivery. Therefore, the unit margin of the TM product increases. However, 
if the customization level of the 3DP product is higher, the traditional manufacturer has to 
use a lower price to maintain its market share, but this results in less profit. Taking all these 
scenarios into consideration, if the logistics vendor uses a 3DP service with a higher 
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customization level as a threat, both the market demand for and the price of the TM product 
drop, and the supply chain cannot achieve better profitability. 
Comparative Analysis  
This section compares the optimal decisions and maximized profits with those earned by the 
traditional manufacturer and the logistics vendor in the benchmarking system (traditional 
manufacturing system) and the 3DP-enabled Bertrand and Stackelberg system, yielding the 
following outcomes: 
PROPOSITION 4-19. If the logistics vendor uses 3DP as a threat, in comparison with the 
traditional manufacturing system,  
(1) The maximized profit of the logistics vendor increases; 
(2) Under a Bertrand market, if 0 < ' < −6 − -,C('D√$E-C'(<."(-D√-?E' $⁄ − (- =1 +#√3@=−109 + 12#√26@( $⁄ , the maximized profit of the traditional manufacturer 
increases; otherwise, it decreases. Under a Stackelberg market, if 0 < ' < (+$ −.A(('D√$)?(**("-+D√-$A)' $⁄ − (? (1 + #√3)(881 + 24#√237)( $⁄ , the maximized profit of the 
traditional manufacturer increases; otherwise, it decreases. 
(3) The optimal price of the logistics delivery service and the TM product decrease; 
(4) The market demand for the TM product increases. 
There are no differences in the optimal decisions and maximized supply chain profit at the 
integrated supply chain level. 
So, if the logistics vendor uses 3DP as a threat, for the purpose of maximizing the actual 
profit from product delivery, the logistics vendor uses a low-price regime. Considering the 
low delivery service charge and the threat of the new 3DP product, naturally the traditional 
manufacturer decreases the price of the TM product and gains more price-sensitive 
consumers. Therefore, the logistics vendor can gain more profits from the increased use of 
its goods delivery service. However, if the customization level of the TM product is low, 
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which means the 3DP product has a significant advantage in terms of its product 
customization level, the traditional manufacturer uses a lower TM product price and more 
price-sensitive consumers buy the TM product. Therefore, the profit of the traditional 
manufacturer increases. If the customization level of the TM product is high, the traditional 
manufacturer does not choose to sacrifice the unit price margin, which results in lower market 
demand for the TM product, compared to the previous scenario. As a result, the traditional 
manufacturer cannot gain more profits. Overall, the maximized profits and the optimal 
decisions stay at the same level, because there is no actual 3DP product to be found in the 
market. 
PROPOSITION 4-20. If the logistics vendor uses 3DP as a threat, under the 3DP-enabled 
decentralized Bertrand manufacturing system,  
(1) If !!"!"# < "$% < ('("#)(*"#)'?(!!"!")'*"#"## , the price of the logistics delivery and the 
profit of the logistics vendor decrease while the price of the TM and 3DP product, 
the market demand for the TM product and the traditional manufacturer’s profit 
increase;  
(2) If ('("#)(*"#)'?(!!"!")'*"#"## < "$% < ('("#)(*"#)('*"('("#)#)'-('*"(',"#)#)(!!"!")('*"#"##)('*"#($"#)) , the 
price of the logistics vendor and the profit of the logistics vendor increase but the 
price of the TM and 3DP product, the market demand for the TM product and the 
traditional manufacturer’s profit decline; 
(3) If ('("#)(*"#)('*"('("#)#)'-('*"(',"#)#)(!!"!")('*"#"##)('*"#($"#)) < "$% < 1, the price of the logistics 
vendor increases but the price of the TM and 3DP product, the market demand for 
the TM product, the traditional manufacturer’s profit, and the profit of the logistics 
vendor decline. 
Under the 3DP-enabled decentralized Stackelberg manufacturing system,  
(4) If !!"!"# < "$% < ('("#)(*"(',"#)#)'('+"#)('$"#)(!!"!")'*"#"## , the price of the logistics 
delivery and the profit of the logistics vendor decrease while the price of the TM and 
3DP product, the market demand for the TM product and the traditional 
manufacturer’s profit increase;  
(5) If ('("#)(*"(',"#)#)'('+"#)('$"#)(!!"!")'*"#"## < "$% <'('("#)(*"(',"#)#)"('$"#)('-"#)(!!"!")*"('A"#)# , the profit of the logistics vendor decreases 
while the price of the logistics delivery, the price of the TM and 3DP product, the 
market demand for the TM product and the traditional manufacturer’s profit 
increase;  
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(6) If '('("#)(*"(',"#)#)"('$"#)('-"#)(!!"!")*"('A"#)# < "$% <('("#)('*",#)(*"(',"#)#)'('-"#)(*"$('$"#)#)(!!"!")(*"('A"#)#)(*"#('."-#)) , the price of the logistics vendor 
and the profit of the logistics vendor increase but the price of the TM and 3DP 
product, the market demand for the TM product and the traditional manufacturer’s 
profit decline; 
(7) If ('("#)('*",#)(*"(',"#)#)'('-"#)(*"$('$"#)#)(!!"!")(*"('A"#)#)(*"#('."-#)) < "$% < 1 , the price of the 
logistics vendor increases but the price of the TM and 3DP product, the market 
demand for the TM product, the traditional manufacturer’s profit, and the profit of 
the logistics vendor decline. 
Under the 3DP-enabled integrated manufacturing system, 
(8) The overall profit of the supply chain decreases; 
(9) There is no difference in the price of the TM product; 
(10) If  !!"!"# < "$% < 1 − ' + "/ + "0 , the price of the 3DP product and the 
market demand for the TM product increase; if the cost of the 3DP product exceeds 
this level, the price of the 3DP product and the market demand for the TM product 
decrease. 
 
 
Figure 4-16 Comparison of the Bertrand Market under Different Threat Strategies (given c! = 0.01, c" = 0.01) 
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Figure 4-17 Comparison of the Stackelberg Market under Different Threat Strategies (given c! =0.01, c" = 0.01) 
In the decentralized market, when the cost of the 3DP product is low (Region I and II in 
Figure 4-16 or Region I in Figure 4-17), the logistics vendor uses a low price regime for its 
logistics delivery service for the purpose of increasing the demand for TM product delivery. 
Because the logistics vendor is not actually providing the 3DP product, it uses a high 3DP 
price strategy to push price-sensitive consumers to buy the TM product. This offers room to 
the traditional manufacturer to also use a high price regime for the purpose of maximizing its 
profit. Consequently, the traditional manufacturer gains more profits, but the logistics vendor 
loses profits due to the reduced margin per delivery. If the cost of the 3DP product is located 
in Region II and III in Figure 4-17 for the Stackelberg decentralized market, the logistics 
vendor uses a higher price for its delivery service for the purpose of maximizing its profits 
and this pushes the traditional manufacturer to use a high price to increase the product’s profit 
margin. Then, the logistics vendor who prices the 3DP product later uses a high price regime 
to help the traditional manufacturer gain more price-sensitive consumers. These pricing 
strategies result in an increase in the traditional manufacturer’s profit and a decrease in the 
logistics vendor’s profit, because the logistics vendor cannot make profits from the 3DP 
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product. If the cost of the 3DP product is located in Region III in Figure 4-16 or Region IV 
in Figure 4-17, the logistics vendor uses a higher price for the logistics delivery in order to 
achieve a greater margin per unit. The logistics vendor uses low pricing to irritate the 
traditional manufacturer into also using low TM pricing to attract more consumers to buy the 
TM product. But due to the low price of the 3DP product, some customization-sensitive 
consumers shift to buying the 3DP product. However, because there is no actual 3DP product, 
they leave the market. Therefore, the market demand for the TM product drops and the 
traditional manufacturer loses profits. However, the logistics vendor benefits from the high 
logistics delivery pricing strategy. Lastly, if the cost of the 3DP product is in Region IV in 
Figure 4-16 or Region V in Figure 4-17, the logistics vendor also uses a high price for the 
delivery service for the purpose of maximizing its actual profits. Both the logistics vendor 
and the traditional manufacturer use a low-price strategy in order to increase the market 
demand for the TM product among price-sensitive consumers. However, due to the low 3DP 
product price, more price-sensitive consumers shift to buying the 3DP product, but because 
they cannot buy the 3DP product from the logistics vendor, they then have to leave the 
market. As a result, not only the traditional manufacturer but also the logistics vendor loses 
profit under the sinking market demand. 
For the integrated 3DP supply chain, because of the cooperation, the traditional manufacturer 
keeps the same price for the TM product. With regard to the logistics vendor, if the cost of 
the 3DP product is low (Region I in Figure 4-16 or Region I and II in Figure 4-17), the 
logistics vendor uses a high price regime to push more customers to buy the TM product. If 
the cost of the 3DP product is high (Region II, III, and IV in Figure 4-16 or Region III, IV, 
and V in Figure 4-17), the logistics vendor prices the 3DP product low for the purpose of 
attracting more consumers into the market, just in case they may buy the TM product after 
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they find out there is not a 3DP product in the market. However, some price-sensitive 
consumers who previously entered the market to buy the TM product change and wish to buy 
the 3DP product and leave the market with empty hands, because there is no 3DP product in 
the market. Therefore, this strategy results in a decline in market demand for the TM product. 
Overall, because the supply chain cannot generate profit from the 3DP product, this threat 
strategy has a negative impact on the system’s profitability. 
4.4 Consumer Surplus 
In this section, this model tries to assess the impacts of different types of 3DP adoption on 
the consumer surplus. The first part focuses on the analysis of the impacts and then 
investigates how consumers are affected by 3DP adoption. 
For the traditional manufacturing system, there is only the TM product in the market. 
Therefore, by considering the individual consumer’s expected surplus on the TM product 
(Mussa & Rosen, 1978), 
:9$%G = E ((H"∗ 'F − /0∗ ) HF 
The optimal price of the decentralized TM product is /0∗ = (+ (3' + "/ + "0), and therefore 
the consumer surplus is  
:9$%G% = − 132 (−4 + 3' + "/ + "0)('(−2 + 3') + (−2 + ')("/ + "0)) (4.13) 
In the integrated traditional manufacturing system, the optimal price of the TM product is /0∗ = (- (' + "/ + "0), and so the consumer surplus is  
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 :9$%GI = −18 (−2 + ' + "/ + "0)('- + (−2 + ')("/ + "0)) (4.14) 
Next, after the logistics vendor adopts 3DP, we derive the expected surplus in the 3DP 
manufacturing system from the total consumer perspective:  
:9$% = E ((H"∗ 'F − /0∗ ) HF + E ((H$%∗ F − /$%∗ ) HF 
By considering the different games, we have the following. Under the decentralized Bertrand 
market, the optimal product prices are /0∗ = #(*"#)"#(+"#)!$%"+!!"+!"-(*"#)  and /$%∗ =
*"#"(*"$#)!$%'-!!'-!"-(*"#) . 
 :9$%> = 18(8 + ')- ((8 + ' − (8 + 3')"$% + 2"/ + 2"0)- − ((−2 + ')(8 + ')+ '(4 + ')"$% + 4"/ + 4"0)('-(8 + ') + (−2 + ')'(4 + ')"$%+ 4(−2 + ')"/ + 4(−2 + ')"0)) (4.15) 
In the decentralized Stackelberg market, the optimal product prices are  
/0∗ = #(*"(',"#)#)'('+"#)#!$%"('-"#)#!!"('-"#)#!"-(*"(',"#)#)  , 
and /$%∗ = *"(',"#)#"(*'$#)!$%"('-"#)!!"('-"#)!"-(*"(',"#)#) . 
 
:9$%@ = 18(8 + (−5 + ')')- ((8 + (−5 + ')' + (−8 + 3')"$% − (−2 + ')"/− (−2 + ')"0)- − 2('(8 + (−5 + ')') − (−4 + ')'"$%+ (−2 + ')-"/ + (−2 + ')-"0)((−4 + ')'"$% − (−2 + ')(8+ (−5 + ')' + (−2 + ')"/ + (−2 + ')"0))+ '(4(8 + (−5 + ')')-− ('(8 + (−5 + ')') − (−4 + ')'"$% + (−2 + ')-"/+ (−2 + ')-"0)-)) 
(4.16) 
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For the integrated 3DP-enabled supply chain, the optimal product prices are /0∗ = (- (' +"/ + "0) and /$%∗ = (- (1 + "$%). 
 
:9$% = 18 (1 − 2"$% + "$%- − (−2 + ' + "/ + "0)('- + (−2 + ')"/ + (−2+ ')"0)) (4.17) 
Lastly, for the fully 3DP-based system, the expected surplus is,  
:9J$% = E ((H$%∗ F − /$%∗ ) HF 
The optimal product price is  /$%∗ =	 (- (1 + "$%). 
 :9J$% = 18 (−1 + "$%)- (4.18) 
4.4.1 Sensitivity Analysis 
In the following subsections, this model tests the impacts of the different costs and product 
customization levels on the consumer surplus under different market structures. 
Impact of Costs 
PROPOSITION 4-21.  
(1) In a decentralized or integrated traditional manufacturing market, the consumer 
surplus decreases in the cost of the TM product and the logistics service cost. 
(2) In a decentralized Bertrand market, after the logistics vendor adopts 3DP technology,  
a. If "$% > '-+"#(+A'-#((<"#))*"#('($"-#(-"#))  ,  the consumer surplus decreases in the cost of 
the logistics delivery service and the TM product; 
b. If "$% < '-+"#(+A'-#((<"#))*"#('($"-#(-"#))  , when  "0 <'(*"#)($"-('-"#)#)'(*"#('($"-#(-"#)))!$%"((*'*#)!!'(*"*# , the consumer surplus 
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decreases in the cost of the logistics delivery service and the TM product;  
otherwise it increases in them. 
c. If !!"!"# < "$% < − (*"#)(*"#((("#('?"#(-"#))))"-(*"#('($"-#(-"#)))(!!"!")'?+"#('+*'+(#"?#$"#)) , 
the consumer surplus decreases in the cost of the 3DP product; otherwise it 
increases in the cost of the 3DP product. 
(3) In a decentralized Stackelberg market, after the logistics vendor adopts 3DP 
technology,  
a. If "$% > ($"('$"#)#)('*"#((."#('(("-#)))*"#('(."#(-<"('*"#)#))  ,  the consumer surplus decreases in 
the cost of the logistics delivery service and the TM product; 
b. If "$% < ($"('$"#)#)('*"#((."#('(("-#)))*"#('(."#(-<"('*"#)#))  , when  "0 <(('$"#)('-"#)($"('$"#)#) ((8 + '(−19 + '(20 + (−8 + ')')))"$% − (3 +(−3 + ')')((−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')') + (−3 + ')(−2 + ')"/)) , the 
consumer surplus decreases in the cost of the logistics delivery service and 
the TM product;  otherwise it increases in them. 
c. If !!"!"# < "$% < ('?+"#(+*"#('+("#($-"('(<"#)#))) ((8 + (−5 + ')')(−8 +(−1 + ')'(5 + (−5 + ')')) + (−2 + ')(8 + '(−19 + '(20 + (−8 +')')))("/ + "0)), the consumer surplus decreases in the cost of the 3DP 
product; otherwise it increases in the cost of the 3DP product. 
(4) In an integrated 3DP-enabled market, the consumer surplus decreases in the cost of 
the TM and 3DP product and the cost of the logistics service. 
 
Figure 4-18 Impact of Costs on Consumer Surplus – Decentralized Market  
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In the traditional manufacturing market, the consumer surplus decreases in the cost of the 
TM product and the logistics delivery cost, because the optimal prices increase in these costs. 
This is also applicable to the integrated 3DP-enabled supply chain. Therefore, cost reduction 
helps the consumer gain more surplus, which is quite straightforward. However, in a 
decentralized market, after the logistics vendor introduces the 3DP product into the market, 
based on PROPOSITION 4-5, the TM product price increases in "0, c1 and c$K, whilst the 
3DP product price decreases in "0 and c1, but increases in c$K. In PROPOSITION 4-21, 
there are three different market structures (Figure 4-18). 
(1) When the cost of the 3DP product is high (Region I), if the cost of the TM product 
and delivery service reduce, for the purpose of maximizing the profit, the traditional 
manufacturer uses a low pricing strategy to increase market demand, but the logistics 
vendor uses a high price regime to increase the unit price margin. Therefore, the 
consumer can enjoy more surplus on the cost reduction of "0 and c1, but loses surplus 
due to the cost reduction of "$%. 
(2) In Region II, the cost of the 3DP product is low but the cost of the TM product and 
the logistics service is high. Therefore, the consumer values the 3DP product less than 
Region I. Therefore, the cost reduction of the "0 and c1 contribute to the low TM 
product price, which results in a higher consumer surplus for the TM product, but 
consumers’ willingness to pay for the 3DP product becomes lower. Thus, the 
consumer cannot benefit from the cost reduction on the TM product and the logistics 
delivery cost. However, if the cost of the 3DP product reduces, both the price of the 
TM and 3DP product reduce, and the consumer can enjoy more surplus.  
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(3) Under Region III, all the relevant costs are low. Cost reduction on the TM product 
and the logistics delivery service help the consumer generate more consumer surplus 
from the TM product, although the consumer surplus on the 3DP product drops due 
to the increase in the 3DP product price. Meanwhile, if there is a cost reduction of the 
3DP product, it brings more consumer surplus because of the low price of both the 
TM and 3DP product. 
PROPOSITION 4-22. In a fully 3DP-based system, the consumer surplus is increased in 
the cost of the 3DP product. 
It is straightforward that for a market only offering the 3DP product, a cost reduction results 
in the logistics vendor using a low pricing strategy to increase market demand and 
maximize the total profit.  
Impact of Product Customization Level 
Here, again due to the complexity of the consumer surplus functions, it is difficult to gain 
direct insights into how they are impacted by the product customization level. Therefore, this 
subsection also uses the numerical tests with the same settings as in Table 4-3 of section 4.3.1 
for the 3DP-enabled system. For the traditional manufacturing system, another three different 
values for the cost of the TM product and the logistics delivery service at low, medium and 
high levels have been created as shown below:  
Table 4-5 Parameter Values in the Numerical Testing of the Impacts of Customization on the 
Optimal Decisions under the Traditional Manufacturing Market and the Integrated 3DP-Enabled 
Supply Chain Market 
 -5 -6 
Low 0.1 0.15 
Medium 0.2 0.35 
High 0.3 0.4 
 
PROPOSITION 4-23.  
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(1) In a traditional manufacturing market and a 3DP-enabled integrated market, the 
consumer surplus increases in the TM product customization level; 
(2) In a 3DP-enabled decentralized market, the consumer surplus is first concave in the 
TM product customization level and then convex in the TM product customization 
level. 
  
(a) (b) 
 
  
(c) (d) 
 
 
(e)  
Figure 4-19 The Impact of the TM Product Customization Level on the Consumer Surplus 
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Firstly, it is obvious that in the traditional manufacturing system (Figure 4-19 (a) and (b)), 
the higher the customization level, the greater the consumer surplus. Secondly, in the 3DP-
enabled decentralized supply chain (Figure 4-19 (c) for the Bertrand market and (d) for the 
Stackelberg market), according to PROPOSITION 4-9, the TM and 3DP product price 
increase in the 3DP product customization level. As such, the impact of the product 
customization level could be summarized into three different scenarios. When the 
customization level of the 3DP product is extremely low (the customization level of the TM 
product '  is high; the customization level of the 3DP product and the TM product are 
similar), the improvement of the 3DP product’s customization level results in the optimal 
price dropping, and therefore the consumer benefits from this 3DP product customization 
level improvement. If the logistics vendor continues to improve the product customization 
level of the 3DP product, although the prices of both products still decline, the consumer can 
generate less surplus from the TM product. Thus, the consumer gains less consumerization. 
If the product customization level of the 3DP product is extremely high, the consumer 
benefits from the improvements of the 3DP product customization level because the system 
can generate more surplus from the low-pricing strategy of both products, and this part of the 
increased surplus can cover the surplus lost in the decreased willingness to pay for the TM 
product. Lastly, in the integrated 3DP-enabled market, the improvement of the customization 
level of the 3DP product results in decreases in the TM and 3DP product price. However, the 
consumer can gain less surplus from the TM product, and therefore, overall, the customer 
never benefits from this 3DP product customization level improvement. 
4.4.2 Comparative Analysis 
This subsection focuses on comparing the consumer surplus between the different systems 
and obtained the following results. 
  168 
PROPOSITION 4-24.  
(1) Under the decentralized supply chain, in a Bertrand market, the consumer benefits 
from this new 3DP adoption if the cost of the 3DP product is high; in a Stackelberg 
market, the consumer can gain more surplus only when the cost of the 3DP product 
is low; in general, the consumer enjoys more surplus under the Bertrand market than 
the Stackelberg market; 
(2) Under the integrated supply chain, the consumer can benefit from 3DP adoption by 
the logistics vendor. 
 
Figure 4-20 Decision Regions for the Comparison of Consumer Surplus – Decentralized Market 
(given c! = 0.01,	c" = 0.01) 
Note: the values of c#$% and  c#$& are listed in the Proofs of Proposition 4-24. 
PROPOSITION 4-24 indicates that, firstly, in a Bertrand market, if the cost of 3DP is low 
(Region I and II in Figure 4-20), the logistics vendor prices the 3DP product low and this 
pushes the traditional manufacturer to use a low-price regime to keep its pricing advantages. 
But the consumer cannot generate more surplus than the market with only a TM product. 
When the cost of the 3DP product is relatively high (Region III in Figure 4-20), the consumer 
can gain more surplus than the traditional manufacturing system, because the consumer can 
gain more consumer surplus from the 3DP product. Secondly, in a Stackelberg market, the 
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logistics vendor prices the 3DP product later. Therefore, if the cost of the 3DP is low (Region 
I in Figure 4-20), the manufacturer sets the TM product price low to achieve a pricing 
advantage and the logistics vendor has to use a low pricing strategy. As a result, the consumer 
can gain more surplus. If the cost of the 3DP is high (Region II and III in Figure 4-20), the 
traditional manufacturer and the logistics vendor use a high product price on both products, 
which leads to less consumer surplus. Thirdly, because the logistics vendor prices the 3DP 
product later in the Stackelberg market, he sets the 3DP product price as high as possible. 
Therefore, the consumer surplus in the Stackelberg market is less than in the Bertrand market. 
Lastly, in an integrated market, after the introduction of a new 3DP product into the market 
by the logistics vendor, the consumer can benefit from the market pricing competition and 
the new consumer surplus from the 3DP product. 
PROPOSITION 4-25. In a decentralized market, if the logistics vendor uses a fully 3DP-
based strategy to replace the TM product, the consumer benefits only if the cost of the 3DP 
product is low ( 0 < "$% < 1 −(-J−(−4 + 3' + "/ + "0)('(−2 + 3') + (−2 + ')"/ + (−2 + ')"0) ); otherwise, the 
consumer loses surplus. Compared to integrated market traditional manufacturing, the 
consumer benefits from the fully 3DP-based strategy. 
This proposition demonstrates that under a decentralized market, if the cost of the 3DP is 
low, the logistics vendor uses a low-price regime, and therefore the consumer can enjoy more 
surplus. Moreover, at the supply chain level, no matter the cost of the 3DP product, the fully 
3DP-based strategy always brings more surplus to the consumer through the high product 
customization. 
4.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter uses a model to rigorously investigate the impact of 3DP adoption by the 
logistics vendor on the supply chain, exploring specifically whether a logistics vendor can 
use this strategy to seize new business opportunities presented by this disruptive 
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manufacturing technology. To do so, this model considers a change that is occurring in 
practice, which is receiving significant attention in the media, involving the logistics vendor 
reckoning with 3DP adoption (UPS, 2017). This model first presents a consumer behaviour 
model that captures the consumer response to the logistics vendor’s 3DP product offering. 
Using this model, this study derives consumer demand, characterizes patterns of consumer 
behaviour, and factors them into the logistics vendor’s and manufacturer’s pricing and 
financial optimization problem. The following section summarizes important implications of 
this model analysis so that this model can help companies cope with the 3DP adoption. 
Several noteworthy implications are discussed below. 
Managerial Insights 
This model then presents a number of managerial insights on how pricing, cost reduction and 
product customization level impact the supply chain and then compares the situation before 
and after the logistics vendor adopts 3DP. The followings are the key insights: 
 
Figure 4-21 Impacts of 3DP Adoption on Profitability  
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Firstly, 3DP adoption can be used by the logistics vendor to restructure the supply chain 
(Pooley, 2013; Wohlers Associates, 2018). Pooley (2013) argues that traditional 
manufacturer might be the best user of the new 3DP technology because they have the 
advantages on product design and product quality control. Our results indicate that the 
logistics vendor can take a more active role, enhancing its financial performance and 
adjusting consumer expectations through this new manufacturing technology. This model 
also identifies a cost threshold below which 3DP product cost reduction provides more profits 
to the traditional manufacturer, meaning that the 3DP does not always have a negative impact 
on the TM industry. The manufacturer can also enjoy a windfall from the vendor’s 3DP 
adoption, so that a win-win situation exists. The results listed in Figure 4-21 also show, 
however, that selecting a 3DP product with a high customization level does not always help 
to improve system profitability. In addition, the logistics vendor can achieve more profits in 
the decentralized Bertrand market than in the decentralized Stackelberg market. Therefore, 
the vendor must be careful in selecting which product should use 3DP technology; 3DP 
product customization level and product cost are two important factors, as explained in this 
chapter.  
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Figure 4-22 Impacts of 3DP Adoption on the Consumer Surplus  
Secondly, the analysis in the consumer surplus section suggests that under a decentralized 
Bertrand market with a high 3DP cost, consumers can also benefit from such 3DP adoption 
(Figure 4-22). However, under a decentralized Stackelberg market, the consumer can only 
gain more surplus if the cost of the 3DP product is high. Additionally, the consumer can gain 
more surplus in the Bertrand market than the Stackelberg market. Therefore, the channel 
power plays an important role here. This model also shows that such 3DP adoption brings 
more surplus to the consumer under the integrated market. In addition, if the cost of the 3DP 
product is low, it is beneficial to the consumer if the logistics vendor can fully replace the 
TM product with the 3DP product. Thus, overall, 3DP adoption and cost reduction of 3DP 
are still future research directions for the 3DP industry. This result is congruent with the 
Lo
w
H
ig
h
x It is beneficial to the consumer under decentralized 
Stackelberg market but not under the decentralized 
Bertrand market, cost reduction on the 3DP can bring 
more surplus;
x In integrated supply chain, consumer gets more surplus 
after the 3DP adoption;
x It is beneficial to the consumer if the TM products is fully 
replaced by the 3DP product.
x It is beneficial to the consumer under decentralized 
Bertrand market but not under the decentralized 
Stackelberg market, cost reduction on the 3DP cannot 
bring more surplus;
x In an integrated supply chain, consumer gets more surplus 
after the 3DP adoption;
x It is not beneficial to the consumer if the TM product Is 
fully replaced by the 3DP product.
C
os
t o
f t
he
 3
DP
 P
ro
du
ct
  173 
findings of other studies indicating that cost reduction of the 3DP would help the long-term 
development of 3DP technology (Ernst & Young, 2016; Wohlers Associates, 2018). 
 
Figure 4-23 Impacts of the Product Customization Level on Consumer Surplus  
Thirdly, as summarized in Figure 4-23 above, with regard to customization improvements, 
under the decentralized 3DP-enabled market, the consumer can only enjoy more surplus 
when the customization level of the 3DP product is neither extremely high nor low. However, 
if the logistics vendor uses a 3DP product to fully replace the TM product, the consumer 
benefits only if the customization level of the 3DP product is low. Therefore, selecting a 
higher customization level for the 3DP product is not beneficial to the consumer, although 
the most studies in the mass customization research suggested that the consumer willingness 
to pay would be increased by the high level of the product customization (Fiore et al., 2004; 
Pine, 1993; Takagoshi & Matsubayashi, 2013). 
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Figure 4-24 The Impact of using 3DP as a Threat 
In addition, this model also investigates the possibility of using 3DP as a threat to influence 
the traditional manufacturer’s business decisions, as Figure 4-24 demonstrates. It is 
beneficial to the logistics vendor to use this strategy only if the customization level of the 
3DP product is low, because in this scenario the traditional manufacturer uses a low-pricing 
strategy to maintain its pricing advantage and thus increase market demand for the TM 
product. Therefore, the logistics vendor can gain more profits from the increased delivery 
service. 
Theoretical Contributions 
First, drawing upon the game theory, this chapter accesses the impact of the logistics vendor’s 
3DP adoption on the supply chain. Based on the analytical model, the research in this chapter 
confirms game theories (Bertrand and Stackelberg, specifically) indeed could be used for 
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decision making on the 3DP adoption and derives guidelines about how to adopt 3DP 
technology.  
Second, in 3DP adoption improvement, there exist two different strategies: (1) improving the 
customization level of the 3DP or (2) reducing the cost of the 3DP production (Dong et al., 
2017).  Unlike the other existing 3DP research literature which focuses on either improving 
the customization level of 3DP or reducing the cost of 3DP (Halassi et al., 2019; Wohlers 
Associates, 2018; Zeltmann et al., 2016), this paper attempts to examine those key variables 
of the 3DP adoption and the interaction among them.  
Also, although some of the existing 3DP research literature (e.g. (Holmström et al., 2010; 
Mellor et al., 2014; Schröder, Falk, & Schmitt, 2015; Zanardini et al., 2016)) have attempted 
to determine the best 3DP adoption strategies, most of them neglect the possibility of a non-
manufacturer’s 3DP adoption using the analytical modelling. In particular, since the 3DP 
adoption has no requirements on tooling and workforce’s skill, this study attempts to theorize 
that a non-manufacturer also can adopt the 3DP for the purpose of improving the supply 
chain. 
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 Adoption of 3DP by the Traditional Manufacturer  
The previous model points out that under certain market structures, the traditional 
manufacturer loses its market share because of the logistics vendor’s 3DP adoption. 
Therefore, this model still uses the two-layer supply chain (one traditional manufacturer and 
one logistics vendor) and seeks to explore what kind of manufacturing decisions the 
traditional manufacturer should take to cope with the threat of the logistics vendor’s 3DP 
adoption. Typically, there are two options for the traditional manufacturer. One option is that 
the traditional manufacturer decides to upgrade its traditional technology to make it more 
flexible and offers alternative products with higher customization levels. Alternatively, 
believing that 3DP may revolutionize the manufacturing industry, the traditional 
manufacturer decides to adopt 3DP. Therefore, what is the best operations decision for the 
manufacturer? This chapter intends to answer this question, which has not yet been formally 
assessed. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 introduces the background 
and Section 5.2 describes the problem, sets up the benchmarking model, and derives the 
equilibrium under different market structures. Section 5.3 focuses on the analysis and 
comparisons of the traditional manufacturer’s different traditional flexible manufacturing 
strategies, when only the logistics vendor provides 3DP product to the market. Section 5.4 
analyzes and compares the benchmarking model with the traditional manufacturer’s potential 
3DP adoption strategies. Section 5.5 presents an extra technical analysis of the traditional 
manufacturer’s traditional flexible manufacturing strategies and 3DP manufacturing 
strategies. Finally, Section 5.6 concludes this chapter by discussing the practical implications 
of the findings and suggesting potential avenues for future research. All the proofs of this 
chapter are detailed in the Appendix B-1. 
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5.1 Introduction 
 
Figure 5-1 Industrial 3DP System Sales (Wohlers Associates, 2018) 
According to a report by Wohlers Associates (2018) (Figure 5-1), the unit sales of industrial 
systems priced over $5,000 grew by 12.6% compared to a growth of 4.2% in 2016 and a 
decline of 2.3% in 2015. The average selling price of industrial 3DP systems decreased after 
increasing in 2016 and 2015. This may be due to a large increase in the number of traditional 
manufacturers now supplying industrial 3DP systems (e.g., GE, Airbus, Adidas, Ford, BMW), 
many of which are at the lower end of the cost spectrum. For instance, General Motors has 
successfully adopted 3DP technology for its smart parts manufacturing strategy and saves 
almost 49 times the amount of money that it initially invested in 3DP (Watkin, 2018). This 
is a typical example of fully successful 3DP adoption. The Mini Cooper (owned by BMW) 
started to offer 3DP personalized accessories and special equipment from 2018 (Figure 5-2) 
(MINI, 2018; Overall, 2017; Saunders, 2017). This 3DP product line is a part of MINI’s 
current high customization production line and the entire delivery service is currently handled 
by DHL in the European market (MINI, 2018).  
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Figure 5-2 MINI Yours Customized 3DP Product Service (Saunders, 2017)  
Considering the cost of replacing existing traditional manufacturing systems with 3DP 
manufacturing, the majority of companies are still choosing flexible manufacturing strategies, 
such as robots, computer controlled machines, and CNC (Computer Numerical Control) 
machines to improve the productivity of the whole manufacturing system and the 
customization level of their products (Faludi, Bayley, Bhogal, & Iribarne, 2015; Tang, Mak, 
& Zhao, 2016). Although these flexible manufacturing technologies are quite expensive, 
adopting the traditional flexible technology is still a common strategy the traditional 
manufacturer uses to improve the product customization level (Bogers et al., 2016; Hu, 2013). 
However, considering the speed of technology improvement and the changes in consumer 
demands, using a flexible manufacturing strategy might not be an absolutely sustainable 
alternative to the traditional manufacturing. In addition, as we already discussed in Chapter 
3, currently, some logistics vendors (e.g. UPS) have put much effort into 3DP adoption for 
production-on-demand. Under certain conditions, the new 3DP product will cannibalize the 
TM product’s market share and have a negative impact on the traditional manufacturer’s 
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profits. This finding motivates us to think about what kind of manufacturing strategy the 
traditional manufacturer can use to face the challenge from the new 3DP technology.   
Therefore, this model considers a traditional manufacturer (like Mini) facing operational 
decisions with regard to the selection of flexible manufacturing technologies during the 
transition to 3DP manufacturing for car accessories. The situation is modelled within the 
market in which the logistics vendor has already adopted 3DP (i.e. UPS) and is using the 
3DP product to compete with the TM product. Then, this model simulates the situation where 
the traditional manufacturer offers a 3DP product to the end consumer via 3DP adoption or 
the expensive traditional flexible manufacturing technologies. By comparing these different 
manufacturing technology decisions, this model aims at further investigation of the impact 
of 3DP adoption on the supply chain. Three more different scenarios are considered in which 
the traditional manufacturer can select a traditional flexible technology or a 3DP 
manufacturing technology to improve its product’s customization level. In the other words, 
this model tries to glean managerial insights by exploring the research question ‘what kind 
of manufacturing strategy should the traditional manufacturer take to cope with 3DP 
adoption by the logistics vendor?’ and the relevant sub-questions, 
Q2.1. Under what conditions will the traditional manufacturer also adopt 3DP? 
Q2.2. Under what conditions will the traditional manufacturer use flexible manufacturing to 
compete with 3DP? 
Q2.3. What are the impacts of the traditional manufacturer’s different manufacturing 
strategies on the supply chain structure? 
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The primary goals of this model are (i) to further develop our first model in Chapter 3 to 
investigate the supply chain following a traditional manufacturer’s adoption of 3DP or 
traditional flexible manufacturing technology, whilst explicitly modelling customization. 
The model also aims (ii) to explore the impact of 3DP adoption on the traditional supply 
chain where the logistics vendor is already empowered by 3DP.  
Overall, this model makes the following contributions. Firstly, it endogenizes the 3DP 
adoption decision under the 3DP enabled supply chain and develops a stylized model to study 
the interaction between traditional manufacturing, traditional flexible manufacturing 
technology and 3DP technology. Secondly, this model derives the conditions under which 
3DP adoption by the traditional manufacturer is mutually beneficial or exclusively beneficial 
for the traditional manufacturer and/or the logistics vendor. Thirdly, this model analyzes the 
consumer surplus of different manufacturing decisions made by the traditional manufacturer. 
The results can help to inform the traditional manufacturer and the logistics vendor with 
regard to the adoption of new manufacturing technology and consumer behaviour research. 
The results have important implications for both decision makers and policymakers. 
Understanding the adoption of 3DP, manufacturers can better focus their R&D efforts on 
projects that ideally perform both in their economic and environmental aspects. Moreover, 
the results support the traditional manufacturer in deciding which manufacturing technology 
strategy is profitable, and for which products it may be worth using 3DP technology. And for 
the logistics vendor, the results help provide further understanding of how to cope with the 
manufacturer’s different manufacturing strategies and how to become involved in the 
manufacturer’s new high customization manufacturing business. Logistics vendors might 
need to start to collaborate with the traditional manufacturer on certain 3DP services. From 
a policy-maker’s point of view, these results highlight the fact that, at this stage, encouraging 
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3DP adoption through legislation ultimately aimed at improving manufacturing technology 
may in fact still have the inverse effect on traditional manufacturing. Therefore, it is a big 
challenge for the policymakers to find a way to not only improve the manufacturing industry 
overall performance but also further help the further 3DP technology’s adoption.   
5.2 Problem Description 
In this model, we consider the period after the logistics vendor adopts 3DP, and in which the 
traditional manufacturer employs a new manufacturing strategy based on traditional 
manufacturing, traditional flexible manufacturing, and 3DP manufacturing. All three 
technologies (TM, TF, and 3DP) deliver the same product quality, but the costs are different 
due to the fixed aspects (i.e. product design, prototyping, machine setting, etc.) and variable 
aspects (i.e. materials, machines, tooling, labour, etc.). Both the traditional and the 3DP 
manufacturing technologies can provide the same product customization variants. In this 
model, we are interested in the manufacturing technology decisions for the traditional 
manufacturer; therefore, this model focuses on five different scenarios:  
If the traditional manufacturer uses the flexible manufacturing strategy, there are two 
different supply chain structures: 
Scenario 1: The traditional manufacturer produces a product using traditional manufacturing 
(TM) and traditional flexible manufacturing (TF), whilst the logistics vendor offers the 3DP 
product (Figure 5-6).  
Scenario 2: The traditional manufacturer fully abandons the traditional manufacturing 
method for the purpose of improving product customization (Figure 5-10).  
  182 
If the traditional manufacturer starts to use 3DP manufacturing technology, there are three 
different combinations: 
Scenario 3: The supply chain where the traditional manufacturer sells three horizontally 
differentiated product variants in the market, the TM, the TF, and the 3DP product (Figure 
5-12).  
Scenario 4: Considering the cost of the flexible manufacturing system, the traditional 
manufacturer only uses 3DP manufacturing technology for high customization products 
(Figure 5-13).  
Scenario 5: The traditional manufacturer fully switches to a 3DP manufacturing system 
(Figure 5-14). 
Table 5-1 provides descriptions of all the parameters which are used in this chapter. 
Table 5-1 Definitions of Parameters 
Parameter Definition K Consumer value discount for the TM product customization level, 0 < ' <1. L Consumer value discount for the TF product customization level, ' < M <1. NL # ∈ {5, QR, 3S5, 3S7}, the unit selling price for a TM product, a FT 
product or a 3DP product offered by the traditional manufacturer or the 
logistics vendor, and the price that is charged by the logistics vendor to 
deliver a TM, FT, or 3DM product for the traditional manufacturer, 0 </D < 1. UVL # ∈ {5, QR, 3S5, 3S7}, the fixed cost for a TM product, a FT product or a 
3DP product that is offered by the traditional manufacturer or the logistics 
vendor, 0 < /D < 1. WVL # ∈ {5, QR, 3S5, 3S7}, the variable cost for a TM product, a FT product or 
a 3DP product that is offered by the traditional manufacturer or the logistics 
vendor, 0 < /D < 1. XL # ∈ {5, QR, 3S5, 3S7}, the sales quantity for the TM, FT, 3DM or 3DL 
products, 0 < .D < 1. 
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YL # ∈ {5, QR, 3S5, 3S7}, the utility of the TM, FT, 3DM or 3DL products. Z 	L  # ∈ {5, 7, 9:}, the manufacturer’s profit, or the logistics vendor’s profit, or the supply chain’s total profit, ∏ ≥D 0. 
In line with the benchmark model in Chapter 4, this model sets the product customization 
level of the TM product lower than that of the TF and 3DP product. For simplicity, this model 
also sets the full customization level of the 3DP product to 1. Therefore, the consumer values 
the TM product less, as designated by 'F , where '	(0 < ' < 1)  represents the 
customization level of the TM product. The higher the degree of customization the 3DP 
product variants have, the less the consumer values the TM product. Because the TF product 
can offer multiple product customization variants, how much the consumer values the TF 
product depends on the number of its variants MF (' < M < 1), which captures two features 
of the traditional flexible manufacturing technology. Firstly, the customization level of the 
TF product is higher than the TM product; and secondly, the customization level of the TF 
product is lower than the 3DP product (Wohlers Associates, 2018). Therefore, the net utilities 
of a consumer buying the TM, TF, and 3DP product from either the traditional manufacturer 
and/or the logistics vendor are \0 = 'F − /0 , \MJ = MF − /MJ , \$%0 = F − /$%0 , and \$%/ = F − /$%/, respectively. 
Because the traditional manufacturer’s flexible manufacturing system might be developed on 
the traditional manufacturing system, referring the model settings by Dong et al. (2017), we 
separate the cost of different manufacturing technology into fixed cost and variable cost. This 
model assumes that the TM product can only offer one variant (in terms of product 
customization), the fixed and variable cost of the TM product are constant at Q0 and ]0. 
However, this model separates the logistics delivery cost, //, from the manufacturing cost. 
Thus, the total cost of the traditionally manufactured product is Q0 + ]0 + // . The 
traditional flexible manufacturing technology can offer multiple product variants via 
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customization. Differently, this model assumes that all variants are equally dissimilar and 
more flexible variants require more investment (Hu, 2013). The fixed cost and the variable 
cost of the traditional manufacturing technology are denoted by QMJ and ]MJ  respectively, 
and the variable cost of the product produced by traditional flexible manufacturing is higher 
than the traditionally manufactured product (]0 < ]MJ) (Syam & Kumar, 2006), then the 
higher the customization level, the greater the variable cost. The variable cost of the 
traditional manufacturing product increases in the degree of TF product customization. 
Therefore, the cost of a TF product is  QMJ + M]MJ + //  (Upton, 2008). Lastly, the 3DP 
manufacturing technology in this model is a new type of flexible manufacturing technology 
with fixed cost Q$% and variable cost ]$%. For the 3DP manufacturing technology, it is easy 
to prototype and design complex and high customization products; therefore, the unit variable 
cost ]$%  does not increase dramatically (Smith, 2015). Nevertheless, this model assumes ]$% > ]MJ > ]0 (Figure 5-3) because the cost of those products which are never 3D printed 
is still high (Smith, 2015; Wohlers Associates, 2018). Thus, the cost of the 3DP product is Q$% + ]$%. In addition, the fixed costs of the TF and 3DP product weakly decrease in their 
own product sales and there is no delivery cost for the logistics vendor, as we explained in 
Chapter 4. 
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Figure 5-3 Variable Cost of Products Produced by three Different Manufacturing Methods 
5.3 Benchmarking Model – 3DL Model 
First of all, based on the structure we used in Chapter 4, because we invent new parameters, 
we recalculate the optimal decisions and the maximized profits of the benchmarking model. 
 
Figure 5-4 Benchmarking Model - TM3DL Model  
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Under the benchmarking model (Figure 5-4), where the logistics vendor adopts the 3DP 
technology (/$%/ ≥ H"# ), the pricewise-linear demand functions for the TM and 3DP product 
are 
(' = )*#() − *'(1 − )))  (5.1) (#() = 1 − *#() − *'1 − )  (5.2) 
The profit functions for the traditional manufacturer and the logistics vendor under the 
decentralized supply chain are 
 . /(*')#() = (*' − 0' − 1' − *))(' (5.3) 
 . 2(*#() , *))#() = (*) − 4)) ∗ (' + (*#() − 0#( − 1#()(#() (5.4) 
And the profit for the vertically integrated supply chain is  
 . 78(*' , *#() , *))#() = (*' − 0' − 1' − 4))(' + (*#() − 0#( − 1#()(#() (5.5) 
Here, this model also uses Bertrand and Stackelberg for the price decision sequence (Figure 
5-5).  
 
Figure 5-5 Pricing Sequence of the Logistics Vendor’s 3DP Manufacturing System  
pM
Logistics Vendor
Manufacturer
pM
Logistics Vendor
Manufacturer
Bertrand
Stackelberg
pL p3DL
pL p3DL
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PROPOSITION 5-1.  
(1) In the decentralized 3DP manufacturing system, under Bertrand-Nash-equilibrium, 
the maximum profit for the traditional manufacturer is ∏ 5("*)∗$%/> =− (2+.)2(0"+1#−.(13%+33%)+3#)2(−1+.).(8+.)2  and the maximum profit for the logistics vendor is ∏ 7="378, "8@∗$%/> = 14(−1+.)(8+.)2 (−(8 + ) − 2+8 + (−8 + )),37 − 2,* + (−8 + ))-37 −2-*)(−(−1 + ))(8 + )) + 6+8 + (−8 + ) + )2),37 + 6,* + (−8 + ) + )2)-37 + 6-*) +1. (2(2 + ))(−+8 − ,* + )(,37 + -37) − -*)(−)(8 + )) + 8+8 + 8,* + )2(,37 + -37) +8-*))) , both of which are maximized by optimal price /0∗ =.(8+.)+40"+41#+.(4+.)(13%+33%)+43#2(8+.) ,  //∗ = .(8+.)+2(4+.)0"−81#−.2(13%+33%)−83#2(8+.) , and /$%/∗ =8+.−20"+(8+3.)13%−21#+(8+3.)33%−23#2(8+.) . The optimal market demand for the TM and 3DP 
product is  .0∗ = (2+.)(0"+1#−.(13%+33%)+3#)(−1+.).(8+.) 	  and .$%/∗ =− −(−1+.)(8+.)+60"+(−8+.+.2)13%+61#+(−8+.+.2)33%+63#2(−1+.)(8+.) . 
(2) In the decentralized 3DP manufacturing system, under Stackelberg-Nash 
equilibrium, the maximum profit for the traditional manufacturer is ∏ 5("*)∗$%/@ =1(−1+.).(8+(−5+.).)2 ((+8 + ,* − )(,37 + -37) + -*)(2(−2 + ))+8 − 4(,* + -*) +)(−2(−2 + )),37 + 2,* + (−4 + )(11 + (−6 + )))))-37 + 2-*)))  and the maximum 
profit for the logistics vendor is ∏ 7("378, "8)∗$%/@ = 14(−1+.)(8+(−5+.).)2 (((−1 + ))(8 +(−5 + )))) − (−3 + ))(−2 + ))+8 + (8 + (−7 + )))),37 + (−3 + ))(−2 + ))(−,* +)-37) − 6-* − (−5 + )))-*)(8 + (−5 + ))) + (−2 + ))+8 + (−8 + (7 − 2)))),37 −2,* − 16-37 − 2-* + )(,* + (20 + (−8 + ))))-37 + -*)) + 1. (2(−2 + ))+8 − 4(,* +-*) + )(−2(−2 + )),37 + 2,* + (−4 + )(11 + (−6 + )))))-37 + 2-*))(−)(8 + (−5 +)))) + (−4 + ))(−2 + ))+8 + 8,* + 8-* + )(−6(,* + -*) + )(,37 + ,* + -37 + -*)))) , 
both of which are maximized by optimal price /0∗ = 12(8+(−5+.).) ()(8 + (−5 + )))) +(−2 + ))2+8 + 4,* − (−4 + )))(,37 − ,* + -37 − -*) + 4-*) ,  //∗ = 12(8+(−5+.).) ()(8 +(−5 + )))) + (8 + (−4 + ))))+8 − 8,* − 8-* − )(−6(,* + -*) + )(,37 + ,* + -37 +-*))) , and /$%/∗ = 12(8+(−5+.).) 	(8 + (−5 + ))) + (−2 + ))+8 + (8 − 3)),37 − 2,* −2-* + )(,* + (10 + (−6 + ))))-37 + -*)). The optimal market demand for the TM and 
3DP product is  .0∗ = − 12(−1+.).(8+(−5+.).) (2(−2 + ))+8 − 4(,* + -*) + )(−2(−2 +)),37 + 2,* + (−4 + )(11 + (−6 + )))))-37 + 2-*))	  and .$%/∗ =12(−1+.)(8+(−5+.).) ((−1 + ))(8 + (−5 + )))) − (−3 + ))(−2 + ))+8 + (8 + (−7 + )))),37 +(−3 + ))(−2 + ))(−,* + )-37) − 6-* − (−5 + )))-*). 
(3) In the integrated 3DP manufacturing system, under Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, the 
maximum profit for the supply chain  is ∏ 67("*, "378)∗$%/> = 14(−1+.). (−)(−1 + ,37 +-37)(−1 + ) − +8 + ,37 − ,* + -37 − -*) + () − +8 − ,* − -*)(+8 + ,* − )(,37 +-37) + -*))  , which is maximized by optimal price /0∗ = 12 () + +8 + ,* + -*)  and  /$%/∗ = 12 (1 + ,37 + -37) . The optimal market demand for the TM and 3DP product is  .0∗ = 0"+1#−.(13%+33%)+3#2(−1+.). 	 and .$%/∗ = 1−.+0"−13%+1#−33%+3#2−2. . 
  188 
Above proposition presents the existing optimal decisions and the maximized profits of 
different market structures for the benchmarking model. 
5.4 Traditional Manufacturer’s Flexible Manufacturing Strategy 
In this subsection, we describe the proposed model for the traditional manufacturer’s flexible 
manufacturing strategy, derive the equilibrium under different supply chain structures, and 
present technical analysis for the comparison between the benchmarking model and the 
proposed models. At the end of the subsection, we conduct a further comparison among all 
the proposed models in this chapter. 
If the traditional manufacturer introduces flexible manufacturing technology instead of 3DP 
technology, consumers can find three different products in the market: the TM and the TF 
product offered by the traditional manufacturer, and the 3DP product provided by the 
logistics vendor. The consumer has three purchase choices under different conditions: 
(1) They buy the TM product when  \0 > \MJ > \$%/  and \0 > 0 or \0 > \$%/ >\MJ and \0 > 0; 
(2) They buy the FT product from the traditional manufacturer when \MJ > \M0 > \$%/ 
and \MJ > 0 or \MJ > \$%/ > \0 and \MJ > 0; and 
(3) They buy the logistics vendor’s 3DP product when \$%/ > \0 > \MJ and \$%/ > 0 
or \$%/ > \MJ > \0 and \$%/ > 0.  
Then, we can derive the inverse market demand functions as shown in Table 5-2. The market 
demand could be summarized into 4 different scenarios depending on the price of each 
product. Scenario II is the same as the benchmarking manufacturing system. Because this 
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section focuses on the question of whether the traditional manufacturer could use traditional 
flexible manufacturing to compete with the logistics vendor’s 3DP, this model only 
investigates scenario I in Section 5.4.1 and scenario III in Section 5.4.2. 
Table 5-2 The Inverse Market Demand of the Traditional Flexible Manufacturing System 
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5.4.1 TMTF3DL Model 
 
Figure 5-6 Flexible Manufacturing System -TMTF3DL Model 
Under Scenario I (Table 5-2), the traditional manufacturer offers the TM and TF product and 
the logistics vendor offers the 3DP product with a high product customization level; for easy 
reference, we name it the TMTF3DL model. For example, most of the automotive companies 
(e.g. Nissan, Ford, Acura) are using CNC machines to improve the productivity and the 
efficiency of their manufacturing systems (Ernst & Young, 2016; Wohlers Associates, 2018). 
The profits of the manufacturer and logistics vendor could be formulated as Equation (5.6) 
and (5.7), respectively,  
 . /(*' , **+)*+ = (*' − 0' − 1' − *))(' + (**+ − 0*+ − 91*+ − *))(*+ (5.6) 
 . 2(*#() , *))*+ = (*) − 4))((' + (*+) + (*#() − 0#( − 1#()(#() (5.7) 
  191 
And the profit for the vertically integrated supply chain is  
. 78(*' , **+ , *#())*+ = (*' − 0' − 1' − 4))(' + (**+ − 0*+ − 91*+ − 4))(*+ + (*#() − 0#(− 1#()(#() (5.8) 
Considering the different market structures (Figure 5-7), next, this model seeks to derive the 
Bertrand equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibrium. 
 
Figure 5-7 Pricing Sequence of Scenario I  
PROPOSITION 5-2.  
(1) In the decentralized 3DP manufacturing system, under Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, 
the maximum profits for the traditional manufacturer and the logistics vendor are 
shown in Equation (5.53) and (5.54) respectively. They are maximized by the optimal 
price in Equation (5.46), (5.47), (5.48), and (5.49). The optimal market demand for 
the TM, TF, and 3DP product are given in Equation (5.50), (5.51), and (5.52)(5.53). 
(2) In the decentralized 3DP manufacturing system, under Stackelberg-Nash 
equilibrium, the maximum profit for the traditional manufacturer is shown in 
Equation (5.62) and the maximum profit for the logistics vendor is as in Equation 
(5.63), both of which are maximized by the optimal price given in Equation (5.55), 
(5.56), (5.57), and (5.58). The optimal market demand for the TM, TF, and 3DP 
product is given in Equation (5.59), (5.60), and (5.61). 
(3) In the integrated 3DP manufacturing system, the maximum profit for the supply chain 
is given in Equation (5.70) , which is maximized by the optimal prices in Equation 
(5.64), (5.65), and (5.66). The optimal market demand for the TM and 3DP product 
are shown in Equation (5.67), (5.68), and (5.69). 
Because of the complexity of the structure of the optimal decisions, it is difficult to gain 
direct insights in the following comparisons. Therefore, this model had to use numerical tests 
pM, pTF
Logistics Vendor
Manufacturer
pM, pTF
Logistics Vendor
Manufacturer
Bertrand
Stackelberg
pL p3DL
pL p3DL
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to investigate the relative performance under different supply chain structures. A full factorial 
design of the cost has been created with three different groups – low-cost, medium-cost and 
high-cost supply chains, as Table 5-3 below shows. We use these supply chain settings for 
all of the following comparative analysis in this chapter. 
Table 5-3 Parameter Values in the Numerical Testing for the Impacts of Product Customization 
Level 
 TM product TF Product 3DP product Delivery 
product Q0 ]0 ' QMJ ]MJ M Q$% ]$% "/ 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.025 0.02 0.2 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.1 0.25 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.35 0.01 
For each cost group we refer to one special item which could be 3D printed by traditional 
manufacturing technology, traditional flexible manufacturing technology and 3DP 
technology. The cost structure of the supply chain with the low setting refers to Mini 
Cooper’s car dashboard fascia (Figure 5-2), the medium setting uses 3DP Formula 1 race car 
aluminium alloy components as the reference (Figure 5-8), and the high setting is based on 
the cost structure for Honda’s new configurable electric car body shell production (Figure 
5-9) (Wohlers Associates, 2018). 
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Figure 5-8 3D Printed Formula 1 Race Car Aluminium Alloy Components (Wohlers Associates, 
2018) 
 
Figure 5-9 Honda's 3D Printed Electric Car Body (Ayre, 2016) 
Based on these cost settings, in the tests of the impact of TM product customization, this 
model selects three different levels of TF product customization (M = 0.2,	M = 0.4, M =0.6). Following the same approach, in the numerical tests of the impact of TF product 
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customization, another three different TM product customization levels were used for 
laboratory analysis (' = 0.1,	' = 0.2, ' = 0.3).  
For the purpose of understanding and comparing the impacts of different product costs and 
the different product customization levels on the overall results, the results about the test on 
each variate are listed in Appendix C-2. 
5.4.2 TF3DL Model 
 
Figure 5-10 Flexible Manufacturing System -TF3DL Model 
In scenario III (Table 5-2), the traditional manufacturer prices the TF product lower (H<=R <H"# ), and so the consumer chooses from two different high customization products, the TF 
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and the 3DP product (Figure 5-10) – we call this the ‘TF3DL’ model. For instance, Boeing, 
Airbus, Rolls Royce, and GE are currently using CNC machining for assembly and 
subassembly fabrication and inspection services. 
In this TF3DL model, the manufacturer’s and the logistics vendor’s profits could be re-
formulated as in Equation (5.9) and (5.10) respectively,  
 . /(**+)*+ = (**+ − 0*+ − 91*+ − *))(*+ (5.9) 
 . 2(*#() , *))*+ = (*) − 4))(*+ + (*#() − 0#( − 1#()(#() (5.10) 
And the profit for the vertically integrated supply chain is  
 . 78(**+ , *#())*+ = (**+ − 0*+ − 91*+ − 4))(*+ + (*#() − 0#( − 1#()(#() (5.11) 
By considering the different market structures (Figure 5-11), in the following discussion this 
model seeks to list the solutions for Bertrand-equilibrium and Stackelberg-equilibrium. 
 
Figure 5-11 Pricing Sequence in Scenario III  
PROPOSITION 5-3. If the traditional manufacturing decides fully use TF product to replace 
TM product for the purpose of coping with the logistics vendor’s 3DP technology, 
(1) In the decentralized 3DP manufacturing system, under Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, 
the maximum profits for the traditional manufacturer and the logistics vendor are 
given in Equation (5.76) and (5.77), respectively. They are maximized by the optimal 
pTF
Logistics Vendor
Manufacturer
pTF
Logistics Vendor
Manufacturer
Bertrand
Stackelberg
pL p3DL
pL p3DL
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prices shown in Equation (5.71), (5.72), and (5.73), whilst the optimal market demand 
for the TM and 3DP product is given in Equation (5.74) and Equation (5.75). 
(2) In the decentralized 3DP manufacturing system, under Stackelberg-Nash 
equilibrium, the maximum profit for the traditional manufacturer is shown in 
Equation (5.83) and the maximum profit for the logistics vendor is as in Equation 
(5.84), both of which are maximized by the optimal price given in Equation (5.78), 
(5.79), and (5.80). The optimal market demand for the TM and 3DP product are as 
in Equation (5.81) and Equation (5.82). 
(3) In the integrated 3DP manufacturing system, the maximum profit for the supply chain 
is given in Equation (5.89), which is maximized by the optimal price as in Equation 
(5.85) and Equation (5.86). The optimal market demand for the TF and 3DP product 
is shown in Equation (5.87) and (5.88). 
5.4.3 Comparison between the TF Enabled Models 
In this subsection, we compare the outcomes in the TF enabled models (TMTF3DL and 
TF3DL) and identify the traditional manufacturer’s best TF manufacturing strategy. 
PROPOSITION 5-4. The traditional manufacturer is better off adding the TF product instead 
of fully replacing the TM product with the TF product in most cases, except  
(1) On the low supply chain setting, when the fixed TF product cost is extremely low;  
(2) On the high supply chain setting when a) the 3DP product costs are high under the 
Bertrand supply chain, or b) the 3DP product costs are sufficiently low or low under 
the Stackelberg supply chain. 
In this supply chain structure, it is obvious that the traditional manufacturer can generate 
more profits by producing two products differentiated by customization level rather than only 
providing the TF product. This finding concurs with a majority of previous papers which 
suggest that the manufacturer should launch a wider range of products to fulfil consumer 
demands under certain conditions. For instance, (Dong et al., 2017) find it an inevitable trend 
for the traditional manufacturer to use flexible technologies to improve product variety. 
Considering the investment cost, adding one of the flexible technologies into the current TM 
production system is a more appropriate manufacturing strategy for the traditional 
manufacturer at this stage. The 3DP product sales become robust because the high price of 
the TF product mitigates the price disadvantage of the 3DP product. For example, consider 
the case of chain brands for clothing and shoes. Selling both the standard items and the highly 
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customized item can help the traditional manufacturer cover a wider consumer base and the 
logistics vender can make more profit on the delivery service. However, on the low supply 
chain setting (where the cost structure of the product is not extremely high), if the costs of 
the TF product are located in a certain low range, fully using TF production is better for the 
traditional manufacturer (Table 5-5). A new TF product benefits the traditional manufacturer 
by a higher margin per product and more customization-sensitive consumers, even with 
valuation uncertainty.  
Therefore, the key implications of this proposition are as follows. Firstly, intuitively, we 
expect a multiple product manufacturing strategy to be better than the TF product only, but 
this proposition suggests that for those products whose cost is not extremely high (e.g. phone 
covers, shoe soles), if the TF product investment is not expensive, fully engaging in TF 
production might be a good manufacturing strategy to cope with the logistics vendor’s 3DP 
product competition. In practice, some companies only provide the customized product. For 
example, SATAIR only provides some highly-customized aeroplane parts to specified airline 
companies (e.g. Airbus) (SATAIR, 2018). Secondly, for high cost products, it is better to add 
the TF product instead of fully replacing the TM production. Rolls-Royce not only provides 
highly customized flight engines (the Trend serials) to the Airbus and Boeing airliners, but 
also provides the standard flight engine (Rolls-Royce, 2018).  
Table 5-4 Traditional Manufacturer’s Maximized Profit: Comparison by TM Product Cost –
TMTF3DL and TF3DL 
Low Medium High 
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 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 Q0 ]0 ' QMJ ]MJ M Q$% ]$% "/ 
Low - - 0.1 0.025 0.02 0.2 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Medium - - 0.2 0.1 0.25 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.01 
High - - 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.35 0.01 
Table 5-5 Traditional Manufacturer’s Maximized Profit: Comparison by TF Product Cost –
TMTF3DL and TF3DL 
Low Medium High 
   
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 Q0 ]0 ' QMJ ]MJ M Q$% ]$% "/ 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 - - 0.2 0.1 0.03 0.01 
MB-TMTF3DL
MB-TF3DML
MB-TMTF3DL
MB-TF3DML
MB-TMTF3DL
MB-TF3DML
MS-TMTF3DL
MS-TF3DL
MS-TMTF3DL
MS-TF3DL
MS-TMTF3DL
MS-TF3DL
MB-TMTF3DL
MB-TF3DL
MB-TMTF3DL
MB-TF3DL
MB-TMTF3DL
MB-TF3DL
MS-TMTF3DL
MS-TF3DL
MS-TMTF3DL
MS-TF3DL
MS-TMTF3DL
MS-TF3DL
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Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 - - 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 - - 0.6 0.6 0.35 0.01 
 
Table 5-6 Traditional Manufacturer’s Maximized Profit: Comparison by 3DP Product Cost –
TMTF3DL and TF3DL 
Low Medium High 
   
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 Q0 ]0 ' QMJ ]MJ M Q$% ]$% "/ 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.025 0.02 0.2 - - 0.01 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.1 0.25 0.4 - - 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 - - 0.01 
 
Table 5-7 Traditional Manufacturer’s Maximized Profit: Comparison by Logistics Delivery Cost – 
TMTF3DL and TF3DL 
Low Medium High 
   
MB-TMTF3DL
MB-TF3DL
MB-TMTF3DL
MB-TF3DL
MB-TMTF3DL
MB-TF3DL
MS-TMTF3DL
MS-TF3DL
MS-TMTF3DL
MS-TF3DL
MS-TMTF3DL
MS-TF3DL
0.005 0.010 0.015
cL
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.005
0.006
MB-TMTF3DL
MB-TF3DML
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
cL
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.005
0.006
MB-TMTF3DL
MB-TF3DML
0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.27
cL
0.006
0.008
0.010
0.012
0.014
MB-TMTF3DL
MB-TF3DML
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 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 Q0 ]0 ' QMJ ]MJ M Q$% ]$% "/ 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.025 0.02 0.2 0.1 0.03 - 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.1 0.25 0.4 0.3 0.3 - 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.35 - 
 
Table 5-8 Traditional Manufacturer’s Maximized Supply Chain Profit: Comparison by TF Product 
Customization Level – TMTF3DL and TF3DL 
Low Medium High 
   
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 Q0 ]0 ' QMJ ]MJ M Q$% ]$% "/ 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.025 0.02 - 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.1 0.25 - 0.3 0.3 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 0.3 0.3 - 0.6 0.35 0.01 
 
PROPOSITION 5-5.   
(1) With the low supply chain setting, the logistics vendor can in general achieve better 
performance under the TF3DL model. However, if a) the TF product costs are high, 
or b) the fixed TF product cost is located within a certain low range, the logistics 
vendor can gain more profits under the TMTF3DL model. 
0.005 0.010 0.015
cL
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.005
0.006
MS-TMTF3DL
MS-TF3DL
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
cL
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.005
0.006
MS-TMTF3DL
MS-TF3DL
0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.27
cL
0.006
0.008
0.010
0.012
0.014
0.016
MS-TMTF3DL
MS-TF3DL
0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00

0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
MB-TMTF3DL
MB-TF3DL
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

0.05
0.10
0.15
MB-TMTF3DL
MB-TF3DL
0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
MB-TMTF3DL
MB-TF3DL
0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00

0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
MS-TMTF3DL
MS-TF3DL
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
MS-TMTF3DL
MS-TF3DL
0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
MS-TMTF3DL
MS-TF3DL
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(2) With the medium supply chain setting, the logistics vendor gains more profit under 
the TF3DL model if a) the TF product costs are sufficiently low, b) the TF product 
costs are sufficiently low or high, c) the logistics delivery cost is high, or d) the TF 
product customization level is high. Otherwise, s/he can make more profit under the 
TMTF3DL model. 
(3) With the high supply chain setting, the logistics vendor obtains more profit under the 
TF3DL model if a) the TF product costs are sufficiently low, b) the fixed TF product 
costs are sufficiently low or high, c) the logistics delivery cost is high, or d) the TF 
product customization level is extremely high. Otherwise, he/she can obtain more 
profit under the TMTF3DL model. 
 
We have several findings regarding this proposition, as illustrated in Table 5-9 to Table 5-13. 
Firstly, we find that multi-product manufacturing does not always lead to more profit for the 
logistics vendor from increased goods delivery and increased 3DP product revenue. With all 
three supply chain settings, if the TM product costs are sufficiently low, the logistics vendor 
can achieve better financial performance under the TF3DL model. If the TM product costs 
are high, the logistics vendor can glean more profits under the TMTF3DL model (Table 5-9). 
On the one hand, if the TM product costs are low, the traditional manufacturer can achieve 
more TM product sales due to the price advantage. Therefore, the logistics vendor can make 
more profit on product delivery. On the other hand, the new TF product benefits the logistics 
vendor through a new stream of profit from TF product delivery. Meanwhile, based on our 
assumption, the TF product price is higher than that of the TM product. Therefore, the higher 
TF product cost (the higher TF price) also discourages price-sensitive switchers (Dong et al., 
2017). Accordingly, the logistics vendor can gain more profits under the traditional 
manufacturer’s TMTF3DL manufacturing strategy. 
Secondly, product differentiation can help the traditional manufacturer achieve better 
financial performance. One of our conjectures is that the TF product always brings more 
profit to the traditional manufacturer because 1) it forces the traditional manufacturer to use 
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a low-price strategy to attract more price-sensitive consumers and 2) it cannibalizes the 3DP 
product market. Therefore, it hurts the logistics vendor’s business performance. However, if 
the price of the TF product is located between the TM and the 3DP product, it mitigates the 
product competition by the product similarity and gains a wider range of consumers. Thus, 
the logistics vendor can benefit from 1) the increased requirement for delivery of the TM and 
TF product and 2) the increased 3DP product business.  
Thirdly, one might expect that the 3DP product costs play an important role in the logistics 
vendor’s profitability. However, this proposition demonstrates that such an intuition does not 
hold. As depicted in Table 5-11 below, the logistics vendor can attain better performance in 
the TF3DL model under the low-cost supply chain setting rather than under the medium and 
high settings. In general, the traditional manufacturer’s TMTF3DL manufacturing strategy 
helps the logistics vendor to gain a new profit stream from the TF product delivery. On the 
low supply chain setting, if the 3DP product costs are low, compared to the TMTF3DL 
model, the logistics vendor can make more profit on 3DP product sales under the TF3DL 
model because there is no low-price TM product. However, on the medium/high supply chain 
setting, the logistics vendor can achieve better profitability in the TMTF3DL model. This 
follows from the fact that if the costs of the TM product are high (such as for bicycle frames, 
aeroplane engines, etc.), the new TF product can lure some customization-sensitive and price-
sensitive consumers. This contributes an increase to the logistics vendor’s goods delivery 
business. 
Lastly, on the high supply chain setting, the logistics vendor’s profitability depends on the 
TF product customization level. Recall that M represents the customization level of the TF 
product. If the customization level of the TF product (M) is low, the logistics vendor cannot 
gain more profits under this scenario, due to the shrunken sales of the TM product. However, 
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if the TF product customization level is slightly higher, the traditional manufacturer can glean 
more profits from the TF product sales. Therefore, the logistics vendor can make more profit 
from the TMTF manufacturing strategy because the positive effect on the product delivery 
business exceeds the negative effect of the decreased 3DP product sales. 
 
Table 5-9 Logistics Vendor’s Maximized Profit: Comparison by TM Product Cost – TMTF3DL and 
TF3DL 
Low Medium High 
   
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 Q0 ]0 ' QMJ ]MJ M Q$% ]$% "/ 
Low - - 0.1 0.025 0.02 0.2 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Medium - - 0.2 0.1 0.25 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.01 
High - - 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.35 0.01 
 
Table 5-10 Logistics Vendor’s Maximized Profit: Comparison by TF Product Cost – TMTF3DL 
and TF3DL 
Low Medium High 
LB-TMTF3DL
LB-TF3DL
LB-TMTF3DL
LB-TF3DL
LB-TMTF3DL
LB-TF3DL
LS-TMTF3DL
LS-TF3DL
LS-TMTF3DL
LS-TF3DL
LS-TMTF3DL
LS-TF3DL
  204 
   
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 Q0 ]0 ' QMJ ]MJ M Q$% ]$% "/ 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 - - 0.2 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 - - 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 - - 0.6 0.6 0.35 0.01 
 
 
Table 5-11 Logistics Vendor’s Maximized Profit: Comparison by 3DP Product Cost – TMTF3DL 
and TF3DL 
Low Medium High 
   
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
LB-TMTF3DL
LB-TF3DL
LB-TMTF3DL
LB-TF3DL
LB-TMTF3DL
LB-TF3DL
LS-TMTF3DL
LS-TF3DL
LS-TMTF3DL
LS-TF3DL
LS-TMTF3DL
LS-TF3DL
LB-TMTF3DL
LB-TF3DL
LB-TMTF3DL
LB-TF3DL
LB-TMTF3DL
LB-TF3DL
LS-TMTF3DL
LS-TF3DL
LS-TMTF3DL
LS-TF3DL
LS-TMTF3DL
LS-TF3DL
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 Q0 ]0 ' QMJ ]MJ M Q$% ]$% "/ 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.025 0.02 0.2 - - 0.01 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.1 0.25 0.4 - - 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 - - 0.01 
 
Table 5-12 Logistics Vendor’s Maximized Profit: Comparison by Logistics Delivery Cost –
TMTF3DL and TF3DL 
Low Medium High 
   
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 Q0 ]0 ' QMJ ]MJ M Q$% ]$% "/ 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.025 0.02 0.2 0.1 0.03 - 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.1 0.25 0.4 0.3 0.3 - 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.35 - 
 
Table 5-13 Logistics Vendor’s Maximized Supply Chain Profit: Comparison by TF Product 
Customization Level – TMTF3DL and TF3DL 
Low Medium High 
   
0.005 0.010 0.015
cL
0.180
0.182
0.184
0.186
0.188
0.190
LB-TMTF3DL
LB-TF3DL
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
cL
0.034
0.036
0.038
0.040
LB-TMTF3DL
LB-TF3DL
0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.27
cL
0.010
0.015
0.020
LB-TMTF3DL
LB-TF3DL
0.005 0.010 0.015
cL0.178
0.180
0.182
0.184
0.186
0.188
0.190
LS-TMTF3DL
LS-TF3DL
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
cL
0.034
0.035
0.036
0.037
0.038
0.039
0.040
0.041
LS-TMTF3DL
LS-TF3DL
0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.27
cL
0.006
0.008
0.010
0.012
0.014
0.016
0.018
LS-TMTF3DL
LS-TF3DL
0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00

0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
LB-TMTF3DL
LB-TF3DL
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

0.05
0.10
0.15
LB-TMTF3DL
LB-TF3DL
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
LB-TMTF3DL
LB-TF3DL
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 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 Q0 ]0 ' QMJ ]MJ M Q$% ]$% "/ 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.025 0.02 - 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.1 0.25 - 0.3 0.3 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 0.3 0.3 - 0.6 0.35 0.01 
 
PROPOSITION 5-6. In general, the traditional manufacturer’s TMTF3DL manufacturing 
strategy contributes to the development of the integrated supply chain. However, on the low 
and medium supply chain settings, if the TF product costs are within a certain low range, the 
TF3DL strategy can help the development of the supply chain instead.  
One might expect that the integrated supply chain is always better off with the traditional 
manufacturer’s TMTF3DL manufacturing strategy (Fahimnia et al., 2013; Koren, 2010; 
Upton, 2008). However, this proposition indicates that this does not always hold; there are 
two exceptions (Table 5-15), green area in low-cost setting and medium-cost setting supply 
chain profits comparison). On the low or medium supply chain setting, there exists a scenario 
where the integrated supply chain can generate more profits under the TF3DL model. This 
helps us to explain the 3DP jewellery production competition, and why some jewellery 
industries still focus only on highly-customized jewellery designs instead of both traditional 
standard jewellery production and highly-customized jewellery production together. Recall 
that the TF product customization level is higher than the TM product customization level. 
Therefore, the TF product is more attractive to those customization-sensitive consumers. If 
the TF product costs are extremely low, it cannibalizes the TM product and the integrated 
supply chain can make more profit on the 3DP product. If the TF product costs are high, it 
discourages price-sensitive switchers, and the integrated supply chain can benefit from more 
0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00

0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
LS-TMTF3DL
LS-TF3DL
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
LS-TMTF3DL
LS-TF3DL
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
LS-TMTF3DL
LS-TF3DL
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TM product business. However, if the TF product costs are located in between the other two 
products, the integrated supply chain’s loss on the 3DP business exceeds the positive effect 
of increased TM product and TF product sales. Therefore, the integrated supply chain prefers 
the traditional manufacturer to choose the TF3DL manufacturing strategy for industry 
development. 
Table 5-14 The Integrated Supply Chain’s Maximized Profit: Comparison by TM Product Cost – 
TMTF3DL and TF3DL 
Low Medium High 
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 Q0 ]0 ' QMJ ]MJ M Q$% ]$% "/ 
Low - - 0.1 0.025 0.02 0.2 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Medium - - 0.2 0.1 0.25 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.01 
High - - 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.35 0.01 
 
Table 5-15 The Integrated Supply Chain’s Maximized Profit: Comparison by TF Product Cost –
TMTF3DL and TF3DL 
Low Medium High 
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 Q0 ]0 ' QMJ ]MJ M Q$% ]$% "/ 
SC-TMTF3DL
SC-TF3DL
SC-TMTF3DL
SC-TF3DL
SC-TMTF3DL
SC-TF3DL
SC-TMTF3DL
SC-TF3DL
SC-TMTF3DL
SC-TF3DL
SC-TMTF3DL
SC-TF3DL
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Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 - - 0.2 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 - - 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 - - 0.6 0.6 0.35 0.01 
 
Table 5-16 The Integrated Supply Chain’s Maximized Profit: Comparison by 3DP Product Cost – 
TMTF3DL and TF3DL 
Low Medium High 
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 Q0 ]0 ' QMJ ]MJ M Q$% ]$% "/ 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.025 0.02 0.2 - - 0.01 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.1 0.25 0.4 - - 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 - - 0.01 
 
Table 5-17 The Integrated Supply Chain’s Maximized Profit: Comparison by Logistics Delivery 
Cost – TMTF3DL and TF3DL 
Low Medium High 
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 Q0 ]0 ' QMJ ]MJ M Q$% ]$% "/ 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.025 0.02 0.2 0.1 0.03 - 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.1 0.25 0.4 0.3 0.3 - 
SC-TMTF3DL
SC-TF3DL
SC-TMTF3DL
SC-TF3DL
SC-TMTF3DL
SC-TF3DL
0.005 0.010 0.015
cL
0.1895
0.1900
0.1905
SC-TMTF3DL
SC-TF3DL
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
cL
0.041
0.042
0.043
0.044
0.045
SC-TMTF3DL
SC-TF3DL
0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.27
cL
0.015
0.020
0.025
0.030
0.035
0.040
0.045
SC-TMTF3DL
SC-TF3DL
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High 0.1 0.08 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.35 - 
 
Table 5-18 The Integrated Supply Chain’s Maximized Supply Chain Profit: Comparison by TF 
Product Customization Level – TMTF3DL and TF3DL 
Low Medium High 
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 Q0 ]0 ' QMJ ]MJ M Q$% ]$% "/ 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.025 0.02 - 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.1 0.25 - 0.3 0.3 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 0.3 0.3 - 0.6 0.35 0.01 
 
5.5 Traditional Manufacturer’s 3DP Manufacturing Strategy 
This subsection conducts a comprehensive comparative analysis of the simulated scenarios 
where the traditional manufacturer adopts 3DP technology and seeks to determine which 
manufacturing strategy decision is best for the traditional manufacturer with regard to 
traditional manufacturing, flexible manufacturing and 3DP manufacturing technology.  
The rest of this sub-section is organized as follows. We present three different models for the 
traditional manufacturer’s 3DP adoption plan, derive the equilibriums for each model, and 
then compare the proposed models with the benchmarking model. Finally, we offer a 
comprehensive comparison of all of the proposed models. 
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Because this model assumes the customization levels of the 3DP product offered by the 
traditional manufacturer and the logistics vendor are the same, the model focuses on the 
scenario in which the traditional manufacturer’s 3DP has a price advantage /$%0 < /$%/.  
5.5.1 TMTF3DM Model 
 
Figure 5-12 Traditional Manufacturer Adopts 3DP – Three Products-TMTF3DM Model  
This model builds on Mini Cooper’s practice, where Mini as the traditional manufacturer has 
three different production lines for its car accessories: a traditional manufacturing line, a 
traditional flexible manufacturing line and the new 3DP manufacturing line. Here, DHL is 
the logistics vendor for all of the parts delivery (MINI, 2018; Wohlers Associates, 2018).  
Based on our analysis of the product market demand in Table 5-2, only when /$%0 < /$%/ 
can the traditional manufacturer offer three products differentiated by customization level. 
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Therefore, the consumer purchases the TM product when  \0 > \MJ > \$%0 and \0 > 0 
or \0 > \$%0 > \MJ  and \0 > 0. The consumer purchases the TF product when \MJ >\0 > \$%0 and \MJ > 0 or \MJ > \$%0 > \M0 and \MJ > 0, and s/he will buy the 3DP 
product when \$%0 > \0 > \MJ  and \$%0 > 0  or \$%0 > \MJ > \0  and \$%0 > 0 . 
Accordingly, we can derive the inverse market demand functions as follows. 
 (' = 9*' − )*,-). − )9  (5.12) 
 (*+ = −*#$" + *,-−1 + 9 + −*' + *,-) − 9  (5.13) 
 (#(' = 1 + *#$" − *,-−1 + 9  (5.14) 
Accordingly, in the decentralized supply chain, the profit functions for the traditional 
manufacturer and the logistics vendor are 
 
. /(*' , **+ , *#(')#(' = (*' − 0' − 1' − *))(' + (**+ − 0*+ − 91*+ − *))(*++ (*#(' − 0#( − 1#( − *))(#(' (5.15) 
 . 2(*))#(' = (*) − 4))((' + (*+ + (#()) (5.16) 
And the profit for the integrated supply chain is  
 . 78(*' , **+ , *#(')#(' = (*' − 0' − 1' − 4))(' + (**+ − 0*+ − 91*+ − 4))(*++ (*#(' − 0#( − 1#( − 4))(#(' (5.17) 
Therefore, the traditional manufacturer decides the price of the three different products after 
the logistics vendor sets the delivery price.  
PROPOSITION 5-7. If the traditional manufacturer tries to offer a TM, TF and 3DP product 
at the same time,  
(1) In the decentralized 3DP manufacturing system, the maximum profit for the 
traditional manufacturer is given in Equation (5.97) and the maximum profit for the 
logistics vendor is as in Equation (5.98), both of which are maximized by the optimal 
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price shown in Equation (5.90), (5.91), (5.92), and (5.93). The optimal market 
demand for the TM and 3DP product is given in Equation (5.94), (5.95), and (5.96). 
(2) In the integrated 3DP manufacturing system, the maximum profit for the supply chain 
is shown in Equation (5.105), which is maximized by optimal price Equation (5.99), 
(5.100), and (5.101). The optimal market demand for the TM and 3DP product is 
given in Equation (5.102), (5.103), and (5.104). 
5.5.2 TM3DM Model 
 
Figure 5-13 Traditional Manufacturer Adopts 3DP –-TM3DM Model 
Because the overall cost of TF product production is higher than TM product production in 
practice, there exists the scenario in which the traditional manufacturer stops the TF product 
manufacturing line and fully transfers to 3DP production for products with a high 
customization level. For example, Formula 1 currently uses traditional manufacturing and 
3DP manufacturing for the production of car parts (Wohlers Associates, 2018). In this 
subsection, we focus on this situation, in which the traditional manufacturer simultaneously 
offers the TM and the 3DP product with a price advantage of  /$%0 < /$%/.  
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Therefore, the consumer can find two different products in the market, the TM and the 3DP 
product, both offered by the traditional manufacturer. Therefore, market demand can be 
easily derived:  
 (' = )*#(' − *'(1 − )))  (5.18) 
 (#(' = 1 − *#(' − *'1 − )  (5.19) 
Accordingly, the profit functions for the traditional manufacturer and the logistics vendor are 
 . /(*' , *#(')#(' = (*' − 0' − 1' − *))(' + (*#(' − 0#( − 1#( − *))(#(' (5.20) 
 . 2(*))#(' = (*) − 4))((' + (#(') (5.21) 
And the profit for the integrated supply chain is  
 . 78(*' , *#(')#(' = (*' − 0' − 1' − 4))(' + (*#(' − 0#( − 1#( − 4))(#(' (5.22) 
 
PROPOSITION 5-8. If the traditional manufacturer tries to offer a TM and 3DP product 
simultaneously, 
(1) In the decentralized 3DP manufacturing system, the maximum profit for the 
traditional manufacturer is given in Equation (5.111) and the maximum profit for the 
logistics vendor is as in Equation (5.112), both of which are maximized by optimal 
price Equation (5.106), (5.107), and (5.108). The optimal market demand for the TM 
and 3DP product is given in Equation (5.109) and (5.110). 
(2) In the integrated 3DP manufacturing system, the maximum profit for the supply chain 
is given in Equation (5.117), 	which is maximized by optimal price Equation (5.113) 
and (5.114). The optimal market demand for the TM and 3DP product is calculated 
by Equation (5.115) and (5.116). 
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5.5.3 3DM Model 
 
Figure 5-14 Traditional Manufacturer Adopts 3DP – 3DM Model 
In this sub-section, this model tests the scenario in which the traditional manufacturer 
completely replaces its current manufacturing system with 3DP technology (e.g. 
LimaCorporate uses 3DP technology to produce orthopaedic products (Wohlers Associates, 
2018)). Therefore, the market demand for the 3DP product is .$%0 = 1 − /$%0 , and the 
profit functions of the traditional manufacturer, the logistics vendor, and the integrated 
supply chain are 
 . /(*#(')#(' = (*#(' − 0#( − 1#( − *))(#(' (5.23) 
 . 2(*))#(' = (*) − 4))(#(' (5.24) 
 . 78(*#(')#(' = (*#(' − 0#( − 1#( − 4))(#(' (5.25) 
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PROPOSITION 5-9. If the traditional manufacturer tries to use a 3DP product to fully 
replace the TM product, 
(1) In the decentralized 3DP manufacturing system, the maximum profit for the 
traditional manufacturer is ∏ 5(/$%0)∗$%0 = ((? (−1 + "/ + Q$% + ]$%)-  and the 
maximum profit for the logistics vendor is ∏ 7(//)∗$%0 = (* (−1 + "/ + Q$% + ]$%)-, 
which are maximized by optimal price //∗ = (- (1 + "/ − Q$% − ]$%)  and /$%0∗ =(+ (3 + "/ + Q$% + ]$%). The optimal market demand for the 3DP product is  .$%0∗ =(+ (1 − "/ − Q$% − ]$%). 
(2) In the integrated 3DP manufacturing system, the maximum profit for the supply chain 
is ∏ 5(/$%0)∗$%0 = (+ (−1 + "/ + Q$% + ]$%)- , which is maximized by optimal 
price /$%0∗ = (- (1 + "/ + Q$% + ]$%) and the optimal market demand for the 3DP 
product is 	.$%0∗ = (- (1 − "/ − Q$% − ]$%). 
Above proposition lists the optional decisions and the maximized profits functions for 
different market structure.  
5.5.4 Comparisons over the 3DP Enabled Models 
In this subsection, we compare the supply chain stakeholders’ profit functions and the 
integrated supply chain’s profitability, for the purpose of finding out which 3DP adoption 
strategy is the best strategy for the traditional manufacturer and what the impacts are for the 
logistics vendor’s profitability and the overall supply chain’s development. 
PROPOSITION 5-10.  The traditional manufacturer is always better off using the TMTF3DM 
strategy; the product costs and the TF product customization level have no impact on this 
manufacturing decision. 
According to Table 5-19 to Table 5-23, it is obvious that it is better to use the TMTF3DM 
manufacturing strategy because it helps the traditional manufacturer to cover a wider variety 
of consumer needs. There are two interesting findings there. Firstly, the product costs are not 
relevant to this decision. When the traditional manufacturer introduces the TMTF3DM 
manufacturing strategy, s/he uses a different pricing setting for each product. Therefore, as 
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long as the costs of the different products are different, the price differences help the 
traditional manufacturer differentiate the TM, the TF, and the 3DP product in the market. 
Secondly, the TF product customization level also cannot influence the traditional 
manufacturer’s manufacturing strategy here. Recall that the TF product customization level M  is located between the TM product customization level '  and the 3DP product 
customization level 1. Therefore, the introduction of the TF product makes the market 
expansion robut and it also can increases the overall profitability of the traditional 
manufacturer. This finding is different from the research result in (Dong et al., 2017)’s work. 
Their study still suggest that adopting traditional flexible manufacturing technology in 
addition to other manufacturing technology might reduce product variety. For those 
companies which have already put much effort into flexible manufacturing, it is time to 
seriously think about the advantages of 3DP production. This result also helps us to 
understand why MINI added a new 3DP production line into its current manufacturing 
system.  
Table 5-19 Traditional Manufacturer’s Maximized Profit: Comparison by TM Product Cost –
TMTF3DM, TM34DM and 3DM 
Low Medium High 
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 Q0 ]0 ' QMJ ]MJ M Q$% ]$% "/ 
Low - - 0.1 0.025 0.02 0.2 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Medium - - 0.2 0.1 0.25 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.01 
M-TMTF3DM
M-TM3DM
M-3 DM
M-TMTF3DM
M-TM3DM
M-3 DM
M-TMTF3DM
M-TM3DM
M-3 DM
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High - - 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.35 0.01 
 
Table 5-20 Traditional Manufacturer’s Maximized Profit: Comparison by TF Product Cost – 
TMTF3DM, TM34DM and 3DM 
Low Medium High 
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 Q0 ]0 ' QMJ ]MJ M Q$% ]$% "/ 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 - - 0.2 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 - - 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 - - 0.6 0.6 0.35 0.01 
 
Table 5-21 Traditional Manufacturer’s Maximized Profit: Comparison by 3DP Product Cost – 
TMTF3DM, TM34DM and 3DM 
Low Medium High 
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 Q0 ]0 ' QMJ ]MJ M Q$% ]$% "/ 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.025 0.02 0.2 - - 0.01 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.1 0.25 0.4 - - 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 - - 0.01 
M-TMTF3DM
M-TM3DM
M-3 DM
M-TMTF3DM
M-TM3DM
M-3 DM
M-TMTF3DM
M-TM3DM
M-3 DM
M-TMTF3DM
M-TM3DM
M-3 DM
M-TMTF3DM
M-TM3DM
M-3 DM
M-TMTF3DM
M-TM3DM
M-3 DM
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Table 5-22 Traditional Manufacturer’s Maximized Profit: Comparison by Logistics Delivery Cost – 
TMTF3DM, TM34DM and 3DM 
Low Medium High 
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 Q0 ]0 ' QMJ ]MJ M Q$% ]$% "/ 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.025 0.02 0.2 0.1 0.03 - 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.1 0.25 0.4 0.3 0.3 - 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.35 - 
 
Table 5-23 Traditional Manufacturer’s Maximized Supply Chain Profit: Comparison by TF Product 
Customization Level – TM3DL and TMTF3DM 
Low Medium High 
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 Q0 ]0 ' QMJ ]MJ M Q$% ]$% "/ 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.025 0.02 - 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.1 0.25 - 0.3 0.3 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 0.3 0.3 - 0.6 0.35 0.01 
 
PROPOSITION 5-11.   
(1) Under the low supply chain setting, operating TM, TF and 3DP production is the best 
manufacturing strategy for the traditional manufacturer if the TM product 
customization level is comparatively high; otherwise, TM3DM is the best 
manufacturing strategy. 
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(2) Under the medium/high supply chain setting, the traditional manufacturer is always 
better off operating the TMTF3DM manufacturing strategy. 
This proposition shows that the parameter '  plays a crucial role in the traditional 
manufacturer’s manufacturing strategy in the supply chain on the low-cost setting. Recall 
that ' is an indicator of the TF product customization level. A higher ' implies that the TM 
product is much more similar to the TM and the 3DP products. If ' is extremely high, the 
competition between the TM, the TF and the 3DM product is more aggressive, which leads 
to more profits for the traditional manufacturer. However, if ' is in the lower range, then the 
TM, the TF, and the 3DP product are differentiated by huge gaps in product customization 
level. The TF product, whose product customization level is located in the middle, 
cannibalizes the TM product market (by its higher production customization) and the 3DP 
product market (by low pricing). This outcome indicates that it is not profitable to the 
traditional manufacturer to operate the 3 differentiated production lines. Therefore, instead 
of introducing both TF and 3DP production, directly adopting 3DP production is the best 
strategy for the traditional manufacturer. In practice, for those small but professional studios 
for racing car component manufacturing, adding 3DP production is a better choice for their 
high-customization but low volume manufacturing. For example, SR Machining, a 
manufacturer of aircraft brake inserts, has successfully adopted 3DP production into its 
manufacturing system and achieved better business performance (3D Systems, 2018d). 
However, on the medium and high supply chain setting, no matter the TF product 
customization level, the traditional manufacturer is always better off using the TMTF3DM 
manufacturing strategy. One example is GE Aircraft (3D Systems, 2018e; Kellner, 2018), 
which simultaneously operates TM, TF and 3DP production lines for aircraft bracket 
production, depending on the different consumer requirements and production line 
availability.  
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Table 5-24 Traditional Manufacturer’s Maximized Supply Chain Profit: Comparison by TM 
Product Customization – TMTF3DM, TM34DM and 3DM 
Low Medium High 
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 Q0 ]0 ' QMJ ]MJ M Q$% ]$% "/ 
Low 0.01 0.01 - 0.025 0.02 0.2 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Medium 0.05 0.05 - 0.1 0.25 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 - 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.35 0.01 
 
PROPOSITION 5-12.  For the logistics vendor, compared to the 3DP product cost, 1) if the 
TM product customization level is low and the TM product costs are comparatively high, or 
2) if the TM product customization level is high but the TM product costs are comparatively 
low, the logistics vendor can glean more profits in the TMTF3DM or the TM3DM model. 
Otherwise, the logistics vendor can gain more profits in the 3DM model. 
Intuitively, we expect that the logistics vendor can attain better profitability under the 
TMTF3DM model, because a larger product range represents more product delivery revenue 
for the logistics vendor. But this proposition indicates that 1) the logistics vendor’s 
profitability under the TMTF3DM and the TM3DM model is the same and his/her financial 
performance only depends on the TM product costs, the logistics delivery cost and the TM 
product customization level under equilibriums. The explanation is that, under both models, 
the competition among products depends on the TM product costs and the TM product 
customization level. In Dong et al. (2017)’s study, they also point out that if there is 
traditional manufacturing line, adopting the traditional flexible technology may reduce 
product variety.. For example, if the costs of the TM product are low and the TM product 
customization level is low, the traditional manufacturer uses low pricing for the TM product 
in order to achieve more product sales but uses a high price on the TF and the 3DP product 
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to obtain a higher margin. 2) If the TM product customization level is high but the relevant 
costs are low, the traditional manufacturer can gain more profits on the TM product, and 
therefore the logistics vendor can make more profits on the TM product delivery. If the TM 
product customization level is low but the cost is high, the traditional manufacturer can gain 
more business from the TF product. Thus, under these two conditions, the wider product 
range can help the logistics vendor make more profits from the extended market range than 
from the 3DM model alone. 
PROPOSITION 5-13.   
(1) Under the low/high supply chain setting, if the TM product costs are sufficiently low, 
the integrated supply chain can make more profit under the traditional 
manufacturer’s TM3DM strategy; otherwise, TMTF3DM is the best manufacturing 
strategy for the integrated supply chain. 
(2) Under the medium supply chain setting, the TMTF3DM manufacturing strategy is the 
best choice for the integrated supply chain. 
Remarkably, we found that there exist two types of scenario where TM3DM is better than 
the TMTF3DM strategy for the integrated supply chain. 1) Under the low supply chain 
setting, if the TM product costs are low, the TM product has the pricing advantage; therefore, 
it is not necessary to operate an extra TF product. The implication of this finding is that for 
those durable product industries, it is better to encourage the traditional manufacturer to adopt 
3DP rather than traditional manufacturing technologies. 2) With the high supply chain 
setting, for example in the Prosthesis industry, although the costs of TM production are low, 
adding a 3DP production line is better than setting up additional flexible production. For 
instance, Emerging Implant Technologies has introduced a 3DP prosthesis into its current 
product line (Emerging Implant Technologies, 2018). Besides these two scenarios, even 
under the medium supply chain setting, the wider product coverage can bring more profits to 
the integrated supply chain through the positive impact of the expanded consumer base and 
the mediated market share.  
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Table 5-25 Integrated Supply Chain’s Maximized Profit: Comparison by TM Product Cost –
TMTF3DM, TM34DM and 3DM 
Low Medium High 
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 Q0 ]0 ' QMJ ]MJ M Q$% ]$% "/ 
Low - - 0.1 0.025 0.02 0.2 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Medium - - 0.2 0.1 0.25 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.01 
High - - 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.35 0.01 
 
PROPOSITION 5-14.  The integrated supply chain can gain more profits if the traditional 
manufacturer chooses the TMTF3DM manufacturing strategy, no matter the costs of the 
TF/3DP product, the cost of logistics delivery, or the customization level of the TM and the 
TF product. 
This proposition endorses one of our expectations that the wider product range helps the 
integrated supply chain’s development. Taking the above proposition into consideration as 
well, interestingly, we expect that the cost of the TM product, other costs and even the 
product customization level cannot influence the overall supply chain performance (Table 
5-26 to Table 5-30). Therefore, during the supply chain’s evolution from a traditional 
manufacturing system to high customization 3DP production, the only consideration is the 
cost of TM production. 
SC-TMTF3DM
SC-TM3DM
SC-3 DM
SC-TMTF3DM
SC-TM3DM
SC-3 DM
SC-TMTF3DM
SC-TM3DM
SC-3 DM
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Table 5-26 Integrated Supply Chain’s Maximized Profit: Comparison by TF Product Cost – 
TMTF3DM, TM34DM and 3DM 
Low Medium High 
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 Q0 ]0 ' QMJ ]MJ M Q$% ]$% "/ 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 - - 0.2 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 - - 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 - - 0.6 0.6 0.35 0.01 
 
Table 5-27 Integrated Supply Chain’s Maximized Profit: Comparison by 3DP Product Cost – 
TMTF3DM, TM34DM and 3DM 
Low Medium High 
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 Q0 ]0 ' QMJ ]MJ M Q$% ]$% "/ 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.025 0.02 0.2 - - 0.01 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.1 0.25 0.4 - - 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 - - 0.01 
SC-TMTF3DM
SC-TM3DM
SC-3 DM
SC-TMTF3DM
SC-TM3DM
SC-3 DM
SC-TMTF3DM
SC-TM3DM
SC-3 DM
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SC-TM3DM
SC-3 DM
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Table 5-28 Integrated Supply Chain’s Maximized Profit: Comparison by Logistics Delivery Cost – 
TMTF3DM, TM34DM and 3DM 
Low Medium High 
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 Q0 ]0 ' QMJ ]MJ M Q$% ]$% "/ 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.025 0.02 0.2 0.1 0.03 - 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.1 0.25 0.4 0.3 0.3 - 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.35 - 
 
Table 5-29 Integrated Supply Chain’s Maximized Profit: Comparison by TM Product 
Customization Level – TMTF3DM, TM34DM and 3DM 
Low Medium High 
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 Q0 ]0 ' QMJ ]MJ M Q$% ]$% "/ 
Low 0.01 0.01 - 0.025 0.02 0.2 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Medium 0.05 0.05 - 0.1 0.25 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 - 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.35 0.01 
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Table 5-30 Integrated Supply Chain’s Maximized Profit: Comparison by TF Product Customization 
Level – TM3DL and TMTF3DM 
Low Medium High 
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 Q0 ]0 ' QMJ ]MJ M Q$% ]$% "/ 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.025 0.02 - 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.1 0.25 - 0.3 0.3 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 0.3 0.3 - 0.6 0.35 0.01 
5.6 Comparison between the TMTF3DL and TMTF3DM Model 
Under this subsection, we compare the TMTF3DL and TMTF3DL model and try to answer 
the questions: 1) Should the traditional manufacturer operate the 3DP product on his/her own, 
and if so, then under what conditions? 2) What is the impact on the logistics vendor’s 
profitability? 3) What are the impacts on the integrated supply chain’s overall performance? 
PROPOSITION 5-15.  It is not always beneficial to the traditional manufacturer to operate 
the 3DM product by himself/herself. 
(1) Under the low supply chain setting, no matter the product costs and the product 
customization level, the traditional manufacturer can glean more profits in the 
TMTF3DM model. 
(2) Under the medium supply chain setting, in most cases, the traditional manufacturer 
can generate more profits under the self-operated 3DP model. However, the only 
exception is that if the TM product costs are high, letting the logistics vendor handle 
the 3DP product is more profitable to the traditional manufacturer in the 
decentralized Bertrand supply chain. 
(3) Under the high supply chain setting, it is profitable for the traditional manufacturer 
to offer a 3DP product 1) if the TM product costs are low; 2) if the fixed TF product 
cost is sufficiently low or high; or 3) if the logistics delivery cost is high. 
 
We have identified several scenarios under which the traditional manufacturer could let the 
logistics vendor handle the 3DP product market (Table 13 to Table 18).  
0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00

0.190
0.195
0.200
SC-TMTF3DM
SC-TM3DM
SC-3 DM
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

0.03805
0.03810
0.03815
0.03820
0.03825
SC-TMTF3DM
SC-TM3DM
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
SC-TMTF3DM
SC-TM3DM
SC-3 DM
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Firstly, we find that in the Bertrand supply chain on the medium setting, if the TM product 
costs are high, it is profitable to the traditional manufacturer to let the logistics vendor operate 
the 3DP product business. In the Bertrand supply chain, the traditional manufacturer gives 
the prices to his/her product first and then the logistics vendor sets the 3DP product price, 
and therefore if the traditional manufacturer operates the 3DM product, s/he increases the 
price of the TF and the 3DP product to offer price advantages to the TM product. But this 
results in shrunken product sales overall. Therefore, the traditional manufacturer cannot 
generate more profits under this scenario. An example to this would be the knee arthroplasty 
case, one of the knee arthroplasty company Courtesy of Aesculap AG outsourcing the high 
customized customer order to the third-party 3DP professional Stratasys (Thompson et al., 
2016). 
Secondly, under the high supply chain setting, 1) if the TM product cost is low, besides the 
new revenue stream from the 3DP product, the traditional manufacturer can also make more 
profits on the low-price TM product. 2) If the fixed cost of the TF product is extremely low 
(e.g. nut) or extremely high (e.g. aerospaceplane), the TF product has customization 
advantages over the TM or the TF product has price advantages over the 3DM product. No 
matter under which scenario, the traditional manufacturer can benefit from the aggressive 
product competition. 3) If the logistics delivery cost is high, it is better to let the logistics 
vendor offer the 3DP product because the traditional manufacturer needs to pay the delivery 
service fee to the logistics vendor for all product sales. 
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Table 5-31 Traditional Manufacturer’s Maximized Profit: Comparison by TM Product Cost –
TMTF3DL and TF3DL 
Low Medium High 
   
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 Q0 ]0 ' QMJ ]MJ M Q$% ]$% "/ 
Low - - 0.1 0.025 0.02 0.2 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Medium - - 0.2 0.1 0.25 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.01 
High - - 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.35 0.01 
 
Table 5-32 Traditional Manufacturer’s Maximized Profit: Comparison by TF Product Cost –
TM3DL and TMTF3DM 
Low Medium High 
   
MB-TMTF3DL
MB-TMTF3DM
MB-TMTF3DL
MB-TMTF3DM
MB-TMTF3DL
MB-TMTF3DM
MS-TMTF3DL
MS-TMTF3DM
MS-TMTF3DL
MS-TMTF3DM
MS-TMTF3DL
MS-TMTF3DM
MB-TMTF3DL
MB-TMTF3DM
MB-TMTF3DL
MB-TMTF3DM
MB-TMTF3DL
MB-TMTF3DM
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 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 Q0 ]0 ' QMJ ]MJ M Q$% ]$% "/ 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 - - 0.2 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 - - 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 - - 0.6 0.6 0.35 0.01 
 
Table 5-33 Traditional Manufacturer’s Maximized Profit: Comparison by 3DP Product Cost –
TM3DL and TMTF3DM 
Low Medium High 
   
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 Q0 ]0 ' QMJ ]MJ M Q$% ]$% "/ 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.025 0.02 0.2 - - 0.01 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.1 0.25 0.4 - - 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 - - 0.01 
 
MS-TMTF3DL
MS-TMTF3DM
MS-TMTF3DL
MS-TMTF3DM
MS-TMTF3DL
MS-TMTF3DM
MB-TMTF3DL
MB-TMTF3DM
MB-TMTF3DL
MB-TMTF3DM
MB-TMTF3DL
MB-TMTF3DM
MS-TMTF3DL
MS-TMTF3DM
MS-TMTF3DL
MS-TMTF3DM
MS-TMTF3DL
MS-TMTF3DM
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Table 5-34 Traditional Manufacturer’s Maximized Profit: Comparison by Logistics Delivery Cost – 
TM3DL and TMTF3DM 
Low Medium High 
   
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 Q0 ]0 ' QMJ ]MJ M Q$% ]$% "/ 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.025 0.02 0.2 0.1 0.03 - 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.1 0.25 0.4 0.3 0.3 - 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.35 - 
 
Table 5-35 Traditional Manufacturer’s Maximized Supply Chain Profit: Comparison by TM 
Product Customization Level – TM3DL and TMTF3DM 
Low Medium High 
   
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
0.005 0.010 0.015
cL
0.05
0.10
0.15
MB-TMTF3DL
MB-TMTF3DM
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
cL
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
0.025
0.030
MB-TMTF3DL
MB-TMTF3DM
0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.27
cL
0.006
0.008
0.010
0.012
0.014
MB-TMTF3DL
MB-TMTF3DM
0.005 0.010 0.015
cL
0.05
0.10
0.15
MS-TMTF3DL
MS-TMTF3DM
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
cL
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
0.025
0.030
MS-TMTF3DL
MS-TMTF3DM
0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.27
cL
0.006
0.008
0.010
0.012
0.014
0.016
MS-TMTF3DL
MS-TMTF3DM
0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20

0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
MB-TMTF3DL
MB-TMTF3DM
0.36 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.40

0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
MB-TMTF3DL
MB-TMTF3DM
0.52 0.54 0.56 0.58 0.60

0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
MB-TMTF3DL
MB-TMTF3DM
0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20

0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
MS-TMTF3DL
MS-TMTF3DM
0.36 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.40

0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
MS-TMTF3DL
MS-TMTF3DM
0.52 0.54 0.56 0.58 0.60

0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
MS-TMTF3DL
MS-TMTF3DM
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 Q0 ]0 ' QMJ ]MJ M Q$% ]$% "/ 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.025 0.02 - 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.1 0.25 - 0.3 0.3 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 0.3 0.3 - 0.6 0.35 0.01 
 
Table 5-36 Traditional Manufacturer’s Maximized Supply Chain Profit: Comparison by TF Product 
Customization Level – TM3DL and TMTF3DM 
Low Medium High 
   
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 Q0 ]0 ' QMJ ]MJ M Q$% ]$% "/ 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.025 0.02 - 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.1 0.25 - 0.3 0.3 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 0.3 0.3 - 0.6 0.35 0.01 
 
PROPOSITION 5-16.  It is not always beneficial to the logistics vendor to operate the 3DP 
product by himself/herself. 
By comparing the logistics vendor’s profitability under the TMTF3DL model and the 
TMTF3DM model ( 
0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00

0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
MB-TMTF3DL
MB-TMTF3DM
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
MB-TMTF3DL
MB-TMTF3DM
0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
MB-TMTF3DL
MB-TMTF3DM
0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00

0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
MS-TMTF3DL
MS-TMTF3DM
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
MS-TMTF3DL
MS-TMTF3DM
0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
MS-TMTF3DL
MS-TMTF3DM
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Table 19 to Table 24), we identified the following scenarios where the logistics vendor can 
also share the benefits of the traditional manufacturer’s TMTF3DM manufacturing strategy 
through two effects: the increased need for product delivery or the expanded 3DP product 
sales. 
1) In the Bertrand supply chain, it is profitable to the logistics vendor to offer the 3DP 
product if a) the TM product costs are low; b) the fixed TF product cost is located at 
medium level; c) 3DP product costs are at an average level; d) the logistics delivery cost 
is high; or e) the TM product customization level is high. 
2) In the Stackelberg supply chain, the logistics vendor can make more profits through the 
self-operated 3DP model except when: a) the TM product costs are low; b) the TF cost 
is at a low or high level; c) 3DP product costs are low; or d) the TM product 
customization level is high. 
Table 5-37 Logistics Vendor’s Maximized Profit: Comparison by TM Product Cost – TMTF3DL 
and TF3DL 
Low Medium High 
   
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 Q0 ]0 ' QMJ ]MJ M Q$% ]$% "/ 
LB-TMTF3DL
LB-TMTF3DM
LB-TMTF3DL
LB-TMTF3DM
LB-TMTF3DL
LB-TMTF3DM
LS-TMTF3DL
LS-TMTF3DM
LS-TMTF3DL
LS-TMTF3DM
LS-TMTF3DL
LS-TMTF3DM
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Low - - 0.1 0.025 0.02 0.2 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Medium - - 0.2 0.1 0.25 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.01 
High - - 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.35 0.01 
 
Table 5-38 Logistics Vendor’s Maximized Profit: Comparison by TF Product Cost – TM3DL and 
TMTF3DM 
Low Medium High 
   
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 Q0 ]0 ' QMJ ]MJ M Q$% ]$% "/ 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 - - 0.2 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 - - 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 - - 0.6 0.6 0.35 0.01 
 
Table 5-39 Logistics Vendor’s Maximized Profit: Comparison by 3DP Product Cost – TM3DL and 
TMTF3DM 
Low Medium High 
LB-TMTF3DL
LB-TMTF3DM
LB-TMTF3DL
LB-TMTF3DM
LB-TMTF3DL
LB-TMTF3DM
LS-TMTF3DL
LS-TMTF3DM
LS-TMTF3DL
LS-TMTF3DM
LS-TMTF3DL
LS-TMTF3DM
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 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 Q0 ]0 ' QMJ ]MJ M Q$% ]$% "/ 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.025 0.02 0.2 - - 0.01 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.1 0.25 0.4 - - 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 - - 0.01 
 
Table 5-40 Logistics Vendor’s Maximized Profit: Comparison by Logistics Delivery Cost –TM3DL 
and TMTF3DM 
Low Medium High 
   
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 Q0 ]0 ' QMJ ]MJ M Q$% ]$% "/ 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.025 0.02 0.2 0.1 0.03 - 
LB-TMTF3DL
LB-TMTF3DM
LB-TMTF3DL
LB-TMTF3DM
LB-TMTF3DL
LB-TMTF3DM
LS-TMTF3DL
LS-TMTF3DM
LS-TMTF3DL
LS-TMTF3DM
LS-TMTF3DL
LS-TMTF3DM
0.005 0.010 0.015
cL
0.05
0.10
0.15
LB-TMTF3DL
LB-TMTF3DM
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
cL
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
0.025
0.030
0.035
LB-TMTF3DL
LB-TMTF3DM
0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.27
cL
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
LB-TMTF3DL
LB-TMTF3DM
0.005 0.010 0.015
cL0.178
0.180
0.182
0.184
0.186
0.188
0.190
LS-TMTF3DL
LS-TMTF3DM
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
cL
0.034
0.035
0.036
0.037
0.038
0.039
0.040
0.041
LS-TMTF3DL
LS-TMTF3DM
0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.27
cL
0.006
0.008
0.010
0.012
0.014
0.016
0.018
LS-TMTF3DL
LS-TMTF3DM
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Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.1 0.25 0.4 0.3 0.3 - 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.35 - 
Table 5-41 Logistics Vendor’s Maximized Supply Chain Profit: Comparison by TM Product 
Customization Level – TM3DL and TMTF3DM 
Low Medium High 
   
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 Q0 ]0 ' QMJ ]MJ M Q$% ]$% "/ 
Low 0.01 0.01 - 0.025 0.02 0.2 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Medium 0.05 0.05 - 0.1 0.25 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 - 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.35 0.01 
Table 5-42 Logistics Vendor’s Maximized Supply Chain Profit: Comparison by TF Product 
Customization Level – TM3DL and TMTF3DM 
Low Medium High 
   
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 Q0 ]0 ' QMJ ]MJ M Q$% ]$% "/ 
0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20

0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
LB-TMTF3DL
LB-TMTF3DM
0.36 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.40

0.025
0.030
0.035
0.040
0.045
0.050
0.055
LB-TMTF3DL
LB-TMTF3DM
0.52 0.54 0.56 0.58 0.60

0.024
0.026
0.028
0.030
0.032
0.034
LB-TMTF3DL
LB-TMTF3DM
0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20

0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
LS-TMTF3DL
LS-TMTF3DM
0.36 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.40

0.025
0.030
0.035
0.040
0.045
0.050
0.055
LS-TMTF3DL
LS-TMTF3DM
0.52 0.54 0.56 0.58 0.60

0.024
0.026
0.028
0.030
0.032
0.034
LS-TMTF3DL
LS-TMTF3DM
0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00

0.05
0.10
0.15
LB-TMTF3DL
LB-TMTF3DM
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
LB-TMTF3DL
LB-TMTF3DM
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
LB-TMTF3DL
LB-TMTF3DM
0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00

0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
LS-TMTF3DL
LS-TMTF3DM
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
LS-TMTF3DL
LS-TMTF3DM
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

0.010
0.015
0.020
0.025
0.030
0.035
LS-TMTF3DL
LS-TMTF3DM
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Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.025 0.02 - 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.1 0.25 - 0.3 0.3 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 0.3 0.3 - 0.6 0.35 0.01 
 
PROPOSITION 5-17.   
(1) Under the low/medium supply chain setting, in most cases, the integrated supply 
chain can attain better performance under the TMTF3DL model. However, if the 3DP 
product costs are high or the TF product customization level is high, the integrated 
supply chain can gain more profits under the TMTF3DM model. 
(2) Under the high supply chain setting, the integrated supply chain can gain more profits 
by the traditional manufacturer’s TMTF3MD strategy if a) the TM product costs are 
high; or b) the TF product costs are low; or c) the 3DP product costs are high. 
This proposition gives the conditions under which the integrated supply chain can make more 
profits. Therefore, as Table 5-43 to  
Table 5-48 show, the different approaches to 3DP adoption have different impacts on the 
integrated supply chain, and the product costs and the product customization level play 
crucial roles here. 
Table 5-43 Integrated Supply Chain’s Maximized Profit: Comparison by TM Product Cost –
TMTF3DL and TF3DL 
Low Medium High 
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 Q0 ]0 ' QMJ ]MJ M Q$% ]$% "/ 
Low - - 0.1 0.025 0.02 0.2 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Medium - - 0.2 0.1 0.25 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.01 
High - - 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.35 0.01 
SC-TMTF3DL
SC-TMTF3DM
SC-TMTF3DL
SC-TMTF3DM
SC-TMTF3DL
SC-TMTF3DM
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Table 5-44 Integrated Supply Chain’s Maximized Profit: Comparison by TF Product Cost –TM3DL 
and TMTF3DM 
Low Medium High 
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 Q0 ]0 ' QMJ ]MJ M Q$% ]$% "/ 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 - - 0.2 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 - - 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 - - 0.6 0.6 0.35 0.01 
 
Table 5-45 Integrated Supply Chain’s Maximized Profit: Comparison by 3DP Product Cost –
TM3DL and TMTF3DM 
Low Medium High 
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 Q0 ]0 ' QMJ ]MJ M Q$% ]$% "/ 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.025 0.02 0.2 - - 0.01 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.1 0.25 0.4 - - 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 - - 0.01 
SC-TMTF3DL
SC-TMTF3DM
SC-TMTF3DL
SC-TMTF3DM
SC-TMTF3DL
SC-TMTF3DM
SC-TMTF3DL
SC-TMTF3DM
SC-TMTF3DL
SC-TMTF3DM
SC-TMTF3DL
SC-TMTF3DM
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Table 5-46 Integrated Supply Chain’s Maximized Profit: Comparison by Logistics Delivery Cost – 
TM3DL and TMTF3DM 
Low Medium High 
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 Q0 ]0 ' QMJ ]MJ M Q$% ]$% "/ 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.025 0.02 0.2 0.1 0.03 - 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.1 0.25 0.4 0.3 0.3 - 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.35 - 
 
Table 5-47 Integrated Supply Chain’s Maximized Profit: Comparison by TM Product 
Customization Level – TM3DL and TMTF3DM 
Low Medium High 
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 Q0 ]0 ' QMJ ]MJ M Q$% ]$% "/ 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.025 0.02 - 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.1 0.25 - 0.3 0.3 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 0.3 0.3 - 0.6 0.35 0.01 
0.005 0.010 0.015
cL
0.184
0.185
0.186
0.187
0.188
0.189
0.190
0.191
SC-TMTF3DL
SC-TMTF3DM
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
cL
0.035
0.040
0.045
SC-TMTF3DL
SC-TMTF3DM
0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.27
cL
0.010
0.015
0.020
0.025
0.030
0.035
0.040
0.045
SC-TMTF3DL
SC-TMTF3DM
0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20

0.190
0.195
0.200
0.205
SC-TMTF3DL
SC-TMTF3DM
0.36 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.40

0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
SC-TMTF3DL
SC-TMTF3DM
0.52 0.54 0.56 0.58 0.60

0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
SC-TMTF3DL
SC-TMTF3DM
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Table 5-48 Integrated Supply Chain’s Maximized Profit: Comparison by TF Product Customization 
Level – TM3DL and TMTF3DM 
Low Medium High 
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 Q0 ]0 ' QMJ ]MJ M Q$% ]$% "/ 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.025 0.02 - 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.1 0.25 - 0.3 0.3 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 0.3 0.3 - 0.6 0.35 0.01 
 
5.7 Chapter Summary 
Motivated by the new development in flexible manufacturing technology and the 
revolutionary 3DP manufacturing technology, this model investigates the impact of different 
manufacturing technologies on a traditional manufacturer’s manufacturing strategy. In this 
model, we have tested five different manufacturing technology combinations which the 
traditional manufacturer could use to cope with the logistics vendor’s 3DP adoption. The 
following sections outlines some important managerial insights and theoretical contributions 
of this model analysis. 
 
 
0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00

0.20
0.21
0.22
0.23
0.24
SC-TMTF3DL
SC-TMTF3DM
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
SC-TMTF3DL
SC-TMTF3DM
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
SC-TMTF3DL
SC-TMTF3DM
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Managerial Insights 
The key message we have obtained from this model is that, in light of first-mover advantages, 
one might expect the logistics vendor to prefer offering the 3DP product for the sake of a 
new revenue stream, just like UPS (UPS, 2016, 2017). Interestingly, our results show that 
this intuition does not always hold true. In most of the cases, the logistics vendor can make 
more profits if s/he only provides the logistics delivery service than if s/he starts to offer the 
3DP product (Figure 5-15 and Figure 5-16). These results also indicate that the value of 3DP 
is not only limited to technological value but also the business value (Wohlers Associates, 
2018). This finding is supported by the case of DHL and Panalpina. Both companies are 
leading logistics vendors but they do not themselves operate 3DP product businesses but only 
provide professional 3DP related delivery services to the traditional manufacturer (MINI, 
2018; Panalpina, 2018; Pooley, 2013).  
 
Figure 5-15 Logistics Vendor Offer 3DP Product - UPS Model 
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Figure 5-16 Traditional Manufacturer Offers 3DP Product - DHL and Panalpina Model 
Secondly, when it comes to the investment cost and improving the product customization 
level, the traditional manufacturer had better not use both the traditional flexible 
manufacturing technology and the 3DP manufacturing technology together for high value 
products. For example, some diesel producers (e.g. Rezmin Tool & Die, Ernst Keller) are 
now fully using 3DP printing for their product manufacturing and product design (3D 
Systems, 2018a, 2018c). However, for low-cost items, the traditional manufacturer is better 
off adopting the 3DP technology together with the flexible traditional manufacturing 
technology for a wider coverage of consumer base. For example, Gira uses TM, TF and 3DP 
production technology for electrical components production (3D Systems, 2018b). 
Thirdly, full 3DP product adoption is still not yet a beneficial strategy for the integrated 
supply chain. This explains why the progress of adopting 3DP manufacturing technology has 
slowed down. Lowering the cost of 3DP production is a solution to the problem, as shown 
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terms of further development of the 3DP technology industry, additional support from the 
local government or research institutions is needed.  
Moreover, the results have important implications for both decision makers and 
policymakers. Understanding the adoption of 3DP, manufacturers can better focus their R&D 
efforts on projects that ideally perform both in their economic and environmental aspects. 
These results highlight the fact that, at this stage, encouraging 3DP adoption through 
legislation ultimately aimed at improving manufacturing technology may in fact still have 
the inverse effect on traditional manufacturing. Therefore, it is a big challenge for the 
policymakers to find a way to not only improve the manufacturing industry overall 
performance but also further help the further 3DP technology’s adoption.   
Theoretical Contributions 
Firstly, this model endogenizes the 3DP adoption decision under the 3DP enabled supply 
chain and develops a stylized model to study the interaction between traditional 
manufacturing, traditional flexible manufacturing technology and 3DP technology. The 
quantitative research analysis on how and when the both the traditional manufacturer and the 
logistics vendor should adopt 3DP manufacturing technology enriches the existing literature 
on the 3DP supply chain research. Thus, this research has extended the existing 3DP research 
with a new comparison on the traditional flexible manufacturing technology and the 3DP 
technology. The results support the traditional manufacturer in deciding which 
manufacturing technology strategy is profitable, and for which products it may be worth 
using 3DP technology.  
Therefore, this model contributes to the knowledge about the new technology disruption on 
how to deal with the competition from the new 3DP technology and how to involve the 
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flexible manufacturing technology under the threat of 3DP. The results provide further 
understanding of how to cope with the technology disruption: (1) self-adopt and (2) 
outsourcing. 
Lastly, this model analyzes the consumer surplus of different manufacturing decisions made 
by the traditional manufacturer. The results can help to inform the traditional manufacturer 
and the logistics vendor with regard to the adoption of new manufacturing technology and 
consumer behaviour research. 
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 Logistics Vendor’s 3DP Engagement Strategy  
This chapter attempts to build a model for studying the logistics vendor’s optimal approach 
to collaboration with the third-party 3DP professionals and the traditional manufacturer, 
obtaining optimal pricing strategies for both the traditional manufacturer and the logistics 
vendor, and the maximum profits available under different scenarios. We seek to answer the 
following questions: What are the best 3DP engagement models for the logistics vendor? 
How does the cost of outsourcing 3DP design and the cost of obtaining the 3DP design from 
the traditional manufacturer affect optimal pricing and the collaboration relationship in 
different supply chain structures? To investigate these questions, we develop a game-
theoretical model, which integrates the different channels of power and demand uncertainty 
to characterize the impact of varying collaboration models on different decentralized and 
centralized supply chains. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.1 gives the necessary background 
information; Section 6.2 presents the problem and develops the model; then the optimal 
decisions and related sensitive analysis under different 3DP engagement models is explored 
in Section 6.3. Section 6.4 to Section 6.8 conduct comparative analysis across all these 
models. Section 9 summarizes the model with a discussion of the practical implications of 
the findings. All the proofs are listed in the Appendix C. 
6.1 Introduction 
3DP technology is recognized as one of the solutions of transfer the supply chain, especially 
the 3DP technology adds new possibilities into the logistics services industry. ‘We believe 
that deepening our capabilities in this area could further strengthen the logistics industry 
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through business model innovation and the creation of new solutions.’ said Lee Eng Keat, 
director of logistics, Singapore Economic Development Board (Liao et al., 2014).  
However, due to considerations related to investment in new 3D printers, the asset 
management of current manufacturing machines, and the technical requirements associated 
with product design, logistics vendors do not currently offer 3DP manufacturing. The ways 
in which logistics vendors engage with 3DP services could be summarized into the following 
three approaches.   
The first approach (Figure 6-1) (denoted by ‘Model X’) is that the logistics vendor only 
provides the 3DP delivery service. The specific examples for this business model are the 
DHL and Mini collaboration model and the UPS and Materialise collaboration model. The 
DHL and Mini collaboration model is a typical model of how the logistics vendor could be 
engaged in the traditional manufacturer’s 3DP manufacturing service. At the current stage, 
DHL is playing a goods delivery service role (MINI, 2018). In the UPS and Materialise 
collaboration model, UPS is working with one of the best 3DP companies and so far has also 
provided the delivery service (UPS, 2018). In addition, Panalpina, one of the world’s leading 
logistics vendors, also provides a 3DP goods delivery service to Shapeways (a 3DP 
community) (Shapeways, 2016). 
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Figure 6-1 The First 3DP Engagement Approach: Model X 
The second approach (Figure 6-2) (denoted by ‘Model Y’) is that the logistics vendor 
provides both the delivery service and the product design service. One typical example here 
is the UPS and Fast Radius collaboration model. UPS outsources the 3DP design and 
development work to Fast Radius and UPS provides the print and delivery service itself (B. 
Zhang, 2016). 
 
Figure 6-2 The Second 3DP Engagement Approach: Model Y 
The third approach (Figure 6-3) (denoted by ‘Model Z’) is that the traditional manufacturer 
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3DP printing and goods delivery services. For instance, Panalpina’s partner (e.g. Shapeways, 
one of biggest 3D printing marketplace) authorizes use of a 3DP solution and Panalpina 
provides the service of ‘printing’ and delivery (Panalpina, 2018). 
 
Figure 6-3 The Third 3DP Engagement Approach: Model Z 
The future of the logistics vendor’s 3DP service is exciting but also uncertain. Therefore, in 
this chapter we build up a theoretical model of a supply chain to explore which type of 
engagement is the best approach. We discuss and compare the three engagement approaches 
above. After that, we also introduce a new engagement approach into the discussion and 
comparison where the logistics vendor offers all of the services: product design, 3DP, and 
the goods delivery service.  
Specifically, our research question for this chapter is ‘what is the best 3DP adoption plan for 
the logistics vendor?’ The detailed sub-questions are as follows.  
Q3.1. Under what conditions will a logistics vendor choose to outsource the product design 
to a third-party 3DP design company? 
Co
ns
um
er
Tr
ad
iti
on
al
 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r
Lo
gi
st
ics
 
Ve
nd
or 3D Printing 
Product Product Delivery
Receive Product
Authorize 
Product Design
Receive 
Requirements
Confirm Final 
Product Design
Provide 
Customization 
Requirements
  247 
Q3.2. Under what conditions will a logistics vendor choose to purchase the product design 
from the original traditional manufacturer? 
Q3.3. What are the impacts of different logistics vendor’s 3DP adoption strategies on the 
relationship between the logistics vendor and traditional manufacturer? 
6.2 Problem Description 
We consider a supply chain where the consumer can choose to buy a TM product at price /0, buy an authorized 3DP product or an unauthorized 3DP product (‘grey goods’) at price /$%. Using the same mould setups as in the previous chapters, we assume that each consumer 
has an intrinsic valuation F  of the authorized 3DP product (where F  is assumed to be a 
uniform distribution from 0 to 1). In addition, it is generally agreed that the traditional 
manufacturer has a better understanding of product design. Therefore, the traditional 
manufacturer can provide a higher quality of product design than the third-party 3DP 
professional (González-Maestre & Granero, 2018; Lumsakul, Sheldrick, & Rahimifard, 
2018). Accordingly, we assume all the consumers have a higher net expected utility for the 
authorized 3DP product (F) than the unauthorized 3DP product (^F, 0 < ^ < 1, ^ is the 
discount rate for the product design quality). This assumption is widely used in the 
operational literature, for example by Ru, Shi, & Zhang (2015) and Huang, He, & Chen 
(2018). At the same time, as we discussed in the previous chapters, the customization level 
of the 3DP product is higher than the TM product, and so we assume for all the consumers 
that their net expected utility of buying a 3DP product is higher than buying a TM product. 
Therefore, the consumer’s willingness-to-pay for the TM product is '^F (where the value of 
parameter ' is the discount rate on the consumer’s willingness-to-pay for the TM product’s 
customization level, 0 < ' < 1). In summary, the net expected utilities of consumers buying 
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the authorized 3DP product, the unauthorized 3DP product and the TM product are \$%S =F − /$%, \$%T = ^F − /$%, and \0 = '^F − /0. We assume the consumers are strategic: 
they only buy the product which provides the highest non-negative utility to maximize utility. 
By considering the investment in new 3DP engagement, we assume that the customers in one 
model cannot purchase a product from the other models (for example, the product in Model 
X and Model Y are in two different industries). This assumption is in line with previous 
modelling techniques used in studies in the supply chain and operations management 
literature (Bergen, Heide, & Dutta, 1998; Rachel Yang, Ahmadi, & Monroe, 1998).  
Therefore, depending on the traditional manufacturer’s channel decision, the game sequence 
can be stated in three or four steps as follows (Figure 6-4). 
Under Model X, the traditional manufacturer self-manufactures the 3DP product: 
Step 1: The logistics vendor releases the logistics delivery service fee. 
Step 2: The traditional manufacturer sets the prices for the TM product and the 3DP product 
simultaneously. 
Step 3: The consumer determines his/her purchasing decision. 
Under Model Y and Model Z, the traditional manufacturer sells the TM product and the 
logistics vendor offers the 3DP product: 
Step 1: The logistics vendor releases the logistics delivery service fee. 
Step 2: The traditional manufacturer sets the prices for the TM product. 
Step 3: The logistics vendor announces the 3DP product price. 
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Step 4: The consumer determines his/her purchasing decision. 
 
Figure 6-4 Pricing Sequence for Model X, Model Y, and Model Z in a Decentralized Supply Chain 
All notions are summarized in the table below. 
Table 6-1 Definitions of Parameters 
Indexes Definition  
M Index of the traditional manufacturer 
L Index of the logistics vendor or logistics delivery 
SC Index of the supply chain 
X Subscript, index of the Model X 
Y Subscript, index of the Model Y  
Z Subscript, index of the Model Z 
I Subscript, integrated supply chain 
D Subscript, decentralized supply chain 
Parameter Definition K Consumer value discount for the TM product customization level, 0 <' < 1. _ The discount rate of the product design quality for the unauthorized 3DP 
product,	0 < ^ < 1 L The unit product design authorization fee of the 3DP product, 0 < M < 1 ` The product design fee charged by the third-party 3DP professional, 0 <a < 1 NL The unit selling price for a product or service, 0 < /D < 1. -L The unit manufacturing cost for a product or service, 0 < "D < 1. 
pM, p3DM
Logistics Vendor
Manufacturer
pM
Logistics Vendor
Manufacturer
Model X
Model Y and Model Z
pL   
pL p3DL
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XL The sales quantity for the product, 0 < .D < 1. ZbL  The profit function, ∏ ≥D 0. 
6.3 Model Analysis 
Under this subsection, we investigate the three models with details. 
6.3.1 Model X 
We consider the first 3DP engagement approach, in which, as demonstrated in Figure 6-5, 
the traditional manufacturer sells both the 3DP (/$%)	and TM (/0) product into the market 
and the logistics vendor only provides the product delivery service at price //.  
 
Figure 6-5 Supply Chain Structure of Model X 
With the customer’s net expected utility, the demand for the TM product and the 3DP product 
in Model X is .0 = 1∫ HF>$%?>"'?@A>"@A = H$%'H"('#U − H"#U  and .$% = 1∫ HF(>$%?>"'?@A = 1 − H$%'H"('#U  
Model X 
Traditional Manufacturer
                                             ConsumerTM 
Product
3DP 
Product
Delivery price
pL
TM product price
pM
3DP product price
 p3D
Logistics Vendor
  251 
respectively. Then, only if '/$% ≥ /0 , will the demand for the TM product be positive. 
Otherwise, if the traditional manufacturer uses a low-price regime for the 3DP product, such 
that '/$% < /0, the demand for the TM product becomes 0. However, as we indicated at the 
beginning of this chapter, this model tries to explore the manufacturing strategy associated 
with the 3DP engagement strategy. Therefore, we only consider the scenario where the 
market demand for both the TM and the 3DP product is positive under all the different models 
therein. 
Focusing on our main research issues and for simplicity, we only consider the product cost 
and the product delivery cost, as all the other costs can be easily included and do not affect 
the main results in this chapter. Therefore, under the decentralized supply chain, the 
traditional manufacturer’s profit and the logistics vendor’s profit are as follows: 
 Z 5(/0 , /$%)V = (/0 − "0 − //).0 + (/$% − "$% − //).$% (6.1) 
 Z 7(//)V = (// − "/)(.0 + .$%) (6.2) 
Under the integrated supply chain, the system profit is 
 Z 9:(/0 , /$%)V = (/0 − "0 − "/).0 + (/$% − "$% − "/).$% (6.3) 
 
PROPOSITION 6-1. In the decentralized supply chain, there exists the maximum profit for the 
traditional manufacturer ∏ /(*' , *#() =∗0 112(41567)67 ();(−4 + (7 − 3);));) − 4);4#(. +(−1 + );)4)(−2); + 4)) + 2(−1 + );)(3); + 4))4' − (1 + 3);)4'. + 8);4#((1 − ); +4')) and the maximum profit for the logistics vendor  ∏ 2∗0 (*)) = (46759!59")#:67 , both of which are 
maximized by unique optimal price *)∗ = 1. (); + 4) − 4') ,  *'∗ = 1; (3); + 4) + 4') ,  *#(∗ =	1; (2 + ); + 24#( + 4) − 4')  and optimal sales of the TM and 3DP product  ('∗ =4.679$%4(41567)(6759!)5(1567)9";(41567)67 	 and (#(∗ = 4156759$%49".(41567) . 
In the integrated supply chain, there also exists the maximum profit for the integrated supply 
chain ∏ 78(*' , *#()∗0 = − 1;(41567)67 (); − );. + );4#(. − (−1 + );)4). + 2);4#((−1 + ); −4') + 2(−1 + );)4)(); − 4') + 4'. ), which is maximized by unique optimal price  *'∗ = 1. (); +
  252 
4) + 4') and *#(∗ =	 1. (1 + 4#( + 4)); and the optimal product sales of the TM and 3DP product 
are  ('∗ = 9!467(9$%59!)59".(41567)67 	 and (#(∗ = 4156759$%49".(41567) . 
Next, we try to analyze the impact of the costs on the optimal decisions and the equilibrium-
maximized profits.  
PROPOSITION 6-2. In decentralized model X,  
(1) The optimal price of the logistics service decreases in the cost of the TM but increases 
in the cost of the logistics service; the cost of the 3DP product has no direct impact 
on the optimal price of the logistics service; 
(2) The optimal price of the TM product increases in the cost of the TM product and the 
logistics service; the cost of the 3DP product has no direct impact on the optimal 
price of the TM product; 
(3) The optimal price of the 3DP product decreases in the cost of the TM product but 
increases in both the cost of the logistics service and the 3DP product; 
(4) The optimal sales of the TM product decrease in the cost of the TM product and the 
logistics service but increase in the cost of the 3DP product; 
(5) The optimal sales of the 3DP product increase in the cost of the TM product but 
decrease in the cost of the TM product; the cost of the logistics service has no direct 
impact on the optimal price of the 3DP product. 
(6) The traditional manufacturer’s maximized profit  
a. decreases in the cost of the TM product if a) $+ (−1 + '^)(−1 + "$%) < "/ <1  or b) 	0 < "/ < $+ (−1 + '^)(−1 + "$%)  and 0 < "0 <+#U!$%"('("#U)($#U"!!)("$#U ; otherwise, it increases in the cost of the TM product. 
b. decreases in the cost of the logistics service. 
c. increases in the cost of the 3DP product if a) !"U < ' < 1  and −(−1 +'^)('^ − "0) < "/ < '^ − "0 ; or b) 	0 < "/ < −(−1 + '^)('^ − "0) 
and 1 − '^ + "0 < "$% < 1; otherwise, it decreases in the cost of the 3DP 
product. 
(7) The logistics vendor’s maximized profit decreases in both the cost of the TM product 
and the logistics service; there is no direct relationship between the logistics vendor’s 
maximized profit and the 3DP product cost. 
The findings of properties (1)-(5) of PROPOSITION 4-5 could be summarized into the 
following four points. Firstly, the higher the relevant costs are, the higher the product/service 
price is (for example, the higher the TM product cost and/or the higher the logistics service 
cost is, the higher the TM product price is). Secondly, the TM product cost has a negative 
impact on both the logistics service price and the 3DP product price. This indicates that if the 
cost of the TM product is low, then i) the logistics vendor uses a high-price regime for the 
logistics service to maximize his/her profit; ii) the traditional manufacturer sets the price of 
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the 3DP product high to a) maximize the unit margin for the 3DP product and b) keep the 
TM product’s pricing advantage. Thirdly, surprisingly, the cost of the 3DP product cannot 
directly influence the price of the logistics service or the cost of the 3DP product. Lastly, the 
lower the relevant costs are, the higher optimal product quantity is. This finding is quite 
straightforward. The relationship between the cost and the product sales is negative. 
However, the impact of the cost of the logistics service on the optimal price of the 3DP 
product is slight.  
Intuitively, we assume that the cost reduction on the product contributes to the traditional 
manufacturer’s profitability. However, this Proposition implies that this assumption holds 
only when the costs of the logistics delivery service and the TM/3DP product are below a 
certain threshold, or else when TM product customization and the TM product design quality 
are below a certain threshold. Further details are given below.  
Firstly, a cost reduction on TM results in a lower TM product price and a higher 3DP product 
price. Therefore, more price-sensitive consumers choose to buy the cheaper TM product 
instead of the 3DP product. Notice that when the logistics delivery service is costly, it forces 
the logistics vendor to use a higher price for the logistics delivery. Therefore, generally, the 
price of the TM product is still in the high region; if the cost of the TM reduces, the new 
profits generated from the TM product cannot cover the loss incurred from the 3DP product. 
Thus, overall, the traditional manufacturer’s profits decrease. In addition, if the logistics 
delivery service demand is low, and if the TM product cost is low as well, then the cost 
reduction can help the traditional manufacturer gain more price-sensitive consumers for the 
TM product – but the TM product unit margin is low. Thus, the traditional manufacturer still 
cannot generate more profit. However, if the logistics delivery cost is low but the TM product 
cost is high, the TM product cost reduction can help the traditional manufacturer derive more 
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profits from the TM product sales than the profit lost on the 3DP product. Thus, in practice, 
for those manufacturers who operate certain low value-add TM and 3DP products, but for 
whom the delivery cost is comparatively high (e.g. office accessories), it is not a profitable 
strategy to put effort into TM product cost reduction. For those items with high production 
cost and a low delivery service cost (e.g. automotive engines, aeroplane parts), cost reduction 
on the TM product part is still beneficial to the traditional manufacturer.  
Secondly, property (2) suggests that cost reduction on the logistics delivery service brings 
more profits to the traditional manufacturer through more TM product sales. However, it has 
no direct impact on the 3DP product’s equilibrium quantity.  
Thirdly, if 1) both the customization level of the TM product and the logistics delivery cost 
are high or 2) the logistics delivery cost is low but the 3DP product cost is high, the cost 
reduction on the 3DP product results in profit lost to the traditional manufacturer. Because 
the new profits on the increased 3DP product sales cannot cover the profit lost on the low 
3DP product unit margin. Lastly, the cost reduction on the TM product and the logistics 
service cost contribute to the logistics vendor’s profit. More precisely, the cost reduction on 
the TM product forces the logistics vendor to use a high-price regime for the logistics service. 
Although sales of the TM product decrease under this scenario, the TM product sales 
increase. Overall, the logistics vendor gains more profits on a) the increased demand for TM 
product delivery service and 2) the higher unit price margin of the logistics delivery service. 
Meanwhile, as demonstrated in the related proof, cost reduction for the delivery service 
results in price decreases for the logistics service and increases in TM product sales. Thus, 
thanks to the increased need for a TM product delivery service the logistics vendor can still 
derive more profit overall. This is a quite straightforward finding. Under model X, the cost 
reduction on the logistics delivery service is still a strategy for the logistics vendor to use to 
  255 
improve business performance. In addition, although the logistics vendor handles the 3DP 
product delivery, the cost of the 3DP product has no influence on the logistics vendor’s profit.  
PROPOSITION 6-3. In integrated model X,  
(1) The optimal price of the TM product increases in the cost of the TM product and the 
logistics service; the cost of the 3DP product has no direct impact on the optimal 
price of the TM product; 
(2) The optimal price of the 3DP product increases in both the cost of the logistics service 
and the 3DP product; the cost of the TM product has no direct impact on the price of 
the 3DP product; 
(3) The optimal number of sales of the TM product decreases in the cost of the TM 
product and the logistics service but increases in the cost of the 3DP product; 
(4) The optimal number of sales of the 3DP product increases in the cost of the TM 
product but decreases in the cost of the TM product; the cost of the logistics service 
has no direct impact on the optimal price of the 3DP product. 
(5) The maximized profit of the integrated supply chain decreases in the cost of the TM 
product and the logistics delivery service; but it increases in the cost of the 3DP 
product only if a) !"U < ' < 1  and −(−1 + '^)('^ − "0) < "/ < '^ − "0  or 
b) 	0 < "/ < −(−1 + '^)('^ − "0)  and 1 − '^ + "0 < "$% < 1 ; otherwise, it 
decreases in the cost of the 3DP product. 
Most of the findings of PROPOSITION 6-3 are the same as the findings in PROPOSITION 
4-5; the only difference is that the cost of the TM product has no direct impact on the price 
of the 3DP product because the price of the logistics delivery service is not a consideration 
for the traditional manufacturer’s pricing strategy under the integrated supply chain. 
Additionally, the cost of both the TM and the 3DP product is not considered in his/her pricing 
strategy. In addition, this proposition also implies that the system performance could be 
enhanced by cost reductions on the TM product and the logistics service, because the system 
can achieve more TM product sales. However, a cost reduction on the 3DP product cannot 
always help the integrated supply chain gain more profits. Specifically, if 1) both the 
customization level of the TM product and the delivery cost are high or 2) the delivery cost 
is low but the 3DP product cost is high, then any cost reduction on the 3DP product leads to 
an increase in 3DP product sales but the supply chain loses more on the low 3DP product 
unit margin. 
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Unfortunately, because of the complex nature of the optimal product quantity decisions and 
the maximized profit functions, it is difficult to obtain direct insight into the impact of 
customization level and product design quality discount rate on these optimal decisions. 
Therefore, the following sections use numerical tests to determine the relative performance 
of customers’ customization sensitivity and sensitivity to product design quality with regard 
to the optimal decisions under different 3DP engagement models. To ensure consistency, we 
employ two full factorial designs (as Table 6-2 and Table 6-3 show) based on the one we 
used in Chapter 4, followed by a depiction of the optimal prices and quantities for each 
parameter for different scenarios.   
Table 6-2 Parameter Values in the Numerical Testing for the Impacts of Customization Level on the 
Optimal Decisions 
 -34 -5 -6 _ 
Low 0.3 0.01 0.01 0.1 
Medium 0.6 0.01 0.01 0.4 
High 0.9 0.01 0.01 0.7 
 
Table 6-3 Parameter Values in the Numerical Testing for the Impacts of Product Design Quality 
Level on the Optimal Decisions 
 -34 -5 -6 K 
Low 0.3 0.01 0.01 0.2 
Medium 0.6 0.01 0.01 0.5 
High 0.9 0.01 0.01 0.8 
 
PROPOSITION 6-4. In decentralized model X,  
(1) The optimal price of the logistics service, the TM product price, and the 3DP product 
price increases in the TM customization level and/or the design quality of the TM 
product. 
(2) The optimal number of sales of the TM product increases in the TM customization 
level and/or the design quality of the TM product, but the optimal number of 3DP 
product sales decreases in it. 
(3) The traditional manufacturer benefits from the improvement of the TM customization 
level and/or the design quality of the TM product only under the supply chain with 
the high-setting. Under the supply chain with the medium-setting, the traditional 
manufacturer’s profitability is concave in the TM customization level and/or the 
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design quality of the TM product. Under the supply chain with the low-setting, the 
higher the TM product customization level and/or the design quality, the lower the 
traditional manufacturer’s profitability. 
(4) The logistics vendor can always achieve better profitability by the improvement of 
the TM product customization level and/or the design quality. 
Under the integrated supply chain,  
(1) The optimal price of the TM product increases in the TM customization level and/or 
the design quality of the TM product; the TM customization level and/or the design 
quality of the TM product has no direct impact on the 3DP product price. 
(2) The optimal number of sales of the TM product increases in the TM customization 
level and/or the design quality of the TM product, but the optimal number of 3DP 
product sales decreases in it. 
(3) The improvement of the TM product customization level contributes to better 
financial performance of the integrated supply chain. 
 
We can obtain the following results from the above proposition: 
(1) As illustrated in Figure 6-6, improvement in either the TM product customization 
level or the design quality always contributes to more TM product sales and results 
in cannibalization of the 3DP product sales. With the higher TM product 
customization level or design quality, the traditional manufacturer uses a high-price 
regime for both products for the purpose of maximizing profits. However, if the 
supply chain is under the low-setting, although the strategy of high pricing helps the 
traditional manufacturer gain more profits from TM product sales, s/he loses more 
from the dropping 3DP product sales. Overall, the traditional manufacturer cannot 
gain a better financial result. Under the supply chain with a medium-setting, if either '  or ^  is relatively low, the traditional manufacturer cannot achieve better 
profitability by improving them. The reason behind this is obvious: the better the TM 
product is, the more profit is lost on the 3DP product sales. Therefore, the traditional 
manufacturer’s profitability decreases in the improvement of	' or ^. If either ' or ^ 
is sufficiently high, a further improvement helps the traditional manufacturer generate 
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more profits on the TM product and can cover the loss due to the effect of 
cannibalization. Thus, the improvement of ' or ^ brings benefits to the traditional 
manufacturer. Lastly, under the supply chain with a high setting, the traditional 
manufacturer benefits from the improvement of either ' or ^ because s/he can enjoy 
more sales of the better TM product. 
(2) Figure 6-6 also demonstrates that improvement in either the TM product 
customization level or the design quality helps the logistics vendor gain more profits 
from either the high logistics service unit price margin or the increased TM product 
sales. More precisely, with the improvement in either ' or ^, the logistics vendor 
raises the delivery price to maximize the profit. Therefore, the logistics vendor can 
generate a portion of the profit by the high unit logistics service price. Meanwhile, 
although 3DP product sales decrease, the logistics vendor can still generate more 
profits on the increased TM product sales. Generally, the logistics vendor can always 
achieve better profitability. 
(3) The findings about the impact of ' or ^ on the optimal decisions under the integrated 
supply chain are similar to the findings we discussed for property (1) above. The only 
difference is that ' and ^ have no direct impact on the 3DP product equilibrium price 
because of the visibility of the information on all the products/services. At supply 
chain level (Figure 6-7), the improvement of ' or ^ always helps the system enjoy 
more benefits from increased TM product sales or the high-pricing strategy for the 
TM product. 
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(c) (d) 
  
(e) (f) 
  
(g) (h) 
Figure 6-6 Impact of Customization Level and Product Design Level in a Decentralized Supply 
Chain – Model X 
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Figure 6-7 Impact of Customization Level and Product Design Level in an Integrated Supply Chain 
– Model X 
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6.3.2 Model Y 
Under the second 3DP engagement scenario (also called system ‘Y’, Figure 6-8), the logistics 
vendor provides a 3DP product (/$%) designed by the third-party 3DP professional at a cost 
of a (0 < a < 1). 
 
Figure 6-8 Supply Chain Structure for Model Y  
Under the decentralized supply chain, the profits of the traditional manufacturer and the 
logistics vendor are shown in equation (6.4) and (6.5), respectively. 
 Z 5(/0)W = (/0 − "0 − //).0 (6.4) 
 Z 7(// , /$%)W = (// − "/).0 + (/$% − "$% − a).$% (6.5) 
The profit of the integrated supply chain is  
 Z 9:(/0 , /$%)W = (/0 − "0 − "/).0 + (/$% − "$%).$% (6.6) 
 
Model Y 
Traditional Manufacturer
Logistics Vendor
ConsumerTM Product 3DP Product
Delivery price
pL
TM product price
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3DP product price
 p3D
Product design fee
γ
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PROPOSITION 6-5. In the decentralized supply chain, the maximum profit for the traditional 
manufacturer is shown in Equation (6.27) and the maximum profit for the logistics vendor is 
as shown in Equation (6.28), both of which are maximized by the optimal price given in 
Equation (6.22), (6.23) and (6.24). Meanwhile, 	
the optimal market demand for the TM and 3DP product is given in Equation (6.25) and 
(6.26). 
In the integrated supply chain, the maximum profit for the supply chain is 	∏ 67("B , "CD)∗E = − F(FGHI)IJ&HIK'(& H(K)HK*)&FLIK'((JFIJHK)HK*)M(FGHI)IJ , which is maximized by "B∗ = GL ()9 ++N + +B)	 and "CD∗ =	 GL (9 + +CD); the optimal market demand for the TM and 3DP product is  .0∗ = −.03%+0"+0#2(−1+.).O 	 and .$%∗ = O−.O−03%+0"+0#2O−2.O . 
 
PROPOSITION 6-6. In decentralized model Y,  
(1) The optimal price of the logistics service decreases in the cost of TM but increases in 
the cost of the TM product, the cost of the 3DP product and the cost of outsourcing 
3DP design, but it increases in the cost of the logistics service. 
(2) The optimal price of the TM product increases in all the costs involved for the 
products/service. 
(3) The optimal price of the 3DP product decreases in the cost of the TM product and the 
cost of the logistics service but increases in the cost of the 3DP product and the cost 
of third-party 3DP design. 
(4) The optimal number of sales of the TM product decreases in the cost of the TM 
product and the logistics service but increases in the cost of the 3DP product and the 
third-party 3DP design fee. 
(5) The optimal number of sales of the 3DP product increases in the cost of the TM 
product and the cost of the logistics service but decreases in the cost of the 3DP 
product and the third-party 3DP design fee. 
(6) The traditional manufacturer’s maximized profit decreases in both the cost of the TM 
product and the logistics delivery service, but it increases in the cost of the 3DP 
product and the cost of outsourcing 3DP product design. 
(7) The logistics vendor’s maximized profit decreases in the both the cost of the TM 
product and the logistics delivery service. However, the logistics vendor’s profit 
decreases in the cost of the 3DP product or the third-party 3DP design fee only if 0 <+B + +N < (FGHI)I(PH(FQHI)I)J&FPHI(RFLIH(FLHI)&J)   and  (FPH(RFLI)I)SF(FGHI)(PH(FQHI)I)JH(FLHI)&K)H(FLHI)&K*PHI(FRHLI) <+CD < 1; otherwise, it increases in the direct costs of the 3DP product. 
This proposition presents the relationships between all the costs and the optimal decisions 
and maximized profits. The findings here can be summarized into the following points: 
Firstly, reducing the cost of the TM product and the logistics delivery service is a win-win 
strategy for both the traditional manufacturer and the logistics vendor (D. R. Eyers & Potter, 
2015; Liu et al., 2014). Specifically, cost reduction on the TM product contributes to the 
traditional manufacturer’s low pricing strategy, which aims to increase the market share of 
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the TM product. Because of the cost reduction on the TM product, it is hard for the logistics 
vendor to use a high-pricing strategy for the logistics delivery service to i) mitigate the low 
pricing advantage of the TM product and ii) generate more profits from increased TM product 
sales. As a result, the traditional manufacturer can gain more profits by the TM product cost 
reduction. Meanwhile, the traditional manufacturer’s low TM pricing also forces the logistics 
vendor to use higher pricing for the 3DP product to allow a larger price margin on the 3DP 
product. Although the 3DP product loses some price-sensitive consumers, the logistics 
vendor can still gain more profits from the TM product delivery service. Meanwhile, the cost 
reduction on the logistics service actually helps the traditional manufacturer’s low-pricing 
strategy and it also helps the TM product to gain more market share. Conversely, it 
cannibalizes the 3DP product market share because the logistics vendor had to use a high-
price regime on the 3DP product for the purpose of getting a better profitability. Overall, both 
the traditional manufacturer and the logistics vendor can enjoy the benefits of the cost 
reduction on the logistics service. However, this also implies that the advantages of the 
logistics service cost reduction have a rare positive impact on the logistics vendor’s 3DP 
product business. 
Secondly, the cost of both the 3DP product and the third-party 3DP design fee results in a 
cannibalization effect on the TM product sales. It is easy to see that a cost reduction for the 
3DP product or the third-party 3DP design fee helps the logistics vendor use a low-price 
strategy for the 3DP product to increase its market share. As the relevant costs of the 3DP 
product are low, the traditional manufacturer had to set the price of the TM product low to 
maintain the TM product’s pricing advantage. Consequently, the low-price 3DP product can 
attract more price-sensitive consumers and consumers sensitive to either customization or 
product design quality to buy the 3DP product instead of the TM product. Therefore, the 
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traditional manufacturer cannot achieve better profitability due to the cannibalization of the 
3DP product.  
Thirdly, depending on the different supply chain settings, the impacts of the cost of the 3DP 
product and the third-party 3DP design fee on the logistics vendor’s profits are different. 
Specifically, 1) if the TM product’s direct costs are extremely high (e.g. "/ is located in the 
high region, or "0 and "/ are costly) the price of the logistics service is high. Therefore, a 
cost reduction on "$% and/or a helps the logistics vendor achieve more 3DP product sales but 
s/he loses business on the delivery of the TM product. Although the logistics vendor uses a 
larger unit delivery margin, overall it still cannot save the loss incurred from TM product 
delivery. 2) If the TM product’s direct costs are considerably low, when the 3DP product 
production is costly, although cost reduction on "$% and/or a can push some consumers to 
shift and buy the 3DP product, the profits generated from those consumers cannot save the 
loss due to decreased TM product delivery. However, if the 3DP product cost is sufficiently 
low, there are more price-sensitive, customization-sensitive, or product-design sensitive 
consumers who choose to buy the 3DP product. The new profits from this are sufficient to 
cover the loss made on the delivery service. Thus, the logistics vendor’s profitability could 
be improved by the cost reduction on the 3DP product and the third-party 3DP product design 
fee. This finding implies that for those low-cost products (e.g., office accessories), reducing 
the 3DP product cost or finding a low-cost 3DP product design company are sustainable 
business strategies for 3DP-enabled logistics vendors. For example, Panalpina is now 
considering how to integrate its 3DP product business with some 3DP design communities 
who can provide low-cost 3DP design services, such as Shapeways (Shapeways, 2016).  
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PROPOSITION 6-7. Under the integrated model Y,  
(1) The optimal price of the TM product increases in the cost of the TM and the cost of 
the logistics service. The 3DP product’s related costs cannot influence the TM 
product price. 
(2) The optimal price of the 3DP product increases in the cost of the 3DP product. All 
other costs have no direct impact on it. 
(3) The optimal number of sales of the TM product decreases in the cost of the TM 
product and the logistics service but increases in the cost of the 3DP product. 
(4) The optimal number of sales of the 3DP product increases in the cost of the TM 
product and the logistics service but decreases in the cost of the 3DP product. 
(5) The cost of outsourced 3DP product design has no impact on any of the optimal 
decisions. 
(6) If 0 < 9 < GGHS and +CD > − SJFGHJ, the supply chain profitability decreases in both the TM 
product cost and the logistics delivery cost. If 0 < 9 < GGHS  and 0 < +CD < − SJFGHJ  or 2) GGHS ≤ 9 < 1, the supply chain’s maximized profit is concave in the TM cost/delivery 
service cost. 
(7) The impact of the 3DP product cost on the supply chain profitability differs by the 
supply chain cost structure: 
a. If 1) I&J&HK)HK*IJ − = − 9 > +N + +B , +N < (FGHI)IJ&FGHIJ  and  (FGHI)IJ&FGHIJ < +N + +B  or  I&J&HK)HK*IJ − = − 9 > +N + +B  and (FGHI)IJ&FGHIJ ≤ +N < )9 , the supply chain profit 
increases in the 3DP product cost; 
b. If the supply chain satisfies 1) +N < (FGHI)IJ&FGHIJ  and +N + +B ≤ (FGHI)IJ&FGHIJ , or 2) (FGHI)IJ&FGHIJ < +N + +B  and I&J&HK)HK*IJ − = − 9 < +N + +B , or 3) I&J&HK)HK*IJ − = − 9 <+N + +B and (FGHI)IJ&FGHIJ ≤ +N, the supply chain profit is concave in the 3DP cost. 
Initially, we assumed that the cost reductions on the product or service contribute to a better 
supply chain financial performance. However, the above proposition implies that under 
certain supply chain structures the cost reduction might hurt the supply chain’s overall 
performance. 
The TM/3DP product-related costs contribute to the increase sales of the TM/3DP product 
by a low-price strategy and cannibalize the rival’s product sales. The impacts of the TM 
product and the delivery cost on supply chain profitability could be summarized into three 
different scenarios. Firstly, when the third-party 3DP product design quality is low, the 
consumer’s valuation of the 3DP product is low. Therefore, if the cost of the 3DP product is 
high, the cost reduction on the TM product or the logistics service helps the supply chain 
generate more profits on the TM product to cover the loss on the 3DP product. Secondly, if 
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both the 3DP product design quality and the cost of the 3DP product are low, the supply chain 
also benefits from the reduction of the TM product costs when those costs are also relatively 
low. However, if the TM product’s related costs are high, the cost reduction on the TM results 
in more supply chain profits losses due to 1) low TM product unit price margin and/or 2) 
decreased 3DP product quantity. Lastly, if the third-party 3DP product design quality is high, 
but the TM product costs are low, the supply chain can generate more profits on the increased 
TM product sales and/or the high 3DP product price through reductions in the TM product’s 
related costs. However, in this case, if the TM product’s related costs are high, the supply 
chain loses more benefits from the reduced 3DP product sales. 
This proposition also shows that the impacts of the 3DP product cost on the supply chain’s 
overall performance are more complex (Y. Li, Jia, Cheng, & Hu, 2017; Zeltmann et al., 
2016). Firstly, if 1) the TM product’s related costs are sufficiently low, and the logistics cost 
is at the medium level or 2) the TM product costs are at the medium level, but the logistics 
cost is extremely low, then a cost reduction for the 3DP product results in the supply chain 
gaining more profits from the increase in 3DP product sales and this covers its loss from the 
TM product sales. Secondly, if 1) the TM product’s related costs are sufficiently low, and 
especially if the logistics cost is low and 2) the TM product costs are extremely high (no 
matter whether or not the TM product cost or the logistics cost is considerably high), then 
the 3DP product cost reduction contributes more profits to the supply chain if the 3DP 
product is not costly (i.e. a low or medium cost structure product). Otherwise, the supply 
chain loses profits by the 3DP product cost reduction (either on declined TM product sales 
or the 3DP product’s low unit margin).  
Compared to Model X, Model Y has one more variable a. Thus, we simulate the value of a 
in our two full factorial designs, as Table 4-3 and Table 6-5 shows. We use these numerical 
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examples to illustrate the impact of the TM customization level and the product design 
quality on the optimal decisions and the equilibrium profitability. 
Table 6-4 Parameter Values in the Numerical Testing for the Impacts of Customization Level on the 
Optimal Decisions – Model Y 
 -34 -5 -6 _ ` 
Low 0.3 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.2 
Medium 0.6 0.01 0.01 0.4 0.4 
High 0.9 0.01 0.01 0.7 0.6 
 
Table 6-5 Parameter Values in the Numerical Testing for the Impacts of Product Design Quality 
Level on the Optimal Decisions – Model Y 
 -34 -5 -6 K ` 
Low 0.3 0.01 0.01 0.2 0.2 
Medium 0.6 0.01 0.01 0.5 0.4 
High 0.9 0.01 0.01 0.8 0.6 
 
PROPOSITION 6-8. In decentralized model Y,  
(1) The optimal price of the logistics service is convex in the TM product customization 
level. Both the optimal price of the TM product and the 3DP product increase in the 
TM product customization level. The optimal number of product sales of the TM 
product increases in the TM product customization level. The TM product 
customization level has no direct impact on the optimal number of 3DP product sales. 
(2) The optimal price of the logistics delivery service, the TM product, the 3DP product 
and the optimal number of TM product sales increases in the third-party 3DP product 
design quality. The optimal number of 3DP product sales decreases in it. 
(3) Both the traditional manufacturer’s and the logistics vendor’s maximized profit 
increase in the TM product customization level but decrease in the third-party 3DP 
product design quality. 
Under the integrated supply chain, 
(1) The optimal TM product price increases in both the TM product customization level 
and the third-party 3DP design quality. The optimal 3DP product price and the 
optimal number of sales increases in the third-party 3DP design quality but the TM 
product customization level has no direct impact on the optimal 3DP product price 
or the optimal number of sales. The optimal number of TM product sales increases 
in the TM product customization level but decreases in the third-party 3DP product 
design quality.  
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(2) The maximized supply chain profit increases in the TM product customization level 
but decreases in the third-party 3DP product design quality. 
As in Figure 6-9, first of all, the improvement of the TM product customization level not 
only contributes to the TM product’s high-price strategy and the improvement of the third-
party 3DP product design, but it also has positive impacts on the optimal price of both the 
TM product and the 3DP product. This finding also supports by the research conducted by 
(Liao et al., 2014). Their study suggests the improving on the product service can help the 
manufacturer get the advantages on product pricing. 
In addition, we can also show that improved TM product customization cannot always help 
the traditional manufacturer achieve more product sales. If the TM product customization 
level is in the low region, the improvement of the TM product forces the logistics vendor to 
use a high-price strategy for the delivery service for the purpose of maximizing his/her 
profitability and mitigating the TM product’s pricing advantage. Meanwhile, a higher 
customization TM product yields higher TM product sales. Accordingly, the logistics vendor 
also uses a high-price strategy in order to increase his/her profit. As a result, the traditional 
manufacturer can gain more profits on the increased TM product sales and the high TM 
product price. Meanwhile, the logistics vendor can also enjoy more profits on the increased 
TM product delivery and the high delivery service price. If the TM product customization 
level is in the high region, any improvement to TM product customization pushes the logistics 
vendor to use a low-price regime for the delivery service. The logistics vendor can help the 
traditional manufacturer’s low pricing strategy for the TM product and then gain more profits 
on the increased TM product sales. In this situation, both the traditional manufacturer and the 
logistics vendor can benefit from the increased TM product sales. 
Next, Figure 6-9 also illustrates that the optimal price of the logistics service, the TM product 
and the 3DP product increases in the quality of the third-party product design. With high 
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product design quality, both the traditional manufacturer and the logistics vendor use a high 
price strategy for the TM and the 3DP product. At the same time, it also pushes the logistics 
vendor to price the service higher for the purpose of maximizing profits. Thus, more 
consumers choose to buy the TM product instead of the 3DP product because of its pricing 
advantage. Consequently, the traditional manufacturer loses profit due to having to pay high 
delivery fees. Meanwhile, the logistics vendor’s profitability is also hurt by the improvement 
of the quality of the third-party product design, which leads to the decline of 3DP product 
sales. 
Under the integrated supply chain (Figure 6-10), the impact of the TM product customization 
level on the supply chain performance is positive but the third-party 3DP product design 
quality has a negative impact on the supply chain’s overall performance. Firstly, due to the 
supply chain integration and the model settings, the third-party 3DP product design quality 
has no direct impact on the optimal price or on the sales of the 3DP product. In addition, 
improved TM product customization helps the TM with a high-price strategy and also helps 
the TM product achieve more sales. Thus, the improvement of the TM product customization 
level helps the supply chain attain more sales of the TM product. However, the improvement 
of the third-party 3DP product design quality brings more product sales to the logistics 
vendor’s 3DP product. This is because more consumers sensitive to high product design 
quality choose to buy the 3DP product instead of the TM product. Consequently, the 
improvement of the third-party 3DP product leads to the integrated supply chain losing more 
profits on the TM product sales. 
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Figure 6-9 Impact of Customization Level and Product Design Level in the Decentralized Supply 
Chain – Model Y 
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Figure 6-10 Impact of Customization Level and Product Design Level in the Integrated Supply 
Chain – Model Y 
6.3.3 Model Z 
In the third 3DP engagement model (here termed Model Y), the traditional manufacturer 
authorizes the product design for the logistics vendor’s 3DP product, under the condition that 
the traditional manufacturer collects an authorization fee M (0 < M < 1) (Figure 6-11). 
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Figure 6-11 Supply Chain Structure of Model Z  
In the decentralized supply chain, both the traditional manufacturer’s and the logistics 
vendor’s profit functions can be rewritten as  
 Z 5(/0)X = (/0 − "0 − //).0 + M.$% (6.7) 
 Z 7(// , /$%)X = (// − "/).0 + (/$% − "$% − M).$% (6.8) 
The profit of the integrated supply chain is  
 Z 9:(/0 , /$%)X = (/0 − "0 − "/).0 + (/$% − "$%).$% (6.9) 
 
PROPOSITION 6-9. In the decentralized supply chain, the maximum profit for the traditional 
manufacturer is Equation (6.39) and the maximum profit for the logistics vendor is Equation 
(6.40), both of which are maximized by the optimal price in Equation (6.34), (6.35) and 
(6.36).	
The optimal market demand for the TM and 3DP product is Equation (6.37) and (6.38). 
In the integrated supply chain, the maximum profit for the supply chain is 	∏ 67("B , "CD)∗E = − IJ(GFIJ)HIJK'(& H(K)HK*)&FLIJK'((GFIJHK)HK*)MIJ(FGHIJ) ,  which is maximized by "B∗ = GL ()9 +
Model Z 
Traditional Manufacturer
Logistics Vendor
ConsumerTM Product 3DP Product
Delivery price
pL
TM product price
pM
3DP product price
 p3D
Unit Royalty fee
β
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+N + +B)	 and "CD∗ = GL (1 + +CD). The optimal market demand for the TM and 3DP product is  .0∗ = −.O03%+0"+0#2.O(−1+.O) 	 and .$%∗ = 1−.O−03%+0"+0#2−2.O . 
PROPOSITION 6-10. In decentralized model Z,  
(1) The optimal price of the logistics service decreases in the cost of the TM, the cost of 
the 3DP product and the unit product design authorization fee, but it increases in the 
cost of the logistics service. 
(2) The optimal price of the TM product increases in all the involved costs for the 
products/service. 
(3) The optimal price of the 3DP product decreases in the cost of the TM product and the 
cost of the logistics service but increases in the cost of the 3DP product and the unit 
product design authorization fee. 
(4) The optimal sales of the TM product decrease in the cost of the TM product and the 
logistics service but increase in the cost of the 3DP product and the unit product 
design fee. 
(5) The optimal sales of the 3DP product increase in the cost of the TM product and the 
cost of the logistics service but decrease in the cost of the 3DP product and the unit 
product design fee. 
(6) The traditional manufacturer’s maximized profit is concave in the cost of the TM 
product, the logistics delivery service and the 3DP product while it decreases in the 
authorization cost for the product design. 
(7) The logistics vendor’s profit is concave in all of the different costs. 
We obtain some interesting findings from the above proposition. 
Firstly, it is straightforward that the cost reduction on the TM product helps the traditional 
manufacturer’s low pricing strategy for the TM product. However, the low-priced TM 
product pushes the logistics vendor to raise the cost of the delivery service to 1) generate 
more profits on the delivery service and 2) mitigate the TM product’s pricing advantage. 
Meanwhile, the logistics vendor also selects a high-price regime on the 3DP product to 
increase the product’s unit margin. However, if the TM product’s cost is low, the traditional 
manufacturer cannot generate more profits because s/he had to pay the high delivery fee. At 
the same time, due to the loss from the decreased 3DP product sales, the logistics vendor 
cannot generate more profits either.  
However, if the TM product cost is high, the cost reduction on the TM product helps the 
traditional manufacturer attract more price-sensitive consumers to buy the TM product. Thus, 
both the supply chain agents can achieve better financial performance from the dramatically 
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increased TM product sales. In general, the impacts of the cost reduction on the logistics 
service are the same as the impacts of the cost reduction on the TM product, but the only 
difference is that the logistics price increases in the cost of the logistics delivery service.  
Secondly, both reduction of the 3DP product cost and the unit product design fee have the 
same impact on the optimal decisions in this supply chain structure. The cost reduction on "$%	or β forces the logistics vendor to use a high price for the logistics service to mitigate the 
TM product’s pricing advantage. Interestingly, the cost reduction on "$%	or β can enhance 
the pricing advantages of both the 3DP product and the TM product. This is simply because 
after the traditional manufacturer notices the cost reduction on the 3DP product, s/he has to 
use a low-price strategy on the TM product to maintain its pricing advantage. Consequently, 
more consumers choose to buy the 3DP product and this induces a cannibalization effect on 
the TM product’s sales.  
 
Figure 6-12 The Impact of 3DP Product Cost on the Maximized Profits – Decentralized Model Z     
(given c! = 0.01, c" = 0.01, δ = 0.7, and β = 0.6) 
Thirdly, the impacts of the 3DP product’s cost and the unit product design fee on both agents’ 
profitability are different. In view of PROPOSITION 6-10, Figure 6-12 illustrates three 
different scenarios. As we explained in the above proposition, the cost reduction on the 3DP 
product results in a low price for both the TM and the 3DP product. Meanwhile, the cost 
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reduction also helps the 3DP product to increase its market share but cannibalizes the TM 
product. Under model Z, the traditional manufacturer can generate profit from two streams: 
one is the TM product sales and the other is the design service for the 3DP product. The 
logistics vendor can also generate profit in two ways: from the delivery service for the TM 
product and from the 3DP product sales. Firstly, if the cost of the 3DP product is low (located 
in Region I), both the traditional manufacturer’s and the logistics vendor’s profits decrease 
in the cost of the 3DP product. 3DP product cost reduction is a win-win strategy. It allows 
the traditional manufacturer to make more profit on the 3DP product design service to cover 
its loss from TM product sales. Meanwhile, the logistics vendor can make more profit on the 
3DP product, although s/he loses profits on the TM product delivery service. Secondly, if the 
3DP cost is slightly higher (Region II), the traditional manufacturer’s profit decreases in the 
cost of the 3DP product but the logistics vendor’s profit increases in it. In this case, the 
traditional manufacturer can still benefit from the increased demand for the 3DP product 
design service, but the logistics vendor cannot generate more profit overall due to the 
increasing loss made on TM product delivery. Therefore, under this supply chain structure, 
it is neither beneficial nor strategical for the logistics vendor to put effort into 3DP product 
cost reduction. Lastly, if the 3DP cost is high, both member’s maximized profit increases in 
the cost of the 3DP product; it is a lose-lose strategy. Under this scenario, the 3DP product’s 
cost reduction hurts both supply chain players’ maximized profit. The traditional 
manufacturer loses more on TM product sales and the logistics vendor also cannot generate 
more profits either from 3DP product sales or the TM product delivery service.  
Lastly, the traditional manufacturer’s maximized profit decreases in the product design 
authorization fee but the logistics vendor’s maximized profit is concave in it. When the 
design authorization fee is low (i.e., !!"!"#U − "$% <
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M '*"#U(,'#U)"(*'$#U)!$%"('-"#U)!!"('-"#U)!"'*"+#U ), if the traditional manufacturer raises the 
product design authorization fee, it results in a high 3DP product price. Therefore, the 3DP 
product loses some price-sensitive consumers. Accordingly, the traditional manufacturer 
loses profit from providing 3DP product design and the logistics vendor loses profit on 3DP 
product sales. Although both supply chain agents can attain more profit on the increased TM 
product sales, they cannot achieve better business performance. When the design 
authorization fee is higher than the threshold 
(M '*"#U(,'#U)"(*'$#U)!$%"('-"#U)!!"('-"#U)!"'*"+#U ), if the fee increases, more price-sensitive 
consumers switch and buy the TM product. However, the profit the traditional manufacturer 
generates from this increase in TM product sales cannot cover his/her loss from the decreased 
demand for 3DP product design authorization. The logistics vendor can benefit from the 
dramatically increased use of the TM product delivery service, although his/her profit from 
3DP product sales drops. The studies about 3DP intellectual (Esmond & Phero, 2014; Piller 
et al., 2004) indicate that the industry should notice and have actions on the 3DP intellectual 
issue. This finding implies that although charge the 3DP design fee is a method to protecting 
the intellectual, but the increasing the 3DP product design authorization fee is not at all a 
strategical action for the traditional manufacturer, 
PROPOSITION 6-11. In integrated supply chain of model Z,  
(1) The optimal price of the TM product increases in the cost of the TM product and the 
logistics service. The optimal price of the 3DP product only increases in the cost of 
the 3DP product. The optimal TM product sales decrease in the cost of the TM 
product but increase in the cost of the 3DP product. Meanwhile, the optimal 3DP 
product sales increase in the cost of the TM product and the logistics service but 
decrease in the cost of the 3DP product. 
(2) The supply chain’s overall profitability is concave in the cost of the TM product, the 
logistics service and the 3DP product. 
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In the integrated supply chain, the unit product design fee is not a consideration with regard 
to the optimal decisions. In the following discussion, we analyze the impact of different costs 
under integrated Model Z one by one.  
Firstly, the impacts of the cost of the TM product and the logistics service are the same. A 
cost reduction on the TM product and on the logistics delivery service helps the TM product 
gain more market share through a low TM price strategy and also cannibalizes the 3DP 
product market share. When the cost of the TM product and the logistics service is low ("0 <'^"$% − "/ or "/ < '^"$% − "0), the cost reduction helps the supply chain achieve more 
profits on the increased TM product sales than the lost on the 3DP product sales. However, 
if the TM product and logistics service are costly (('^("$% + M) − "/ > "0 > '^"$% − "/ 
or '^("$% + M) − "0 > "/ > '^"$% − "0 )), the cost reduction on the TM product and 
logistics service cannot help the supply chain generate more profits on the TM product than 
the loss made on 3DP product sales. Therefore, it cannot help the improvement of the 
integrated supply chain.  
Secondly, a cost reduction can help the 3DP product expand its market share through a low-
price strategy. But, surprisingly, under this supply chain setting, the cost of the 3DP product 
has no direct impact on the optimal TM product price. Depending on the different 3DP 
product cost levels, the impacts of the 3DP product cost on the integrated supply chain are 
different. When the 3DP product cost is low (!!"!"#U − M < "$% < 1 − '^ + "/ + "0), the 
cost reduction helps the supply chain generate more profits on 3DP product sales. However, 
when the 3DP product cost is high (1 − '^ + "/ + "0 < "$% < 1), a cost reduction on the 
3DP product results in the system losing profit from either 1) the decreased TM product sales 
or 2) the low unit price margin for the 3DP product. This finding implies that 3DP product 
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cost reduction is a beneficial strategy for the integrated supply chain only if the 3DP product 
is not costly. Therefore, in practice, reducing the 3DP production cost is one of the key future 
directions that should be taken to improve low-cost 3DP product manufacturing.  
Compared to Model X, Model Z includes one more parameter M . Using the same 
methodology, we assigned the value of M in our two full factorial designs for numerical tests 
(Table 6-6 and Table 6-7). 
Table 6-6 Parameter Values in the Numerical Testing of the Impacts of Customization Level on the 
Optimal Decisions – Model Z 
 -34 -5 -6 _ L 
Low 0.3 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.2 
Medium 0.6 0.01 0.01 0.4 0.4 
High 0.9 0.01 0.01 0.7 0.6 
 
Table 6-7 Parameter Values in the Numerical Testing of the Impacts of Product Design Quality 
Level on the Optimal Decisions – Model Z 
 D<= D> D? E F 
Low 0.3 0.01 0.01 0.2 0.2 
Medium 0.6 0.01 0.01 0.5 0.4 
High 0.9 0.01 0.01 0.8 0.6 
 
PROPOSITION 6-12. In decentralized model Z, 
(1) The optimal price of the logistics vendor increases in the TM product customization 
level and product design quality in the supply chain with the low- and medium-
setting; it is convex in the TM product customization level and product design quality 
in the supply chain with the high-setting. The optimal price of both the TM product 
and the 3DP product increases in the TM product customization level and product 
design quality; 
(2) The optimal market demand for the TM product increases in the TM product 
customization level and product design quality. Only in the supply chain with the low-
setting do the 3DP product sales decrease in the TM product customization level and 
product design quality, otherwise, the TM product customization level and the 
product design quality have no direct impact on 3DP product sales. 
(3) The optimal market demand for the 3DP product increases in the cost of the TM 
product and the logistics service; however, it decreases in the cost of the TM product. 
(4) The traditional manufacturer’s maximized profit decreases in the TM product 
customization level but the logistics vendor’s maximized profit increases in it. 
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(5) Both the traditional manufacturer’s and the logistics vendor’s maximized profit 
increases in the product design quality under the supply chain with the medium and 
high setting. However, under the low setting, the improvement in the product design 
quality benefits the logistics vendor, but the traditional manufacturer cannot achieve 
better profitability.  
The findings of this proposition (shown in Figure 6-13) can be summarized as follows:  
Firstly, under the supply chain with the low setting, improvement of the TM product’s 
customization level or the design quality pushes the traditional manufacturer to set the TM 
product price high. And the logistics vendor uses a high price regime for the delivery service 
to 1) mitigate the TM product’s pricing advantage and 2) increase the profits made on the 
delivery service. In addition, a high TM product price also offers room to the logistics vendor 
to increase the 3DP product’s unit margin. As a result, more consumers choose the TM 
product because of the improved customization level and design quality. Therefore, the 3DP 
product loses market share. However, under the supply chain with the medium setting, the 
improvement in ' or ^ cannot directly influence the 3DP product sales, because the product 
pricing still determines the consumer’s shopping behavior (Chiang et al., 2003; Vorst & 
Beulens, 2002). For the traditional manufacturer, improvement in the product design enables 
generation of more profits from either the higher TM product price or the increased TM 
product sales. But the logistics vendor loses more profits from the decline in expensive 3DP 
product sales, although the profits from the logistics service increase. However, there is one 
exception. In the supply chain with the low-cost setting, the improvement in the TM product 
design quality pushes the logistics vendor to use a high price strategy for the logistics service. 
Therefore, the delivery cost accounts for a large portion of the low-cost TM product’s cost 
structure. In this case, the traditional manufacturer cannot achieve better financial 
performance due to the huge cost of TM product delivery. 
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Figure 6-13 Impact of Customization Level and Product Design Level in the Decentralized Supply 
Chain – Model Z 
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PROPOSITION 6-13. Under the integrated model Z,  
(1) Both the optimal price and quantity of the TM product increase in the TM product 
customization level and the product design quality. The TM product customization 
level and product design level have no direct impact on the 3DP product price but 
both of them negatively impact the 3DP product’s optimal sales. 
(2) The supply chain’s performance improves in either the TM product customization 
level or product design quality. 
As Figure 6-14 shows, the improvement of ' or ^ can help the system gain more profits from 
the TM product business (increased TM product price and larger TM product sales), although 
sales of the 3DP product drop.  
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(f) 
Figure 6-14 Impact of Customization Level and Product Design Level in the Integrated Supply 
Chain – Model Z 
6.4 The Logistics Vendor’s 3DP Adoption Strategy 
In following subsections, for the purpose of find out the best 3DP engagement strategy, we 
try to put Model X, Model Y, and Model Z into comparisons. 
6.4.1 The Logistics Vendor’s 3DP Adoption Strategy 
To understand should the Logistics Vendor only provide the 3DP product delivery service or 
sell the self-produced 3DP product by the third-party 3DP professional’s product design, we 
will compare Model X and Model Y. Firstly, and we test under which conditions the 
traditional manufacturer should leave the whole 3DP product market to the logistics vendor. 
Then we attempt to analyze the impact on the logistics vendor’s profitability. Lastly, we also 
compare the profitability of the whole supply chain under model X and model Y. 
PROPOSITION 6-14. In the decentralized supply chain, if the traditional manufacturer leaves 
the 3DP market and authorizes its 3DP product design to the logistics vendor, 
(1) When the product quality is high, the traditional manufacturer can make more profit 
only if the cost of the 3DP product is low; when the product quality is low, it is 
beneficial to the traditional manufacturer only if the 3DP product production is 
costly. 
(2) The logistics vendor incurs a profit loss. 
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(3) The logistics vendor reduces the logistics service fee. If the cost of the 3DP product 
is low, the traditional manufacturer reduces the TM product price; if the cost of the 
3DP product is high, the traditional manufacturer raises the TM product price; if the 
cost of the 3DP product is low, the logistics vendor uses a low 3DP product price. If 
the cost of the 3DP product is high, the logistics vendor uses a high 3DP product 
price. 
(4) The traditional manufacturer sells more TM products in Model Y. If the product 
design quality is low, the 3DP product sells more in Model Y; if the product design 
quality is high, the 3DP product sells less in Model Y. 
(5)  
Figure 6-15 Traditional Manufacturer’s Profit: Comparison between Model X and Y (given c#$ = 0.5, c! = 0.01, c" = 0.01, δ = 0.1, γ = 0.2) 
PROPOSITION 6-14 shows that operating the entire 3DP product service is not always 
profitable for the traditional manufacturer, but it always results in profit loss for the logistics 
vendor.  
After the logistics vendor starts to do the 3DP product business, s/he lowers the price of the 
delivery service for the purpose of increasing his/her profit on TM product delivery. If the 
cost of 3DP is low ( !!"!"#U − a < "$% < '-('+"#)Y'(*"(',"#)#)U"('$"#)!!"('$"#)!"-('+"#) ), the 
traditional manufacturer uses low pricing on the TM product to keep its pricing advantage. 
However, if the 3DP product is costly ( '-('+"#)Y'(*"(',"#)#)U"('$"#)!!"('$"#)!"-('+"#) < "$% <1), it offers more room to the traditional manufacturer to raise the price of the TM product 
for the purpose of maximizing the unit margin on the TM product. By the same logic, if the 
3DP product is not costly ( !!"!"#U − a < "$% <
II
I
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
c3D
c3D1
cL+cM
 
-
  286 
− -(*'*Y"#(',"#"$Y))"('-"#)(*"(',"#)#)U"('+"#)('$"#)!!'(+"('$"#)#)!"-('-"#)# ), the logistics 
vendor uses a low 3DP product price; otherwise, the logistics vendor uses a high 3DP product 
price to cover the costs and to maximize the profits on the 3DP product. Consequently, the 
traditional manufacturer can always sell more TM products. The reason behind this is that 
the TM product always has a price advantage regardless of the 3DP product price. However, 
only if the product design quality is low (0< ^ < '*"A#'##'*",#"##), can the 3DP product actually 
sell more. Therefore, the traditional manufacturer can discourage 3DP product sales by 
lowering the product design quality. This finding shows that both the design quality and the 
3DP product cost are key considerations for the traditional manufacturer’s 3DP strategy. 
Specifically, when the product design quality is high ( '(?#"*##'?+"(++#'($A##",.#$'((#)"#T < ^ <1), only if the 3DP product is not costly (Region II, Figure 6-15) is it profitable to the 
traditional manufacturer to conduct the 3DP business on his/her own. The traditional 
manufacturer can have more control over the pricing strategy for the TM and 3DP product, 
which helps the traditional manufacturer to achieve better profitability, especially on the 
product price. However, if 3DP is costly (Region I, Figure 6-15), it is not profitable for the 
traditional manufacturer because in this case, the traditional manufacturer uses a low pricing 
strategy on the TM product and the 3DP product’s unit price margin is comparatively low. 
Therefore, the traditional manufacturer cannot make more profit. However, if the product 
design quality is low (0 < ^ < '(?#"*##'?+"(++#'($A##",.#$'((#)"#T), the effect of this strategy on 
the traditional manufacturer’s profitability is the opposite. When the 3DP product is not 
costly (Region II, Figure 6-15), the traditional manufacturer can obtain more profit on the 
3DP product. This is because the traditional manufacturer can use a low-price strategy for 
the 3DP product and then increase the market demand for the 3DP product. However, if the 
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cost of the 3DP product is high (Region II, Figure 6-15), the traditional manufacturer cannot 
sufficiently increase profit from 3DP product sales to cover its loss from the reduced TM 
product sales. However, the impact of the logistics vendor’s 3DP strategy on his/her profit is 
more straightforward: because of the reduced price for the logistics service and the TM 
product market demand, the logistics vendor always loses profit on TM product delivery, 
although s/he can make new profits on 3DP product sales. But, overall, the profit loss for this 
part outweighs the new profit generated from the new 3DP product business. 
In summary, this proposition implies that 1) it is not profitable to the logistics vendor to 3DP 
those products for which the traditional manufacturer already has 3DP production and for 
which the product price is comparatively low. For example, currently French toymaker 
Smoby Toys is using FDM to produce indoor and outdoor plastic toys for infants and young 
children (Stratasys, 2018). Although UPS also has the capability to produce these kinds of 
toys, considering the profitability of this strategy, these products are not a beneficial focus 
for the logistics vendor’s 3DP business. 2) As we discussed in the introduction chapter, the 
logistics vendor’s 3DP adoption is one of the most efficient approaches to ‘production-on-
scale’ for the 3DP production. For the development of 3DP adoption, the government should 
establish some regulations or policies to support the logistics vendor’s 3DP product business.  
For example, the government could reduce the tax rate for 3DP product businesses or set up 
some funding streams to support initial investment in 3DP adoption. 
PROPOSITION 6-15. In the integrated supply chain, if the traditional manufacturer leaves 
the 3DP market and authorizes the use of its 3DP product design to the logistics vendor, 
(1) There is no impact on the optimal price for the TM product. The logistics vendor 
reduces the 3DP product price; the traditional manufacturer sells more TM products, 
but the market demand for the 3DP product reduces. 
(2) As for supply chain profitability,  
a. When the product design quality is high, but the TM product customization 
level is low, this strategy is not profitable.  
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b. When the product design quality is low, but the TM product customization 
level is high, this strategy is only not profitable to the supply chain if the cost 
of the 3DP product is located at the medium level. If 3DP production is 
extremely costly or extremely cheap, this strategy is profitable to the supply 
chain. 
This proposition demonstrates that after the logistics vendor fully takes over 3DP production 
and design, the logistics vendor uses a low price for the 3DP product in order to gain more 
profits from 1) the new 3DP product and/or 2) the logistics delivery service. As a result, 
under Model Y, the supply chain can sell more TM products but the 3DP market demand 
reduces. Under the following two scenarios, the supply chain cannot achieve better 
performance. First, if the product design quality is high ('("!!'!!#"!"'!!!"'("!" < ^ < 1) but the 
customization level is low ( !!"!"YU < ' < '("U"!!"!"'U!"U!! ), the 3DP product loses its 
advantages with regard to product design. Second, better performance is also not obtainable 
if the cost of the 3DP product is located at the medium level (
('("#U)!!"(?'UAUV!)#√X "('("U)!"'("U <
"$% < ('("#U)!!'(?'UAUV!)#√Y "('("U)!"'("U ,  where e = ('("U"!!)#('("#)U('("#U)). In these two cases, the 
newly generated profits from the increased TM sales cannot cover the losses incurred from 
the 3DP product sales. For the other situations, the supply chain can obtain more profit from 
the increased TM product sales to cover its loss from the 3DP product sales. Therefore, this 
proposition also shows that it is not beneficial to 3DP adoption if the logistics vendor operates 
the 3DP product market. Therefore, the manufacturing industry should still encourage more 
traditional manufacturers to look into 3DP products (Holmström et al., 2016). In addition, it 
also implies that the logistics vendor’s 3DP adoption still needs more government or industry 
support (Ernst & Young, 2016; Wohlers Associates, 2018). 
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6.4.2 The Traditional Manufacturer’s 3DP Product Design Strategy 
We now extend the comparison by considering the impact of the traditional manufacturer’s 
control of product design. In recent years, more and more traditional manufacturers have 
clamoured for greater protection of product design and intellectual property (IP), especially 
in the 3DP product industry (Esmond & Phero, 2014; Gao et al., 2015; Manners-Bell & Lyon, 
2012; Wilkof, 2016). For the purpose of protecting IP related issues, some 3DP enabled 
logistics vendors choose to collaborate with traditional manufacturers on product design; for 
example, Panalpina collaborates with Shapeways (Shapeways, 2016). In this case, 
intuitionally, both parties can benefit from this business model. Specifically, although the 
traditional manufacturer often suffers from intense competition with the 3DP product 
provider (the logistics vendor), s/he can gain some sales by providing the product design 
service. At the same time, the logistics vendor can offer a better product design service for 
his/her 3DP product business. Therefore, in this subsection we compare model X and model 
Y to test whether it is a beneficial strategy for the traditional manufacturer to authorize its 
3DP product design to the logistics vendor. Then we also examine the impact of this strategy 
on the logistics vendor’s profitability and on the integrated supply chain. 
PROPOSITION 6-16. Under the decentralized supply chain, if the traditional manufacturer 
leaves the 3DP market and authorizes its 3DP product design to the logistics vendor, but 
controls the product design, 
(1) When the 3DP product design authorization fee is high, or the product design 
authorization fee is low but the 3DP product is cheap, this strategy is not profitable 
to the traditional manufacturer. When the 3DP product design authorization fee is 
low but 3DP production is costly, the traditional manufacturer can gain more profits 
by this strategy. 
(2) When the product design authorization fee is high, or the product design 
authorization fee is low but the 3DP product cost is extremely high or sufficiently 
low, the logistics vendor can obtain more profit under model Z. When the product 
design authorization fee is low and the 3DP production cost is located at the middle 
level, the logistics vendor cannot gain more profits by this strategy. 
(3) Depending on different product design authorization fees, the impact of this strategy 
on the optimal decisions is different.  
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We now use a numerical example to illustrate the equilibrium optimal decisions under 
different values of M (product design authorization fee). We first use "/ = 0.2,	"0 = 0.3, "$% = 0.6 and	^ = 0.8 to examine the impact of controlling the 3DP product design strategy 
(from Model X to Model Y) on the optimal decisions (Figure 6-16, Table 6-8). We also set c1 = 0.03,	c2 = 0.03, c$K = 0.15,	δ = 0.5 and	α = 0.6 to examine the impact of M on the 
traditional manufacturer’s equilibrium business model strategy (Figure 6-17). In addition, we 
use another set of numbers ( c1 = 0.04 , 	c2 = 0.04 , c$K = 0.3 , 	δ = 0.2 , 	α = 0.5 ) to 
demonstrate the decision regions of the impact on the logistics vendor’s profitability. 
 
Figure 6-16 The Decision Regions of β on the Optimal Decisions (given c! = 0.2,	c" = 0.3, c#$ =0.6,	δ = 0.8) 
Table 6-8 The Decision Regions of β on the Optimal Decisions – Model X vs Model Z 
 H>@∗ − H>A∗  H?@∗ − H?A∗  H<=@∗ − H<=A∗  I?@∗ − I?A∗  I<=@∗ − I<=A∗  
Region I > 0 > 0 > 0 < 0 < 0 
Region II > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 < 0 
Region III > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 
Region IV > 0 > 0 < 0 > 0 > 0 
Region V > 0 < 0 < 0 > 0 > 0 
Region VI < 0 < 0 < 0 > 0 > 0 
Region VII < 0 > 0 < 0 > 0 > 0 
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Figure 6-16 and Table 6-8 show that there are 7 different decision regions for the impact of M  on the optimal decisions. Specifically, under region I, where M  is extremely high, the 
logistics vendor uses a low price regime for the logistics delivery for the purpose of 
increasing the profit of the goods delivery service. Because of the high M, the traditional 
manufacturer sets the TM product price low to keep the TM product’s price advantage and 
this forces the logistics vendor to use a lower 3DP product price to maintain the market share. 
Therefore, this results in an increase of the TM product and 3DP product sales. However, if M is slightly lower, in Region II, the 3DP product price is lower than Region I, and so some 
more customization-sensitive consumers start to buy the 3DP product and the sales of the 
TM product reduce. Then, if the value of M falls to Region III or lower (Regions IV-VII), the 
price of the TM and the 3DP product are much more similar, which results in more 
competition between the TM and the 3DP product. Therefore, both the sales of the TM and 
the 3DP product reduce. Next, if the value of M is located in Region IV, both the traditional 
manufacturer and the logistics vendor use a high-price regime on the TM and the 3DP product 
to increase the unit price margin of the product to maximize their profits. Then, in Region VI 
and VII, the logistics vendor shifts to using a high-price strategy for the logistics delivery 
service to compensate for the loss from decreased TM product sales. Lastly, in Region VII, 
the traditional manufacturer returns to using a low-price strategy on the TM product to attract 
more price-sensitive consumers. However, both the product sales for the TM and the 3DP 
product still show a declining trend. 
The findings above help us to understand the impact of this strategy on the traditional 
manufacturer’s and the logistics vendor’s profitability. Intuitionally, we assumed that a 
higher authorization fee would help the traditional manufacturer to generate more profits and 
that the 3DP product business could also improve the logistics vendor’s financial 
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performance. Surprisingly, our findings from this proposition imply that our assumption only 
holds under certain conditions. 
For the traditional manufacturer, if the authorization fee is high (M > M∗, Region II, Figure 
6-17), s/he cannot achieve better profitability. Because of the high authorization fee, the 
traditional manufacturer loses profitability on 1) the decreased TM product unit margin or 2) 
the 3DP product business.  However, if the authorization fee is low (M < M∗, Region I, Figure 
6-17), then if the 3DP product cost is high, the traditional manufacturer loses more profit on 
both the 3DP and TM product business than the new profits generated from the product 
design authorization fee. However, in this case, if the 3DP product cost is high, the TM 
product has the absolute advantage of price over the 3DP product. Therefore, the traditional 
manufacturer can achieve better financial performance.  
 
Figure 6-17 The Decision Regions of β on the Traditional Manufacturer’s Profits  (given c! =0.03,	c" = 0.03, c#$ = 0.15,	δ = 0.5,	α = 0.6) 
Note: 9∗ = 1.(41567)(42;567(2:567(4.#5#67))) M−8);(−3 + );)(−2 + );)(−1 + );) + 2(−1 +);)(−40 + );(36 + );(−9 + );)))4) + 8(−3 + );)(−2 + );)(−1 + );)4' + √((−1 +);)(64 + );(−96 + );(49 + );(−10 + );))))((−228 + );(219 + );(−62 + 7);)))4). −2(−1 + );).(−4 + 3);)4)(); − 4') + (−1 + );)(36 + );(−23 + 3);))(−); + 4').))P 
The impacts of controlling product design on the logistics vendor’s optimal business model 
could be summarized into two categories, as illustrated in Figure 6-18. Firstly, if the product 
design authorization fee is high (Region II,  M∗ < M), the logistics vendor can obtain more 
profits either from 1) the new 3DP business, 2) increased TM product sales, or 3) the 
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increased unit price margin on the logistics delivery service. Secondly, if the product design 
authorization fee is low (Region II, M < M∗), there are two different scenarios. 1) If 3DP 
production is cheap, the logistics vendor can make more profit because s/he can profit from 
1) the new 3DP product business and/or 2) the increased unit margin on the logistics delivery 
price. Secondly, if the 3DP product is costly, the logistics vendor cannot achieve better 
performance because the profit gain from the new 3DP product business and the increased 
unit margin on the logistics delivery price cannot cover that which is lost on the decreased 
TM product delivery service. 
The results in this proposition suggest that raising the product design authorization fee to a 
high level cannot benefit the traditional manufacturer. This may explain why some large 
companies are not directly authorizing product designs to their logistics vendors who have 
3DP capabilities. For example, GE is currently using the logistics delivery service provided 
by UPS, but GE does not outsource any part of its 3DP business to UPS yet (Kellner, 2018; 
B. Zhang, 2016). 
 
Figure 6-18 The Decision Regions of β on the Logistics Vendor’s Profits  (given c! = 0.04,	c" =0.04, c#$ = 0.3,	δ = 0.2,	α = 0.5) 
Note: e = '^('^ + 2M(−4 + M + 2'^)) − (−8M + 2'^ + 4'M^ − "/ − "0)("/ + "0), M∗ = − (-#U =2'-^- + 4("/ + "0) − 2'^(2 + "/ + "0) +√2J(8 + '^(−9 + 2'^))(−'^ + "/ + "0)-@ 
PROPOSITION 6-17. In the integrated supply chain, if the traditional manufacturer leaves 
the 3DP market and authorizes the 3DP product design to the logistics vendor, it is not 
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beneficial to the supply chain’s development. Specifically, there is no impact on the TM 
product price, and the logistics vendor uses a low 3DP product price. In addition, TM 
product sales decrease but 3DP product sales increase. 
This proposition implies that for the consideration of developing the supply chain, it is better 
to encourage the traditional manufacturer to operate the 3DP product. However, if the 
logistics vendor can sell the 3DP product with authorized product design, the logistics vendor 
uses a low 3DP product price for the purpose of attracting more price- and customization-
sensitive consumers. Consequently, more consumers switch from the TM product market to 
the 3DP product market. However, at the supply chain level, profit is lost due to 1) decreased 
TM product sales and/or 2) the low unit margin for the 3DP product. This finding echoes our 
findings in PROPOSITION 6-15 and other related literature (Despeisse et al., 2017; Gebler 
et al., 2014; Rehnberg & Ponte, 2018; Wohlers Associates, 2016). Accordingly, encouraging 
more traditional manufacturers to adopt 3DP is a long-term strategy not only for the 
industry’s development but also for the 3DP industry’s development. 
6.4.3 The Logistics Vendor’s 3DP Product Design Strategy 
Under this subsection, we seek to explore which business model the 3DP capable logistics 
vendor should adopt for 3DP product design by comparing the logistics vendor’s profitability 
under model Y and Model Z. Should they purchase the product design from the traditional 
manufacturer (Model X) or from the third-party 3DP product design professional (Model Y)? 
Right now, more logistics vendors have a passion for the 3DP product business, but they are 
still seeking to determine which approach to 3DP adoption is the best one for them. 
Therefore, this subsection tries to answer the question: which 3DP engagement model is the 
best one for the logistics vendor’s business and the supply chain’s sustainable development. 
  295 
However, due to the complexity of the structured model, in this section, we use a numerical 
example to illustrate the impact of different product design strategies on the logistics vendor 
and on the traditional manufacturer’s 3DP adoption strategy. Specifically, we use a factored 
design (Table 6-9) to examine the impact of the costs of product design by the traditional 
manufacturer M and the cost of design by the third-party 3DP design professional a on both 
the traditional manufacturer’s and the logistics vendor’s business performance in supply 
chain structures at low, medium, and high settings. In addition, we also compare the 
integrated supply chain’s performance under different models as well.  
Table 6-9 Parameter Values in the Numerical Testing for the 3DP Design Strategy 
 -34 -5 -6 _ K 
Low 0.3 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.2 
Medium 0.6 0.01 0.01 0.4 0.5 
High 0.9 0.01 0.01 0.7 0.8 
 
Low Medium High 
   
   
Figure 6-19 Comparisons of the Traditional Manufacturer's and the Logistics Vendor’s Profitability 
– Model Y and Model Z  
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From Figure 6-19 and Figure 6-20, several observations can be made. Firstly, under the 
supply chain with the low-setting, because the logistics vendor needs to pay the product 
design authorization fee to the traditional manufacturer under Model Z, s/he uses a low-price 
regime on the TM product delivery service. This low-price strategy also helps the traditional 
manufacturer to set the TM product’s price low to maintain the price advantage. Therefore, 
the logistics vendor has to use a low-price strategy on the 3DP product for the purpose of 
gaining more price-sensitive consumers. Therefore, sales of the TM and the 3DP product are 
larger in Model Y than in Model Z. Both the traditional manufacturer and the logistics vendor 
can obtain more profits under model Y. This may explain why some logistics vendors are 
focusing on the 3DP business for low-cost items and the traditional manufacturers under this 
product category are not striving to eliminate logistics vendors’ 3DP production (Ciampa & 
Meo, 2011; Wohlers Associates, 2018). 
Next, we analyze the supply chain performance under the medium-setting and high-setting. 
i) The lower the product design authorization fee (M) is, the lower the logistics delivery fee 
that is charged by the logistics vendor. ii) If M is high but the third-party product design fee 
(a) is low, the TM product price under Model Y is lower than the TM product price under 
model Z. The reason is that the 3DP product has more price advantages under Model Z. 
Therefore, the logistics vendor can use the low-price strategy under Model Z. If M  is 
comparatively low but a is high, the traditional manufacturer uses a low-price strategy on the 
TM product under Model Z to keep the TM product’s price advantage. Meanwhile, the low M helps the logistics vendor use a low-price strategy on the 3DP product as well. If the value 
of M and a is located at the rest regions, the traditional manufacturer uses a low-price strategy 
on TM under Model Z, in view of new profits from product design authorization. And the 
logistics vendor uses a low price on the 3DP product for the purpose of maximizing profits 
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on the 3DP product business.  However, in all of these scenarios, the cannibalization effect 
becomes much fiercer under model Z. Thus, both products’ sales perform better under Model 
Y than Model Z. In general, the traditional manufacturer and the logistics vendor can enjoy 
more profits under Model Y. However, there is one exception: under the supply chain with 
the medium setting, if M is extremely high but a is sufficiently low (Figure 6-19), the logistics 
vendor surprisingly can achieve better profitability under Model Z, because in this case, the 
logistics vendor can use a high unit margin on the logistics delivery price and/or the 3DP 
product price. This finding reflects the fact that some 3DP enabled logistics vendors now also 
target high value added automotive parts production as their new 3DP business direction 
(Baumers et al., 2016; Laplume, Anzalone, & Pearce, 2016; Liu et al., 2014; Wohlers 
Associates, 2018). 
Low Medium High 
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Figure 6-20 Comparisons of the Optimal Decisions – Model Y and Model Z  
PROPOSITION 6-18. Compared to model Y, if the traditional manufacturer chooses to 
control the product design (Model Z), the system can achieve better profitability. Specifically, 
there is no difference in the TM product price, but the 3DP product price increases. If the 
3DP product is costly, the TM product sales drop but the 3DP product sales rise. Otherwise, 
the TM product sales rise but the 3DP product sales decline.  
This proposition indicates that at the integrated supply chain level, it is good for the industry’s 
development if the traditional manufacturer can help with the product design because the 
supply chain can benefit from i) the increased 3DP product price if the 3DP product is costly 
or ii) increased TM product sales if 3DP production is cheap. Interestingly, this finding is in 
conflict with the findings for the decentralized supply chain. Under the decentralized supply 
chain, individual entities can obtain more profits in Model Y, but Model Z contributes to the 
integrated supply chain’s development. Therefore, Model Y is still a short-term strategy for 
the 3DP industry’s development. But encouraging the traditional manufacturer to participate 
p3 DY-p3 DZ p3 DY-p3 DZ p3 DY-p3 DZ
qMY-qMZ qMY-qMZ qMY-qMZ
q3 DY-q3 DZ q3 DY-q3 DZ q3 DY-q3 DZ
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in the adoption of 3DP can benefit the supply chain’s development and the 3DP industry’s 
development in the long term (Despeisse et al., 2017; Wohlers Associates, 2018).  
6.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has explored the 3DP engagement model, considering product design quality, 
product customization level, and the cost of product design from two different sources (a 
third-party 3DP company or the traditional manufacturer). Three different logistics vendor’s 
3DP engagement models were analyzed. Firstly, the traditional manufacturer offers the TM 
and 3DP product and the logistics vendor only offers a goods delivery service (Model X). 
Secondly, the traditional manufacturer only offers the TM product and the service of goods 
delivery, the logistics vendor also produces a 3DP product designed by third-party 3DP 
design professionals (Model Y). Thirdly, the traditional manufacturer sells the TM product 
and also provides the product design for the logistics vendor’s 3DP product; the logistics 
vendor can thus profit from the TM product delivery and the sales of the 3DP product (Model 
Z). We have also identified both the traditional manufacturer’s and the logistics vendor’s 
collaboration strategies and discussed the impacts of the involved critical system parameters 
on both players’ optimal decisions under different 3DP engagement models to obtain several 
managerial insights.  
Managerial Insights 
We have showen that the traditional manufacturer’s 3DP engagement strategy depends 
strongly on the 3DP product’s cost, product design quality, and the product design 
authorization fee. Firstly, the traditional manufacturer cannot always gain more profits under 
the self-3DP production model. For example, if the product design quality is low and 3DP 
production is costly, the manufacturer can make more profit from the TM product sales if the 
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traditional manufacturer leaves the whole 3DP product market to the logistics vendor. If the 
3DP product authorization fee is low but the 3DP production cost is high, the traditional 
manufacturer can benefit from providing the 3DP product design.  
As compared to Model X, the logistics vendor cannot gain more profits by choosing to 
produce the 3DP product with a third-party 3DP product design. This finding implicates that 
for those 3DP-enabled logistics vendors (for example, UPS), it is not profitable to participate 
in the market competition where the traditional manufacturer already has TM and 3DP 
production (like GE). Meanwhile, if the logistics vendor chooses to use the traditional 
manufacturer’s product design and only operates the actual 3DP production, it is a strategical 
move only for products for which the design authorization fee is extremely high (e.g. limited-
edition products, products with a requirement for a high level of design skills (Ernst & Young, 
2016; Newcastle University, 2018) or if the 3DP authorization fee is low but 3DP production 
is costly (e.g. some specific aerospace equipment or F1 race car parts (3D systems, 2013; 3D 
Systems, 2018e). In addition, if the logistics vendor chooses to adopt 3DP production, using 
third-party 3DP product design professionals is in general better than cooperating with the 
traditional manufacturer. However, if the product design authorization fee is extremely high, 
the logistics vendor can use a high 3DP product price to increase his/her profits on the TM 
product delivery service. 
Lastly, our findings in this chapter suggest that 3DP promises a revolution to supply chain 
development in the long-term, and we should encourage more traditional manufacturers to 
start transferring their products to the 3DP production line for the supply chain’s long-term 
development. Although some research points out that 3DP is the future of some industries, 
our findings here indicate that compared to the hard-revolution, adding 3DP products into 
the manufacturing system is a more profitable soft-landing plan for both the traditional 
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manufacturer and the integrated supply chain’s development (Ernst & Young, 2016; S. Ford 
& Despeisse, 2016; Wohlers Associates, 2018). Furthermore, at the current stage, 3DP 
adoption by the logistics vendor is a strategy for the evolution of the supply chain, which 
means it cannot always contribute to the integrated supply chain’s development, but it helps 
the traditional manufacturer to start thinking about 3DP adoption. Therefore, the 3DP 
industry is keen for additional help with market expansion, such as policy and regulatory 
support. The latter can help to reduce the fixed costs of 3DP production and encourage 3DP 
usage. 
Theoretical Contributions 
In particular, this model is probably the first to study the current logistics vendor’s 3DP 
adoption strategies. In detail, this model reviews three different 3DP engagement approach 
by the logistics vendor first, and then quantitively analyzes the performance of those three 
different 3DP engagements. It contributes to the body of knowledge of managing the new 
technology disruption in the logistics industry. The results support the logistics vendor in 
deciding how to engage the 3DP technology into their traditional logistic delivery business. 
In addition, this model also contributes to the literature on the 3DP intellectual research. Most 
of exisiting under the 3DP intellectual research are limited to discuss the importance of 
protecting intellectual in a legal perspective (Gao et al., 2015; Wilkof, 2016), Different from 
that, this chapter uses game theories to analytically analyze what are the impact of intellectual 
protection (through design fee and royalty fee) on the supply chain performance from the 
operational and management perspectives.  
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 Conclusions 
This chapter summarizes the thesis, presents the research findings, and identifies areas for 
further study. The following section, Section 7.1, provides a summary of the research, 
Section 7.2 summarizes the research findings, and Section 7.3 presents the limitations of this 
research and finally also suggests areas for future study. 
7.1 Research Summary 
With the rapid growth of the disruptive 3DP technology, it continues to offer tremendous 
untapped potential for the improvement of manufacturing technology, especially about 
product customization. Therefore, it is important and timely to explore the question: ‘What 
is the impact of 3DP adoption on the supply chain?’ The prime motivation of this research is 
the need to deeply understand the current 3DP adoption situation, to find insights and analysis 
tools that will assist in maximizing the potential of this 3DP market. What is immediately 
derived from the prime motivation is the secondary motivations relating to the factors that 
influence 3DP adoption by the logistics vendor and the traditional manufacturer, including 
cost, price, market demand, and the level of customization of the 3DP products.  
This PhD thesis has focused on investigating this question and has developed three models 
to assess the impact of 3DP adoption. The respective models have 1) explored the possibility 
of the logistics vendor’s 3DP adoption; 2) sought to help the manufacturer to evaluate 
different manufacturing strategies to improve product customization; and 3) investigated and 
compared the logistics vendor’s different 3DP adoption strategies and, in turn, produced 
some insights into the future development of manufacturing strategy and 3DP adoption. More 
specifically, we have studied various new technology adoption issues in supply chain 
management connected to the impact of the new 3DP technology. As a result, we have 
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proposed three different game theoretical models to determine (i) if the logistics vendor starts 
to provide a 3DP service, how the competition and collaboration between the logistics vendor 
and traditional manufacturer may change the interactions among supply chain systems; (ii) 
what the most effective 3DP adoption strategies are for the traditional manufacturer, and (iii) 
what the implications are for the logistics vendors in terms of 3DP adoption efficiency. We 
have diagnosed the problems of pricing, production cost, individual supply chain member’s 
profitability and the overall supply chain profitability, especially when the consumers exhibit 
different purchasing behaviour with regard to different product customization.  
7.2 Research Findings and Discussion 
The research findings from this PhD thesis are considered to be of interest to practitioners 
contemplating 3DP adoption and to 3DP companies wishing to promote 3DP adoption. This 
research raises awareness of the possible 3DP adoption strategies and the related impact on 
the supply chain through three different studies. 
Our first study in Chapter 4 has considered the impact of the logistics vendor’s 3DP adoption 
on the supply chain. We have investigated the competition and/or collaboration relationship 
between the traditional manufacturer and the logistics vendor before and after the logistics 
vendor starts to offer high customization 3DP products in a single supply chain (one 
traditional manufacturer, one logistics vendor and one consumer). Consumers’ evaluation of 
the TM and 3DP product can mainly be influenced by two key factors: the product price and 
the product customization level. This is supported with the findings of Schröder et al. (2015) 
and Dong et al. (2017) indicating that product price and the product customization level are 
two key success factors on 3DP adoption. Nowadays, product customization is a robust 
cognitive bias that influences consumers’ shopping behaviour and consumers evaluate 
production customization as increasingly important (Attaran, 2017; Macchion et al., 2017). 
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We have considered the consumers to have uncertainty and heterogeneous preferences about 
product customization level, but the customization level of the 3DP product was greater than 
the TM product. Followed the literature on product competition,  we have introduced the 
product customization level as a factor that affects consumers’ product choice to analyze the 
product competition strategy and the logistics vendor’s 3DP adoption decisions. We have 
found that the logistics vendor can be better off if s/he starts to provide a 3DP service in 
addition to the traditional TM product delivery service (Wohlers Associates, 2018). While 
the logistics vendor’s 3DP adoption might aggravate the competition between the 3DP and 
the TM product, there exists a scenario in which the logistics vendor’s 3DP adoption strategy 
might mitigate product competition, benefiting both the traditional manufacturer and the 
logistics vendor and even improving the overall supply chain performance. This finding is 
somewhat consistent with the findings of  Song & Zhang (2018), indicating that 3DP could 
improve the overall supply chain system performance as it has no requirements on product 
delivery. 
Our second study in Chapter 5 has explored the traditional manufacturer’s 3DP adoption 
strategy. We have considered the traditional manufacturer’s production strategy in the face 
of the logistics vendor’s 3DP product competition. In a supply chain consisting of a 
traditional manufacturer and a logistics vendor, the traditional manufacturer could use either 
traditional flexible manufacturing technology or the new 3DP technology to produce 
vertically differentiated products: low customization TM products and high customization 
traditional flexibly manufactured products or the 3DP product. If the manufacturer now 
traditionally sells the TM product through the logistics vendor’s delivery service, then to 
cope with the logistics vendor’s high customization 3DP product, s/he might establish a 
traditional flexible manufactured product or a 3DP product. In a recent study conducted by 
Dong et al. (2017), they have found that using the multi-product technologies (dedicated 
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technology, flexible technology and 3DP technology) might reduce the product variety and 
only 3DP printing can always enhance the product variety. However, our model has indicated 
that if the traditional manufacturer sells high customization products through traditional 
flexible manufacturing technology, after the logistics vendor adopts the 3DP technology, (i) 
multi-product manufacturing does not always bring more profits to the logistics vendor ; (ii) 
product differentiation can help the traditional manufacturer achieve better financial 
performance; (iii) the integrated supply chain can achieve better performance in most cases. 
But, if the production volume is low and the TF product costs are located within a certain 
low range, then the integrated supply chain can achieve better performance than traditional 
manufacturing which fully uses TF manufacturing technology. 
Moreover, if the traditional manufacturer decides to add a traditionally manufactured 
product, the supply chain profits from it. This finding is consistent with the research results 
in (Holmström et al., 2010; Wohlers Associates, 2018). By using case studies on the 3DP 
adoption, both of the papers have suggested that the current supply chain could be benefited 
by operating both the advanced 3DP and the traditional manufacturing technology. 
If the traditional manufacturer decides to replace traditional manufacturing production with 
traditional flexible manufacturing production, the supply chain can only gain more profits if 
product production is cheap overall and the cost of the traditionally manufactured product is 
low. Besides, we have demonstrated that if traditional manufacturing starts to adopt 3DP 
technology, (i) the traditional manufacturer is always better off using traditional 
manufacturing, traditional flexible manufacturing and 3DP manufacturing together. This 
finding is different from the research results in (Dong et al., 2017)’s study, which showed 
that adding the traditional flexible technology in addition to other technologies may reduce 
product variety chosen by the firm and only 3DP technology can improve the product variety. 
(ii) The logistics vendor can also gain more profits when the traditional manufacturer sells 
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TM, TF and 3DP products if the TM product cost is high but the TM product customization 
level is low, or the TM product cost is low, but the TM product customization level is high. 
Otherwise, the logistics vendor can gain more profits only if the traditional manufacturer 
fully moves to 3DP manufacturing. (iii) If the 3DP production is extremely cheap (e.g. nut) 
or expensive (e.g. aerospace plane)  overall, then adding 3DP technology but no flexible 
manufacturing technology contributes to the overall supply chain performance; otherwise, 
operating all three different manufacturing technologies is the best strategy for the integrated 
supply chain.  
In summary, firstly, under the Bertrand supply chain with the medium setting, if the TM 
product costs are high, it is profitable to the traditional manufacturer to let the logistics vendor 
operate the 3DP product business. Secondly, with the high setting, if the TM product costs 
are low, the traditional manufacturer can also gain more profits on the low-price TM product. 
If the fixed cost of the TF product is extremely low or extremely high, the TF product has 
product customization advantages over the TM or the TF product and has price advantages 
over the 3DP product, whilst the traditional manufacturer can benefit from the aggressive 
product competition. Thirdly, if the logistics delivery cost is high, it is better to let the 
logistics vendor offer the 3DP product because the traditional manufacturer needs to pay the 
delivery service fee to the logistics vendor for all product sales. Fourthly, it is not always 
beneficial to the logistics vendor to handle 3DP products. Lastly, multi-product competition 
cannot contribute to supply chain performance improvement. In a supply chain where 
production is too low, the supply chain can show better performance if the logistics vendor 
offers the 3DP product, but if the level of 3DP product customization is distinguishingly high 
or the TF product customization level is high, the supply chain can achieve better 
performance if the traditional manufacturer offers the 3DP product himself/herself. In the 
high product production supply chain, the supply chain can benefit from the traditional 
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manufacturer’s three production line strategy if the TM product costs are high, the TF product 
costs are low, or the 3DP product costs are high.  
Our third study in Chapter 5 considered the logistics vendor’s 3DP engagement strategy. It 
has been suggested that the traditional manufacturer would be the best user of the 3DP 
technology and it is not easy for the logistics vendor to provide a professional product design 
service for the 3DP product, (D. R. Eyers & Potter, 2015; Holmström et al., 2010; Ryan et 
al., 2017). Thus, starting to offer the 3DP product and how to operate the 3DP product design 
service are important business strategy issues for the logistics vendor. We built up theoretical 
models for a supply chain consisting of a traditional manufacturer, a logistics vendor and a 
third-party 3DP product design professional to discuss three different 3DP engagement 
strategies for the logistics vendor: (i) the traditional manufacturer sells both the 3DP product 
and TM product into the market and the logistics vendor only provides the product delivery 
service; (ii) the logistics vendor provides the 3DP product but it is designed by a third-party 
3DP design professional; and (iii) the logistics vendor provides the 3DP product but the 
product design is authorized by the traditional manufacturer. We derived the equilibrium 
product costs, the logistics vendor’s 3DP engagement strategy and efforts, and the product 
price to provide managerial insights.  
We obtained some interesting findings. Firstly, if the logistics vendor provides the 3DP 
product with a third-party 3DP professional’s design, it is still beneficial to the traditional 
manufacturer under certain conditions (e.g. if the third-party 3DP product design 
professional’s product design quality is high but the 3DP product cost is low, or the third-
party 3DP product design professional’s product design quality is low but the 3DP product 
cost is high); but it is always profitable to the logistics vendor to offer the 3DP product. This 
finding echos to the similar research results in (Pooley, 2013), the 3DP offers advantages in 
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less delivery cost and the logistics vendor might be the best adopter of the 3DP manufacturing 
technology. 
However, the integrated supply chain shows different performance depending on the third-
party professional’s product design quality, TM product customization level, and 3DP 
product cost. For instance, if the third-party professional’s design quality is high, but the TM 
product customization level is low, it is not profitable to the integrated supply chain if the 
logistics vendor starts to offer a 3DP product. Conversely, if the third-party professional’s 
design quality is low but the 3DP product cost is extremely high, the integrated supply chain 
can show better performance if the 3DP product is offered by the logistics vendor instead of 
the traditional manufacturer.  
Secondly, the traditional manufacturer can choose to provide a 3DP product design service 
to the logistics vendor instead of offering a 3DP product if the 3DP product design 
authorization fee and the 3DP product cost meet certain conditions. When the 3DP product 
design authorization fee is high, or the product design authorization fee is low but the 3DP 
product is cheap, the traditional manufacturer can generate more profit by controlling the 
3DP product design if and only if 3DP production is cheap. Conversely, when the 3DP 
product design authorization fee is low but 3DP production is costly, the traditional 
manufacturer can gain more profits by controlling and providing 3DP product design only. 
As for the logistics vendor, when the product design authorization fee is high, or the product 
design authorization fee is low but the 3DP product cost is extremely high or sufficiently 
low, the logistics vendor can gain more profits by offering the 3DP product with the 
traditional manufacturer’s 3DP product design. Conversely, when the product design 
authorization fee is low and the 3DP production cost is at the middle level, the logistics 
vendor can obtain more benefits by providing 3DP with the third-party professional’s 3DP 
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product design. At the integrated supply chain level, it is not beneficial if the traditional 
manufacturer leaves the entire 3DP product market to the logistics vendor and the third-party 
3DP professional, and it is always beneficial to the supply chain if the logistics vendor 
chooses to purchase the 3DP product design from the traditional manufacturer.  
We summarize the managerial implications from key stakeholder perspectives as follows.  
Insights for the logistics vendor 
The managers of logistics vendors should be encouraged to engage in 3DP adoption because 
3DP service can grant logistics vendors a new business opportunity to enhance their value in 
the supply chain. They should work with 3DP developers to accelerate the development and 
commercialization of 3DP technology. However, it is worth noting that a capable logistics 
vendor should not always use 3DP as the game-changer to reshape the supply chain structure, 
under certain conditions the logistics vendor can obtain a higher profit by not using 3DP. 
Therefore, it is critical for managers of logistics vendors to examine the market condition and 
the cost structure to strategically use 3DP as a game-changer or as a potential threat. Most 
importantly, this research also gives suggestions on the 3DP adoption of the different product 
under the different market structure which could be used as an important reference for the 
logistics vendor who is really considering 3DP as his/her new business.  
Insights for the traditional manufacturer 
When logistics vendors are going to adopt 3DP, traditional manufacturers certainly face new 
competition pressure. The conventional wisdom usually suggests that managers of traditional 
manufacturers should attempt to deter the adoption of 3DP by logistics vendors, which 
perhaps leads to new channel conflict. Our analysis demonstrates that it is not always 
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necessary to do so. Actually, the adoption of 3DP by the logistics vendor can benefit the 
traditional manufacturer in the same supply chain if the traditional manufacturing product 
still has cost advantages. In other words, traditional manufacturers should embrace rather 
than boycott 3DP by logistics vendors under certain conditions. Meanwhile, there exist 
scenarios that beneficial to the traditional manufacturer to combine the 3DP manufacturing 
technology into his/her manufacturing system. Besides, this research also can be used for the 
improvement of his/her business and R&D strategy for the different 3DP product (e.g. how 
to extend the current 3DP adoption market, how to explore the new 3DP adoption market, 
which part of the 3DP technology should be improved). 
Insights for the policymaker 
Although 3DP technology has more than 50 years of development history, it is still in infancy 
(Ryan et al., 2017; Wohlers Associates, 2018). The research results also help the policymaker 
to have a further understanding of the impact of 3DP adoption on the supply chain. This 
research points out that for different 3DP technology/product, the impact on traditional 
manufacturing and the supply chain are different. Our research findings above highlights 
three important issues for the policymaker of 3DP industry: (1) It is still not always beneficial 
to adopt the 3DP manufacturing technology either by the traditional manufacturer or the 
logistics vendor, therefore,  the policymaker should help the expansion of the 3DP technology 
adoption by government support; (2) Protecting the intellectual of 3DP by charge the design 
fee cannot help the long-term development of the 3DP industry; (3) Although the 
manufacturing industry should encourage the 3DP adoption for the long-term development, 
how to protect or upgrade the traditional manufacturing technology is also important. Thus, 
the policymaker should help the manufacturing industry to softly transfer and upgrade some 
out-of-date traditional manufacturing technology step by step and get the balance between 
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the new disruptive 3DP manufacturing technology and the traditional manufacturing or the 
flexible manufacturing technology to improve the supply chain sustainability. 
7.3 Research Limitations and Future Research Directions  
This work is by no means an exhaustive study of the research questions we addressed. There 
are several methods which could be used to extend and enrich our models and the analysis in 
this research. The PhD research work presented in this thesis is limited by several factors.  
Firstly, it is obvious that not all of the related variables and their causal relationships were 
considered. The factors considered here which might influence the consumer’s shopping 
behaviour were limited to the product cost and product customization. Some other key factors 
which might relate to the consumer’s actual shopping behaviour were not included, such as 
different product delivery lead times (Song & Zhang, 2018; UPS, 2016) and the consumer’s 
hassle cost for getting the TM product or the 3DP product (Chiang et al., 2003). To increase 
the generalizability of the research findings, this limitation might be mitigated by exploring 
new factors which will also influence the consumer’s shopping decisions, such as by: 
• adding more variables related to consumer shopping behaviour into the models 
developed in this research  
• comparing and contrasting the results of the different variables in the research results 
• using empirical testing for our analytical results 
Secondly, different types of 3DP technology need different amounts of investment and the 
production costs are different, but for the generalizability of the research, we have not 
specified the 3DP technology in this thesis. Therefore, the research findings are limited by 
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the diverse cost elements to different 3DP technologies/products. Over the years, a large body 
of research has case studied the implication of a specific 3DP technology (Bamford, 
Karjalainen, & Jenavs, 2012; Oettmeier & Hofmann, 2016; Wohlers Associates, 2018). 
Therefore, it might be easier to focus on one specific 3DP technology and extend the 3DP 
supply chain research by considering:  
• developing a better profit model for the traditional manufacturer, the logistics vendor, 
and the integrated supply chain (by considering more cost elements)  
• comparing and contrasting the results for the different 3DP technologies in the 
research results 
Thirdly, the three models discussed were built on the logistics vendor’s 3DP adoption. 
However, in practice, other supply chain members might be the 3DP provider as well – for 
example, the retailer or the distributor. Therefore, a richer model of contracts among supply 
chain members with the adoption of more general models of 3DP adoption could provide a 
more nuanced understanding of the strategic impact of the presence of 3DP adoption. A 
future research direction would be to study the other supply chain member’s 3DP adoption 
strategy by: 
• investigating the other supply chain member’s 3DP adoption possibilities (e.g. 
retailer, channel distributer) 
• comparing and contrasting the results of different supply chain member’s 3DP 
adoption and identifying the best 3DP adoption strategy for different types of product 
In the end, as 3DP has not been widely adopted, the relevant research data is lacking; as a 
quantitative analytical model, the results could be more robust and accurate if additional work 
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was conducted to increase the generalisability of the study and extend the research to a wider 
area.  In addition, the research results still need to be tested by actual future business cases, 
if at all possible.  
Yet it is clear that 3DP technology is on an improvement trajectory that eventually will 
compete with traditional manufacturing and even replace it. As such we conclude that 3DP 
manufacturing will bring more research questions about how to adopt it in supply chain 
management research domain, such as the product scheduling issue, inventory and 
distribution management, product variety problems, etc. In the following section, we 
summarize the new ideas and ground the future research agenda for the 3DP supply chain 
research field. 
Production Scheduling Issue 
3DP technology has fewer requirements about the workforce and even the workplace 
(Pooley, 2013; Sculpteo, 2018). For example, by using 3DP technology, the assembly 
process would be eliminated from the supply chain processes. However, currently, 3DP still 
cannot fully replace traditional manufacturing technologies. As mentioned in Abstract, 3DP 
technology has advantages on economic-of-one while traditional manufacturing is good at 
economic-of-scale. Therefore, how to combine 3DP manufacturing technology with other 
traditional manufacturing technology would be one of the key research questions. In detail, 
when the manufacturer gets a consumer order with some product variants, s/he needs to plan 
the production schedule by selecting the right manufacturing methodology according to 
requirements on product variants, product cost, production time, and even the delivery lead 
time. 
Inventory and Distribution Management 
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As discussed in the Literature Review chapter, 3DP technology is a tool to fulfil the consumer 
order with high customization requirements in product design and product delivery (Conner 
et al., 2014; Novshek & Thoman, 2006). Therefore, to improve the product customization 
level, the traditional manufacturer would consider adopting the 3DP technology into his/her 
current manufacturing system, However, the new 3DP technology has different requirements 
on the inventory and distribution. For example, some 3D printed product does not need 
inventory and distribution, while, for some large or complex product which only could be 
partially 3D printed, they still need inventory and distribution support. Thus, how to change 
the current inventory and distribution system for the new 3DP enabled supply chain would 
be another interesting research question in the research agenda. 
Intellectual Property Problem 
Section 2.1.4 highlights the importance of protecting the intellectual property for the 3DP 
product design (Esmond & Phero, 2014; Wilkof, 2016). What would be the best strategy to 
manage the 3DP product design in the supply chain is an urgent question need to be fully 
assessed. Although this research question has been assessed in Chapter 6, this research has 
not considered other IP management strategies, such as open-source. Therefore, it would be 
noteworthy to put this research question into the research agenda. 
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Appendix A: List of 3DP Supply Chain Studies 
 Research Topic Method  Key Findings Source 
1 Production Cost Axiomatic  This paper proposed a new 
cost model for laser sintering 
based on the Hopkinson-
Dickens model. It also points 
out that it is essential to 
evolve the current cost 
models by considering more 
new factors, and indirect cost 
play a critical role in the new 
modern cost model.  
(Ruffo et al., 
2006) 
2 Production Cost Axiomatic Based on the Hopkinson-
Dickens model, this paper 
proposed a new cost model 
which considered the 
simultaneous production of 
different parts through a case 
study. 
(Ruffo & 
Hague, 
2007) 
3 Supply Chain 
Management: Sourcing 
Interpritve The status of bureaus in the 
factory and the sequential 
use of rapid prototyping 
costing are two key 
considerations for rapid 
manufacturing.   
(Ruffo et al., 
2007) 
4 Supply Chain 
Management 
Empiricial This paper demonstrates the 
use of Rapid Manufacturing 
(RM) as the enabling 
technology for flexible 
manufacturing in a number 
of industrial sectors. The use 
of RM will have particular 
impact on supply chain 
management paradigms such 
as lean and agile and has 
particular strategic fit with 
mass customisation.  
(Tuck et al., 
2007) 
5 Production Cost Axiomatic This study used a 
thermodynamic framework 
to characterize and analyze 
the material and energy 
resources used in 20 different 
manufacturing processes. 
The results confirmed that 
exergy analysis can be used 
to identify where resources 
are lost in these processes, 
which is the first step in 
proposing and/or redesigning 
new more efficient 
processes. 
(Gutowski et 
al., 2009) 
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6 Intellectual Property Interpretive This paper investigates 
existing IP legislation and 
case law about 3DP with 
regard to copyright design 
protection, patents, 
trademarks, and passing off. 
The outcome of this paper 
reports that in the UK 3D 
printer owners use 3DP to 
produce items for personal 
use and not for marketing.  
(Bradshaw et 
al., 2010) 
7 Supply Chain 
Management 
Interpretive The rapid manufacturing can 
simultaneously improve 
service and reduce the 
inventory for the spare parts 
supply chain. The two most 
feasible adoption strategies 
are centralized development 
by the original equipment 
manufacturer or setting the 
rapid manufacturing close to 
the point of the market. 
(Holmström 
et al., 2010) 
8 Product Technology Interpretive This paper compares the 
characteristics and 
applications of 3DP with 
mass customization and 
other manufacturing 
technology. It concludes that 
3DP brings changes in 
production time, costs, and 
materials. 
(Berman, 
2012) 
9 Supply Chain 
Management 
Interpretive This paper outlines a 
literature review on the 
societal impact of additive 
manufacturing from a 
technical perspective, 
including customized 
healthcare products, the 
environmental impact on 
sustainability, and simplified 
supply chains.  
(S. H. Huang 
et al., 2013) 
10 Supply Chain 
Management 
Interpretive 3DP has advantages in terms 
of production costs and 
logistics costs, and it also has 
the potential to reduce the 
time required for design and 
production. Also, it helps 
product design innovation. 
(Petrick & 
Simpson, 
2014) 
11 Product Technology Empirical This paper uses a 
geometrical benchmarking 
model (GBM) to test and 
evaluate the geometrical 
accuracy of open source 
(Sanchez et 
al., 2014) 
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FDM (Fused Deposition 
Modelling) 3D printers. 
12 Production Cost Axiomatic 3DP has the potential for cost 
reduction and to decouple 
energy and CO2 emissions. 
(Gebler et 
al., 2014) 
13 Product Technology Empirical This research presents new 
practical applications for 
developing gradient alloys 
with low-coefficients of 
thermal expansion and 
multifunctional properties. 
(Hofmann et 
al., 2014) 
14 Supply Chain 
Management 
Empirical Using empirical research, 
this paper develops a 
multiple hybrid criteria 
decision-making framework 
for evaluating and enhancing 
appropriate 3DP providers’ 
service performance. This 
study also uses Decision-
Making Trial and Network 
Process based Evaluation 
Laboratory, as well as 
VIKOR (VIseKriterijumska 
Optimizacijia I 
Kompromisno Resenje). 
(Liao et al., 
2014) 
15 Supply Chain 
Management  
Empirical This paper evaluates the 
impact of additive 
manufacturing in the aircraft 
spare parts industry by 
comparing three different 
structured supply chain: a 
conventional supply chain, a 
centralized AM supply chain 
and a distributed AM supply 
chain. The study finally 
concludes that AM has the 
potential to reduce the safety 
inventory level. 
(Liu et al., 
2014) 
16 Supply Chain 
Management 
Empirical This paper develops an 
implementation framework 
as a guide for AM adoption 
from the perspective of AM 
technology, the supply chain, 
organization, operation and 
strategy. 
(Mellor et 
al., 2014) 
17 Supply Chain 
Management 
Interpretive In this paper, the authors 
analyze the potential of 3DP 
in practice, research and 
teaching with regard to 
supply chain management 
and identify impacts of 3DP 
on these areas. 
(Waller & 
Fawcett, 
2014) 
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18 Intellectual Property Interpretive This paper summarises the 
status of the additive 
manufacturing revolution 
and corresponding legal 
developments and then 
points out the necessity of 
protecting innovation. 
(Esmond & 
Phero, 2014) 
19 Product Technology Interpretive This paper uses 
mathematical analyzes to 
investigate the correlation 
between the energy 
consumption and geometry 
of parts manufactured by 
Binder-Jetting. It then 
proposes a process model to 
improve the design of part 
geometry with regard to 
energy consumption. 
(Xu et al., 
2015) 
20 Business Model  Interpretive This study points out that in 
a monopoly market structure, 
by using AM the barriers to 
market entry are fewer and 
AM also enables the ability 
to serve multiple markets at 
the same time. In addition, 
AM can help the 
manufacturer to reduce the 
price of products. 
(Weller et 
al., 2015) 
21 Industry Review Interpretive This report provides various 
3DP industry insights, 
including in terms of 
technology development, 
adoption, the advantages of 
3DP, and future challenges. 
(Ernst & 
Young, 
2016) 
22 Supply Chain 
Management 
Empirical This paper compares direct 
digital manufacturing with 
traditional tool-based 
manufacturing and finds that 
that digital manufacturing 
has advantages for the unit 
production cost but it cannot 
have a better performance on 
several orders of magnitude. 
Therefore, it brings more 
challenges for operations 
management. In addition, 
this paper also summarizes 
these challenges for 
operations and supply chain 
management. 
(Holmström 
et al., 2016) 
23 Business Model  Interpretive 3DP has the potential to 
change business model 
innovation by enabling 
(Rayna & 
Striukova, 
2016) 
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adaptive business models 
and by adding rapid 
prototyping. 
24 Production Cost Interpretive By comparing the cost 
models of two different AM 
technologies, this paper 
shows that economies of 
scale are achievable with 
AM. 
(Baumers et 
al., 2016) 
25 Supply Chain 
Management 
Interpretive This study summarizes the 
state of AM development 
and studies about how AM 
can influence business model 
development and operations 
in consumer goods 
manufacturing.  
(Bogers et 
al., 2016) 
26 Supply Chain 
Management 
Empirical Based on the analysis of two 
case studies, this paper 
concludes that the whole 
supply chain and internal 
processes are affected by 
AM with regard to the 
production of industrial 
parts.  
(Oettmeier 
& Hofmann, 
2016) 
27 Intellectual Property Interpretive This paper reviews the 
creation of patent rights and 
the enforcement of registered 
patents. It finds that patent 
considerations may be more 
crucial than copyrights and 
trademarks. 
(Wilkof, 
2016) 
28 Supply Chain 
Management 
Interpretive This paper identifies the 
challenges, highlights, 
impacts, trends, and 
transformative potential of 
AM technology. It also 
summarizes the advantages 
and disadvantages of 
traditional manufacturing. 
(Attaran, 
2017) 
29 Supply Chain 
Management: 
Manufacturing 
Axiomatic This research compares 3DP 
and traditional flexible 
technology with regard to 
assortment and capacity 
decisions. Its results suggest 
that 3DP can always 
contribute to product variety 
and that it has influence on 
company’s product 
assortment and production 
strategy. 
(Dong et al., 
2017) 
30 Supply Chain 
Management 
Interpretive This paper uses 
multidimensional scaling to 
investigate and study the 
(Niaki & 
Nonino, 
2017a) 
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current researches about AM 
in management, business and 
economics domain and then 
proposes future research 
directions. 
31 Supply Chain 
Management 
Interpretive This paper explores the 
current state of affairs and 
main problems for Chinese 
manufacturing and the 3DP 
industry and analyzes the 
potential impacts of 3DP on 
Chinese manufacturing. 
(Long et al., 
2017) 
32 Supply Chain 
Management  
Interpretive  This study identifies and 
conceptualizes a frame for 
the global factory concept. 
And then it further 
investigates the potential 
impact of AM on the global 
production. At last, it 
concludes that AM will 
changes the industries and 
production activity with 
managerial and practical 
implications. 
(Hannibal & 
Knight, 
2018) 
33 Supply Chain 
Management 
Interpretive This paper summarizes 
current 3DP technology 
adoption in oral drug 
production and by consulting 
with experts identifies that 
mass production might still 
be too ambitious for the oral 
drug industry. 
(Hsiao et al., 
2018) 
34 Product Technology Empirical This paper selects a patient 
who once use a handmade 
prosthesis as research 
objective and then use 3DP 
technology to re-create the 
patient’s uncompromised 
anatomy from CT scan data 
to explore the possibilities of 
medical imaging and 3D 
modelling for prosthesis 
production.  
(Mohammed 
et al., 2018) 
35 Supply Chain 
Management 
Interpretive This paper examines the 
impacts of 3DP adoption on 
global value chains and finds 
that in a complementarity 
scenario of where 3DP and 
traditional manufacturing are 
overlapping, 3DP can 
increase the total value add 
for the value chain. 
However, in a substitution 
(Rehnberg & 
Ponte, 2018) 
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scenario of 3DP partly or 
entirely replacing traditional 
manufacturing, 3DP reduces 
the overall value-add. 
36 Product Technology Empirical This paper reviews current 
treatments including the use 
of prosthetic ears or surgical 
methods such as auto-
grafting rib cartilage and 
finds that although they are 
highly dependent on the 
surgeon’s skill, the quality is 
quite poor. Meanwhile, 3DP 
technology can provide 
higher quality, lower costs 
and more customization 
options to patients and 
parents alike.  
(Ross et al., 
2018) 
37 Supply Chain 
Management: Logistics 
Axiomatic This paper presents a model 
to analyze the impact of 3DP 
on spare parts logistics and 
finds that 3DP has 
advantages in terms of cost 
saving and also increases the 
variety of parts. 
(Song & 
Zhang, 
2018) 
38 Production Cost Axiomatic This paper proposes a 
decision-making model 
based on the lifecycle costs 
of two components from two 
different companies and 
finds that component 
reliability is essential, whilst 
short production lead times 
can aid the reduction of 
logistical costs and help 
overcome design and 
production costs. 
(Westerweel 
et al., 2018) 
39 Industry Review Interpretive This report offers a general 
review of the current state of 
the 3DP industry and its 
future development. 
(Wohlers 
Associates, 
2018) 
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Appendix B: Proofs of Chapter 4 
Proof of PROPOSITION 4-1. By using the backward induction, the first-order-conditions 
of ∏ 5$%G  from Equation (4.1) is  
 
h∏ 5(/0)$%Gh/0 = ' + "0 + // − 2/0'   
Here, it is easy to verify that ∏ 5$%G  strictly convex in /0. Therefore, the solution to the 
first order conditions gives the maximizer. 
 
h∏ 5(/0)$%Gh/0 = ' + "0 + // − 2/0' = 0  
Then, the optimal price for the TM product is  /0∗ = (- (' + "0 + //) 
Accordingly, the logistics vendor’s profit function is  
 
Z 7(//)$%G = (// − "/).0 = (// − "/) i1 − /0' j= ("/ − //)(−' + "0 + //)2'   
Which is convex in //. So, the first-order-conditions of ∏ 7$%G  gives the maximizer.  
 
h∏ 7(//)$%Gh// = ' + "/ − "0 − 2//2' = 0  
the optimal price of the logistics vendor’s goods delivery service is //∗ = (- (' + "/ − "0). 
Because //∗ = (- (' + "/ − "0), so /0∗ = (+ (3' + "/ + "0). 
Besides, the optimal demand of the TM product is .0∗ = #'!!'!"+#  and the maximum profits 
for the manufacturer and the logistics vendor are as follows 
 Z 5(/0)∗$%G = (−' + "/ + "0)-16'  (4.19) 
 Z 7(//)∗$%G = (−' + "/ + "0)-8'  (4.20) 
 
Proof of PROPOSITION 4-2.  ∏ R59$%G  is concave in /0, so the first-order-conditions of ∏ R59$%G  in Equation (4.3) gives the maximum value. 
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h∏ R59(/0)$%Gh/0 = ' + "/ + "0 − 2/0' = 0  
Therefore, when /0∗ = (- (' + "/ + "0) and .0∗ = #'!!'!"-# , the supply chain system 
achieves the maximum profit as  
 Z R59∗$%G = (−' + "/ + "0)-4'  (4.21) 
where ' − "/ − "0 > 0. 
Proof of PROPOSITION 4-3. According to Equation (4.4) and Equation (4.5), the first-
order-conditions and the second-order-conditions of ∏ 5(/0)$%  and ∏ 7(/$% , //)$%  in 
Equation (4.6) and Equation (4.7),  
⎩⎪⎨
⎪⎧ h∏ 5(/0)$%h/0 = "0 + '/$% + // − 2/0' − '- 	h ∏ 7(/$% , //)$%h/$% = 1 − ' + "$% − "/ − 2/$% + // + /01 − '  
⎩⎪⎨
⎪⎧h∏ 5(/0)-$%h/0- = 2(−1 + ')' < 0h∏ 7(/$% , //)-$%h/$%- = 2−1 + ' < 0 
So, the solution to the first-order-conditions gives the unique maximizer.  
⎩⎪⎨
⎪⎧ h∏ 5(/0)$%h/0 = "0 + '/$% + // − 2/0' − '- = 0	h∏ 7(/$% , //)$%h/$% = 1 − ' + "$% − "/ − 2/$% + // + /01 − ' = 0 
o/0∗ =	 (−1 + ')' − '"$% + '"/ − 2"0 − (2 + ')//−4 + '/$%∗ = 2 − 2' + 2"$% − 2"/ + "0 + 3//4 − '  
Then, the logistics vendor’s profit function (4.7) can be updated as 
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Z 7(/$% , //)$%= (1 − ')(8 + ')//-(−4 + ')-(−1 + ')'+ ((1 − ')'-"$% − 2(1 − ')(4 + ')"/ + (−1 + ')('(8 + ') − 8"0))//(−4 + ')-(−1 + ')'+ 1(−4 + ')-(−1 + ')' (8(1 − ')'"$% − 4(1 − ')'-"$%− (−2 + ')-'"$%- + (1 − ')'(4 + ')"/ + '(4 + (−3 + ')')"$%"/− '-"/- − 2(−2 + ')'"$%"0 + (−8 + 6')"/"0 − '(2 − 2' + "0)-) 
(4.22) 
which is convex in //, so the first-order-conditions gives the maximum profit. h∏ 7(/$% , //)$% h// = −'-"$% + 2(4 + ')"/ − 8"0 + (8 + ')(' − 2//)(−4 + ')-' = 0 //∗ = '(8 + ') − '-"$% + 2(4 + ')"/ − 8"02(8 + ')  
The final optimal decisions are 
 //∗ = '(8 + ') − '-"$% + 2(4 + ')"/ − 8"02(8 + ')  (4.23) 
 /0∗ = '(8 + ') + '(4 + ')"$% + 4"/ + 4"02(8 + ')  (4.24) 
 /$%∗ = 8 + ' + (8 + 3')"$% − 2"/ − 2"02(8 + ') 	 (4.25) 
 .0∗ = −(2 + ')('"$% − "/ − "0)(−1 + ')'(8 + ')  (4.26) 
 .$%∗ = −8 + 7' + '- − (−8 + ' + '-)"$% − 6"/ − 6"02(−1 + ')(8 + ')  (4.27) 
The maximized profits are 
 Z 5(/0)∗$%> = −(2 + ')-(−'"$% + "/ + "0)-(−1 + ')'(8 + ')-  (4.28) 
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Z 7∗$%> (/$% , //)= 14(' − 1)'(8 + ') ((−1 + ')'(8 + ') + '(−8 + '(3 + '))"$%-− 2'"$%(−8 + 7' + '- − 4"/ − 4"0) − 4("/ + "0)-) 
(4.29) 
where '"$% − "0 − "/ > 0 ("$% > !!"!"# ) and 0 < "/ + "0 < ' < 1. 
The first-order-conditions and the second-order-conditions of ∏ 9:(/0 , /$% , //)$%>  in 
Equation (4.8) are 
⎩⎪⎨
⎪⎧ h∏ 9:(/0 , /$%)$%> h/0 = −−'"$% + "/ + "0 + 2'/$% − 2/0(−1 + ')' 	h∏ 9:(/0 , /$%)$%>h/$% = −1 + ' − "$% + "/ + "0 + 2/$% − 2/0−1 + '  
⎩⎪⎪
⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪
⎧h∏ 9:(/0 , /$%)-$%> h/0- = 2(−1 + ')' < 0h∏ 9:(/0 , /$%)-$%>h/$%- = 2−1 + ' < 0h∏ 9:(/0 , /$%)-$%>h/0h/$% = − 2−1 + ' > 0h∏ 9:(/0 , /$%)-$%>h/$%h/0 = − 2−1 + ' > 0
 
So, the determinant of the Hessian Matrix can be written as 
p = qq 2(−1 + ')' − 2−1 + '− 2−1 + ' 2−1 + ' qq =
2(−1 + ')' × s 2−1 + 't − s− 2−1 + 't- = 4(1 − ')'
> 0 
Therefore, this Hessian Matrix is a negative-definite matrix, the solution to the first-order-
conditions gives the unique maximizer of ∏ 9:(/0 , /$%)$%> . 
⎩⎪⎨
⎪⎧ h∏ 9:(/0 , /$%)$%> h/0 = −−'"$% + "/ + "0 + 2'/$% − 2/0(−1 + ')' = 0	h ∏ 9:(/0 , /$%)$%>h/$% = −1 + ' − "$% + "/ + "0 + 2/$% − 2/0−1 + ' = 0 
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 /0∗ = 12 (' + "/ + "0)	 (4.30) 
 /$%∗ = 12 (1 + "$%) (4.31) 
So,  
 .0∗ =	−'"$% + "/ + "02(−1 + ')'  (4.32) 
 .$%∗ = 1 − ' − "$% + "/ + "02 − 2'  (4.33) 
 
Z 9:(/0 , /$%)∗$%>= −−(−1 + ')' + '"$%- + ("/ + "0)- − 2'"$%(1 − ' + "/ + "0)4(−1 + ')'  (4.34) 
Proof of PROPOSITION 4-4. Use the same methodology as in Bertrand, this model uses 
the backward induction to find out the Nash equilibrium of ∏ 7(/$% , //)$%  and ∏ 5(/0)$% . 
To do so, first, it is easily to find out that ∏ 7(/$% , //)$%  is convex in /$%. So, the first-
order-conditions of ∏ 7(/$% , //)$%  in Equation (4.7) gives the maximizer,  h∏ 7(/$% , //)$%h/$% = 1 − ' + "$% − "/ − 2/$% + // + /01 − ' = 0 /$%∗ = 12 (1 − ' + "$% − "/ + // + /0) 
Then, the ∏ 5(/0)$%  can be updated as  
Z 5(/0)$% 	= ("0 + // − /0)('(1 − ' + "$% − "/ + //) + (−2 + ')/0)2(−1 + ')'  
which is also convex in /0, so the first-order-condition of ∏ 5(/0)$%  archives the 
maximized value. h∏ 5(/0)$%h/0 = ("0 + // − /0)('(1 − ' + "$% − "/ + //) + (−2 + ')/0)2(−1 + ')' = 0 /2∗ = (−1 + ')' − '"$% + '"/ + (−2 + ')"0 − 2//2(−2 + ')  /$%∗  updates as  
  327 
/$%∗ = −4 + 5' − '- + (−4 + ')"$% − (−4 + ')"/ − 2"0 + '"0 + 2(−3 + ')//4(−2 + ')  
The ∏ 7(/$% , //)$%  can be rewritten as  
Z 7(/$% , //)$% = − 116(−2 + ')-(−1 + ')' ((4 − 3')-'"$%- + '$"/-+ '(4 − 5' + '- − (−2 + ')"0)- + 2"/(−(−2 + ')(8 + (−8 + ')')"0+ (−1 + ')(8 + (−4 + ')')(' − 2//)) − 4(−1 + ')('(8 + (−5 + ')')− (−4 + ')(−2 + ')"0)// + 4(−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')')//-+ 2'"$%((−8 + (12 − 5')')"/ + (−4 + 3')(4 − 5' + '- − (−2+ ')"0) + 2(−1 + ')'//)) 
and it is convex in //, so the first-order-conditions gives the maximizer h∏ 7(/$% , //)$% h// = − 14(−2 + ')-' (−'(8 + (−5 + ')') + '-"$% − (8 + (−4 + ')')"/+ (−4 + ')(−2 + ')"0 + 16// + 2(−5 + ')'//) = 0 //∗ = '(8 + (−5 + ')') − '-"$% + (8 + (−4 + ')')"/ − (−4 + ')(−2 + ')"02(8 + (−5 + ')')  
Therefore, the final optimal decisions are 
//∗ = '(8 + (−5 + ')') − '-"$% + (8 + (−4 + ')')"/ − (−4 + ')(−2 + ')"02(8 + (−5 + ')')  (4.35) /0∗ = '(8 + (−5 + ')') − (−4 + ')'"$% + (−2 + ')-"/ + (−2 + ')-"02(8 + (−5 + ')')  (4.36) /$%∗ = 8 + (−5 + ')' + (8 − 3')"$% + (−2 + ')"/ + (−2 + ')"02(8 + (−5 + ')') 	 (4.37) .0∗ = (−2 + ')('"$% − "/ − "0)(−1 + ')'(8 + (−5 + ')') (4.38) 
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.$%∗ = 12(−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')') ((−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')') + (8 + (−7+ ')')"$% − 6"/ − 6"0 − (−5 + ')'("/ + "0)) (4.39) 
The maximized profits are Z 5(/0)∗$%@ = 2(−2 + ')(−'"$% + "/ + "0)-(−1 + ')'(8 + (−5 + ')')-  (4.40) Z 7(/$% , //)∗$%@ = 14(−1 + ')'(8 + (−5 + ')') ((−1 + ')'(8 + (−5 + ')')+ '(−8 + (9 − 2')')"$%- − (−2 + ')-("/ + "0)- + 2'"$%(−(−1+ ')(8 + (−5 + ')') + (−2 + ')-"/ + (−2 + ')-"0)) 
  
(4.41) 
where '"$% − "0 − "/ > 0 ("$% > !!"!"# ) and 0 < "/ + "0 < ' < 1. 
It is easily to find out that ∏ 9:(/0 , /$%)$%@  is convex in /$%. So, the first-order-conditions 
of ∏ 9:(/0 , /$%)$%@  in (3.8) gives the maximizer,  h∏ 9:(/0 , /$%)$%@h/$% = −1 + ' − "$% + "/ + "0 + 2/$% − 2/0−1 + ' = 0 /$%∗ = 12 (1 − ' + "$% − "/ − "0) + /0 
Then, the ∏ 9:(/0 , /$% , //)$%@  can be rewritten as  Z 9:(/0 , /$%)$%@ = − 14(−1 + ')' ('"$%- − 2'"$%(1 − ' + "/ + "0)+ '(−1 + ' + "/ + "0)- − 4(−1 + ')(' + "/ + "0)/0 + 4(−1 + ')/0- ) 
And it is convex in /0, so the first-order-conditions gives the maximized value. h∏ 9:(/0 , /$%)$%@ h/0 = −1 + ' − "$% + "/ + "0 + 2/$% − 2/0−1 + ' = 0 /0∗ = 12 (' + "/ + "0) 
There, the optimal decisions are 
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 /0∗ = 12 (' + "/ + "0) (4.42) 
 /$%∗ = 12 (1 + "$%) (4.43) 
So,  
 .0∗ =	−'"$% + "/ + "02(−1 + ')'  (4.44) 
 .$%∗ = 1 − ' − "$% + "/ + "02 − 2'  (4.45) 
 
Z 9:(/0 , /$%)∗$%@ = −−(−1 + ')' + '"$%- + ("/ + "0)- − 2'"$%(1 − ' + "/ + "0)4(−1 + ')'  (4.46) 
Proof of PROPOSITION 4-5. According to Table 4-2, it is easy to find out that for the 
Bertrand market, 
h//∗h"0 = − 48 + ' < 0 h//∗h"/ = 4 + '8 + ' > 0 h//∗h"$% = − '-2(8 + ') < 0 h/0∗h"0 = 28 + ' > 0 h/0∗h"/ = 28 + ' > 0 h/0∗h"$% = '(4 + ')2(8 + ') > 0 h/$%∗h"0 = − 18 + ' < 0 h/$%∗h"/ = − 18 + ' < 0 h/$%∗h"$% = 8 + 3'2(8 + ') > 0 
For the equilibrium market demand, h.0∗h"0 = 2 + ''(−8 + 7' + '-) < 0 h.$%∗h"0 = − 3−8 + 7' + '- > 0 h.0∗h"/ = 2 + ''(−8 + 7' + '-) < 0 h.$%∗h"/ = − 3−8 + 7' + '- > 0 h.0∗h"$% = − 2 + '−8 + 7' + '- > 0 h.$%∗h"$% = − −8 + ' + '-2(−1 + ')(8 + ') < 0 
For the traditional manufacturer leading Stackelberg market,  
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h//∗h"0 = −(−4 + ')(−2 + ')2(8 + (−5 + ')') < 0 h//
∗h"/ = 8 + (−4 + ')'2(8 + (−5 + ')')> 0 
h//∗h"$%= − '-2(8 + (−5 + ')')< 0 
h/0∗h"0 = (−2 + ')-2(8 + (−5 + ')') > 0 h/0
∗h"/ = (−2 + ')-2(8 + (−5 + ')')> 0 
h/0∗h"$%= − (−4 + ')'2(8 + (−5 + ')')> 0 h/$%∗h"0 = −2 + '2(8 + (−5 + ')') < 0 h/$%
∗h"/ = −2 + '2(8 + (−5 + ')')< 0 
h/$%∗h"$% = 8 − 3'2(8 + (−5 + ')')> 0 
For the equilibrium market demand, 
h.0∗h"0 = − −2 + '(−1 + ')'(8 + (−5 + ')') < 0 h.$%
∗h"0 = − 6 + (−5 + ')'2(−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')')> 0 h.0∗h"/ = − −2 + '(−1 + ')'(8 + (−5 + ')') < 0 h.$%
∗h"/ = − 6 + (−5 + ')'2(−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')')> 0 h.0∗h"$% = −2 + '(−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')') > 0 h.$%∗h"$% = 8 + (−7 + ')'2(−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')') < 0 
Proof of PROPOSITION 4-6. The optimal prices and market demand of the Bertrand-
market and Stackelberg-market are the same. For the optimal prices,  h/0∗h"0 = 12 > 0 h/0∗h"/ = 12 > 0 h/$%∗h"$% = 12 > 0 
For the optimal market demand, 
h.0∗h"0 = 12(−1 + ')' < 0 h.$%∗h"0 = 12 − 2' > 0 
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h.0∗h"/ = 12(−1 + ')' < 0 h.$%∗h"/ = 12 − 2' > 0 h.0∗h"$% = 12 − 2' > 0 h.$%∗h"$% = 12(−1 + ') < 0 
Proof of PROPOSITION 4-7. From Equation (4.28), it is easy to find out that 
(1)  ∏ 5(/0)∗$%>  is concave in "0, therefore, when  h∏ 5(/0)∗$%>h"0 = −2(2 + ')-(−'"$% + "/ + "0)(−1 + ')'(8 + ')- = 0 "0∗ = '"$% − "/ 
gives the minimum value. However, because '"$% > "/ + "0, therefore, ∏ 5(/0)∗$%>  is 
decreasing in "0;  
(2) ∏ 5(/0)∗$%>  is concave in "/, therefore, when  h∏ 5(/0)∗$%>h"/ = −2(2 + ')-(−'"$% + "/ + "0)(−1 + ')'(8 + ')- = 0 "/∗ = '"$% − "0 
gives the minimum value. However, because '"$% > "/ + "0, therefore, ∏ 5(/0)∗$%>  is 
decreasing in "/;  
(3) ∏ 5(/0)∗$%>  is concave in "$%, therefore, when  h∏ 5(/0)∗$%>h"$% = 2(2 + ')-(−'"$% + "/ + "0)(−1 + ')(8 + ')- = 0 "$%∗ = "/ + "0'  
gives the minimum value. However, because '"$% > "/ + "0, therefore, ∏ 5(/0)∗$%>  is 
increasing in "$%. 
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According to Equation (4.29), we can have,  
(1) ∏ 7∗$%> (/$% , //) is concave in "0, so, if h∏ 7∗$%> (/$% , //)	h"0 = 2'"$% − 2("/ + "0)(−1 + ')'(8 + ') = 0 "0∗ = '"$% − "/ 
gives the minimum value. However, because '"$% > "/ + "0, therefore, ∏ 5(/0)∗$%>  is 
decreasing in "0; 
(2) ∏ 7∗$%> (/$% , //) is concave in "/, so, if h∏ 7∗$%> (/$% , //)	h"/ = 2'"$% − 2("/ + "0)(−1 + ')'(8 + ') = 0 "/∗ = '"$% − "0 
gives the minimum value. However, because '"$% > "/ + "0, therefore, ∏ 5(/0)∗$%>  is 
decreasing in "/; 
(3) ∏ 7∗$%> (/$% , //) is concave in "$%, so, if h∏ 7∗$%> (/$% , //)	h"$% = −(−1 + ')(8 + ') + (−8 + '(3 + '))"$% + 4"/ + 4"02(−1 + ')(8 + ') = 0 "$%∗ = (−1 + ')(8 + ') − 4("/ + "0)−8 + '(3 + ') > "/ + "0'  
gives the minimum value. However, because '"$% > "/ + "0, therefore, 
If !!"!"# < "$% < ('("#)(*"#)'+(!!"!")'*"#($"#) , ∏ 7∗$%> (/$% , //) decreases in "$%; 
If ('("#)(*"#)'+(!!"!")'*"#($"#) < "$% < 1, ∏ 7∗$%> (/$% , //) increases in "$%. 
Use the similar approach, based on Equation (4.40), it is easy to derive that  
(1)  ∏ 5(/0)∗$%@  is concave in "0, therefore, when  
  333 
h∏ 5(/0)∗$%@h"0 = 4(−2 + ')(−'"$% + "/ + "0)(−1 + ')'(8 + (−5 + ')')- = 0 "0∗ = '"$% − "/ 
gives the minimum value. However, because '"$% > "/ + "0, therefore, ∏ 5(/0)∗$%@  is 
decreasing in "0;  
(2) ∏ 5(/0)∗$%@  is concave in "/, therefore, when  h∏ 5(/0)∗$%@h"/ = 4(−2 + ')(−'"$% + "/ + "0)(−1 + ')'(8 + (−5 + ')')- = 0 "/∗ = '"$% − "0 
gives the minimum value. However, because '"$% > "/ + "0, therefore, ∏ 5(/0)∗$%@  is 
decreasing in "/;  
(3) ∏ 5(/0)∗$%@  is concave in "$%, therefore, when  h∏ 5(/0)∗$%@h"$% = −4(−2 + ')(−'"$% + "/ + "0)(−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')')- = 0 "$%∗ = "/ + "0'  
gives the minimum value. However, because '"$% > "/ + "0, therefore, ∏ 5(/0)∗$%@  is 
increasing in "$%. 
According to Equation   (4.41), it is easily to find out that,  
(1) ∏ 7∗$%@ (/$% , //) is concave in "0, so, if h∏ 7∗$%@ (/$% , //)	h"0 = (−2 + ')-('"$% − "/ − "0)2(−1 + ')'(8 + (−5 + ')') = 0 "0∗ = '"$% − "/ 
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gives the minimum value. However, because '"$% > "/ + "0, therefore, ∏ 5(/0)∗$%@  is 
decreasing in "0; 
(2) ∏ 7∗$%@ (/$% , //) is concave in "/, so, if h∏ 7∗$%@ (/$% , //)	h"/ = (−2 + ')-('"$% − "/ − "0)2(−1 + ')'(8 + (−5 + ')') = 0 "/∗ = '"$% − "0 
gives the minimum value. However, because '"$% > "/ + "0, therefore, ∏ 5(/0)∗$%@  is 
decreasing in "/; 
(3) ∏ 7∗$%@ (/$% , //) is concave in "$%, so, if h∏ 7∗$%@ (/$% , //)	h"$%= −(−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')') + (−8 + (9 − 2')')"$% + (−2 + ')-"/ + (−2 + ')-"02(−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')')= 0 "$%∗ = −(−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')') + (−2 + ')-("/ + "0)8 + '(−9 + 2') > "/ + "0'  
gives the minimum value. However, because '"$% > "/ + "0, therefore, 
If !!"!"# < "$% < '('("#)(*"(',"#)#)"('-"#)#(!!"!")*"#('."-#) , ∏ 7∗$%@ (/$% , //) decreases in "$%; 
If '('("#)(*"(',"#)#)"('-"#)#(!!"!")*"#('."-#) < "$% < 1, ∏ 7∗$%@ (/$% , //) increases in "$%. 
For the total supply chain maximized profits, Equation (4.34) is the same with Equation 
(4.46) and which are concave in "0, "/, and "$%. h∏ 9:∗$%> (/$% , //)	h"0 = h∏ 9:∗$%@ (/$% , //)	h"0 = −−2'"$% + 2("/ + "0)4(−1 + ')' = 0 "0∗ = '"$% − "/ 
  335 
and h∏ 9:∗$%> (/$% , //)	h"/ = h∏ 9:∗$%@ (/$% , //)	h"/ = −−2'"$% + 2("/ + "0)4(−1 + ')' = 0 "0∗ = '"$% − "0 
Because '"$% > "/ + "0, so ∏ 9:∗$%> (/$% , //) or ∏ 9:∗$%@ (/$% , //) decrases in "0 and "/. 
Then, set h∏ 9:∗$%> (/$% , //)	h"$% = h∏ 9:∗$%@ (/$% , //)	h"$% = −2'"$% − 2'(1 − ' + "/ + "0)4(−1 + ')' = 0 "$%∗ = 1 − ' + "/ + "0 > "/ + "0'  
therefore, 
If !!"!"# < "$% < 1 − ' + "/ + "0, ∏ 9:∗$%> (/$% , //) or ∏ 9:∗$%@ (/$% , //) decreases in "$%; 
If 1 − ' + "/ + "0 < "$% < 1, ∏ 9:∗$%> (/$% , //) or ∏ 9:∗$%@ (/$% , //)increases in "$%. 
Proof of PROPOSITION 4-8.  h/$%∗h"$% = 12 > 0 h.$%∗h"$% = −12 < 0 
And for the maximized profits, it is convex in "$%. Therefore, the first-order-condition  h∏ 7(/$%)∗J$% 	h"$% = h∏ 9:(/$%)∗J$% 	h"$% = 12 (−1 + "$%) = 0 "$%∗ = 1 
Because 0 < "$% < 1, therefore, the profit of the logistics vendor and supply chain 
decrease in "$%. 
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Proof of PROPOSITION 4-11.  
(1) For the logistics vendor’s maximized profits, compare Equation (4.29) and (4.20),  Z 7∗$%> (/$% , //) −Z 7(//)∗$%G= − 18(−1 + ')(8 + ') ((−2 + ')(−1 + ')(8 + ') − 2(−8 + '(3+ '))"$%- + 16"/ + 4"$%((−1 + ')(8 + ') − 4"/ − 4"0) + 16"0 − (7+ ')(2' − "/ − "0)("/ + "0)) 
It is concave in "$%, therefore, when the first-order-condition  h(∏ 7∗$%> (/$% , //) − ∏ 7(//)∗$%G )h"$%= −(−1 + ')(8 + ') + (−8 + '(3 + '))"$% + 4"/ + 4"02(−1 + ')(8 + ') = 0 
"$% = (−1 + ')(8 + ') − 4"/ − 4"0−8 + '(3 + ')  
There is the minimum value of  
Z 7∗$%> (/$% , //) −Z 7(//)∗$%G = − (3 + ')(−' + "/ + "0)-8=−8 + '(3 + ')@ > 0 
(2) For the traditional manufacturer’s maximized profits, compare Equation (4.28) and 
(4.19)  Z 5∗$%> (/0) −Z 5(/0)∗$%G= − 116(−1 + ')(8 + ')- ((−1 + ')'(8 + ')- + 16'(2 + ')-"$%-+ 128"/ + 128"0 − 32(2 + ')-"$%("/ + "0) + ("/ + "0)(−2'(48+ '(15 + ')) + (112 + '(31 + '))"/ + (112 + '(31 + '))"0)) 
It is also concave in "$%, therefore, when the first-order-condition  
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h(∏ 5∗$%> (/0) − ∏ 5(/0)∗$%G )h"$% = −2(2 + ')-('"$% − "/ − "0)(−1 + ')(8 + ')- = 0 "$% = "/ + "0'  
There is the minimum value of  
Z 5∗$%> (/$% , //) −Z 5(/$% , //)∗$%G = −(−' + "/ + "0)-16' < 0 
Then, if ∏ 5∗$%> (/$% , //) − ∏ 5(/$% , //)∗$%G = 0, 
"$%( = "/ + "0' − (' + 8)(' − "/ − "0)√1 − '4'(2 + ')  "$%- = "/ + "0' + (' + 8)(' − "/ − "0)√1 − '4'(2 + ')  
Here, "$%( < !!"!"# < "$%- < 1. Because "$% > !!"!"# , therefore,  
o#u	 "/ + "0' < "$% < "$%-,Z 5∗$%> (/$% , //) −Z 5(/$% , //)∗$%G < 0;#u	"$%- < "$% < 1,Z 5∗$%> (/$% , //) −Z 5(/$% , //)∗$%G > 0.  (4.47) 
(3) Based on Table 4-2, compare the optimal price and quantity,  
//∗ '(8 + ') − '
-"$% + 2(4 + ')"/ − 8"02(8 + ') − 12 (' + "/ − "0)= '(−'"$% + "/ + "0)2(8 + ') < 0 
/0∗  
'(8 + ') + '(4 + ')"$% + 4"/ + 4"02(8 + ') − 14 (3' + "/ + "0)= '(−8 − ' + 2(4 + ')"$% − "/ − "0)4(8 + ')  
 
If !!"!"# < "$% < *"#"!!"!"*"-# , #('*'#"-(+"#)!$%'!!'!")+(*"#) < 0; 
If *"#"!!"!"*"-# < "$% < 1, #(*"#'-(+"#)!$%"!!"!")+(*"#) > 0. 
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.0∗  
−(2 + ')('"$% − "/ − "0)(−1 + ')'(8 + ') − s−−' + "/ + "04' t= −(−1 + ')(8 + ') − 4(2 + ')"$% + (11 + ')("/ + "0)4(−1 + ')(8 + ')  
If !!"!"# < "$% < '('("#)(*"#)"((("#)(!!"!")+(-"#) , '*"A#"##"+(-"#)!$%'((("#)!!'((("#)!"+('("#)(*"#) < 0; 
If '('("#)(*"#)"((("#)(!!"!")+(-"#) < "$% < 1, '*"A#"##"+(-"#)!$%'((("#)!!'((("#)!"+('("#)(*"#) >0. 
 
 
Proof of PROPOSITION 4-12.  
(1) For the logistics vendor’s maximized profits, compare Equation (4.41) and (4.20),  Z 7∗$%@ (/$% , //) −Z 7(//)∗$%G= 14 + (−8 + (9 − 2')')"$%-4(−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')') − (−2 + ')-("/ + "0)-4(−1 + ')'(8 + (−5 + ')')− (−' + "/ + "0)-8'+ "$%((1 − ')(8 + (−5 + ')') + (−2 + ')-"/ + (−2 + ')-"0)2(−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')')  
It is concave in "$%, therefore, when the first-order-condition  h(∏ 7∗$%> (/$% , //) − ∏ 7(//)∗$%G )h"$%= −(−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')') + (−8 + (9 − 2')')"$% + (−2 + ')-"/ + (−2 + ')-"02(−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')')= 0 
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"$% = −(−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')') + (−2 + ')-("/ + "0)8 + '(−9 + 2')  
There is the minimum value of  
Z 7∗$%@ (/$% , //) −Z 7(//)∗$%G = (−' + "/ + "0)-8(8 + '(−9 + 2')) > 0 
(2) For the traditional manufacturer’s maximized profits, compare Equation (4.40) and 
(4.19)  Z 5∗$%@ (/0) −Z 5(/0)∗$%G= 2(−2 + ')'"$%-(−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')')- + 2(−2 + ')"/-(−1 + ')'(8 + (−5 + ')')-+ 4(−2 + ')"/"0(−1 + ')'(8 + (−5 + ')')- + 2(−2 + ')"0-(−1 + ')'(8 + (−5 + ')')-− (−' + "/ + "0)-16' + "$%(− 4(−2 + ')"/(−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')')-− 4(−2 + ')"0(−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')')-) 
It is also concave in "$%, therefore, when the first-order-condition  h(∏ 5∗$%@ (/0) − ∏ 5(/0)∗$%G )h"$% = 4(−2 + ')('"$% − "/ − "0)(−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')')- = 0 "$% = "/ + "0'  
There is the minimum value of  
Z 5∗$%@ (/$% , //) −Z 5(/$% , //)∗$%G = −(−' + "/ + "0)-16' < 0 
Then, if ∏ 5∗$%@ (/$% , //) − ∏ 5(/$% , //)∗$%G = 0, 
"$%( = "/ + "0' + √2(8 + (−5 + ')')(' − "/ − "0)J(−2 + ')(−1 + ')8(−2 + ')'  
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"$%- = "/ + "0' − √2(8 + (−5 + ')')(' − "/ − "0)J(−2 + ')(−1 + ')8(−2 + ')'  
Here, "$%( < !!"!"# < "$%- < 1. Because "$% > !!"!"# , therefore,  
o#u	 "/ + "0' < "$% < "$%-,Z 5∗$%@ (/$% , //) −Z 5(/$% , //)∗$%G < 0;#u	"$%- < "$% < 1,Z 5∗$%> (/$% , //) −Z 5(/$% , //)∗$%G > 0.  (4.48) 
(3) Based on Table 4-2, compare the optimal price and quantity under Stackelberg-
equilibrium,  
//∗ '(8 + (−5 + ')') − '
-"$% + (8 + (−4 + ')')"/ − (−4 + ')(−2 + ')"02(8 + (−5 + ')')− 12 (' + "/ − "0) = '(−'"$% + "/ + "0)2(8 + (−5 + ')') < 0 
/0∗  
'(8 + (−5 + ')') − (−4 + ')'"$% + (−2 + ')-("/ + "0)2(8 + (−5 + ')') − 14 (3' + "/ + "0)= '(−8 − (−5 + ')' − 2(−4 + ')"$% + (−3 + ')("/ + "0))4(8 + (−5 + ')')  
If !!"!"# < "$% < '*'(',"#)#"('$"#)(!!"!")-('+"#) , #('*'(',"#)#'-('+"#)!$%"('$"#)(!!"!"))+(*"(',"#)#) < 0; 
If '*'(',"#)#"('$"#)(!!"!")-('+"#) < "$% < 1, #('*'(',"#)#'-('+"#)!$%"('$"#)(!!"!"))+(*"(',"#)#) >0. 
 
.0∗  
−(2 + ')('"$% − "/ − "0)(−1 + ')'(8 + ') − s−−' + "/ + "04' t
= 4'(−' + "/ ++"0) + 4(−2 + ')('"$% − "/ − "0)(−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')') + "04'(−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')')  
If !!"!"# < "$% < − '('("#)(*"(',"#)#)"('$"#)#(!!"!")+('-"#) , +#('#"!!""!")")(?#U@)(@V$%?V!?V")(?'U@)(ZU(?TU@)@) "!"+#('("#)(*"(',"#)#) < 0; 
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If − '('("#)(*"(',"#)#)"('$"#)#(!!"!")+('-"#) < "$% < 1, +#('#"!!""!")")(?#U@)(@V$%?V!?V")(?'U@)(ZU(?TU@)@) "!"+#('("#)(*"(',"#)#) > 0. 
 
Proof of PROPOSITION 4-13.  
Compare the optimal decisions and maximized profits between the decentralized Bertrand 
and Stackelberg 3DP enabled market. 
(1) For the logistics vendor’s maximized profits, compare Equation (4.29) and    (4.41), 
Z 7∗$%> (/$% , //) −Z 7∗$%@ (/$% , //) = (−8 + '-)('"$% − "/ − "0)-4(−1 + ')(8 + ')(8 − 5' + '-) > 0 
(2) For the traditional manufacturer’s maximized profits, compare Equation (4.28) and 
(4.40), 
Z 5∗$%> (/0) −Z 5∗$%@ (/0)= −'=−64 + '(46 + (−5 + ')(−1 + ')')@(−'"$% + "/ + "0)-(−1 + ')(8 + ')-(8 + (−5 + ')')- < 0 
(3) Based on Table 4-2, compare the optimal price and quantity under Stackelberg-
equilibrium,  
//∗ 
'(8 + ') − '-"$% + 2(4 + ')"/ − 8"02(8 + ')− '(8 + (−5 + ')') − '-"$% + (8 + (−4 + ')')"/ − (−4 + ')(−2 + ')"02(8 + (−5 + ')')= − (−6 + ')'-('"$% − "/ − "0)2(8 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')') > 0 
/0∗  
'(8 + ') + '(4 + ')"$% + 4"/ + 4"02(8 + ')− '(8 + (−5 + ')') − (−4 + ')'"$% + (−2 + ')-"/ + (−2 + ')-"02(8 + (−5 + ')')= '(−8 + '-)('"$% − "/ − "0)2(8 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')') < 0 
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/$%∗  
8 + ' + (8 + 3')"$% − 2"/ − 2"02(8 + ')− 8 + (−5 + ')' + (8 − 3')"$% + (−2 + ')"/ + (−2 + ')"02(8 + (−5 + ')')= '(−4 + 3')('"$% − "/ − "0)2(8 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')') < 0 
.0∗  −
(2 + ')('"$% − "/ − "0)(−1 + ')'(8 + ') − (−2 + ')('"$% − "/ − "0)(−1 + ')'(8 + (−5 + ')')= − (4 + (−2 + ')')('"$% − "/ − "0)(−1 + ')(8 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')') > 0 
 
.$%∗  
−8 + 7' + '- − (−8 + ' + '-)"$% − 6"/ − 6"02(−1 + ')(8 + ')− (−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')') + (8 + (−7 + ')')"$% − 6"/ − 6"0 − (−5 + ')'("/ + "0)2(−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')')= − (−4 + ')'(1 + ')('"$% − "/ − "0)2(−1 + ')(8 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')') < 0 
Proof of PROPOSITION 4-14.  
(1) Because the optimal decisions in decentralized Bertrand and Stackelberg are the 
same, thus, to assessing the supply chain profitability, compare Equation (4.34) or 
(4.46) with (4.21),  Z 9:∗$% (/0 , /$% , //) −Z 9:(/0 , /$% , //)∗$%G= − 1 − '4(−1 + ') − "$%-4(−1 + ') − ("/ + "0)-4(−1 + ')' − 3(−' + "/ + "0)-16'+ "$%(1 − ' + "/ + "0)2(−1 + ')  
which is also concave in "$%, therefore, when the first-order-condition  h(∏ 9:∗$% (/0 , /$% , //) − ∏ 9:(/0 , /$% , //)∗$%G )h"$% = 1 − ' − "$% + "/ + "02(−1 + ') = 0 "$% = 1 − ' + "/ + "0 
There is the minimum value of  
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Z 7∗$% (/$% , //) −Z 7(//)∗$%G = −3(−32 + ' + 4'-)(−' + "/ + "0)-16(8 + ')- > 0 
(2) Based on Table 4-2, compare the optimal price and quantity of the supply chain 
equilibrium scenario,  /0∗  12 (' + "/ + "0) − 14 (3' + "/ + "0) = 14 (−' + "/ + "0) < 0 
.0∗  
−'"$% + "/ + "02(−1 + ')' − s−−' + "/ + "04' t= ' − '- + "/ + "0 + '(−2"$% + "/ + "0)4(−1 + ')'  
If !!"!"# < "$% < '('("#)#"(("#)(!!"!")-# , #'##"!!"!""#('-!$%"!!"!")+('("#)# < 0; 
If '('("#)#"(("#)(!!"!")-# < "$% < 1, #'##"!!"!""#('-!$%"!!"!")+('("#)# > 0. 
 
 
Proof of PROPOSITION 4-15.  
(1) Compare the optimal decisions of the full 3DP system with the decentralized 
traditional manufacturing system, 
 Z 7∗J$% (/$% , //) −Z 7(//)∗$%G% = 14 (−1 + "$%)- − (−' + "/ + "0)-8'   
Which is concave in "$%, therefore, the first-order-condition is   h(∏ 7∗J$% (/$% , //) − ∏ 7(//)∗$%G% )h"$% = 12 (−1 + "$%) = 0 "$% = 1 
So, the minimum value is  
 Z 7∗J$% (/$% , //) −Z 7(//)∗$%G% = −(−' + "/ + "0)-8' < 0  
Therefore, set ∏ 7∗J$% (/$% , //) − ∏ 7(//)∗M0% = 0 
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"$%( = 12 (2 + √2(−' + "/ + "0)√' ) "$%- = 12 (2 + √2(' − "/ − "0)√' ) 
Here, "$%- < !!"!"# < 1 < "$%(, therefore, 
o#u	0 < "$% < "$%-,Z 7∗J$% (/$% , //) −Z 7(//)∗$%G% > 0;#u	"$%- < "$% < "/ + "0' ,Z 7∗J$% (/$% , //) −Z 7(//)∗$%G% < 0.  
  
(2) Compare the optimal decisions of the full 3DP system with the integrated traditional 
manufacturing system, 
 
Z 9:∗J$% (/$% , //) −Z 9:(//)∗$%GI= 14 ((−1 + "$%)- − (−' + "/ + "0)-' )  
Which is concave in "$%, therefore, the first-order-condition is   h(∏ 9:∗J$% (/$% , //) − ∏ 9:(//)∗$%GI )h"$% = 12 (−1 + "$%) = 0 "$% = 1 
So, the minimum value is  
 Z 9:∗J$% (/$% , //) −Z 9:(//)∗$%GI = −(−' + "/ + "0)-4' < 0  
Therefore, set ∏ 7∗J$% (/$% , //) − ∏ 7(//)∗$%GI = 0 "$%( = 1 + ' − "/ − "0√'  "$%- = 1 − −' + "/ + "0√'  
Here, "$%( < !!"!"# < 1 < "$%-, therefore,  
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o#u	0 < "$% < "$%(,Z 9:∗J$% (/$% , //) −Z 9:(//)∗M0I > 0;#u	"$%( < "$% < "/ + "0' ,Z 9:∗J$% (/$% , //) −Z 9:(//)∗M0I < 0.  
Proof of PROPOSITION 4-16. In pervious decentralized Bertrand-equilibrium 3DP 
manufacturing system, set the Equation (4.27) .$%∗ = 0,  
 .$%∗ = −8 + 7' + '- − (−8 + ' + '-)"$% − 6"/ − 6"02(−1 + ')(8 + ') = 0  
 "$% = (−1 + ')(8 + ') − 6"/ − 6"0−8 + ' + '-   
Then, the Equation (4.23), (4.24), (4.25) and (4.26) can be rewritten as  
 /(:$%∗ ;<,/>)∗ = (−4 + '-)"/ + (−4 + ')(' − "0)−8 + ' + '-  (4.49) 
 /(:$%∗ ;<,0>)∗ = '(−6 + '(2 + ')) − (2 + ')("/ + "0)−8 + ' + '-  (4.50) 
 /(:$%∗ ;<,$%>)∗ = −8 − '(3 + 2') + (2 + ')("/ + "0)−8 + ' + '-  (4.51) 
 .(:$%∗ ;<,0>)∗ = −(2 + ')(' − "/ − "0)'(−8 + ' + '-)  (4.52) 
where 0 < "/ + "0 < ' < 1. 
The new profit functions for the traditional manufacturer and the logistics vendor are 
 
Z 5(/0)∗(:$%∗ ;<,>) = (/0 − "0 − //).0= −(−1 + ')(2 + ')-(−' + "/ + "0)-'(−8 + ' + '-)-  (4.53) 
 
Z 7(/$% , //)∗(:$%∗ ;<,>) = (// − "/).0= −(−4 + ')(2 + ')(−' + "/ + "0)-'(−8 + ' + '-)-  (4.54) 
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Use the same approach as the proof of PROPOSITION 4-16, after set .$%∗ = 0 in Equation 
(4.39), the optimal decisions for the new Nash-Stackelberg equilibrium are 
 /(:$%∗ ;<,/@)∗ = (4 − 3')"/ + (−2 + ')-(' − "0)8 + (−7 + ')'  (4.55) 
 /(:$%∗ ;<,0@)∗ = '(6 + (−6 + ')') − (−2 + ')"/ − (−2 + ')"08 + (−7 + ')'  (4.56) 
 /(:$%∗ ;<,$%@)∗ = 8 + '(−9 + 2') − (−2 + ')"/ − (−2 + ')"08 + (−7 + ')'  (4.57) 
 .(:$%∗ ;<,0@)∗ = −(−2 + ')(' − "/ − "0)'(8 + (−7 + ')')  (4.58) 
where 0 < "/ + "0 < ' < 1. 
The maximized profits for both the manufacturer and logistics vendor are 
 Z 5(/0)∗(:$%∗ ;<,>) = 2(−2 + ')(−1 + ')(−' + "/ + "0)-'(8 + (−7 + ')')-  (4.59) 
 Z 7(/$% , //)∗(:$%∗ ;<,>) = −(−2 + ')$(−' + "/ + "0)-'(8 + (−7 + ')')-  (4.60) 
The optimal decisions for the integrated Bertrand and Stackelberg manufacturing system 
are the same. Therefore, under the Nash-equilibrium, after set .$%∗ = 0 in Equation (4.45), 
the optimal decisions are 
 /(:$%∗ ;<,0@B)∗ = 12 (' + "/ + "0) (4.61) 
 /(:$%∗ ;<,$%@B)∗ = 12 (2 − ' + "/ + "0) (4.62) 
 .(:$%∗ ;<,0@B)∗ = −−' + "/ + "02'  (4.63) 
where 0 < "/ + "0 < ' < 1. 
The maximized profits for both the manufacturer and logistics vendor are 
 Z 9:(/2, /$%)∗(:$%∗ ;<) = (−' + "/ + "0)-4'  (4.64) 
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Proof of PROPOSITION 3-17. Under the Bertrand decentralized system, according to 
Equation (4.49), (4.50), (4.51), and (4.52),  
h/(:$%∗ ;<,/>)∗h"0 = 4 − '−8 + ' + '- < 0 h/(:$%∗ ;<,0>)∗ h"/ = −4 + '-−8 + ' + '- < 0 h/(:$%∗ ;<,0>)∗ h"0 = − 2 + '−8 + ' + '- > 0 h/(:$%∗ ;<,0>)∗ h"/ = − 2 + '−8 + ' + '- > 0 h/(:$%∗ ;<,$%>)∗ h"0 = − 2 + '−8 + ' + '- > 0 h/(:$%∗ ;<,$%>)∗ h"/ = − 2 + '−8 + ' + '- > 0 h.(:$%∗ ;<,0>)∗ h"0 = 2 + ''(−8 + ' + '-) < 0 h.(:$%∗ ;<,0>)∗ h"/ = 2 + ''(−8 + ' + '-) < 0 
For the Stackelberg decentralized system, based on Equation (4.55), (4.56), (4.57) and 
(4.58),  
h/(:$%∗ ;<,/@)∗h"0 = 4 − '−8 + ' + '- < 0 h/(:$%∗ ;<,/@)∗ h"/ = 4 − '−8 + ' + '- < 0 h/(:$%∗ ;<,0@)∗ h"0 = 2 − '8 + (−7 + ')' > 0 h/(:$%∗ ;<,0@)∗ h"/ = 2 − '8 + (−7 + ')' > 0 h/(:$%∗ ;<,$%@)∗ h"0 = 2 − '8 + (−7 + ')' > 0 h/(:$%∗ ;<,$%@)∗ h"/ = 2 − '8 + (−7 + ')' > 0 h.(:$%∗ ;<,0@)∗ h"0 = −2 + ''(8 + (−7 + ')') < 0 h.(:$%∗ ;<,0@)∗ h"/ = −2 + ''(8 + (−7 + ')') < 0 
For the 3DP enabled integrated supply chain, according to Equation (4.61), (4.62), and 
(4.63), h/(:$%∗ ;<,0@B)∗ h"0 = 12 > 0 h/(:$%∗ ;<,0@B)∗ h"/ = 12 > 0 h/(:$%∗ ;<,$%@B)∗ h"0 = 12 > 0 h/(:$%∗ ;<,$%@B)∗ h"/ = 12 > 0 h.(:$%∗ ;<,0@B)∗ h"0 = − 12' < 0 h.(:$%∗ ;<,0@B)∗ h"/ = − 12' < 0 
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Under decentralized Bertrand supply chain, from Equation (4.53) and (4.54), it is easy to 
find out that 
(1)  ∏ 5(/2)∗(:$%∗ ;<,>)  is concave in "0, therefore, when  h∏ 5(/2)∗(:$%∗ ;<,>)h"0 = −2(−1 + ')(2 + ')-(−' + "/ + "0)'(−8 + ' + '-)- = 0 "0∗ = ' − "/ 
gives the minimum value. However, because '"$% > "/ + "0, therefore, ∏ 5(/2)∗(:$%∗ ;<,>)  
is decreasing in "0;  
(2) ∏ 5(/2)∗(:$%∗ ;<,>)  is concave in "/, therefore, when  h∏ 5(/2)∗(:$%∗ ;<,>)h"/ = −2(−1 + ')(2 + ')-(−' + "/ + "0)'(−8 + ' + '-)- = 0 "/∗ = ' − "0 
gives the minimum value. However, because '"$% > "/ + "0, therefore, ∏ 5(/2)∗(:$%∗ ;<,>)  
is decreasing in "/; 
(3) ∏ 7(/$% , //)∗(:$%∗ ;<,>)  is concave in "0, therefore, when  h∏ 7(/$% , //)∗(:$%∗ ;<,>)h"0 = −2(−2 + ')$(−' + "/ + "0)'(8 + (−7 + ')')- = 0 "0∗ = ' − "/ 
gives the minimum value. However, because '"$% > "/ + "0, therefore, ∏ 7(/$% , //)∗(:$%∗ ;<,>)  is decreasing in "0;  
(4) ∏ 7(/$% , //)∗(:$%∗ ;<,>)  is concave in "/, therefore, when  
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h∏ 7(/$% , //)∗(:$%∗ ;<,>)h"/ = −2(−4 + ')(2 + ')(−' + "/ + "0)'(−8 + ' + '-)- = 0 "/∗ = ' − "0 
gives the minimum value. However, because '"$% > "/ + "0, thus, ∏ 7(/$% , //)∗(:$%∗ ;<,>)  
is decreasing in "/. 
Under decentralized Stackelberg supply chain, based on Equation (4.59) and (4.60),  
(1)  ∏ 5(/2)∗(:$%∗ ;<,@)  is concave in "0, therefore, when  h∏ 5(/2)∗(:$%∗ ;<,@)h"0 = −2(−1 + ')(2 + ')-(−' + "/ + "0)'(−8 + ' + '-)- = 0 "0∗ = ' − "/ 
gives the minimum value. However, because '"$% > "/ + "0, therefore, ∏ 5(/2)∗(:$%∗ ;<,@)  
is decreasing in "0;  
(2) ∏ 5(/2)∗(:$%∗ ;<,@)  is concave in "/, therefore, when  h∏ 5(/2)∗(:$%∗ ;<,@)h"/ = −2(−1 + ')(2 + ')-(−' + "/ + "0)'(−8 + ' + '-)- = 0 "/∗ = ' − "0 
gives the minimum value. However, because '"$% > "/ + "0, therefore, ∏ 5(/2)∗(:$%∗ ;<,@)  
is decreasing in "/; 
(3) ∏ 7(/$% , //)∗(:$%∗ ;<,@)  is concave in "0, therefore, when  h∏ 7(/$% , //)∗(:$%∗ ;<,@)h"0 = 4(−2 + ')(−1 + ')(−' + "/ + "0)'(8 + (−7 + ')')- = 0 "0∗ = ' − "/ 
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gives the minimum value. However, because '"$% > "/ + "0, therefore, ∏ 7(/$% , //)∗(:$%∗ ;<,@)  is decreasing in "0;  
(4) ∏ 7(/$% , //)∗(:$%∗ ;<,@)  is concave in "/, therefore, when  h∏ 7(/$% , //)∗(:$%∗ ;<,@)h"/ = 4(−2 + ')(−1 + ')(−' + "/ + "0)'(8 + (−7 + ')')- = 0 "/∗ = ' − "0 
gives the minimum value. However, because '"$% > "/ + "0, thus, ∏ 7(/$% , //)∗(:$%∗ ;<,@)  
is decreasing in "/. 
For the integrated supply chain, based on Equation (4.64),  
(1) ∏ 9:(/2, /$%)∗(:$%∗ ;<)  is concave in "0, therefore, when  h∏ 9:(/2, /$%)∗(:$%∗ ;<)h"0 = −' + "/ + "02' = 0 "0∗ = ' − "/ 
gives the minimum value. However, because '"$% > "/ + "0, therefore, ∏ 9:(/2, /$%)∗(:$%∗ ;<)  is decreasing in "0;  
(2) ∏ 5(/2)∗(:$%∗ ;<,@)  is concave in "/, therefore, when  h∏ 9:(/2, /$%)∗(:$%∗ ;<)h"/ = −' + "/ + "02' = 0 "/∗ = ' − "0 
gives the minimum value. However, because '"$% > "/ + "0, therefore, ∏ 9:(/2, /$%)∗(:$%∗ ;<)  is decreasing in "/. 
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Proof of PROPOSITION 4-19. Under the Bertrand decentralized market, by comparing 
the optimal and maximized profits with the benchmark traditional manufacturing system, 
(1) For the logistics vendor’s maximized profits,  Z 7(/$% , //)∗(:$%∗ ;<,>) −Z 7(//)∗$%G
= −i−32 + '=−7 + '(2 + ')@j (−' + "/ + "0)-8(−8 + ' + '-)- > 0 
(2) For the traditional manufacturer’s maximized profits,  
Z 5(/2)∗(:$%∗ ;<,>) −Z 5(/0)∗$%G = −(−16 + '(33 + '(18 + ')))(−' + "/ + "0)-16(−8 + ' + '-)-  
Therefore,  
⎩⎪⎨
⎪⎧#u	 − (−16 + '(33 + '(18 + ')))16(−8 + ' + '-)- > 0,Z 5(/2)∗C:$%∗ ;<,>E −Z 5(/0)∗$%G > 0;	#u	 − (−16 + '(33 + '(18 + ')))16(−8 + ' + '-)- < 0,Z 5(/2)∗C:$%∗ ;<,>E −Z 5(/0)∗$%G < 0.   
Then, set − ('(?"#($$"#((*"#)))(?('*"#"##)# = 0, 
' = −6 + 25=−109 + 12#√26@( $⁄ + =−109 + 12#√26@( $⁄ ≈ −15.855 ' = −6 − 25=1 + #√3@2=−109 + 12#√26@( $⁄ − 12 =1 − #√3@=−109 + 12#√26@( $⁄ ≈ −2.542 ' = −6 − 25(1 − #√3)2(−109 + 12#√26)( $⁄ − 12 (1 + #√3)(−109 + 12#√26)( $⁄ ≈ 0.396989 
Therefore, the value of − ('(?"#($$"#((*"#)))(?('*"#"##)#  can be simulated as below 
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Because 0< ' < 1, 
if0 < ' < −6 − -,C('D√$E-C'(<."(-D√-?E' $⁄ − (- =1 + #√3@=−109 + 12#√26@( $⁄ , ∏ 5(/2)∗C:$%∗ ;<,>E −∏ 5(/0)∗$%G > 0; 
if−6 − -,C('D√$E-C'(<."(-D√-?E' $⁄ − (- =1 + #√3@=−109 + 12#√26@( $⁄ < ' < 1,  ∏ 5(/2)∗C:$%∗ ;<,>E −∏ 5(/0)∗$%G < 0. 
(3) Based on Table 4-2, compare the optimal price and quantity,  
//∗ (−4 + '-)"/ + (−4 + ')(' − "0)−8 + ' + '- − 12 (' + "/ − "0)= −(−1 + ')'(' − "/ − "0)2(−8 + ' + '-) < 0 
/0∗  '(−6 + '(2 + ')) − (2 + ')"/ − (2 + ')"0−8 + ' + '- − 14 (3' + "/ + "0)= '(5 + ')(' − "/ − "0)4(−8 + ' + '-) < 0 .0∗  −(2 + ')(' − "/ − "0)'(−8 + ' + '-) − s−−' + "/ + "04' t = − (5 + ')(' − "/ − "0)4(−8 + ' + '-) > 0 
-20 -15 -10 -5 
-0.10
-0.05
0.05
0.10
- (-16+ (33+ (18+)))
16 -8++2 2
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Under the Stackelberg decentralized market, by comparing the optimal and maximized 
profits with the benchmark traditional manufacturing system, 
(1) For the logistics vendor’s maximized profits,  Z 7(/$% , //)∗(:$%∗ ;<,@) −Z 7(//)∗$%G= −(−16 + '(17 + (−6 + ')'))(−' + "/ + "0)-8(8 + (−7 + ')')- > 0 
(2) For the traditional manufacturer’s maximized profits,  Z 5(/2)∗(:$%∗ ;<,@) −Z 5(/0)∗$%G= −(−16 + (−11 + ')(−3 + ')')(−' + "/ + "0)-16(8 + (−7 + ')')-  
Therefore,  
⎩⎪⎨
⎪⎧#u	 − (−16 + (−11 + ')(−3 + ')')16(8 + (−7 + ')')- > 0,Z 5(/2)∗C:$%∗ ;<,@E −Z 5(/0)∗$%G > 0;	#u	 − (−16 + (−11 + ')(−3 + ')')16(8 + (−7 + ')')- < 0,Z 5(/2)∗C:$%∗ ;<,@E −Z 5(/0)∗$%G < 0.   
Then, set − ('(?"('(("#)('$"#)#)(?(*"('A"#)#)# = 0, 
' = 13 (14 + 97(881 + 24#√237)( $⁄ + (881 + 24#√237)( $⁄ ) ≈ 11.1751 ' = 143 − 97(1 + #√3)6(881 + 24#√237)( $⁄ − 16 (1 − #√3)(881 + 24#√237)( $⁄ ≈ 2.16291 ' = 143 − 97(1 − #√3)6(881 + 24#√237)( $⁄ − 16 (1 + #√3)(881 + 24#√237)( $⁄ ≈ 0.661956 
Therefore, the value of − ('(?"('(("#)('$"#)#)(?(*"('A"#)#)#  can be simulated as below 
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Because 0< ' < 1, 
if0 < ' < (+$ − .A(('D√$)?(**("-+D√-$A)' $⁄ − (? (1 + #√3)(881 + 24#√237)( $⁄ , ∏ 5(/2)∗C:$%∗ ;<,@E −∏ 5(/0)∗$%G > 0; 
if(+$ − .A(('D√$)?(**("-+D√-$A)' $⁄ − (? (1 + #√3)(881 + 24#√237)( $⁄ < ' < 1,  ∏ 5(/2)∗C:$%∗ ;<,@E −∏ 5(/0)∗$%G < 0. 
(3) Based on Table 4-2, compare the optimal price and quantity,  
//∗ (−4 + '-)"/ + (−4 + ')(' − "0)−8 + ' + '- − 12 (' + "/ − "0)= − (−1 + ')'(' − "/ − "0)2(−8 + ' + '-) < 0 
/0∗  '(6 + (−6 + ')') − (−2 + ')"/ − (−2 + ')"08 + (−7 + ')' − 14 (3' + "/ + "0)= (−3 + ')'(' − "/ − "0)4(8 + (−7 + ')') < 0 .0∗  −(−2 + ')(' − "/ − "0)'(8 + (−7 + ')') − s−−' + "/ + "04' t = − (−3 + ')(' − "/ − "0)4(8 + (−7 + ')') > 0 
2 4 6 8 10 12

-0.10
-0.05
0.05
0.10
- (-16+(-11+) (-3+) )
16 (8+(-7+) )2
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Proof of PROPOSITION 4-20. Under the Bertrand decentralized market, by comparing 
the optimal and maximized profits with the decentralized 3DP enabled supply chain, 
(1) For the logistics vendor’s maximized profits,  Z 7(/$% , //)∗(:$%∗ ;<,>) −Z 7(/$% , //)∗$%>= 14 (−1 − (−8 + '(3 + '))"$%-(−1 + ')(8 + ') + 2"$%((−1 + ')(8 + ') − 4"/ − 4"0)(−1 + ')(8 + ')+ 4("/ + "0)-(−1 + ')'(8 + ') − 4(−4 + ')(2 + ')(−' + "/ + "0)-'(−8 + ' + '-)- ) 
which is convex in "$%, therefore, when the first-order-condition h∏ 7(/$% , //)∗(:$%∗ ;<,>) −∏ 7(/$% , //)∗$%>h"$%= −8 + 7' + '- − (−8 + '(3 + '))"$% − 4"/ − 4"02(−1 + ')(8 + ') = 0 "$%∗ = (−1 + ')(8 + ') − 4("/ + "0)−8 + '(3 + ')  
There is the maximum value of  
Z 7(/$% , //)∗(:$%∗ ;<,>) −Z 7(/$% , //)∗$%> = (−1 + ')(8 + ')(−' + "/ + "0)-(−8 + ' + '-)-=−8 + '(3 + ')@ > 0 
Set ∏ 7(/$% , //)∗(:$%∗ ;<,>) −∏ 7(/$% , //)∗$%> = 0 
"$%( = (−1 + ')(8 + ') − 6("/ + "0)−8 + ' + '-  "$%- = (−1 + ')(8 + ')(−8 + (−1 + ')') − 2(−8 + (−5 + ')')("/ + "0)(−8 + ' + '-)(−8 + '(3 + '))  
It is obvious that !!"!"# < "$%( < "$%- < 1 
If !!"!"# < "$% < ('("#)(*"#)'?(!!"!")'*"#"## ,	∏ 7(/$% , //)∗(:$%∗ ;<,>) −∏ 7(/$% , //)∗$%> < 0; 
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If ('("#)(*"#)'?(!!"!")'*"#"## < "$% < ('("#)(*"#)('*"('("#)#)'-('*"(',"#)#)(!!"!")('*"#"##)('*"#($"#)) , ∏ 7(/$% , //)∗(:$%∗ ;<,>) −∏ 7(/$% , //)∗$%> > 0; 
If ('("#)(*"#)('*"('("#)#)'-('*"(',"#)#)(!!"!")('*"#"##)('*"#($"#)) < "$% < 1,	∏ 7(/$% , //)∗(:$%∗ ;<,>) −∏ 7(/$% , //)∗$%> < 0. 
 
(2) For the traditional manufacturer’s maximized profits,  Z 5(/2)∗(:$%∗ ;<,>) −Z 5(/0)∗$%>= '(2 + ')-"$%-(−1 + ')(8 + ')- + (2 + ')-"/-(−1 + ')'(8 + ')- + 2(2 + ')-"/"0(−1 + ')'(8 + ')-+ (2 + ')-"0-(−1 + ')'(8 + ')- − (−1 + ')(2 + ')-(−' + "/ + "0)-'(−8 + ' + '-)-+ "$%(− 2(2 + ')-"/(−1 + ')(8 + ')- − 2(2 + ')-"0(−1 + ')(8 + ')-) 
which is convex in "$%, therefore, when the first-order-condition 
h∏ 5(/2)∗(:$%∗ ;<,>) −∏ 5(/0)∗$%>h"$% = −2(2 + ')-(−'"$% + "/ + "0)(−1 + ')(8 + ')- = 0 "$%∗ = "/ + "0'  
There is the maximum value of  
Z 5(/2)∗(:$%∗ ;<,>) −Z 5(/0)∗$%> = −(−1 + ')(2 + ')-(−' + "/ + "0)-'(−8 + ' + '-)- > 0 
Set ∏ 5(/2)∗(:$%∗ ;<,>) −∏ 5(/0)∗$%> = 0 
"$%( = (−1 + ')(8 + ') − 6("/ + "0)−8 + ' + '-  "$%- = −(−1 + ')'(8 + ') + 2(−8 + '(4 + '))("/ + "0)'(−8 + ' + '-)  
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It is obvious that "$%- < !!"!"# < "$%( < 1 
If !!"!"# < "$% < ('("#)(*"#)'?(!!"!")'*"#"## ,	∏ 5(/2)∗(:$%∗ ;<,>) −∏ 5(/0)∗$%> > 0; 
If ('("#)(*"#)'?(!!"!")'*"#"## < "$% < 1, ∏ 5(/2)∗(:$%∗ ;<,>) −∏ 5(/0)∗$%> < 0. 
(3) Compare the optimal price and quantity,  
//∗ 
(−4 + '-)"/ + (−4 + ')(' − "0)−8 + ' + '- − '(8 + ') − '-"$% + 2(4 + ')"/ − 8"02(8 + ')= −'2 + '-"$%2(8 + ') − (4 + ')"/8 + '+ (−4 + '-)"/ + (−4 + ')(' − "0)−8 + ' + '- + 4"08 + ' 
If !!"!"# < "$% < ('("#)(*"#)'?(!!"!")'*"#"## ,	('+"##)!!"('+"#)(#'!")'*"#"## −#(*"#)'##!$%"-(+"#)!!'*!"-(*"#) < 0; 
If ('("#)(*"#)'?(!!"!")'*"#"## < "$% < 1, ('+"##)!!"('+"#)(#'!")'*"#"## −#(*"#)'##!$%"-(+"#)!!'*!"-(*"#) > 0. 
 
/0∗  
'(−6 + '(2 + ')) − (2 + ')"/ − (2 + ')"0−8 + ' + '-− '(8 + ') + '(4 + ')"$% + 4"/ + 4"02(8 + ')= −'2 − '(4 + ')"$%2(8 + ') − 2"/8 + ' − 2"08 + '+ '(−6 + '(2 + ')) − (2 + ')"/ − (2 + ')"0−8 + ' + '-  
If !!"!"# < "$% < ('("#)(*"#)'?(!!"!")'*"#"## ,	#('?"#(-"#))'(-"#)!!'(-"#)!"'*"#"## −#(*"#)"#(+"#)!$%"+!!"+!"-(*"#) > 0; 
If ('("#)(*"#)'?(!!"!")'*"#"## < "$% < 1, #('?"#(-"#))'(-"#)!!'(-"#)!"'*"#"## −#(*"#)"#(+"#)!$%"+!!"+!"-(*"#) < 0. 
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/$%∗  
−8 − '(3 + 2') + (2 + ')"/ + (2 + ')"0−8 + ' + '- − 8 + ' + (8 + 3')"$% − 2"/ − 2"02(8 + ')= − 48 + ' − '2(8 + ') − (8 + 3')"$%2(8 + ') + "/8 + ' + "08 + '− 8 − '(3 + 2') + (2 + ')"/ + (2 + ')"0−8 + ' + '-  
If !!"!"# < "$% < ('("#)(*"#)'?(!!"!")'*"#"## ,	− *'#($"-#)"(-"#)!!"(-"#)!"'*"#"## −*"#"(*"$#)!$%'-!!'-!"-(*"#) > 0; 
If ('("#)(*"#)'?(!!"!")'*"#"## < "$% < 1, − *'#($"-#)"(-"#)!!"(-"#)!"'*"#"## −*"#"(*"$#)!$%'-!!'-!"-(*"#) < 0. 
.0∗  
− (2 + ')(' − "/ − "0)'(−8 + ' + '-) − s− (2 + ')('"$% − "/ − "0)(−1 + ')'(8 + ') t= (2 + ')"$%(−1 + ')(8 + ') − (2 + ')"/(−1 + ')'(8 + ') − (2 + ')(' − "/ − "0)'(−8 + ' + '-)− (2 + ')"0(−1 + ')'(8 + ') 
If !!"!"# < "$% < ('("#)(*"#)'?(!!"!")'*"#"## ,	− (-"#)(#'!!'!")#('*"#"##) −i− (-"#)(#!$%'!!'!")('("#)#(*"#) j > 0; 
If ('("#)(*"#)'?(!!"!")'*"#"## < "$% < 1, − (-"#)(#'!!'!")#('*"#"##) − i− (-"#)(#!$%'!!'!")('("#)#(*"#) j < 0. 
(4) For the integrated Bertrand supply chain’s maximized profits, 
Z 9:(/2, /$%)∗(:$%∗ ;<,>) −Z 9:(/2, /$%)∗$%> = (1 − ' − "$% + "/ + "0)-4(−1 + ') < 0 
(5) Compare the optimal price and quantity,  /0∗  12 (' + "/ + "0) − 12 (' + "/ + "0) = 0 
/$%∗  
12 (2 − ' + "/ + "0) − 12 (1 + "$%) = 12 (1 − ' − "$% + "/ + "0) 
If !!"!"# < "$% < 1 − ' + "/ + "0,	(- (1 − ' − "$% + "/ + "0) > 0; 
If 1 − ' + "/ + "0 < "$% < 1,	(- (1 − ' − "$% + "/ + "0) < 0. 
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.0∗  −
−' + "/ + "02' − −'"$% + "/ + "02(−1 + ')' = 1 − ' − "$% + "/ + "02 − 2'  
If !!"!"# < "$% < 1 − ' + "/ + "0,	('#'!$%"!!"!"-'-# > 0; 
If 1 − ' + "/ + "0 < "$% < 1,	('#'!$%"!!"!"-'-# < 0. 
Under the Stackelberg decentralized market, by comparing the optimal and maximized 
profits with the decentralized 3DP enabled supply chain, 
(1) For the logistics vendor’s maximized profits,  Z 7(/$% , //)∗(:$%∗ ;<,@) −Z 7(/$% , //)∗$%@= −14 − (−8 + (9 − 2')')"$%-4(−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')') + (−2 + ')-("/ + "0)-4(−1 + ')'(8 + (−5 + ')')− (−2 + ')$(−' + "/ + "0)-'(8 + (−7 + ')')-− "$%((1 − ')(8 + (−5 + ')') + (−2 + ')-"/ + (−2 + ')-"0)2(−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')')  
which is convex in "$%, therefore, when the first-order-condition h∏ 7(/$% , //)∗(:$%∗ ;<,@) −∏ 7(/$% , //)∗$%@h"$%= −−(−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')') + (−8 + (9 − 2')')"$% + (−2 + ')-"/ + (−2 + ')-"02(−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')')= 0 "$%∗ = −(−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')') + (−2 + ')-("/ + "0)8 + '(−9 + 2')  
There is the maximum value of  
Z 7(/$% , //)∗(:$%∗ ;<,@) −Z 7(/$% , //)∗$%@= −(−2 + ')-(−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')')(−' + "/ + "0)-4(8 + (−7 + ')')-(8 + '(−9 + 2')) > 0 
Set ∏ 7(/$% , //)∗(:$%∗ ;<,@) −∏ 7(/$% , //)∗$%@ = 0 
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"$%( = −(−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')') + (−3 + ')(−2 + ')("/ + "0)8 + (−7 + ')'  "$%- = (−1 + ')(−8 + 5')(8 + (−5 + ')') − (−2 + ')(8 + 3(−3 + ')')("/ + "0)(8 + (−7 + ')')(8 + '(−9 + 2'))  
It is obvious that !!"!"# < "$%( < "$%- < 1 
If !!"!"# < "$% < '('("#)(*"(',"#)#)"('$"#)('-"#)(!!"!")*"('A"#)# ,	∏ 7(/$% , //)∗(:$%∗ ;<,@) −∏ 7(/$% , //)∗$%@ < 0; 
If '('("#)(*"(',"#)#)"('$"#)('-"#)(!!"!")*"('A"#)# < "$% <('("#)('*",#)(*"(',"#)#)'('-"#)(*"$('$"#)#)(!!"!")(*"('A"#)#)(*"#('."-#)) , ∏ 7(/$% , //)∗(:$%∗ ;<,@) −∏ 7(/$% , //)∗$%@ > 0; 
If ('("#)('*",#)(*"(',"#)#)'('-"#)(*"$('$"#)#)(!!"!")(*"('A"#)#)(*"#('."-#)) < "$% < 1,	∏ 7(/$% , //)∗(:$%∗ ;<,@) −∏ 7(/$% , //)∗$%@ < 0. 
(2) For the traditional manufacturer’s maximized profits,  Z 5(/2)∗(:$%∗ ;<,@) −Z 5(/0)∗$%@= − 2(−2 + ')'"$%-(−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')')- − 2(−2 + ')"/-(−1 + ')'(8 + (−5 + ')')-− 4(−2 + ')"/"0(−1 + ')'(8 + (−5 + ')')- − 2(−2 + ')"0-(−1 + ')'(8 + (−5 + ')')-+ 2(−2 + ')(−1 + ')(−' + "/ + "0)-'(8 + (−7 + ')')-+ "$%( 4(−2 + ')"/(−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')')- + 4(−2 + ')"0(−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')')-) 
which is convex in "$%, therefore, when the first-order-condition 
h∏ 5(/2)∗(:$%∗ ;<,@) −∏ 5(/0)∗$%@h"$% = 4(−2 + ')(−'"$% + "/ + "0)(−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')')- = 0 "$%∗ = "/ + "0'  
There is the maximum value of  
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Z 5(/2)∗(:$%∗ ;<,@) −Z 5(/0)∗$%@ = 2(−2 + ')(−1 + ')(−' + "/ + "0)-'(8 + (−7 + ')')- > 0 
Set ∏ 5(/2)∗(:$%∗ ;<,@) −∏ 5(/0)∗$%@ = 0,  
"$%( = −(−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')') + (−3 + ')(−2 + ')("/ + "0)8 + (−7 + ')'  "$%- = (−1 + ')'(8 + (−5 + ')') − (−16 + '(20 + (−7 + ')'))("/ + "0)'(8 + (−7 + ')')  
It is obvious that "$%- < !!"!"# < "$%( < 1. 
If !!"!"# < "$% < '('("#)(*"(',"#)#)"('$"#)('-"#)(!!"!")*"('A"#)# ,	∏ 5(/2)∗(:$%∗ ;<,@) −∏ 5(/0)∗$%@ > 0; 
If '('("#)(*"(',"#)#)"('$"#)('-"#)(!!"!")*"('A"#)# < "$% < 1, ∏ 5(/2)∗(:$%∗ ;<,@) −∏ 5(/0)∗$%@ <0. 
(3) Compare the optimal price and quantity,   
//∗ 
(−4 + '-)"/ + (−4 + ')(' − "0)−8 + ' + '-− '(6 + (−6 + ')') − (−2 + ')"/ − (−2 + ')"08 + (−7 + ')'= −'2 + '-"$%2(8 + (−5 + ')') − (8 + (−4 + ')')"/2(8 + (−5 + ')')+ (−4 + '-)"/ + (−4 + ')(' − "0)−8 + ' + '- + (−4 + ')(−2 + ')"02(8 + (−5 + ')')  
If !!"!"# < "$% < ('("#)(*"(',"#)#)'('+"#)('$"#)(!!"!")'*"#"## ,	('+"##)!!"('+"#)(#'!")'*"#"## −#(?"('?"#)#)'('-"#)!!'('-"#)!"*"('A"#)# < 0; 
If ('("#)(*"(',"#)#)'('+"#)('$"#)(!!"!")'*"#"## < "$% < 1, ('+"##)!!"('+"#)(#'!")'*"#"## −#(?"('?"#)#)'('-"#)!!'('-"#)!"*"('A"#)# > 0. 
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/0∗  
'(6 + (−6 + ')') − (−2 + ')"/ − (−2 + ')"08 + (−7 + ')'− '(8 + (−5 + ')') − (−4 + ')'"$% + (−2 + ')-"/ + (−2 + ')-"02(8 + (−5 + ')')= −'2 + (−4 + ')'"$%2(8 + (−5 + ')') − (−2 + ')-"/2(8 + (−5 + ')') − (−2 + ')-"02(8 + (−5 + ')')+ '(6 + (−6 + ')') − (−2 + ')"/ − (−2 + ')"08 + (−7 + ')'  
If !!"!"# < "$% <'('("#)(*"(',"#)#)"('$"#)('-"#)(!!"!")*"('A"#)# ,	#(?"('?"#)#)'('-"#)!!'('-"#)!"*"('A"#)# −#(*"(',"#)#)'('+"#)#!$%"('-"#)#!!"('-"#)#!"-(*"(',"#)#) > 0; 
If '('("#)(*"(',"#)#)"('$"#)('-"#)(!!"!")*"('A"#)# < "$% < 1, #(?"('?"#)#)'('-"#)!!'('-"#)!"*"('A"#)# − #(*"(',"#)#)'('+"#)#!$%"('-"#)#!!"('-"#)#!"-(*"(',"#)#) <0. 
 
/$%∗  
8 + '(−9 + 2') − (−2 + ')"/ − (−2 + ')"08 + (−7 + ')'− 8 + (−5 + ')' + (8 − 3')"$% + (−2 + ')"/ + (−2 + ')"02(8 + (−5 + ')')= − 48 + (−5 + ')' − (−5 + ')'2(8 + (−5 + ')') + (−8 + 3')"$%2(8 + (−5 + ')')− (−2 + ')"/2(8 + (−5 + ')') − (−2 + ')"02(8 + (−5 + ')')+ 8 + '(−9 + 2') − (−2 + ')"/ − (−2 + ')"08 + (−7 + ')'  
If !!"!"# < "$% <'('("#)(*"(',"#)#)"('$"#)('-"#)(!!"!")*"('A"#)# ,	*"#('."-#)'('-"#)!!'('-"#)!"*"('A"#)# −*"(',"#)#"(*'$#)!$%"('-"#)!!"('-"#)!"-(*"(',"#)#) > 0; 
If '('("#)(*"(',"#)#)"('$"#)('-"#)(!!"!")*"('A"#)# < "$% < 1, *"#('."-#)'('-"#)!!'('-"#)!"*"('A"#)# − *"(',"#)#"(*'$#)!$%"('-"#)!!"('-"#)!"-(*"(',"#)#) < 0. 
  363 
.0∗  
−(−2 + ')(' − "/ − "0)'(8 + (−7 + ')') − (−2 + ')('"$% − "/ − "0)(−1 + ')'(8 + (−5 + ')')= (2 − ')"$%(−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')') − (2 − ')"/(−1 + ')'(8 + (−5 + ')')− (−2 + ')(' − "/ − "0)'(8 + (−7 + ')') − (2 − ')"0(−1 + ')'(8 + (−5 + ')') 
If !!"!"# < "$% < '('("#)(*"(',"#)#)"('$"#)('-"#)(!!"!")*"('A"#)# ,	− ('-"#)(#'!!'!")#(*"('A"#)#) −('-"#)(#!$%'!!'!")('("#)#(*"(',"#)#) > 0; 
If '('("#)(*"(',"#)#)"('$"#)('-"#)(!!"!")*"('A"#)# < "$% < 1, − ('-"#)(#'!!'!")#(*"('A"#)#) −('-"#)(#!$%'!!'!")('("#)#(*"(',"#)#) < 0. 
For the integrated supply chain, there is not difference between Bertrand and Stackelberg, so 
we take Bertrand as the sample for test. First, for the supply chain’s maximized profits, 
Z 9:(/2, /$%)∗(:$%∗ ;<,>) −Z 9:(/2, /$%)∗$%> = (1 − ' − "$% + "/ + "0)-4(−1 + ') < 0 
Second, compare the optimal price and quantity,  
/0∗  12 (' + "/ + "0) − 12 (' + "/ + "0) = 0 
/$%∗  
12 (2 − ' + "/ + "0) − 12 (1 + "$%) = 12 (1 − ' − "$% + "/ + "0) 
If !!"!"# < "$% < 1 − ' + "/ + "0,	(- (1 − ' − "$% + "/ + "0) > 0; 
If 1 − ' + "/ + "0 < "$% < 1,	(- (1 − ' − "$% + "/ + "0) < 0. 
.0∗  −
−' + "/ + "02' − −'"$% + "/ + "02(−1 + ')' = 1 − ' − "$% + "/ + "02 − 2'  
If !!"!"# < "$% < 1 − ' + "/ + "0,	('#'!$%"!!"!"-'-# > 0; 
If 1 − ' + "/ + "0 < "$% < 1,	('#'!$%"!!"!"-'-# < 0. 
Proof of PROPOSITION 4-21. In a decentralized traditional manufacturing system, 
according to Equation (4.13),  
(1) As :9$%G% is concave in "0. Therefore, the first-order-condition  
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h:9$%G%h"0 = 116 (−4 − 3(−2 + ')' − (−2 + ')"/ − (−2 + ')"0) = 0 "0∗ = − 4−2 + ' − 3' − "/ > ' − "/ 
Because "/ + "0 < ' < 1, therefore, :9$%G% decreases in "0. 
(2) :9$%G% is concave in "/, the first-order-condition  h:9$%G%h"/ = 116 (−4 − 3(−2 + ')' − (−2 + ')"/ − (−2 + ')"0) = 0 "/∗ = − 4−2 + ' − 3' − "0 > ' − "0 
Because "/ + "0 < ' < 1, therefore, :9$%G% decreases in "/. 
In an integrated traditional manufacturing system, according to Equation (4.14),  
(1) As :9$%GI is concave in "0. Therefore, the first-order-condition  h:9$%GIh"0 = 14 (−2 − (−2 + ')' − (−2 + ')"/ − (−2 + ')"0) = 0 "0∗ = − 2−2 + ' − ' − "/ > ' − "/ 
Because "/ + "0 < ' < 1, therefore, :9$%GI decreases in "0. 
(2) :9$%GI is concave in "/, the first-order-condition  h:9$%GIh"/ = 14 (−2 − (−2 + ')' − (−2 + ')"/ − (−2 + ')"0) = 0 "/∗ = − 2−2 + ' − ' − "0 > ' − "/ 
Because "/ + "0 < ' < 1, therefore, :9$%GI decreases in "/. 
In a 3DB enabled decentralized Bertrand market, according to Equation (4.15),  
(1) :9$%> is concave in "0. Therefore, the first-order-condition  
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h:9$%>h"0 = 12(8 + ')- (−(8 + ')(3 + 2(−2 + ')') − (8 + '(−13 + 2'(2 + ')))"$%+ (18 − 8')"/ + 2(9 − 4')"0) = 0 "0∗ = −(8 + ')(3 + 2(−2 + ')') − (8 + '(−13 + 2'(2 + ')))"$% + (18 − 8')"/−18 + 8'  
Because "/ + "0 < ' < 1, therefore, 
If '(*"#)($"-('-"#)#)'(*"#('($"-#(-"#)))!$%"((*'*#)!!'(*"*# > ' − "/, that is "$% >'-+"#(+A'-#((<"#))*"#('($"-#(-"#))  , :9$%> decreases in "0; 
If '(*"#)($"-('-"#)#)'(*"#('($"-#(-"#)))!$%"((*'*#)!!'(*"*# < ' − "/, that is "$% <'-+"#(+A'-#((<"#))*"#('($"-#(-"#))  ,  
a) If "0 < '(*"#)($"-('-"#)#)'(*"#('($"-#(-"#)))!$%"((*'*#)!!'(*"*#  :9$%> decreases in "0; 
b) If '(*"#)($"-('-"#)#)'(*"#('($"-#(-"#)))!$%"((*'*#)!!'(*"*# < "0 < ' − "/ , :9$%> 
increases in "0. 
(2) Equation (4.15) :9$%> is concave in "/. Therefore, the first-order-condition  
Therefore, the first-order-condition  h:9$%>h"/ = 12(8 + ')- (−(8 + ')(3 + 2(−2 + ')') − (8 + '(−13 + 2'(2 + ')))"$%+ (18 − 8')"/ + 2(9 − 4')"0) = 0 "/∗ = −(8 + ')(3 + 2(−2 + ')') − (8 + '(−13 + 2'(2 + ')))"$% + (18 − 8')"0−18 + 8'  
Because "/ + "0 < ' < 1, therefore, 
If '(*"#)($"-('-"#)#)'(*"#('($"-#(-"#)))!$%"((*'*#)!"'(*"*# > ' − "0, that is "$% >'-+"#(+A'-#((<"#))*"#('($"-#(-"#))  , :9$%> decreases in "/; 
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If '(*"#)($"-('-"#)#)'(*"#('($"-#(-"#)))!$%"((*'*#)!"'(*"*# < ' − "0, that is "$% <'-+"#(+A'-#((<"#))*"#('($"-#(-"#))  ,  
a) If "/ < '(*"#)($"-('-"#)#)'(*"#('($"-#(-"#)))!$%"((*'*#)!"'(*"*# ,  :9$%> decreases in "/; 
b) If '(*"#)($"-('-"#)#)'(*"#('($"-#(-"#)))!$%"((*'*#)!"'(*"*# < "/ < ' − "0 , :9$%> 
increases in "/. 
(3)  Equation (4.15) :9$%> is concave in "$%. Therefore, the first-order-condition, h:9$%>h"$% = − 14(8 + ')- ((8 + ')(8 + '(11 + '(−6 + '(2 + ')))) + (−64 + '(−48− 41' + 6'$ + '+))"$% + 16"/ + 16"0 + 2'(−13 + 2'(2 + '))("/+ "0)) = 0 "$%∗= −(8 + ')(8 + '(11 + '(−6 + '(2 + ')))) + 2(8 + '(−13 + 2'(2 + ')))("/ + "0)−64 + '(−48 − 41' + 6'$ + '+)> "/ + "0'  
Therefore,  
a) If !!"!"# < "$% < − (*"#)(*"#((("#('?"#(-"#))))"-(*"#('($"-#(-"#)))(!!"!")'?+"#('+*'+(#"?#$"#)) ,  :9$%> 
decreases in "$%; 
b) If − (*"#)(*"#((("#('?"#(-"#))))"-(*"#('($"-#(-"#)))(!!"!")'?+"#('+*'+(#"?#$"#)) < "$% < 1 , :9$%> 
increases in "$%. 
In a 3DB enabled decentralized Stackelberg market, according to Equation (4.16),  
(1) :9$%@ is concave in "0. Therefore, the first-order-condition  h:9$%@h"0 = 14(8 + (−5 + ')')- ((−2 + ')((8 + '(−19 + '(20 + (−8 + ')')))"$% − (3+ (−3 + ')')((−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')') + (−3 + ')(−2 + ')"/ + (−3+ ')(−2 + ')"0))) = 0 
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"0∗ = 1(−3 + ')(−2 + ')(3 + (−3 + ')') ((8 + '(−19 + '(20 + (−8 + ')')))"$%− (3 + (−3 + ')')((−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')') + (−3 + ')(−2 + ')"/)) 
Because "/ + "0 < ' < 1, therefore, 
If (('$"#)('-"#)($"('$"#)#) ((8 + '(−19 + '(20 + (−8 + ')')))"$% − (3 + (−3 +')')((−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')') + (−3 + ')(−2 + ')"/)) > ' − "/, that is  
"$% > ($"('$"#)#)('*"#((."#('(("-#)))*"#('(."#(-<"('*"#)#))  , :9$%@ decreases in "0; 
If (('$"#)('-"#)($"('$"#)#) ((8 + '(−19 + '(20 + (−8 + ')')))"$% − (3 + (−3 +')')((−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')') + (−3 + ')(−2 + ')"/)) > ' − "/, that is 
 "$% < ($"('$"#)#)('*"#((."#('(("-#)))*"#('(."#(-<"('*"#)#))  ,  
a) If "0 < (('$"#)('-"#)($"('$"#)#) ((8 + '(−19 + '(20 + (−8 + ')')))"$% − (3 +(−3 + ')')((−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')') + (−3 + ')(−2 + ')"/)) , :9$%@ 
decreases in "0; 
b) If (('$"#)('-"#)($"('$"#)#) ((8 + '(−19 + '(20 + (−8 + ')')))"$% − (3 +(−3 + ')')((−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')') + (−3 + ')(−2 + ')"/)) < "0 < ' −"/, :9$%@ increases in "0. 
(2) Equation (4.16) :9$%@ is concave in "/. Therefore, the first-order-condition  
Therefore, the first-order-condition  h:9$%@h"/ = 14(8 + (−5 + ')')- ((−2 + ')((8 + '(−19 + '(20 + (−8 + ')')))"$% − (3+ (−3 + ')')((−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')') + (−3 + ')(−2 + ')"/ + (−3+ ')(−2 + ')"0))) = 0 
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"/∗ = 1(−3 + ')(−2 + ')(3 + (−3 + ')') ((8 + '(−19 + '(20 + (−8 + ')')))"$%− (3 + (−3 + ')')((−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')') + (−3 + ')(−2 + ')"0)) 
Because "/ + "0 < ' < 1, therefore, 
If (('$"#)('-"#)($"('$"#)#) ((8 + '(−19 + '(20 + (−8 + ')')))"$% − (3 + (−3 +')')((−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')') + (−3 + ')(−2 + ')"0)) > ' − "/, that is  
"$% > ($"('$"#)#)('*"#((."#('(("-#)))*"#('(."#(-<"('*"#)#))  , :9$%@ decreases in "0; 
If (('$"#)('-"#)($"('$"#)#) ((8 + '(−19 + '(20 + (−8 + ')')))"$% − (3 + (−3 +')')((−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')') + (−3 + ')(−2 + ')"0)) > ' − "/, that is 
 "$% < ($"('$"#)#)('*"#((."#('(("-#)))*"#('(."#(-<"('*"#)#))  ,  
a) If "/ < (('$"#)('-"#)($"('$"#)#) ((8 + '(−19 + '(20 + (−8 + ')')))"$% − (3 +(−3 + ')')((−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')') + (−3 + ')(−2 + ')"0)) , :9$%@ 
decreases in "0; 
b) If (('$"#)('-"#)($"('$"#)#) ((8 + '(−19 + '(20 + (−8 + ')')))"$% − (3 +(−3 + ')')((−1 + ')(8 + (−5 + ')') + (−3 + ')(−2 + ')"0)) < "/ < ' −"/, :9$%@ increases in "0. 
(3) Equation (4.16) :9$%@ is concave in "$%. Therefore, the first-order-condition, h:9$%@h"$% = 14(8 + (−5 + ')')- ((8 + (−5 + ')')(−8 + (−1 + ')'(5 + (−5 + ')'))− (−64 + '(48 + '(−41 + '(32 + (−10 + ')'))))"$% − 16"/ − 16"0+ '(46 + '(−59 + '(36 + (−10 + ')')))("/ + "0)) = 0 
  369 
"$%∗ = 1−64 + '(48 + '(−41 + '(32 + (−10 + ')'))) ((8 + (−5 + ')')(−8 + (−1+ ')'(5 + (−5 + ')')) + (−2 + ')(8 + '(−19 + '(20 + (−8+ ')')))("/ + "0)) > "/ + "0'  
Therefore,  
a) If !!"!"# < "$% < ('?+"#(+*"#('+("#($-"('(<"#)#))) ((8 + (−5 + ')')(−8 + (−1 +')'(5 + (−5 + ')')) + (−2 + ')(8 + '(−19 + '(20 + (−8 + ')')))("/ +"0)),  :9$%@ decreases in "$%; 
b) If ('?+"#(+*"#('+("#($-"('(<"#)#))) ((8 + (−5 + ')')(−8 + (−1 + ')'(5 +(−5 + ')')) + (−2 + ')(8 + '(−19 + '(20 + (−8 + ')')))("/ + "0)) <"$% < 1, :9$%@ increases in "$%. 
In a 3DB enabled integrated market, according to Equation (4.17),  
(1) :9$% is concave in "0. Therefore, the first-order-condition  h:9$%h"0 = 14 (−2 − (−2 + ')' − (−2 + ')"/ − (−2 + ')"0) = 0 "0∗ = − 2−2 + ' − ' − "/ > ' − "/ 
Because "/ + "0 < ' < 1, therefore, :9$% decrases in "0. 
(2) :9$% is concave in "/. Therefore, the first-order-condition  
Therefore, the first-order-condition  h:9$%h"/ = 14 (−2 − (−2 + ')' − (−2 + ')"/ − (−2 + ')"0) = 0 "/∗ = − 2−2 + ' − ' − "0 > ' − "0 
Because "/ + "0 < ' < 1, therefore, :9$% decrases in "/. 
(3) :9$%  is concave in "$%. Therefore, the first-order-condition, 
  370 
h:9$%h"$% = 14 (−1 + "$%) = 0 "$%∗ = 1 "$% < 1, therefore, :9$% decrases in "$%. 
Proof of PROPOSITION 4-24. 
In the decentralized Bertrand market,  
:9$%> − :9$%G%= 132(8 + ')- ((8 + ')-(4 + '(8 + 5(−2 + ')')) − 4(−64 + '(−48− 41' + 6'$ + '+))"$%- + 128"/ + 128"0 + ("/ + "0)(2'(−88 + '(4+ '(26 + 3'))) + (16 + (−2 + ')'(16 + '))"/ + (16 + (−2 + ')'(16+ '))"0) − 8"$%((8 + ')(8 + '(11 + '(−6 + '(2 + ')))) + 2(8+ '(−13 + 2'(2 + ')))"/ + 2(8 + '(−13 + 2'(2 + ')))"0)) 
 
which is concave in "$%, therefore, when the first-order-condition  h(:9$%> − :9$%G%)h"$% = − 14(8 + ')- ((8 + ')(8 + '(11 + '(−6 + '(2 + ')))) + (−64+ '(−48 − 41' + 6'$ + '+))"$% + 16"/ + 16"0 + 2'(−13 + 2'(2+ '))("/ + "0)) = 0 "$%= (8 + ')(8 + '(11 + '(−6 + '(2 + ')))) + 2(8 + '(−13 + 2'(2 + ')))("/ + "0)−64 + '(−48 − 41' + 6'$ + '+)  
There is the minimum value of  
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:9$%> − :9$%G%= 132(−64 + '(−48 − 41' + 6'$ + '+)) ('('(192 + '(−568 + '(578+ '(−161 + 3'(−28 + 3'(4 + ')))))) + (−2 + ')(16 + '(5 + ')(−5+ ' + '-))"/- + 2"/(32 + '(−148 + '(198 + '(−67 + '(−32 + 3'(4+ '))))) + (−2 + ')(16 + '(5 + ')(−5 + ' + '-))"0) + "0(64+ 2'(−148 + '(198 + '(−67 + '(−32 + 3'(4 + '))))) + (−2+ ')(16 + '(5 + ')(−5 + ' + '-))"0))) < 0 
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Then, if !"!"# − !"!"$" = 0,  &!"# = 12(−64 + -(−48 − 41- + 6-! + -%)) 0−4(8 + -(−13 + 2-(2 + -)))&& − 4(8 + -(−13 + 2-(2 + -)))&' + (8+ -)(8(−2 + √( 1(8 + -)( -(-(192 + -(−568 + -(578 + -(−161 + 3-(−28 + 3-(4 + -)))))) + (−2 + -)(16+ -(5 + -)(−5 + - + -())&&( + 2&&(32 + -(−148 + -(198 + -(−67 + -(−32 + 3-(4 + -))))) + (−2 + -)(16+ -(5 + -)(−5 + - + -())&') + &'(64 + 2-(−148 + -(198 + -(−67 + -(−32 + 3-(4 + -))))) + (−2+ -)(16 + -(5 + -)(−5 + - + -())&')))) + -(−22 − 2-(−6 + -(2 + -)) + √( 1(8 + -)( -(-(192 + -(−568+ -(578 + -(−161 + 3-(−28 + 3-(4 + -)))))) + (−2 + -)(16 + -(5 + -)(−5 + - + -())&&( + 2&&(32+ -(−148 + -(198 + -(−67 + -(−32 + 3-(4 + -))))) + (−2 + -)(16 + -(5 + -)(−5 + - + -())&') + &'(64+ 2-(−148 + -(198 + -(−67 + -(−32 + 3-(4 + -))))) + (−2 + -)(16 + -(5 + -)(−5 + - + -())&')))))6 
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&!"#( = 12(−64 + -(−48 − 41- + 6-! + -%)) 0(4(8 + -(−13 + 2-(2 + -)))&& + 4(8 + -(−13 + 2-(2 + -)))&' + (8+ -)(8(2 + √( 1(8 + -)( -(-(192 + -(−568 + -(578 + -(−161 + 3-(−28 + 3-(4 + -)))))) + (−2 + -)(16+ -(5 + -)(−5 + - + -())&&( + 2&&(32 + -(−148 + -(198 + -(−67 + -(−32 + 3-(4 + -))))) + (−2 + -)(16+ -(5 + -)(−5 + - + -())&') + &'(64 + 2-(−148 + -(198 + -(−67 + -(−32 + 3-(4 + -))))) + (−2+ -)(16 + -(5 + -)(−5 + - + -())&')))) + -(22 + 2-(−6 + -(2 + -)) + √( 1(8 + -)( -(-(192 + -(−568+ -(578 + -(−161 + 3-(−28 + 3-(4 + -)))))) + (−2 + -)(16 + -(5 + -)(−5 + - + -())&&( + 2&&(32+ -(−148 + -(198 + -(−67 + -(−32 + 3-(4 + -))))) + (−2 + -)(16 + -(5 + -)(−5 + - + -())&') + &'(64+ 2-(−148 + -(198 + -(−67 + -(−32 + 3-(4 + -))))) + (−2 + -)(16 + -(5 + -)(−5 + - + -())&')))))6 
Here,  &!"#( < )!*)"+ < &!"# < 1, therefore,  89:	 && + &'- < &!" < &!"# , !"!"# − !"!"$" < 0;9:	&!"# < &!" < 1, !"!"# − !"!"$" > 0.  
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In the decentralized Stackelberg market,  
!"!"# − !"!"$"= 132 ((−4 + 3+ + ,% + ,&)(+(−2 + 3+) + (−2 + +),% + (−2 + +),&)+ 1(8 + (−5 + +)+)' 4((8 + (−5 + +)+ + (−8 + 3+),!" − (−2 + +),%− (−2 + +),&)' − 2(+(8 + (−5 + +)+) − (−4 + +)+,!" + (−2 + +)',%+ (−2 + +)',&)((−4 + +)+,!" − (−2 + +)(8 + (−5 + +)+ + (−2+ +),% + (−2 + +),&)) + +(4(8 + (−5 + +)+)'− (+(8 + (−5 + +)+) − (−4 + +)+,!" + (−2 + +)',%+ (−2 + +)',&)'))) 
 
which is concave in ,!", therefore, when the first-order-condition  0(!"!"# − !"!"$")0,!" = 14(8 + (−5 + +)+)' ((8 + (−5 + +)+)(−8 + (−1 + +)+(5 + (−5+ +)+)) − (−64 + +(48 + +(−41 + +(32 + (−10 + +)+)))),!" − 16,%− 16,& + +(46 + +(−59 + +(36 + (−10 + +)+)))(,% + ,&)) = 0 ,!" = 1−64 + +(48 + +(−41 + +(32 + (−10 + +)+))) ((8 + (−5 + +)+)(−8 + (−1+ +)+(5 + (−5 + +)+)) + (−2 + +)(8 + +(−19 + +(20 + (−8+ +)+))),% + (−2 + +)(8 + +(−19 + +(20 + (−8 + +)+))),&) 
There is the minimum value of  
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!"!"# − !"!"$"= 132(−64 + +(−48 − 41+ + 6+! + +()) (+(+(192 + +(−568 + +(578+ +(−161 + 3+(−28 + 3+(4 + +)))))) + (−2 + +)(16 + +(5 + +)(−5+ + + +')),%' + 2,%(32 + +(−148 + +(198 + +(−67 + +(−32 + 3+(4+ +))))) + (−2 + +)(16 + +(5 + +)(−5 + + + +')),&) + ,&(64+ 2+(−148 + +(198 + +(−67 + +(−32 + 3+(4 + +))))) + (−2+ +)(16 + +(5 + +)(−5 + + + +')),&))) < 0 
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Then, if !"!"# − !"!"$" = 0,  &!"# = 12(−64 + -(48 + -(−41 + -(32 + (−10 + -)-)))) 12(−2 + -)(8 + -(−19 + -(20 + (−8 + -)-)))&% + 2(−2 + -)(8+ -(−19 + -(20 + (−8 + -)-)))&& + (−5 + -)-(16 + (−5 + -)-)√( 1(8 + (−5 + -)-)' -(-(320 + -(−1016+ -(1442 + -(−1121 + 3-(164 + 3(−12 + -)-))))) + (−2 + -)(−16 + -(−25 + -(32 + (−10 + -)-)))&%'+ 2&%(−32 + -(−84 + -(294 + -(−323 + -(160 + 3(−12 + -)-)))) + (−2 + -)(−16 + -(−25 + -(32+ (−10 + -)-)))&&) + &&(−64 + 2-(−84 + -(294 + -(−323 + -(160 + 3(−12 + -)-)))) + (−2 + -)(−16+ -(−25 + -(32 + (−10 + -)-)))&&))) + 2(-'(97 + -(−103 + -(48 + (−11 + -)-))) + 32(−2+ √( 1(8 + (−5 + -)-)' -(-(320 + -(−1016 + -(1442 + -(−1121 + 3-(164 + 3(−12 + -)-))))) + (−2+ -)(−16 + -(−25 + -(32 + (−10 + -)-)))&%' + 2&%(−32 + -(−84 + -(294 + -(−323 + -(160 + 3(−12+ -)-)))) + (−2 + -)(−16 + -(−25 + -(32 + (−10 + -)-)))&&) + &&(−64 + 2-(−84 + -(294 + -(−323+ -(160 + 3(−12 + -)-)))) + (−2 + -)(−16 + -(−25 + -(32 + (−10 + -)-)))&&)))))6 
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&!"#' = 12(−64 + -(48 + -(−41 + -(32 + (−10 + -)-)))) 12(−2 + -)(8 + -(−19 + -(20 + (−8 + -)-)))&% + 2(−2 + -)(8+ -(−19 + -(20 + (−8 + -)-)))&& − (−5 + -)-(16 + (−5 + -)-)√( 1(8 + (−5 + -)-)' -(-(320 + -(−1016+ -(1442 + -(−1121 + 3-(164 + 3(−12 + -)-))))) + (−2 + -)(−16 + -(−25 + -(32 + (−10 + -)-)))&%'+ 2&%(−32 + -(−84 + -(294 + -(−323 + -(160 + 3(−12 + -)-)))) + (−2 + -)(−16 + -(−25 + -(32+ (−10 + -)-)))&&) + &&(−64 + 2-(−84 + -(294 + -(−323 + -(160 + 3(−12 + -)-)))) + (−2 + -)(−16+ -(−25 + -(32 + (−10 + -)-)))&&))) + 2(-'(97 + -(−103 + -(48 + (−11 + -)-))) − 32(2+ √( 1(8 + (−5 + -)-)' -(-(320 + -(−1016 + -(1442 + -(−1121 + 3-(164 + 3(−12 + -)-))))) + (−2+ -)(−16 + -(−25 + -(32 + (−10 + -)-)))&%' + 2&%(−32 + -(−84 + -(294 + -(−323 + -(160 + 3(−12+ -)-)))) + (−2 + -)(−16 + -(−25 + -(32 + (−10 + -)-)))&&) + &&(−64 + 2-(−84 + -(294 + -(−323+ -(160 + 3(−12 + -)-)))) + (−2 + -)(−16 + -(−25 + -(32 + (−10 + -)-)))&&)))))6 
Here,  (!)("* < &!"# < 1 < &!"#', therefore, 89	 (!)("* < &!" < &!"#, !"!"# − !"!"$" > 0; 	89	&!"# < &!" < 1, !"!"# − !"!"$" < 0. 
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In the decentralized 3DP enabled market,  
!"!"# − !"!"$= − 18(8 + ))%(8 + (−5 + ))))% )(),!" − ,& − ,')((512 + )(512+ )(−712 + )(10 + )(119 + )(−20 + (−4 + ))))))))),!" + (−4+ )))(280 + )(−13 + )(−32 + )(10 + )))))(,& + ,') + 2((8 + ))(8+ (−5 + ))))(−20 + )(19 + )(−6 + (−2 + )))))) + 448,& + 448,')) 
 
which is convex in ,!", therefore, when the first-order-condition  4(!"!"$ − !"!"(")4,!" = 14(8 + ))%(8 + (−5 + ))))% )(−)(8 + ))(8 + (−5 + ))))(−20+ )(19 + )(−6 + (−2 + )))))) + 256,& + 256,' + )(−(512 + )(512+ )(−712 + )(10 + )(119 + )(−20 + (−4 + ))))))))),!" − (192+ )(−204 + )(161 + )(−2 + )(−26 + 5))))))(,& + ,'))) = 0 ,!" = 1)(512 + )(512 + )(−712 + )(10 + )(119 + )(−20 + (−4 + ))))))))) (−)(8+ ))(8 + (−5 + ))))(−20 + )(19 + )(−6 + (−2 + )))))) + (256+ )(−192 + )(204 + )(−161 + )(2 + (26 − 5)))))))),& + (256+ )(−192 + )(204 + )(−161 + )(2 + (26 − 5)))))))),') 
There is the maximum value of  
!"!"# − !"!"($= 18(512 + )(512 + )(−712 + )(10 + )(119 + )(−20 + (−4 + ))))))))) ()(−20+ )(19 + )(−6 + (−2 + )))))) + (4 + )(13 + (−4 + )))(2 + )))),& + (4 + )(13+ (−4 + )))(2 + )))),')% > 0 
Therefore, set !"!"# − !"!"($ = 0, 
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,!") = ,& + ,')  
,!"% = 1512 + )(512 + )(−712 + )(10 + )(119 + )(−20 + (−4 + )))))))) (2(8+ ))(8 + (−5 + ))))(−20 + )(19 + )(−6 + (−2 + )))))) + (896+ (−4 + )))(280 + )(−13 + )(−32 + )(10 + )))))),& + (896 + (−4+ )))(280 + )(−13 + )(−32 + )(10 + )))))),') 
Here, *!+*", = ,!") < 1 < ,!"%, so when *!+*", < ,!") < 1, !"!"# − !"!"($ > 0. 
In the Integrated market,  
!"!" − !"!"(- = 18 (−1 + ,!")% > 0 
Proof of PROPOSITION 4-25. 
In the decentralized market,  
!".!" − !"!"("= 132 (4(−1 + ,!")% + (−4 + 3) + ,& + ,')()(−2 + 3)) + (−2 + )),&+ (−2 + )),')) 
 
which is concave in ,!", therefore, when the first-order-condition  4(!".!" − !"!"(")4,!" = 14 (−1 + ,!") = 0 ,!" = 1 
There is the minimum value of  
!".!" − !"!"(" = 132 (−4 + 3) + ,& + ,')()(−2 + 3)) + (−2 + )),& + (−2 + )),') 
Set !".!" − !"!"(" = 0, 
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,!") = 1 − 128−(−4 + 3) + ,& + ,')()(−2 + 3)) + (−2 + )),& + (−2 + )),') ,!"% = 12 (2 + 8−(−4 + 3) + ,& + ,')()(−2 + 3)) + (−2 + )),& + (−2 + )),')) 
To ensure  −(−4 + 3) + ,& + ,')()(−2 + 3)) + (−2 + )),& + (−2 + )),') > 0, then 
the minimum value of  !".!" − !"!"(" < 0.  Because ,!") < *!+*", < 1 < ,!"%,  9:;	0 < ,!" < ,!"#), !".!" − !"!"(" > 0;:;	,!"#) < ,!" < ,& + ,') , !".!" − !"!"(" < 0. 
In the integrated market,  
!".!" − !"!"(-= 18 ((−1 + ,!")% + (−2 + ) + ,& + ,')()% + (−2 + )),& + (−2+ )),')) 
 
which is concave in ,!", therefore, when the first-order-condition  4(!".!" − !"!"(-)4,!" = 14 (−1 + ,!") = 0 ,!" = 1 
There is the minimum value of  
!".!" − !"!"(- = 18 (−2 + ) + ,& + ,')()% + (−2 + )),& + (−2 + )),') 
Set !".!" − !"!"(- = 0,  ,!") = 1 − 8−(−2 + ) + ,& + ,')()% + (−2 + )),& + (−2 + )),') ,!"% = 1 + 8−(−2 + ) + ,& + ,')()% + (−2 + )),& + (−2 + )),') 
To ensure −(−2 + ) + ,& + ,')()% + (−2 + )),& + (−2 + )),') > 0, then the 
minimum value of  !".!" − !"!"(- > 0, therefore, !".!" − !"!"(-. 
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Appendix C-1: Proofs of Chapter 5 
Proof of PROPOSITION 5-1.  
(1) According to Equation (5.1) and Equation (5.2), the first-order-conditions and the 
second-order-conditions of ∏ @(A')!"  and ∏ B(A!"& , A&)!"  in Equation (5.3) and 
Equation (5.4),  
⎩⎪⎨
⎪⎧ 4∏ @(A')!"&4A' = G' + )A!/0 + A& − 2A' + H') − )% 	4 ∏ B(A!"& , A&)!"&4A!"& = 1 − ) − ,& + G!" − 2A!/0 + A& + A' + H!"1 − )  
⎩⎪⎨
⎪⎧4∏ @(A')%!"&4A'% = 2(−1 + ))) < 04∏ B(A!" , A&)%!"&4A!"% = 2−1 + ) < 0 
So, the solution to the first-order-conditions gives the unique maximizer.  
⎩⎪⎨
⎪⎧ 4∏ @(A')!"&4A' = G' + )A!"& + A& − 2A' + H') − )% = 0	4∏ B(A!" , A&)!"&4A!" = 1 − ) − ,& + G!" − 2A!/0 + A& + A' + H!"1 − ) = 0 
IA'∗ =	 (−1 + ))) + ),& − 2G' − 2A& − )(G!" + A& + H!") − 2H'−4 + )A!"∗ = 2 − 2) − 2,& + 2G!" + G' + 3A& + 2H!" + H'4 − )  
Then, the logistics vendor’s profit function (5.4) can be updated as 
 
J B(A!"& , A&)!"& = 1(−4 + ))%(−1 + ))) ()((−2 + )),& − (−2 + ))G!" − G' + A&+ 2(−1 + ) + H!") − )(A& + H!") − H')(2 − 2) − 2,& + (−2+ ))G!" + G' + 3A& + (−2 + ))H!" + H') + (−4 + ))(,&− A&)((−1 + ))) + ),& + 2G' + 2A& + 2H' − )(G!" + G' + 2A&+ H!" + H'))) 
(5.26) 
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which is convex in A&, so the first-order-conditions of Equation (5.26) gives the maximum 
profit. 4∏ B(A!"& , A&)!"& 4A&= )(8 + )) + 2(4 + )),& − 8G' − 16A& − )(2A& + )(G!" + H!")) − 8H'(−4 + ))%) = 0 A&∗ = )(8 + )) + 2(4 + )),& − 8G' − )%(G!" + H!") − 8H'2(8 + ))  
The final optimal decisions are 
 A&∗ = )(8 + )) + 2(4 + )),& − 8G' − )%(G!" + H!") − 8H'2(8 + ))  (5.27). 
 A'∗ = )(8 + )) + 4,& + 4G' + )(4 + ))(G!" + H!") + 4H'2(8 + ))  (5.28) 
 A!"&∗ = 8 + ) − 2,& + (8 + 3))G!" − 2G' + (8 + 3))H!" − 2H'2(8 + )) 	 (5.29) 
 K'∗ = (2 + ))(,& + G' − )(G!" + H!") + H')(−1 + )))(8 + ))  (5.30) 
 
K!"&∗= −−(−1 + ))(8 + )) + 6,& + (−8 + ) + )%)G!" + 6G' + (−8 + ) + )%)H!" + 6H'2(−1 + ))(8 + ))  (5.31) 
The maximized profits are 
 J @(A')∗!"&# = −(2 + ))%(,& + G' − )(G!" + H!") + H')%(−1 + )))(8 + ))%  (5.32) 
 
J B∗!"&# (A!"& , A&)= 14(−1 + ))(8 + ))% (−(8 + ) − 2,& + (−8 + ))G!" − 2G'+ (−8 + ))H!" − 2H')(−(−1 + ))(8 + )) + 6,& + (−8 + )+ )%)G!" + 6G' + (−8 + ) + )%)H!" + 6H')+ 1) (2(2 + ))(−,& − G' + )(G!" + H!") − H')(−)(8 + )) + 8,&+ 8G' + )%(G!" + H!") + 8H'))) 
(5.33) 
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(2)  Using the same methodology as in Bertrand, this model uses the backward induction 
to find out the Nash equilibrium of ∏ B(A!"& , A&)!"&  and ∏ @(A')!"& . 
To do so, first, it is easy to find out that ∏ B(A!"& , A&)!"&  is convex in A!"&. So, the first-
order-conditions of ∏ B(A!"& , A&)!"&  in Equation (5.4) gives the maximizer,  4∏ B(A!"& , A&)!"&4A!"& = 1 − ) − ,& + G!" − 2A!/0 + A& + A' + H!"1 − ) = 0 A!"∗ = 12 (1 − ) − ,& + G!" + A& + A' + H!") 
Then, the ∏ @(A')!"&  can be updated as  
J @(A')!"& 	= (−A' + 12)(1 − ) − ,& + G!" + A& + A' + H!"))(G' + A& − A' + H')(−1 + )))  
which is also convex in A', so the first-order-condition of ∏ @(A')!"&  archives the 
maximized value. 4∏ @(A')!"&4A'= (−1 + ))) − 2G' − 2A& + 4A' − 2H' + )(,& − G!" + G' − 2A' − H!" + H')2(−1 + ))) = 0 A2∗ = (−1 + ))) − 2G' − 2A& − 2H' + )(,& − G!" + G' − H!" + H')2(−2 + ))  A!"&∗  updates as  
A!"&∗ = − 14(−2 + )) (4 − 5) + )% + (−4 + )),& − (−4 + ))G!" + 2G' + 6A& + 2H'− )(G' + 2A& + (−5 + 2))H!" + H')) 
The ∏ B(A!"& , A&)!"&  can be rewritten as  
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J B(A!"& , A&)!"& = 11 − ) (− 116(−2 + ))% (4 − 5) + )% + (4 − 3)),& + (−4 + 3))G!"+ 2G' − 2A& + )(−G' + 2A& + (−3 + 2))H!" − H') + 2H')(−4 + 5)− )% − (−4 + )),& + (4 − 3))G!" − 2G' − 6A& + 8H!" − 2H' + )(G'+ 2A& + (−9 + 2))H!" + H'))+ 14) ((,& − A&)((−1 + ))) + ),& + 2G' + 2A& + 2H' − )(G!" + G'+ 2A& + (−1 + 2))H!" + H')))) 
and it is convex in A&, so the first-order-conditions gives the maximizer 4∏ B(A!"& , A&)!"& 4A& = 14(−2 + ))%) ()(8 + (−5 + )))) + (8 + (−4 + )))),& − 8G' − 16A&− 8H' − )()(G!" + G' + 2A& + H!" + H') − 2(3G' + 5A& + 3H'))) = 0 A&∗ = 12(8 + (−5 + )))) ()(8 + (−5 + )))) + (8 + (−4 + )))),& − 8G' − 8H'− )(−6(G' + H') + )(G!" + G' + H!" + H'))) 
Therefore, the final optimal decisions are 
A&∗ = 12(8 + (−5 + )))) ()(8 + (−5 + )))) + (8 + (−4 + )))),& − 8G'− 8H' − )(−6(G' + H') + )(G!" + G' + H!" + H'))) (5.34) A'∗ = 12(8 + (−5 + )))) ()(8 + (−5 + )))) + (−2 + ))%,& + 4G' − (−4+ )))(G!" − G' + H!" − H') + 4H') (5.35) A!"&∗ = 12(8 + (−5 + ))))	(8 + (−5 + ))) + (−2 + )),& + (8 − 3))G!"− 2G' − 2H' + )(G' + (10 + (−6 + ))))H!" + H')) (5.36) K'∗ = − 12(−1 + )))(8 + (−5 + )))) (2(−2 + )),& − 4(G' + H') + )(−2(−2+ ))G!" + 2G' + (−4 + )(11 + (−6 + )))))H!" + 2H')) (5.37) 
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K!"&∗ = 12(−1 + ))(8 + (−5 + )))) ((−1 + ))(8 + (−5 + )))) − (−3+ ))(−2 + )),& + (8 + (−7 + ))))G!" + (−3 + ))(−2+ ))(−G' + )H!") − 6H' − (−5 + )))H') (5.38) 
The maximized profits are J @(A')∗!"&$ = 1(−1 + )))(8 + (−5 + ))))% ((,& + G' − )(G!" + H!")+ H')(2(−2 + )),& − 4(G' + H') + )(−2(−2 + ))G!" + 2G'+ (−4 + )(11 + (−6 + )))))H!" + 2H'))) 
(5.39) 
J B(A!"& , A&)∗!"&$ = 14(−1 + ))(8 + (−5 + ))))% (((−1 + ))(8 + (−5 + ))))− (−3 + ))(−2 + )),& + (8 + (−7 + ))))G!" + (−3 + ))(−2+ ))(−G' + )H!") − 6H' − (−5 + )))H')(8 + (−5 + )))+ (−2 + )),& + (−8 + (7 − 2))))G!" − 2G' − 16H!" − 2H'+ )(G' + (20 + (−8 + ))))H!" + H')) + 1) (2(−2 + )),&− 4(G' + H') + )(−2(−2 + ))G!" + 2G' + (−4 + )(11 + (−6+ )))))H!" + 2H'))(−)(8 + (−5 + )))) + (−4 + ))(−2+ )),& + 8G' + 8H' + )(−6(G' + H') + )(G!" + G' + H!"+ H')))) 
(5.40) 
(3) The first-order-conditions and the second-order-conditions of ∏ "!(A' , A!" , A&)!"#  
in Equation (5.5) are 
⎩⎪⎨
⎪⎧ 4∏ "!(A' , A!"&)!"&# 4A' = −,& + G' − 2A' − )(G!" − 2A!/0 + H!") + H'(−1 + ))) 	4∏ "!(A' , A!"&)!"&#4A!"& = −1 + ) + ,& − G!" + G' + 2A!/0 − 2A' − H!" + H'−1 + )  
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⎩⎪⎪
⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪
⎧4∏ "!(A' , A!")%!"# 4A'% = 2(−1 + ))) < 04∏ "!(A' , A!")%!"#4A!"% = 2−1 + ) < 04∏ "!(A' , A!")%!"#4A'4A!" = − 2−1 + ) > 04∏ "!(A' , A!")%!"#4A!"4A' = − 2−1 + ) > 0
 
So, the determinant of the Hessian Matrix can be written as 
L = MM 2(−1 + ))) − 2−1 + )− 2−1 + ) 2−1 + ) MM =
2(−1 + ))) × O 2−1 + )P − O− 2−1 + )P% = 4(1 − )))
> 0 
Therefore, this Hessian Matrix is a negative-definite matrix, the solution to the first-order-
conditions gives the unique maximizer of ∏ "!(A' , A!"&)!"&# . 
⎩⎪⎨
⎪⎧ 4∏ "!(A' , A!"&)!"&# 4A' = −,& + G' − 2A' − )(G!" − 2A!/0 + H!") + H'(−1 + ))) = 04∏ "!(A' , A!"&)!"&#4A!"& = −1 + ) + ,& − G!" + G' + 2A!/0 − 2A' − H!" + H'−1 + ) = 0 
 A'∗ = 12 () + ,& + G' + H') (5.41) 
 A!"&∗ = 12 (1 + G!" + H!") (5.42) 
So,  
 K'∗ =	,& + G' − )(G!" + H!") + H'2(−1 + )))  (5.43) 
 K!"&∗ = 1 − ) + ,& − G!" + G' − H!" + H'2 − 2)  (5.44) 
 
J "!∗!"&# (A!"& , A&)= 14(−1 + ))) (−)(−1 + G!" + H!")(−1 + ) − ,& + G!" − G'+ H!" − H') + () − ,& − G' − H')(,& + G' − )(G!" + H!") + H')) 
(5.45) 
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Proof of PROPOSITION 5-2.  
(1) According to Table 5-2, the first-order-conditions and the second-order-conditions of ∏ @(A' , A3.)3.  and ∏ B(A!"& , A&)3.  in Equation (5.6) and Equation (5.7) 4∏ @(A' , A3.)3. 	4A' = )(G45 + A& − 2A45) − Q(G' + A& − 2A' + H' − )H45))() − Q)  4∏ @(A' , A3.)3. 	4A3. = 1(−1 + Q)(−) + Q) (−(−1 + Q)G' + (−1 + ))G45 − 2A' + )(A!/0+ A& − 2A45) + 2A45 + H' − Q(A!/0 + A& − 2A' + H' + H45 − )H45)) 
 4∏ B(A!"& , A&)3.4A!"& = 1 − Q − ,& + G!" − 2A!/0 + A& + A45 + H!"1 − Q  4∏ @(A' , A3.)%!" 4A'% = 2Q)% − )Q < 0 4∏ @(A' , A3.)%!" 4A3.% = 2O 1) − Q + 1−1 + QP < 0 4∏ B(A!"& , A&)%!"4A!"&% = 2−1 + Q < 0 
the solution to the first-order-conditions gives the unique maximizer.  
A'∗ =	 18 − 2Q (2) − 2)Q − 2),& + 2)G!" − (−4 + Q)G' + )G45 + 4A& + 3)A&− QA& + 2)H!" + 4H' − QH' + )QH45) A3.∗ =	 (−1 + Q)Q + Q,& − 2G45 − 2A& − Q(G!" + A& + H!" + 2H45)−4 + Q  A!"&∗ =	2 − 2Q − 2,& + 2G!" + G45 + 3A& + 2H!" + QH454 − Q  
Then, the logistics vendor’s profit function (5.7) can be updated as 
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J B(A!"& , A&)3. = 12(−4 + Q)%(−1 + Q) (1) (−4 + Q)(,& − A&)(2)(−1 + Q) + 2),&− 2)G!" + (−4 + Q)(−1 + Q)G' + 3)G45 − )QG45 + 4A& + )A& − 5QA&− )QA& + Q%A& − 2)H!" + 4H' − 5QH' + Q%H' − )(−3 + Q)QH45)+ 2(2 − 2Q − 2,& + (−2 + Q)G!" + G45 + 3A& + (−2 + Q)H!"+ QH45)((−2 + Q),& − (−2 + Q)G!" − G45 + A& + 2(−1 + Q + H!")− Q(A& + H!" + H45))) 
which is convex in A&, so the first-order-conditions of Equation (5.7) gives the maximum 
profit. 4∏ B(A!"& , A&)3. 4A& = 12)(−4 + Q)% ((−)(−12 + Q) + (−4 + Q)%),& − 2)QG!" + 8QG'− Q%G' − 8)G45 + )QG45 − 20)A& + 16QA& + 2)QA& − 2Q%A&− 2)QH!" + 2()(8 + Q) − 8G' − 16A& − 8H') + 8QH' − Q%H'+ )(−8 + Q)QH45) = 0 A&∗ = 12)(−10 + Q) − 2(−4 + Q)% (()(−12 + Q) − (−4 + Q)%),& + 2)QG!" + 8)G45− 2()(8 + Q) − 8G' − 8H') + Q((−8 + Q)G' + (−8 + Q)H' − )(G45− 2H!" + (−8 + Q)H45))) 
The final optimal decisions are 
A&∗ = 12)(−10 + Q) − 2(−4 + Q)% (()(−12 + Q) − (−4 + Q)%),& + 2)QG!"+ 8)G45 − 2()(8 + Q) − 8G' − 8H') + Q((−8 + Q)G' + (−8+ Q)H' − )(G45 − 2H!" + (−8 + Q)H45))) (5.46) 
 389 
A'∗ = − 14)(−10 + Q) − 4(−4 + Q)% (2)(16 + )(11 − 2Q) + Q(−9 + 2Q))+ (−(−8 + ))) + (−4 + Q)%),& + 2)(8 + 5) − 3Q)G!" + 16G'+ 8)G' − 8QG' + )QG' + Q%G' − )%G45 − )QG45 + 16)H!"+ 10)%H!" − 6)QH!" + 16H' + 8)H' − 8QH' + )QH' + Q%H'− )Q() + Q)H45) 
(5.47) 
A3.∗ = 12)(−10 + Q) − 2(−4 + Q)% (()(−6 + Q) − (−4 + Q)(−2 + Q)),&+ 2Q(−4 − 2) + Q)G!" − 6)G45 + 2(−(−4 + Q)(−1 + Q)Q+ )(−4 + (−6 + Q)Q) + 4G' − 8G45 + 4H') + Q(−(−2 + Q)G'+ (4 + ))G45 + Q(2H!" − H' + (4 + ))H45) − 2(2(2 + ))H!" − H'+ (8 + 3))H45)))	 
(5.48) 
A!"&∗ = 12)(−10 + Q) − 2(−4 + Q)% ((4 + ) − Q),& − 2(8 + 5) − 2Q)G!" + 12G'− 3QG' + (−8 + ))G45 + 2QG45 − 10)H!" + 4QH!" − 3QH'+ 2(−8 − 11) + 2(5 + ))Q − 2Q% − 8H!" + 6H') + Q(−8 + )+ 2Q)H45) 
(5.49) 
K'∗ = 14)()(−10 + Q) − (−4 + Q)%)() − Q) (2)() − Q)(8 + Q) − ()(−12 + Q)− (−4 + Q)%)() − Q),& + 2)Q(−) + Q)G!" − 16)G' − 16QG'− 12)QG' + 8Q%G' + )Q%G' − Q!G' + 32)G45 + 12)%G45− 8)QG45 − )%QG45 + )Q%G45 − 2)%QH!" + 2)Q%H!" − 16)H'− 16QH' − 12)QH' + 8Q%H' + )Q%H' − Q!H' + )Q(4(8 + 3))− (8 + ))Q + Q%)H45) 
(5.50) 
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K3.∗ = 14()(−10 + Q) − (−4 + Q)%)() − Q)(−1 + Q) (()(−13 + Q) − (−5+ Q)(−4 + Q))() − Q),& + 2() − Q)(8 − 2Q + )(5 + Q))G!"− 16)G' + 44QG' + 17)QG' − 13Q%G' − )Q%G' + Q!G'− 4)G45 − 13)%G45 − 24QG45 + 5)QG45 + )%QG45 + 4Q%G45− )Q%G45 + 16)H!" + 10)%H!" − 16QH!" − 14)QH!" + 2)%QH!"+ 4Q%H!" − 2)Q%H!" − 16)H' + 44QH' + 17)QH' − 13Q%H'− )Q%H' + Q!H' − 2((8 + 3) − 2Q)() − Q)(−1 + Q) + 16G'− 16G45 + 16H') + ()%(−13 + Q) + 4(−4 + Q)(−2 + Q) − )(−4+ Q)(−1 + Q))QH45) 
(5.51) 
K!"&∗ = 12(−)(−10 + Q) + (−4 + Q)%)(−1 + Q) (()(−7 + Q) − (−4 + Q)(−3+ Q)),& + 2(8 + 5) − 2(3 + ))Q + Q%)G!" − 4G' + 5QG' − Q%G'− (8 + 7))G45 + 2QG45 + )QG45 + 10)H!" − 12QH!" − 4)QH!"+ 2Q%H!" + 2((8 + 3) − 2Q)(−1 + Q) + 8H!" − 2H') + 5QH'− Q%H' + Q(−8 − 7) + (2 + ))Q)H45) 
(5.52) 
The maximized profits are 
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J @(A' , A3.)∗3.#= − 14()(−10 + Q) − (−4 + Q)%)() − Q) ( 14)()(−10 + Q) − (−4 + Q)%) (2)()− Q)(−11 + 2Q) + ()% − 2)(−8 + Q) + (−4 + Q)%),& + 2)(−8 − 5) + Q)G!"+ 16G' + 32)G' − 8QG' − 5)QG' + Q%G' − 16)G45 + )%G45 + 3)QG45− 16)H!" − 10)%H!" + 2)QH!" + 16H' + 32)H' − 8QH' − 5)QH' + Q%H'+ )Q(−16 + ) + 3Q)H45)(−2)() − Q)(8 + Q) + ()(−12 + Q)− (−4 + Q)%)() − Q),& + 2)() − Q)QG!" + 16)G' + 16QG' + 12)QG'− 8Q%G' − )Q%G' + Q!G' − 32)G45 − 12)%G45 + 8)QG45 + )%QG45− )Q%G45 + 2)%QH!" − 2)Q%H!" + 16)H' + 16QH' + 12)QH' − 8Q%H'− )Q%H' + Q!H' + )Q(−32 + )(−12 + Q) − (−8 + Q)Q)H45)+ 1(−)(−10 + Q) + (−4 + Q)%)(−1 + Q) (()(−13 + Q) − (−5 + Q)(−4+ Q))() − Q),& + 2() − Q)(8 − 2Q + )(5 + Q))G!" − 16)G' + 44QG'+ 17)QG' − 13Q%G' − )Q%G' + Q!G' − 4)G45 − 13)%G45 − 24QG45+ 5)QG45 + )%QG45 + 4Q%G45 − )Q%G45 + 16)H!" + 10)%H!" − 16QH!"− 14)QH!" + 2)%QH!" + 4Q%H!" − 2)Q%H!" − 16)H' + 44QH' + 17)QH'− 13Q%H' − )Q%H' + Q!H' − 2((8 + 3) − 2Q)() − Q)(−1 + Q) + 16G'− 16G45 + 16H') + ()%(−13 + Q) + 4(−4 + Q)(−2 + Q) − )(−4 + Q)(−1+ Q))QH45)(() − Q)(−4 + Q)(−1 + Q) + (4 + 3) − Q),& + Q(−4 − 3)+ Q)G!" − 4G' + 8G45 + 3)G45 − 4H' + Q(−(−5 + Q)G' + (−6 + Q)G45 − (4+ 3))H!" + 5H' + (8 + 3))H45 + Q(H!" − H' + (−6 + Q)H45)))) 
(5.53) 
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J B∗3.# (A!"& , A&)= − 18)(−)(−10 + Q) + (−4 + Q)%)%(−1 + Q) (2)(()(−7 + Q)− (−4 + Q)(−3 + Q)),& + 2(8 + 5) − 2(3 + ))Q + Q%)G!"− 4G' + 5QG' − Q%G' − (8 + 7))G45 + 2QG45 + )QG45+ 10)H!" − 12QH!" − 4)QH!" + 2Q%H!" + 2((8 + 3) − 2Q)(−1+ Q) + 8H!" − 2H') + 5QH' − Q%H' + Q(−8 − 7) + (2+ ))Q)H45)((4 + ) − Q),& + 2(8 + 5) − (6 + ))Q + Q%)G!"+ )(G45 + 10H!") + 2(−8 − 11) + 2(5 + ))Q − 2Q% + 6G'− 4G45 + 8H!" + 6H') + Q(−3G' + 2G45 − 2(6 + ) − Q)H!"− 3H' + (−8 + ) + 2Q)H45)) + (()%(−13 + Q) + (−4 + Q)%(−1+ Q) − 2)(16 + (−11 + Q)Q)),& + 2)(8 − Q(1 + Q) + )(5+ Q))G!" − 16)G' + 24QG' + 17)QG' − 9Q%G' − )Q%G'+ Q!G' − 16)G45 − 13)%G45 + 5)QG45 + )%QG45 − )Q%G45+ 16)H!" + 10)%H!" − 2)QH!" + 2)%QH!" − 2)Q%H!" − 16)H'+ 24QH' + 17)QH' − 9Q%H' − )Q%H' + Q!H' − 2(3)()− Q)(−1 + Q) + 8G' + 8H') + )Q(−16 + )(−13 + Q) − (−5+ Q)Q)H45)(()(−8 + Q) − (−4 + Q)%),& − 2)QG!" − 8)G45+ 2()(8 + Q) − 8G' − 8H') + Q(−(−8 + Q)G' − (−8 + Q)H'+ )(G45 − 2H!" + (−8 + Q)H45)))) 
(5.54) 
(2) The first-order-conditions and the second-order-conditions of ∏ B(A!"& , A&)3.  in 
Equation (5.7) 4∏ B(A!"& , A&)3.4A!"& = 1 − Q − ,& + G!" − 2A!/0 + A& + A45 + H!"1 − Q  4∏ B(A!"& , A&)%!"4A!"&% = 2−1 + Q < 0 ∏ B(A!"& , A&)3.  is convex in A!"&, the solution to the first-order-conditions gives the 
unique maximizer.  
A!"&∗ =	12 (1 − Q − ,& + G!" + A& + A45 + H!") 
Then, the ∏ @(A' , A3.)3.  can be updated as  
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J @(A' , A3.)3. 	= − (QA' − )A45)(G' + A& − A' + H'))() − Q) + (−A' + A45) − Q+ 1 − Q − ,& + G!" + A& − A45 + H!"2 − 2Q )(−G45 − A& + A45 − QH45) 
Next, the traditional manufacturer sets the price of the TM and TF product synchronically, 
the first and the second order condition of ∏ @(A' , A3.)3.  are 4∏ @(A' , A3.)3. 	4A' = )(G45 + A& − 2A45) − Q(G' + A& − 2A' + H' − )H45))() − Q)  4∏ @(A' , A3.)3. 	4A3. = 12(−1 + Q)(−) + Q) (2(−1 + Q)(A' − A45) + () − Q)(1 − Q − ,&+ G!" + A& − A45 + H!") − 2(−1 + Q)(G' + A& − A' + H') + (−2 + )+ Q)(G45 + A& − A45 + QH45)) 
⎩⎪⎪
⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪
⎧ 4∏ @(A' , A3.)%3. 4A'% = 2Q)% − )Q < 04∏ @(A' , A3.)%3. 4A3.% = 2) − Q + 1−1 + Q < 04∏ @(A' , A3.)%3.4A'4A3. = 2−) + Q > 04∏ @(A' , A3.)%3.4A3.4A' = 2−) + Q > 0
 
So, the determinant of the Hessian Matrix can be written as 
L = MM 2Q)% − )Q 2−) + Q2−) + Q 2) − Q + 1−1 + QMM = 2Q)% − )Q × O 2) − Q + 1−1 + QP − O 2−) + QP
%
= − 2(−2 + Q))() − Q)(−1 + Q) > 0 
Therefore, this Hessian Matrix is a negative-definite matrix, the solution to the first-order-
conditions gives the unique maximizer of ∏ @(A' , A3.)3. . 
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A'∗ = )(−1 + Q) + ),& − )G!" − 2G' + QG' − (2 + ))A& + QA& − )H!" − 2H' + QH'2(−2 + Q) 	 A!"&∗ = (−1 + Q)Q − 2G45 − 2A& + Q(,& − G!" + G45 − H!" + (−2 + Q)H45)2(−2 + Q)  ∏ B(A!"& , A&)3.  can be rewritten as  J B(A!"6 , A&)3. 	= − 116(−1 + Q) ( 1(−2 + Q)% (−4 + 5Q − Q% + (−4 + 3Q),& + (4 − 3Q)G!" − 2G45+ 2A& + 4H!" + Q(G45 − 2A& − 3H!" + (−2 + Q)H45))(−4 + 5Q − Q% − (−4 + Q),&+ (4 − 3Q)G!" − 2G45 − 6A& + 4H!" + Q(G45 + 2A& − 3H!" + (−2 + Q)H45))+ 4(,& − A&)((−1 + Q)() − 2G' − 2A& − 2H') + )(,& − G!" + G45 − H!" + QH45))) ) 
Which is convex in A& , therefore, the first condition gives the unique maximizer. 
Accordingly, the optimal decisions are  A&∗ = 12()(−3 + Q) − 2(−2 + Q)%) (−)(8 + (−5 + Q)Q) + ()(−4 + Q)− 2(−2 + Q)%),& + )QG!" + 8G' + 2)G45 + 8H' + Q(2(−4+ Q)G' + 2(−4 + Q)H' + )(−G45 + H!" − (−2 + Q)H45))) (5.55) A'∗ = 14()(−3 + Q) − 2(−2 + Q)%) ()(−16 + (17 − 5Q)Q + )(−7 + 3Q))+ (8(−1 + Q) + () − 2Q)() + Q)),& + )(−8 − 3) + 5Q)G!"− 8G' − 2)G' + 8QG' − 2Q%G' + 2)G45 + )%G45 − )QG45− 8)H!" − 3)%H!" + 5)QH!" − 8H' − 2)H' + 8QH' − 2Q%H'+ )(2 + ) − Q)QH45) 
(5.56) 
A3.∗ = 12()(−3 + Q) − 2(−2 + Q)%) (−2(−2 + Q)(−1 + Q)Q + )(−4 + (−1+ Q)Q) + (2 + ) − 2Q)(−2 + Q),& + Q(−4 − ) + 2Q)G!" + 4G'− 8G45 − 2)G45 + 4H' + Q(−2G' + (8 + ) − 2Q)G45 − (4 + )− 2Q)H!" − 2H' + (4 + ) − 2Q)(−2 + Q)H45)) 
(5.57) 
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A!"&∗ = 12()(−3 + Q) − 2(−2 + Q)%) (−)(−3 + Q)% + (−4 + Q)(−2 + Q)(−1+ Q) − (−2 + Q),& + ()(−3 + Q) − (−4 + Q)(−2 + Q))G!" + 6G'− 4G45 − 8H!" − 3)H!" + 6H' + Q((−5 + Q)G' + 4G45 + (6+ ))H!" − 5H' − 4H45 − Q(G45 + H!" − H' + (−4 + Q)H45))) 
(5.58) 
K'∗ = 14)()(−3 + Q) − 2(−2 + Q)%)() − Q) ()() − Q)(8 + (−5 + Q)Q) − ()(−4+ Q) − 2(−2 + Q)%)() − Q),& + )Q(−) + Q)G!" − 8)G' − 8QG'+ 2)QG' + 8Q%G' − 2Q!G' + 16)G45 + 4)%G45 − 14)QG45− )%QG45 + 3)Q%G45 − )%QH!" + )Q%H!" − 8)H' − 8QH'+ 2)QH' + 8Q%H' − 2Q!H' + )Q(4(4 + )) − (14 + ))Q+ 3Q%)H45) 
(5.59) 
K3.∗ = 14() − Q)(−1 + Q) (() − Q)(−1 + Q) + () − Q),& + (−) + Q)G!" + 2G'− 2G45 + )(G45 − H!") + 2H' + Q(−2G' + G45 + H!" − 2H'+ (−2 + ) + Q)H45)) (5.60) K!"&∗ = 12(−)(−3 + Q) + 2(−2 + Q)%)(−1 + Q) ((−1 + Q)(8 + ) − 6Q + Q%)+ (3 + ) − 2Q)(−2 + Q),& + (8 + 3) − 2(5 + ))Q + 3Q%)G!"− 2G' + 3QG' − Q%G' − 2(2 + ))G45 + 4QG45 + )QG45 − Q%G45+ 8H!" + 3)H!" − 10QH!" − 2)QH!" + 3Q%H!" − 2H' + 3QH'− Q%H' + (2 + ) − Q)(−2 + Q)QH45) 
(5.61) 
The maximized profits are 
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J @(A' , A3.)∗.3$ = − 116()(−3 + Q) − 2(−2 + Q)%)%() − Q)() − )Q)) (((−1+ Q)()() − Q)(−7 + 3Q) + ()% + )(8 − 3Q) + 2(−2 + Q)%),&+ )(−8 − 3) + 3Q)G!" + 8G' + 10)G' − 8QG' − 4)QG'+ 2Q%G' − 2)G45 + )%G45 + )QG45 − 8)H!" − 3)%H!" + 3)QH!"+ 8H' + 10)H' − 8QH' − 4)QH' + 2Q%H' + )Q(−2 + )+ Q)H45)()() − Q)(8 + (−5 + Q)Q) − ()(−4 + Q)− 2(−2 + Q)%)() − Q),& + )Q(−) + Q)G!" − 8)G' − 8QG'+ 2)QG' + 8Q%G' − 2Q!G' + 16)G45 + 4)%G45 − 14)QG45− )%QG45 + 3)Q%G45 − )%QH!" + )Q%H!" − 8)H' − 8QH'+ 2)QH' + 8Q%H' − 2Q!H' + )Q(4(4 + )) − (14 + ))Q+ 3Q%)H45) + 4)()(−3 + Q) − 2(−2 + Q)%)(() − Q)(−1 + Q)+ () − Q),& + (−) + Q)G!" + 2G' − 2G45 + )(G45 − H!") + 2H'+ Q(−2G' + G45 + H!" − 2H' + (−2 + ) + Q)H45))(() − Q)(−2+ Q)(−1 + Q) + (2 + ) − Q),& + Q(−2 − ) + Q)G!" − 2G' + 4G45+ )G45 − 2H' + Q(−(−3 + Q)G' + (−4 + Q)G45 − (2 + ))H!"+ 3H' + (4 + ))H45 + Q(H!" − H' + (−4 + Q)H45))))) 
(5.62) 
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J B(A!"& , A&)∗.3$ = 18)()(−3 + Q) − 2(−2 + Q)%)%(−1 + Q) (2)((−1 + Q)(8 + )− 6Q + Q%) + (3 + ) − 2Q)(−2 + Q),& + (8 + 3) − 2(5 + ))Q+ 3Q%)G!" − 2G' + 3QG' − Q%G' − 2(2 + ))G45 + 4QG45+ )QG45 − Q%G45 + 8H!" + 3)H!" − 10QH!" − 2)QH!" + 3Q%H!"− 2H' + 3QH' − Q%H' + (2 + ) − Q)(−2 + Q)QH45)()(−3 + Q)%− (−4 + Q)(−2 + Q)(−1 + Q) + (−2 + Q),& + (−8 − 3) + (10+ ))Q − 3Q%)G!" − 6G' + 4G45 − 8H!" − 3)H!" − 6H' + Q(−(−5+ Q)G' + (−4 + Q)G45 + (10 + ))H!" + 5H' − Q(3H!" + H')+ 4H45 + (−4 + Q)QH45)) − ()() − Q)(−3 + Q)(−1 + Q)+ ()%(−3 + Q) + 2(−2 + Q)%(−1 + Q) − )(−3 + Q)(−4 + 3Q)),&+ )(8 + 3) − (7 + ))Q + Q%)G!" − 8G' − 6)G' + 16QG'+ 8)QG' − 10Q%G' − 2)Q%G' + 2Q!G' − 6)G45 − 3)%G45+ 5)QG45 + )%QG45 − )Q%G45 + 8)H!" + 3)%H!" − 7)QH!"− )%QH!" + )Q%H!" − 8H' − 6)H' + 16QH' + 8)QH' − 10Q%H'− 2)Q%H' + 2Q!H' + )(2 + ) − Q)(−3 + Q)QH45)()(8 + (−5+ Q)Q) + (4 + ) − 2Q)(−2 + Q),& − )QG!" − 8G' − 2)G45 − 8H'+ Q(−2(−4 + Q)G' − 2(−4 + Q)H' + )(G45 − H!" + (−2+ Q)H45)))) 
(5.63) 
(3) The first-order-conditions of ∏ "!(A' , A3. , A!"&)3.  in Equation (5.8) 4∏ "!(A' , A3. , A!"&)3. 	4A' = () − Q),& + )(G45 − 2A45) − Q(G' − 2A' + H' − )H45))() − Q)  4∏ "!(A' , A3. , A!"&)3. 	4A3.= 1(−1 + Q)(−) + Q) (() − Q),& + (−) + Q)G!" + G' − G45 − 2A'+ 2A45 + )(G45 + 2A!/0 − 2A45 − H!") + H' − Q(G' + 2A!/0 − 2A'− H!" + H' + H45 − )H45)) 4∏ "!(A' , A3. , A!"&)3. 4A!"& = −1 + Q + ,& − G!" + G45 + 2A!/0 − 2A45 − H!" + QH45−1 + Q  
So, the determinant of the Hessian Matrix can be written as 
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L =
⎣⎢⎢
⎢⎢⎢
⎡ 2Q)% − )Q 2−) + Q 02−) + Q 2( 1) − Q + 1−1 + Q) − 2−1 + Q0 − 2−1 + Q 2−1 + Q ⎦⎥⎥
⎥⎥⎥
⎤ = − 8)() − Q)(−1 + Q) < 0 
Therefore, the solution to the first-order-conditions gives the unique maximizer. 
 A'∗ = 12 () + ,& + G' + H') (5.64) 
 A3.∗ = 12 (Q + ,& + G45 + QH45) (5.65) 
 A!"&∗ = 12 (1 + G!" + H!") (5.66) 
And the optimal sales amounts are 
 K'∗ = Q() + ,& + G' + H') − )(Q + ,& + G45 + QH45)2)() − Q)  (5.67) 
 
K3.∗ = 12(−1 + Q)(−) + Q) ((−) + Q),& + () − Q)G!" − G' + G45 + )(−G45+ H!") − H' + Q(G' − H!" + H' + H45 − )H45)) (5.68) 
 K!"&∗ = 1 − Q + ,& − G!" + G45 − H!" + QH452 − 2Q  (5.69) 
The maximized profits are 
 
J "!(A' , A3. , A!"&)∗.3#= 14O(−1 + G!" + H!")(1 − Q + ,& − G!" + G45 − H!" + QH45)−1 + Q+ 1(−1 + Q)(−) + Q) ((,& + G45 + Q(−1 + H45))(() − Q),& + (−) + Q)G!"+ G' − QG' + (−1 + ))G45 − )H!" + QH!" + H' − QH' + (−1 + ))QH45))− () − ,& − G' − H')(() − Q),& + )G45 − Q(G' + H' − )H45)))() − Q) P 
(5.70) 
Proof of PROPOSITION 5-9.  
(1) The first-order-conditions and the second-order-conditions of ∏ @(A3.)3.#  and ∏ B(A!"& , A&)3.#  in Equation (5.9) and Equation (5.10),  
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⎩⎪⎨
⎪⎧ 4∏ @(A3.)3.#4A3. = G45 + QA!/0 + A& − 2A45 + QH45Q − Q% 	4 ∏ B(A!"& , A&)3.#4A!"& = 1 − Q − ,& + G!" − 2A!/0 + A& + A45 + H!"1 − Q  
⎩⎪⎨
⎪⎧4∏ @(A')%!"&4A3.% = 2(−1 + Q)Q < 04∏ B(A!" , A&)%!"&4A!"% = 2−1 + Q < 0 
So, the solution to the first-order-conditions gives the unique maximizer.  
⎩⎪⎨
⎪⎧ 4∏ @(A3.)3.#4A3. = G45 + QA!/0 + A& − 2A45 + QH45Q − Q% = 04∏ B(A!"& , A&)3.#4A!"& = 1 − Q − ,& + G!" − 2A!/0 + A& + A45 + H!"1 − Q = 0 
⎩⎨
⎧A3.∗ =	 (−1 + Q)Q + Q,& − 2G45 − 2A& − Q(G!" + A& + H!" + 2H45)−4 + QA!"&∗ = 2 − 2Q − 2,& + 2G!" + G45 + 3A& + 2H!" + QH454 − Q  
Then, the logistics vendor’s profit function (5.10) can be updated as J B(A!"& , A&)3.# = 1(−4 + Q)%(−1 + Q)Q (Q(2 − 2Q − 2,& + (−2 + Q)G!" + G45 + 3A&+ (−2 + Q)H!" + QH45)((−2 + Q),& − (−2 + Q)G!" − G45 + A& + 2(−1+ Q + H!") − Q(A& + H!" + H45)) − (−4 + Q)(,& − A&)(Q − Q% − 2G45− 2A& + Q(−,& + G!" + G45 + 2A& + H!" + (−2 + Q)H45))) 
which is convex in A&, so the first-order-conditions of it gives the maximum profit. 4∏ B(A!"& , A&)3.# 4A&= Q(8 + Q) + 2(4 + Q),& − 8G45 − 16A& − Q(QG!" + 2A& + QH!" + 8H45)(−4 + Q)%Q = 0 A&∗ = Q(8 + Q) + 2(4 + Q),& − 8G45 − Q(Q(G!" + H!") + 8H45)2(8 + Q)  
The final optimal decisions are 
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 A&∗ = Q(8 + Q) + 2(4 + Q),& − 8G45 − Q(Q(G!" + H!") + 8H45)2(8 + Q)  (5.71) 
 A3.∗ = Q(8 + Q) + 4,& + 4G45 + Q(4 + Q)(G!" + H!") + 4QH452(8 + Q)  (5.72) 
 A!"&∗ = 8 + Q − 2,& + (8 + 3Q)G!" − 2G45 + (8 + 3Q)H!" − 2QH452(8 + Q) 	 (5.73) 
 K3.∗ = (2 + Q)(,& + G45 − Q(G!" + H!" − H45))(−1 + Q)Q(8 + Q)  (5.74) 
 
K!"&∗ = − 12(−1 + Q)(8 + Q) (−(−1 + Q)(8 + Q) + 6,& + (−8 + Q + Q%)G!"+ 6G45 + (−8 + Q + Q%)H!" + 6QH45) (5.75) 
The maximized profits are 
 J @(A3.)∗3.# = −(2 + Q)%(,& + G45 − Q(G!" + H!" − H45))%(−1 + Q)Q(8 + Q)%  (5.76) 
 
J B∗3.# (A!"& , A&)= 14(−1 + Q)(8 + Q)% (−(8 + Q − 2,& + (−8 + Q)G!" − 2G45+ (−8 + Q)H!" − 2QH45)(−(−1 + Q)(8 + Q) + 6,& + (−8 + Q+ Q%)G!" + 6G45 + (−8 + Q + Q%)H!" + 6QH45)+ 1Q (2(2 + Q)(−,& − G45 + Q(G!" + H!" − H45))(−Q(8 + Q)+ 8,& + 8G45 + Q(Q(G!" + H!") + 8H45)))) 
(5.77) 
(2) Here, ∏ B(A!"& , A&)3.  is convex in A!/0, therefore, the solution of the first-order-
condition gives the unique maximizer 4∏ B(A!"& , A&)3.4A!"& = 1 − Q − ,& + G!" − 2A!/0 + A& + A45 + H!"1 − Q = 0 A!"&∗ = 12 (1 − Q − ,& + G!" + A& + A45 + H!") 
Then, the ∏ @(A3.)3.#  can be updated as  
J @(A3.)3. = − 12(−1 + Q)Q (((−1 + Q)Q + Q,& + 2A45 − Q(G!" + A& + A45+ H!"))(G45 + A& − A45 + QH45)) 
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Which is convex in A3., the solution of the first-order-condition gives the maximum value, 4∏ @(A3.)3.4A3.= (−1 + Q)Q − 2G45 − 2A& + 4A45 + Q(,& − G!" + G45 − 2A45 − H!" + (−2 + Q)H45)2(−1 + Q)Q= 0 A3.∗ = (−1 + Q)Q − 2G45 − 2A& + Q(,& − G!" + G45 − H!" + (−2 + Q)H45)2(−2 + Q)  
Therefore, ∏ B(A!"& , A&)3.  could be rewritten as 
J B(A!"& , A&)3. = 116(−2 + Q)%(−1 + Q)Q (−Q(−4 + 5Q − Q% + (−4 + 3Q),& + (4− 3Q)G!" − 2G45 + 2A& + 4H!" + Q(G45 − 2A& − 3H!" + (−2+ Q)H45))(−4 + 5Q − Q% − (−4 + Q),& + (4 − 3Q)G!" − 2G45 − 6A&+ 4H!" + Q(G45 + 2A& − 3H!" + (−2 + Q)H45)) + 4(−2 + Q)%(,&− A&)(Q − Q% − 2G45 − 2A& + Q(−,& + G!" + G45 + 2A& + H!" + (−2+ Q)H45))) 
Which is convex in A& and the solutions to the first-order-condition give the unique 
maximizer. 4∏ B(A!"& , A&)3. 4A& = 14(−2 + Q)%Q (Q(8 + (−5 + Q)Q) + (8 + (−4 + Q)Q),& − 8G45 − 16A&+ Q(6G45 + 10A& − Q(G!" + G45 + 2A& + H!") − (−4 + Q)(−2 + Q)H45))= 0 
A&∗ = 12(8 + (−5 + Q)Q) (Q(8 + (−5 + Q)Q) + (8 + (−4 + Q)Q),& − 8G45 − Q(QG!"+ (−6 + Q)G45 + QH!") − (−4 + Q)(−2 + Q)QH45) 
The final optimal decisions are 
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A&∗ = 12(8 + (−5 + Q)Q) (Q(8 + (−5 + Q)Q) + (8 + (−4 + Q)Q),& − 8G45− Q(QG!" + (−6 + Q)G45 + QH!") − (−4 + Q)(−2 + Q)QH45) (5.78) A3.∗ = 12(8 + (−5 + Q)Q) (Q(8 + (−5 + Q)Q) + (−2 + Q)%,& + 4G45 − (−4+ Q)Q(G!" − G45 + H!") + (−2 + Q)%QH45) (5.79) A!"&∗ = 12(8 + (−5 + Q)Q)	(8 + (−5 + Q)Q + (−2 + Q),& + (8 − 3Q)G!" − 2G45+ 8H!" + Q(G45 − 3H!" + (−2 + Q)H45)) (5.80) K3.∗ = −(−2 + Q)(,& + G45 − Q(G!" + H!" − H45))(−1 + Q)Q(8 + (−5 + Q)Q)  (5.81) K!"&∗ = 12(−1 + Q)(8 + (−5 + Q)Q) ((−1 + Q)(8 + (−5 + Q)Q) − (−3 + Q)(−2+ Q),& + (8 + (−7 + Q)Q)G!" − 6G45 + 8H!" + Q(−(−5 + Q)G45+ (−7 + Q)H!" − (−3 + Q)(−2 + Q)H45)) (5.82) 
The maximized profits are 
 J @(A3.)∗3.# = 2(−2 + Q)(,& + G45 − Q(G!" + H!" − H45))%(−1 + Q)Q(8 + (−5 + Q)Q)%  (5.83) 
 
J B∗3.# (A!"& , A&)= 14(−1 + Q)(8 + (−5 + Q)Q)% (− 1Q X2(−2 + Q)Y−,& − G45+ Q(G!" + H!" − H45)ZY−Q(8 + (−5 + Q)Q)+ (−4 + Q)(−2 + Q),& + 8G45+ Q(QG!" + (−6 + Q)G45 + QH!" + (−4 + Q)(−2 + Q)H45)Z[+ (−8 − (−5 + Q)Q − (−2 + Q),& + (8 + Q(−7 + 2Q))G!"+ 2G45 + 8H!" + Q(−G45 + (−7 + 2Q)H!" − (−2+ Q)H45))(−(−1 + Q)(8 + (−5 + Q)Q) + (−3 + Q)(−2 + Q),&− (8 + (−7 + Q)Q)G!" + 6G45 − 8H!" + Q((−5 + Q)G45 − (−7+ Q)H!" + (−3 + Q)(−2 + Q)H45))) 
(5.84) 
(3)  The first-order-conditions and the second-order-conditions of ∏ @(A3.)3.#  and ∏ B(A!"& , A&)3.#  in Equation (5.9) and Equation (5.10),  
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⎩⎪⎨
⎪⎧ 4∏ "!(A3. , A!"&)3.# 4A3. = ,& − QG!" + G45 + 2QA!/0 − 2A45 − QH!" + QH45Q − Q% 	4 ∏ "!(A3. , A!"&)3.# 4A!"& = −1 + Q + ,& − G!" + G45 + 2A!/0 − 2A45 − H!" + QH45−1 + Q  
⎩⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎧ 4∏ "!(A3. , A!"&)%!"& 4A3.% = 2(−1 + Q)Q < 04∏ "!(A3. , A!"&)%!"& 4A!"% = 2−1 + Q < 04∏ "!(A3. , A!"&)%!"&4A3.4A!"& = 4∏ "!(A3. , A!"&)%!"&4A!"&4A3. = − 2−1 + Q > 0
 
So, the determinant of the Hessian Matrix can be written as 
L = MM 2(−1 + Q)Q − 2−1 + Q− 2−1 + Q 2−1 + Q MM = 2(−1 + Q)Q × O− 2−1 + QP − O− 2−1 + QP
% = 4Q − Q%
> 0 
Thus, it is a negative-definite matrix, the solution to the first-order-conditions gives the 
unique maximizer.  
 A3.∗ = 12 (Q + ,& + G45 + QH45)	 (5.85) 
 A!"&∗ = 12 (1 + G!" + H!") (5.86) 
Accordingly, 
 K3.∗ =	,& + G45 − Q(G!" + H!" − H45)2(−1 + Q)Q  (5.87) 
 K!"&∗ = 1 − Q + ,& − G!" + G45 − H!" + QH452 − 2Q  (5.88) 
 
J "!(A3. , A!"&)∗.3#= 14(−1 + Q) O− (,& + G45 − Q(G!" + H!" − H45))(,& + G45 + Q(−1 + H45))Q+ (−1 + G!" + H!")(1 − Q + ,& − G!" + G45 − H!" + QH45)P 
(5.89) 
Proof of PROPOSITION 5-19.  
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(1) According to Equation (5.15), the first-order-conditions and the second-order-
condition are 4∏ @(A' , A3. , A!"')!"' 	4A' = )(G45 + A& − 2A45) − Q(G' + A& − 2A' + H' − )H45))() − Q)  4∏ @(A' , A3. , A!"')!"' 	4A3.= 1(−1 + Q)(−) + Q) ((−) + Q)G!" − (−1 + Q)G' + (−1 + ))G45+ 2)A!/2 − 2A' + 2A45 − 2)A45 − )H!" + H' + Q(−2A!/2 + 2A'+ H!" − H' + (−1 + ))H45)) 4∏ @(A' , A3. , A!"')!"' 4A!"' = −1 + Q − G!" + G45 + 2A!/2 − 2A45 − H!" + QH45−1 + Q  
So, the determinant of the Hessian Matrix can be written as 
L =
⎣⎢⎢
⎢⎢⎢
⎡ 2Q)% − )Q 2−) + Q 02−) + Q 2( 1) − Q + 1−1 + Q) − 2−1 + Q0 − 2−1 + Q 2−1 + Q ⎦⎥⎥
⎥⎥⎥
⎤ = − 8)() − Q)(−1 + Q) < 0 
Therefore, the solution to the first-order-conditions gives the unique maximizer. 
 A'∗ = 12 () + G' + A& + H')  
 A3.∗ = 12 (Q + G45 + A& + QH45)  
 A!"'∗ = 12 (1 + G!" + A& + H!")  
The ∏ B(A&)!"'  can be updated as 
J B(A&)!"' = (,& − A&)(−) + G' + A& + H')2)  
Which is convex in A&, thus, the first-order-condition gives the unique maximizer, 4∏ B(A&)!"' 	4A& = ) + ,& − G' − 2A& − H'2)  
 A&∗ = 12 () + ,& − G' − H')  
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Accordingly, the optimal decisions are 
 A&∗ = 12 () + ,& − G' − H') (5.90) 
 A'∗ = 14 (3) + ,& + G' + H') (5.91) 
 A3.∗ = 14 () + 2Q + ,& − G' + 2G45 − H' + 2QH45) (5.92) 
 A!"'∗ = 14 (2 + ) + ,& + 2G!" − G' + 2H!" − H') (5.93) 
and 
 K'∗ = )(−) + Q) + (−) + Q),& + () + Q)G' − 2)G45 + )H' + QH' − 2)QH454)() − Q)  (5.94) 
 
K3.∗ = 14)() − Q) ((−) + Q)G!" − (−1 + Q)G' + (−1 + ))G45 − )H!" + H'+ Q(H!" − H' + (−1 + ))H45)) (5.95) 
 K!"'∗ = −1 + Q + G!" − G45 + H!" − QH452(−1 + Q)  (5.96) 
 
J @(A' , A3. , A!"')∗!"' = 116\− 1−1 + Q (2(−2 + ) + ,& + 2G!" − G' + 2H!" − H')(−1+ Q + G!" − G45 + H!" − QH45))− 1)() − Q) (() − ,& − G' − H')()% − )Q + () − Q),& − ()+ Q)G' + 2)G45 − )H' − QH' + 2)QH45))− 1() − Q)(−1 + Q) (2() − 2Q + ,& − G' + 2G45 − H'+ 2QH45)((−) + Q)G!" − (−1 + Q)G' + (−1 + ))G45 − )H!"+ H' + Q(H!" − H' + (−1 + ))H45)))] 
(5.97) 
 J B(A&)∗!"' = (−) + ,& + G' + H')%8)  (5.98) 
(2) According to Equation (5.17), the first-order-conditions are 
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4∏ "!(A' , A3. , A!"')!"' 	4A' = () − Q),& + )(G45 − 2A45) − Q(G' − 2A' + H' − )H45))() − Q)  4∏ "!(A' , A3. , A!"')!"' 	4A3.= 1(−1 + Q)(−) + Q) ((−) + Q)G!" − (−1 + Q)G' + (−1 + ))G45+ 2)A!/2 − 2A' + 2A45 − 2)A45 − )H!" + H' + Q(−2A!/2 + 2A'+ H!" − H' + (−1 + ))H45)) 4∏ "!(A' , A3. , A!"')!"' 4A!"' = −1 + Q − G!" + G45 + 2A!/2 − 2A45 − H!" + QH45−1 + Q  
So, the determinant of the Hessian Matrix can be written as 
L =
⎣⎢⎢
⎢⎢⎢
⎡ 2Q)% − )Q 2−) + Q 02−) + Q 2( 1) − Q + 1−1 + Q) − 2−1 + Q0 − 2−1 + Q 2−1 + Q ⎦⎥⎥
⎥⎥⎥
⎤ = − 8)() − Q)(−1 + Q) < 0 
Therefore, the solution to the first-order-conditions gives the unique maximizer. 
 A'∗ = 12 () + ,& + G' + H') (5.99) 
 A3.∗ = 12 (Q + ,& + G45 + QH45) (5.100) 
 A!"'∗ = 12 (1 + ,& + G!" + H!") (5.101) 
Accordingly, the optimal sales amount and the maximized profit of the supply chain are 
K'∗ = Q() + ,& + G' + H') − )(Q + ,& + G45 + QH45)2)() − Q)  (5.102) K3.∗ = 12(−1 + Q)(−) + Q) (() − Q)G!" + (−1 + Q)G' − (−1 + ))G45 + )H!"− H' + Q(−H!" + H' + H45 − )H45)) (5.103) K!"'∗ = −1 + Q + G!" − G45 + H!" − QH452(−1 + Q)  (5.104) 
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J "!(A' , A3. , A!"')∗!"'= 14^− (−1 + ,& + G!" + H!")(−1 + Q + G!" − G45 + H!" − QH45)−1 + Q+ 1(−1 + Q)(−) + Q) ((,& + G45 + Q(−1 + H45))((−) + Q)G!" − (−1 + Q)G'+ (−1 + ))G45 − )H!" + H' + Q(H!" − H' + (−1 + ))H45)))− () − ,& − G' − H')(() − Q),& + )G45 − Q(G' + H' − )H45)))() − Q) _ 
(5.105) 
Proof of PROPOSITION 5-26.  
(1) According to Equation (5.20), the first-order-conditions are 4∏ @(A' , A!"')!"' 	4A' = −G' + A& − 2A' − )(G!" − 2A!/2 + A& + H!") + H'(−1 + )))  4∏ @(A' , A!"')!"'4A!"' = −1 + ) − G!" + G' + 2A!/2 − 2A' − H!" + H'−1 + )  
So, the determinant of the Hessian Matrix can be written as 
L = MM 2(−1 + ))) − 2−1 + )− 2−1 + ) 2−1 + ) MM =
2(−1 + ))) × 2−1 + ) − O− 2−1 + )P% = 4) − )% < 0 
Therefore, the first-order-conditions gives the unique maximizer, 4∏ @(A' , A!"')!"' 	4A' = −G' + A& − 2A' − )(G!" − 2A!/2 + A& + H!") + H'(−1 + ))) = 0 4∏ @(A' , A!"')!"'4A!"' = −1 + ) − G!" + G' + 2A!/2 − 2A' − H!" + H'−1 + ) = 0 A' = 12 () + G' + A& + H') A!/2 = 12 (1 + G!" + A& + H!" 
So, ∏ B(A&)!"'  can be updated as 
J B(A&)!"' 	= (,& − A&)(−) + G' + A& + H')2)  
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Which is convex in A&, thus, the solution to the first-order-condition gives the maximizer, 4∏ B(A&)!"' 	4A& = ) + ,& − G' − 2A& − H'2) = 0 
 A&∗ = 12 () + ,& − G' − H')  
And the optimal decision and the maximized profits of the traditional manufacturer and the 
logistics vendor are 
 A&∗ = 12 () + ,& − G' − H') (5.106) 
 A'∗ = 14 (3) + ,& + G' + H') (5.107) 
 A!"'∗ = 14 (2 + ) + ,& + 2G!" − G' + 2H!" − H') (5.108) 
 K'∗ = ) − )% − (−1 + )),& + G' + H' + )(−2G!" + G' − 2H!" + H')4(−1 + )))  (5.109) 
 K!"'∗ = −1 + ) + G!" − G' + H!" − H'2(−1 + ))  (5.110) 
 J @(A' , A!"')∗!"' = 116(−1 + ))) (−2)(−1 + ) + G!" − G' + H!" − H')(−2+ ) + ,& + 2G!" − G' + 2H!" − H') + () − ,& − G' − H')()− )% − (−1 + )),& + G' + H' + )(−2G!" + G' − 2H!"+ H'))) 
(5.111) 
 J B(A&)∗!"' = (−) + ,& + G' + H')%8)  (5.112) 
(2) According to Equation (5.22), the first-order-conditions are 4∏ "!(A' , A!"')!"' 	4A' = (−1 + )),& − G' + 2A' + )(G!" − 2A!/2 + H!") − H'(−1 + )))  4∏ "!(A' , A!"')!"'4A!"' = −1 + ) − G!" + G' + 2A!/2 − 2A' − H!" + H'−1 + )  
So, the determinant of the Hessian Matrix can be written as 
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L = MM 2(−1 + ))) − 2−1 + )− 2−1 + ) 2−1 + ) MM =
2(−1 + ))) × 2−1 + ) − O− 2−1 + )P% = 4) − )% < 0 
Therefore, the first-order-conditions gives the unique maximizer, 4∏ @(A' , A!"')!"' 	4A' = −G' + A& − 2A' − )(G!" − 2A!/2 + A& + H!") + H'(−1 + ))) = 0 4∏ @(A' , A!"')!"'4A!"' = −1 + ) − G!" + G' + 2A!/2 − 2A' − H!" + H'−1 + ) = 0 
So, we can have 
 A'∗ = 12 () + ,& + G' + H') (5.113) 
 A!"'∗ = 12 (1 + ,& + G!" + H!") (5.114) 
And the optimal sales amount and the maximized profit of the supply chain is 
 K'∗ = −(−1 + )),& + G' − )(G!" + H!") + H'2(−1 + )))  (5.115) 
 K!"'∗ = −1 + ) + G!" − G' + H!" − H'2(−1 + ))  (5.116) 
 J "!(A' , A!"')∗!"'= − 14(−1 + )) O(−1 + ,& + G!" + H!")(−1 + ) + G!" − G' + H!" − H')+ () − ,& − G' − H')((−1 + )),& − G' + )(G!" + H!") − H')) P 
(5.117) 
Proof of PROPOSITION 5-31.   
(1) Here, Equation (5.23) is convex in A!"', therefore, the first-order-conditions gives 
the maximizer, 4∏ @(A!"')!"' 	4A!"' = 1 + G!" − 2A!/2 + A& + H!" = 0 
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A!"' = 12 (1 + G!" + A& + H!") 
Then, the Equation (5.24) can be rewritten as J B(A&)!"' = 1 + G!" − 2A!/2 + A& + H!" = 0 
It is convex in A&, again, the first-order-conditions gives the maximized value of ∏ B(A&)!"' , 4∏ B(A&)!"' 	4A& = 12 (1 + ,& − G!" − 2A& − H!") = 0 A&∗ = 12 (1 + ,& − G!" − H!") 
Therefore, the optimal prices are  
 A&∗ = 12 (1 + ,& − G!" − H!") (5.118) 
 A!"'∗ = 14 (3 + ,& + G!" + H!") (5.119) 
And the optimal sales amount and the maximized profit of the supply chain is 
 K!"'∗ = 14 (1 − ,& − G!" − H!") (5.120) 
 J @(A!"')∗!"' = 116 (−1 + ,& + G!" + H!")% (5.121) 
 J B(A&)∗!"' = 18 (−1 + ,& + G!" + H!")% (5.122) 
(2) Equation (5.23) is convex in A!"' , therefore, the first-order-conditions gives the 
maximizer, 4∏ "!(A!"')!"' 	4A!"' = 1 + ,& + G!" − 2A!/2 + H!" = 0 
 A!"'∗ = 12 (1 + ,& + G!" + H!") (5.123) 
So, the optimal sales volume of the 3DP product and the maximized profit of the supply chain 
is  
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 K!"'∗ = 12 (1 − ,& − G!" − H!") (5.124) 
 J "!(A!"')∗!"' = 14 (−1 + ,& + G!" + H!")% (5.125) 
Proof of PROPOSITION 5-38. 
The logistics vendor’s profit functions under the TMTF3DM model, TM3DM model, and 
3DM model are (5.98), (5.112), and (5.122) 
J B(A&)∗3'3.!"' = (−) + ,& + G' + H')%8)  
J B(A&)∗3'!"' = (−) + ,& + G' + H')%8)  
J B(A&)∗!"' = 18 (−1 + ,& + G!" + H!")% 
Thus, 
1) If `7,+*!+."+8"√, ` > |−1 + ,& + G!" + H!"|,  
then ∏ B(A&)∗3'3.!"' = ∏ B(A&)∗3'!"' > ∏ B(A&)∗!"' ; 
2) If `7,+*!+."+8"√, ` < |−1 + ,& + G!" + H!"|;  
then ∏ B(A&)∗3'3.!"' = ∏ B(A&)∗3'!"' < ∏ B(A&)∗!"' . 
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Appendix C-2: Sensitivity Analysis of Chapter 5 
TMTF3DM Model 
The Impact of the TM Product Costs 
PROPOSITION 1. If the traditional manufacturer adds the TF product to compete with the 
logistics vendor’s 3DP product, 
(1) The supply chain with the low setting is profitable for the traditional manufacturer 
but is not profitable for the logistics vendor in the decentralized supply chain. The 
integrated supply chain can also gain more profits except when the fixed TM product 
cost is extremely low. 
(2) If the product costs and the customization level are at the medium setting supply 
chain, it is profitable to the traditional manufacturer, but it is not profitable to the 
logistics vendor in the decentralized supply chain. The integrated supply chain can 
also obtain more profits. 
(3) If the product costs and the customization level are at the high setting, in the 
decentralized supply chain, this strategy is always profitable to the traditional 
manufacturer. Overall, the logistics vendor cannot gain more profits, but if the costs 
of the TM product are sufficiently low, the logistics vendor can also obtain more 
profits if the traditional manufacturer use both TM and TF manufacturing 
technology. This strategy can improve the integrated supply chain’s profitability; 
however, there is a scenario where the costs of TM are located at a low-level, and the 
integrated supply chain cannot make more profit. 
 
Table 1 Comparison of Maximized Profit by TM Product Cost – TM3DL and TMTF3DL 
Low Medium High 
   
   
MB-TM3DL
MB-TMTF3DL
MB-TM3DL
MB-TMTF3DL
MB-TM3DL
MB-TMTF3DL
LB-TM3DL
LB-TMTF3DL
LB-TM3DL
LB-TMTF3DL
LB-TM3DL
LB-TMTF3DL
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 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 G' H' ) G3. H3. Q G!" H!" ,& 
Low - - 0.1 0.025 0.02 0.2 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Medium - - 0.2 0.1 0.25 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.01 
High - - 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.35 0.01 
 
Table 1 illustrates how the profits of the benchmarking model and the TMTF3DL model 
change as the TM product cost increases. Remarkably, we find that the traditional 
manufacturer always benefits from offering the TF products, regardless of the TM product 
costs. At the same time, the claim that this strategy hurts the logistics vendor’s profitability 
does not always hold. Furthermore, this strategy contributes to the development of the 
integrated supply chain in most cases as well. Another key finding here is that in a market 
led by the traditional manufacturer, if the TM product costs are low enough, the traditional 
manufacturer’s flexible manufacturing strategy is beneficial to all supply chain stakeholders 
in the decentralized supply chain and the integrated supply chain. 
MS-TM3DL
MS-TMTF3DL
MS-TM3DL
MS-TMTF3DL
MS-TM3DL
MS-TMTF3DL
LS-TM3DL
LS-TMTF3DL
LS-TM3DL
LS-TMTF3DL
LS-TM3DL
LS-TMTF3DL
SC-TM3DL
SC-TMTF3DL
SC-TM3DL
SC-TMTF3DL
SC-TM3DL
SC-TMTF3DL
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Specifically, in the decentralized Bertrand supply chain, adding the new TF product can bring 
more profits to the traditional manufacturer because of the cannibalization effect on the TM 
and 3DP product market. Consequently, the logistics vendor loses profit due to both the 
shrunken 3DP product market and the reduced delivery service for the TM product. In the 
Stackelberg supply chain, the insights are almost the same. However, if the TM product cost 
are extremely low, the logistics vendor can also enjoy more profits. When the TM product 
costs are low, the new TF product forces the logistics vendor to price the 3DP product higher 
to maximize the 3DP product’s margin, although it results in more price-sensitive consumers 
switching to the TF or the TM product instead. Overall, the logistics vendor can gain more 
profits. For the integrated supply chain, on the low setting, when the fixed TM product cost 
is extremely low, the supply chain loses some profit because some customization-sensitive 
consumers start to buy the newly introduced TF product. In the supply chain with the medium 
setting, the system always attains more profits because of the newly created TF product 
market. However, under the high setting, generally the new TF product contributes to the 
system’s performance; but if the costs of TF are low, the new TF product cannibalizes the 
TM product market. Therefore, the system cannot achieve better financial performance. 
The Impact of the TF Product Costs 
PROPOSITION 2. If the traditional manufacturer adds the TF product to compete with the 
logistics vendor’s 3DP product, 
(1) At the low-cost structure and low product customization supply chain, it is profitable 
to the traditional manufacturer. The logistics vendor can also enjoy the benefits of 
this strategy, except when the fixed TF cost is extremely low. The integrated supply 
chain can also attain better profitability. 
(2) If the product costs and the customization level are at the medium level, it is profitable 
for the traditional manufacturer. But adding TF manufacturing technology by the 
traditional manufacturer is not always profitable to the logistics vendor in the 
decentralized supply chain. In the Bertrand supply chain, if the fixed TF product cost 
is located in the extremely low range, this strategy has a negative impact on the 
logistics vendor’s maximized profit. The integrated supply chain can also gain more 
profits. 
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(3) If the product costs and the customization level are high, in the decentralized supply 
chain, this strategy is always profitable to the traditional manufacturer. Overall, the 
logistics vendor cannot attain more profit, but under the Bertrand supply chain, if the 
fixed cost of the TF product is low or high enough, the logistics vendor can also 
obtain more profits. This strategy can improve the integrated supply chain’s 
profitability. 
Table 2 Maximized Profit Comparison by TF Product Cost – TM3DL and TMTF3DL 
Low Medium High 
   
   
   
   
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 G' H' ) G3. H3. Q G!" H!" ,& 
MB-TM3DL
MB-TMTF3DL
MB-TM3DL
MB-TMTF3DL
MB-TM3DL
MB-TMTF3DL
LB-TM3DL
LB-TMTF3DL
LB-TM3DL
LB-TMTF3DL
LB-TM3DL
LB-TMTF3DL
MS-TM3DL
MS-TMTF3DL
MS-TM3DL
MS-TMTF3DL
MS-TM3DL
MS-TMTF3DL
LS-TM3DL
LS-TMTF3DL
LS-TM3DL
LS-TMTF3DL
LS-TM3DL
LS-TMTF3DL
SC-TM3DL
SC-TMTF3DL
SC-TM3DL
SC-TMTF3DL
SC-TM3DL
SC-TMTF3DL
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Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 - - 0.2 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 - - 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 - - 0.6 0.6 0.35 0.01 
Table 2 summarizes the impact of the TF product costs on the results of the overall 
comparison between the TM3DL and TMTF3DL models. No matter the TF product cost 
level, it is positive for the integrated supply chain and the traditional manufacturer in the 
decentralized supply chain. The new TF product brings more profits to the supply chain either 
through the newly created TF product business or the increased sales of the TM or 3DP 
product. The traditional manufacturer can obtain more profits from the increased TM product 
sales if the TM product costs are high, or from the new TF product sales if the TF product 
costs are low. However, the impact of this strategy on the logistics vendor’s overall 
profitability differs across supply chain structures.  
a) In the decentralized Stackelberg supply chain on the low setting, if the fixed cost of the 
TF product is extremely low, the traditional manufacturer prices both the TM and the TF 
product low for the purpose of keeping his/her pricing advantages. However, more 
customization-sensitive consumers choose to buy the TF product instead of the TM or the 
3DP product. Overall, the impact of this strategy is negative for the logistics vendor.  
b) In the supply chain with the medium setting, the logistics vendor can gain more profits in 
most cases. However, in the Bertrand supply chain, if the fixed cost of the TF product is low, 
the traditional manufacturer prices the TM and TF product low. Accordingly, the sales of TM 
products drop, and the logistics vendor loses revenue on the traditional delivery service.  
c) In the supply chain with the high setting, if the fixed cost of the TF product is low, the low 
TF price helps the TF product acquire more customization-sensitive consumers who 
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previously chose to buy the TM product; if the TF product’s fixed cost is high, the high TF 
product price helps the logistics vendor gain more consumers for his/her 3DP product. The 
logistics vendor can benefit from both of these different scenarios. 
The Impact of the 3DP Product Costs 
PROPOSITION 3. If the traditional manufacturer adds the TF product to compete with the 
logistics vendor’s 3DP product, 
(1) As for the low-cost structure and low product customization supply chain, it is 
profitable to the traditional manufacturer. The logistics vendor can also enjoy the 
benefits of this strategy if the costs of the 3DP product are low in the Bertrand supply 
chain or the variable cost of the 3DP product is low enough. The integrated supply 
chain can also attain better profitability. 
(2) If the product costs and the customization level are at the medium level, generally, 
this is profitable for the traditional manufacturer to use this strategy. Meanwhile, in 
the Stackelberg supply chain, if the costs of the 3DP product are low enough, the 
traditional manufacturer cannot gain more profits by using this strategy. In the 
decentralized Bertrand supply chain, if the costs of the 3DP product are located in a 
certain low range, this strategy has a negative impact on the logistics vendor’s 
profitability. Otherwise, the logistics vendor can always achieve better profitability, 
whilst the integrated supply chain can always attain more profits. 
(3) If the product costs and the customization level are high, both the traditional 
manufacturer and the logistics vendor can always gain more profits in the 
decentralized Stackelberg supply chain by this strategy. Meanwhile, in the 
decentralized Bertrand supply chain, if the 3DP product is located in a low-cost 
range, it is not profitable to the traditional manufacturer; and if the 3DP product is 
located at a medium cost range, the logistics vendor cannot achieve better business 
performance. In the other scenarios, both parties can attain more profits. This 
strategy has a positive impact on the integrated supply chain’s development. 
Generally, whatever the 3DP product costs are, adding a new TF product is beneficial to the 
integrated supply chain’s development. In a supply chain with the low setting (Table 3), if the 
costs of the 3DP product are low, the new TF product with a pricing advantage cannibalizes 
the 3DP product market even if the price of the 3DP product is low. Therefore, the logistics 
vendor cannot achieve better profitability. With the supply chain on the medium setting, 
overall, this strategy is beneficial to the traditional manufacturer’s new TF product business 
and also beneficial to the logistics vendor due to the increased use of the product delivery 
service. However, in the decentralized Bertrand supply chain, if the 3DP product is located 
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in the low-cost range, the logistics vendor cannot obtain more profits because the new TF 
product results in the cannibalization of the 3DP product. In the decentralized Stackelberg 
supply chain, if the costs of the 3DP product are low enough, for the traditional manufacturer, 
the introduction of a new TF product results in profit loss on the TM product. In a supply 
chain on the high setting, in the decentralized Bertrand supply chain, if the costs of 3DP are 
low, the new TF product helps the traditional manufacturer generate new profits from TM 
product sales. The logistics vendor can also gain more profits on the goods delivery service. 
If the 3DP product costs are high, the new TF product forces the logistics vendor to use a 
high-price regime on the 3DP product. Therefore, the traditional manufacturer can gain more 
price-sensitive consumers for its TM and TF product. Overall, the profitability of the 
traditional manufacturer and the logistics vendor is improved. In the decentralized 
Stackelberg supply chain, because the logistics vendor prices the 3DP product later, the 
logistics vendor uses a different price strategy to maximize his/her profit. As we explained 
above, the logistics vendor’s profitable 3DP pricing strategy can also help the traditional 
manufacturer generate more profits. 
Table 3 Maximized Profit Comparison by 3DP Product Cost – TM3DL and TMTF3DL 
Low Medium High 
   
   
MB-TM3DL
MB-TMTF3DL
MB-TM3DL
MB-TMTF3DL
MB-TM3DL
MB-TMTF3DL
LB-TM3DL
LB-TMTF3DL
LB-TM3DL
LB-TMTF3DL
LB-TM3DL
LB-TMTF3DL
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 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 G' H' ) G3. H3. Q G!" H!" ,& 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.025 0.02 0.2 - - 0.01 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.1 0.25 0.4 - - 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 - - 0.01 
 
The Impact of the Logistics Delivery Cost 
PROPOSITION 4. If the traditional manufacturer adds the TF product to compete with the 
logistics vendor’s 3DP product, 
(1) If the product costs and the customization level are at the medium level, it is profitable 
to the traditional manufacturer but not to the logistics vendor in the decentralized 
supply chain. The integrated supply chain can achieve better profitability. 
(2) If the product costs and the customization level are at the medium level, generally it 
is profitable to the traditional manufacturer but not to the logistics vendor in the 
decentralized Bertrand supply chain. In the decentralized Stackelberg supply chain, 
this strategy benefits supply chain stakeholders. The integrated supply chain can 
always gain more profits by the introduction of this new TF product. 
(3) If the product costs and the customization level are high, both the traditional 
manufacturer and the logistics vendor can always gain more profits in the 
decentralized Bertrand supply chain from this strategy. However, in the decentralized 
Stackelberg supply chain, this strategy is beneficial to the logistics vendor but not to 
MS-TM3DL
MS-TMTF3DL
MS-TM3DL
MS-TMTF3DL
MS-TM3DL
MS-TMTF3DL
LS-TM3DL
LS-TMTF3DL
LS-TM3DL
LS-TMTF3DL
LS-TM3DL
LS-TMTF3DL
SC-TM3DL
SC-TMTF3DL
SC-TM3DL
SC-TMTF3DL
SC-TM3DL
SC-TMTF3DL
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the traditional manufacturer. The integrated supply chain can obtain more profits 
from this strategy. 
As Table 4 indicates, whatever the costs of the logistics delivery are, the whole supply chain 
achieves better financial performance either from the newly created TF product sales or the 
increased TM or 3DP product sales. In a supply chain on the low setting, the introduction of 
the TF product helps the traditional manufacturer generate more profits on the new TF 
product. But the logistics vendor loses profit on 3DP product sales. On the medium setting, 
in the decentralized Bertrand supply chain, the new TF product helps the traditional 
manufacturer obtain more profits on the new TF product. Because some price-sensitive 
consumers choose to buy the new TF product instead of the 3DP product, the logistics vendor 
loses part of the revenue. However, under the decentralized Stackelberg supply chain, for the 
purpose of maximizing his/her profit, the logistics vendor always prices the 3DP product 
after s/he receives the prices of the TF and the TM product. On the high setting, in the 
decentralized Bertrand supply chain, the logistics vendor uses a high price to maximize the 
3DP product margin, which leads to increases in the TM and TF product sales. Thus, it brings 
more profit to the traditional manufacturer through the TM and the TF product sales, whilst 
the logistics vendor gains more profit on the goods delivery service. However, under the 
decentralized Stackelberg supply chain, because of the high cost structure, the traditional 
manufacturer ‘defaults’ the price of the 3DP product is high and uses high price regimes for 
the TM and the TF product. However, the logistics vendor uses a low-price regime to 
maximize profits from 3DP product sales. In the end, the traditional manufacturer loses profit 
due to the high price strategy, but the logistics vendor gains more profit due to the high 3DP 
product margin. 
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Table 4 Maximized Profit: Comparison by Logistics Service Cost – TM3DL and TMTF3DL 
Low Medium High 
   
   
   
   
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 G' H' ) G3. H3. Q G!" H!" ,& 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.025 0.02 0.2 0.1 0.03 - 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.1 0.25 0.4 0.3 0.3 - 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.35 - 
 
The Impact of the TM Product Customization Level 
PROPOSITION 5.  If the traditional manufacturer adds the TF product to compete with the 
logistics vendor’s 3DP product, 
0.005 0.010 0.015
cL
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.005
0.006
MB-TM3DL
MB-TMTF3DL
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
cL
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.005
0.006
MB-TM3DL
MB-TMTF3DL
0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.27
cL
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.010
0.012
0.014
MB-TM3DL
MB-TMTF3DL
0.005 0.010 0.015
cL
0.180
0.182
0.184
0.186
0.188
0.190
LB-TM3DL
LB-TMTF3DL
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
cL
0.034
0.036
0.038
0.040
0.042
LB-TM3DL
LB-TMTF3DL
0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.27
cL
0.010
0.015
0.020
LB-TM3DL
LB-TMTF3DL
0.005 0.010 0.015
cL
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.005
0.006
MS-TM3DL
MS-TMTF3DL
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
cL
-0.001
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.005
0.006
MS-TM3DL
MS-TMTF3DL
0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.27
cL
0.006
0.008
0.010
0.012
0.014
0.016
0.018
MS-TM3DL
MS-TMTF3DL
0.005 0.010 0.015
cL0.178
0.180
0.182
0.184
0.186
0.188
0.190
LS-TM3DL
LS-TMTF3DL
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
cL
0.024
0.026
0.028
0.030
0.032
0.034
0.036
LS-TM3DL
LS-TMTF3DL 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.27 cL
-0.015
-0.010
-0.005
0.005
0.010
0.015
LS-TM3DL
LS-TMTF3DL
0.005 0.010 0.015
cL
0.1896
0.1898
0.1900
0.1902
0.1904
0.1906
SC-TM3DL
SC-TMTF3DL
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
cL
0.041
0.042
0.043
0.044
0.045
SC-TM3DL
SC-TMTF3DL
0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.27
cL
0.015
0.020
0.025
0.030
0.035
0.040
0.045
SC-TM3DL
SC-TMTF3DL
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(1) In the low-cost structure supply chain, this strategy is profitable to the traditional 
manufacturer in the decentralized supply chain. It is not profitable to the logistics 
vendor except when the TM product customization level is extremely high. This 
strategy contributes more profits to the integrated supply chain. 
(2) In the medium cost structure supply chain, both the traditional manufacturer and the 
logistics vendor can share the benefits of this strategy. The integrated supply chain 
can achieve better financial performance as well after the traditional manufacturer 
replaces the TM product with the TF product. 
(3) In the high cost structure supply chain, it is profitable for the traditional 
manufacturer but not for the logistics vendor in the decentralized Bertrand supply 
chain. In the decentralized Stackelberg supply chain, it is profitable to the traditional 
manufacturer, but the logistics vendor can only obtain more profit if the TM product’s 
customization level is low enough. It is profitable for the integrated supply chain. 
As seen in Table 5, in a supply chain on the low setting, the TF product with its higher 
customization level can help the traditional manufacturer acquire more price-sensitive 
consumers from the 3DP product’s consumer base. Therefore, the traditional manufacturer 
can achieve better financial performance. However, if the TM product’s customization level 
is low (low customization, low product price), some customization-sensitive consumers 
switch to the TF product and some price-sensitive consumers choose to buy the TF product 
instead of the 3DP product. As a result, the logistics vendor loses profit from both the 
traditional logistics delivery service and 3DP product sales. But, if the customization level of 
the TM product is high, the new TF product has no significant impact on market demand. 
However, the new TF product helps with the acquisition of more price-sensitive and 
customization-sensitive consumers, which contributes to the logistics vendor’s profitability. 
Overall, in the integrated supply chain, the new TF product helps the supply chain gain more 
profits through the newly created TF product market. 
In a supply chain on the medium setting, the new TF product helps the traditional 
manufacturer create a new revenue stream and the logistics vendor can also enjoy more 
business for its product delivery service. Therefore, supply chain stakeholders can achieve 
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better performance and the integrated suppliers’ profitability might be improved by this new 
TF product adoption as well. 
Under a supply chain on the high setting, the new TF product can also help the traditional 
manufacturer generate more profits on the new TF product in the decentralized supply chain. 
The integrated supply chain can make more profit through the TF product. However, in the 
decentralized Bertrand supply chain, the new TF product forces the logistics vendor to use a 
high-price regime for his/her 3DP product to increase the product margin. Consequently, the 
logistics vendor’s profitability declines due to both the reduced 3DP product sales and TM 
product delivery. However, in the decentralized Stackelberg supply chain, if the TM product 
customization level is extremely low, the introduction of a new TF product can help the 
traditional manufacturer acquire more customization-sensitive consumers and the logistics 
vendor can benefit from the new TF product delivery service. In general, the new TF product 
helps the development of the integrated supply chain. 
 
Table 5 Maximized Supply Chain Profit: Comparison by TM Product Customization Level – 
TM3DL and TMTF3DL 
Low Medium High 
   
   
0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20

0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
MB-TM3DL
MB-TMTF3DL
0.36 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.40

0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
MB-TM3DL
MB-TMTF3DL
0.52 0.54 0.56 0.58 0.60

0.5
1.0
1.5
MB-TM3DL
MB-TMTF3DL
0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20

0.18
0.19
0.20
0.21
LB-TM3DL
LB-TMTF3DL
0.36 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.40

0.046
0.048
0.050
0.052
0.054
LB-TM3DL
LB-TMTF3DL
0.52 0.54 0.56 0.58 0.60

0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
LB-TM3DL
LB-TMTF3DL
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 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 G' H' ) G3. H3. Q G!" H!" ,& 
Low 0.01 0.01 - 0.025 0.02 0.2 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Medium 0.05 0.05 - 0.1 0.25 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 - 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.35 0.01 
 
The Impact of the TF Product Customization Level  
PROPOSITION 6.  If the traditional manufacturer adds a TF product to compete with the 
logistics vendor’s 3DP product, 
(1) In the low-cost structure supply chain, this strategy is profitable to the traditional 
manufacturer in the decentralized supply chain. It is not profitable to the logistics 
vendor except when the TM product customization level is extremely high. This 
strategy contributes more profits to the integrated supply chain. 
(2) In the medium cost structure supply chain, the traditional manufacturer can always 
gain more profits by adding a new TF product into the market. However, in the 
decentralized Bertrand supply chain, the logistics vendor can also obtain more profit 
only if the TF product’s customization level is high. In the decentralized Stackelberg 
supply chain, the logistics vendor gains the benefits of this strategy if the TF product’s 
customization level is extremely high or low. The integrated supply chain can achieve 
better financial performance by this strategy. 
(3) In the high cost structure supply chain, the traditional manufacturer can attain better 
profitability in the decentralized supply chain. The logistics vendor can also share 
the benefits of this strategy in the decentralized Stackelberg supply chain. However, 
the logistics vendor can only gain more profits if the TF product’s customization level 
0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20

0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
MS-TM3DL
MS-TMTF3DL
0.36 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.40

0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
MS-TM3DL
MS-TMTF3DL
0.52 0.54 0.56 0.58 0.60

0.5
1.0
1.5
MS-TM3DL
MS-TMTF3DL
0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20

0.18
0.19
0.20
0.21
LS-TM3DL
LS-TMTF3DL
0.36 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.40

0.035
0.040
0.045
0.050
0.055
LS-TM3DL
LS-TMTF3DL
0.52 0.54 0.56 0.58 0.60

0.025
0.030
0.035
0.040
LS-TM3DL
LS-TMTF3DL
0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20

0.190
0.192
0.194
0.196
0.198
0.200
0.202
SC-TM3DL
SC-TMTF3DL
0.36 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.40

0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
SC-TM3DL
SC-TMTF3DL
0.52 0.54 0.56 0.58 0.60

0.5
1.0
1.5
SC-TM3DL
SC-TMTF3DL
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is located in the high region. The integrated supply chain can achieve better 
performance. 
As shown in below table, in a supply chain on the low setting, the TF product with a higher 
product customization level can help the traditional manufacturer acquire more price-
sensitive consumers from the 3DP product’s consumer base. Therefore, the traditional 
manufacturer can achieve better financial performance through the newly created TF product 
market. For the logistics vendor, s/he loses profit due to the cannibalization of the TF product. 
However, if the customization level of the TF product is similar to the 3DP product, the 
logistics vendor can generate more profits from goods delivery. 
In a supply chain on the medium setting, the traditional manufacturer can attain better 
financial performance due to the newly created TF product market. But in the decentralized 
Bertrand supply chain, if the TM product’s customization level is low, the TM product not 
only cannibalizes the 3DP product market but also the TM product market. Therefore, the 
logistics vendor loses profits overall. However, if the TF product customization level is 
nearly the same as that of the 3DP product, the new TF product only has a cannibalization 
effect on the 3DP product. Thus, the logistics vendor can make more profit on its traditional 
goods delivery business. In the decentralized Stackelberg supply chain, if the TF product 
customization level is sufficiently low (i.e. the TF price is low, as formalized in 
PROPOSITION 2), the new TF product strategy pushes the logistics vendor to set the 3DP 
product price low to attract more customization-sensitive consumers. If the TF product 
customization level is higher, the introduction of the TF product pushes the logistics vendor 
to price the 3DP product higher to maximizing his/her profits. In general, the logistics vendor 
can increase his/her profits, either from 3DP product sales or from the newly created 
traditional delivery requirements. 
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In a supply chain on the high setting, the new TF product creates a new profit stream for the 
traditional manufacturer and the integrated supply chain. However, the logistics vendor’s 
profitability depends on the TM product’s customization level. In the decentralized Bertrand 
supply chain, if the TM product’s customization level is low, the TF product cannibalizes the 
TM product market. Thus, the logistics vendor loses profit on traditional goods delivery. But, 
if the TM product’s customization level is high, the traditional manufacturer could use a low 
TF product price to attract more price-sensitive consumers to switch from the 3DP product, 
and the logistics vendor benefits from the increased TF product goods delivery. But, in the 
decentralized Stackelberg supply chain, this does not hold true if the TM product 
customization level is low. After the traditional manufacturer uses a low-price regime for the 
TF product, the logistics vendor could use a high price strategy for the 3DP product to achieve 
a larger margin on the 3DP product. The logistics vendor can always attain better profitability 
in the decentralized Stackelberg supply chain. 
Table 6 Maximized Supply Chain Profit: Comparison by TF Product Customization Level – 
TM3DL and TMTF3DL 
Low Medium High 
   
   
   
0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00

0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
MB-TM3DL
MB-TMTF3DL
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
MB-TM3DL
MB-TMTF3DL
0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
MB-TM3DL
MB-TMTF3DL
0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00

0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
LB-TM3DL
LB-TMTF3DL
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
LB-TM3DL
LB-TMTF3DL
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
LB-TM3DL
LB-TMTF3DL
0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00

0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
MS-TM3DL
MS-TMTF3DL
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
MS-TM3DL
MS-TMTF3DL
0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

0.05
0.10
0.15
MS-TM3DL
MS-TMTF3DL
 427 
   
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 G' H' ) G3. H3. Q G!" H!" ,& 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.025 0.02 - 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.1 0.25 - 0.3 0.3 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 0.3 0.3 - 0.6 0.35 0.01 
 
TF3DL Model 
In below section, we test whether the traditional manufacturer using TF production to fully 
replace TM production is a profitable manufacturing strategy for the traditional manufacturer 
and the logistics vendor. We also analyze whether this strategy is beneficial for the integrated 
supply chain or not.  
The Impact of the TM Product Costs 
PROPOSITION 7. If the traditional manufacturing decides fully use TF product to replace 
TM product for the purpose of coping with the logistics vendor’s 3DP technology, 
(1) For the low-cost structure and low product customization supply chain, fully 
replacing TM production with TF production is not a profitable strategy for either 
the traditional manufacturer or the logistics vendor in the decentralized supply chain. 
It cannot bring any benefits to the integrated supply chain either. 
(2) If the product costs and the customization level are at the medium level, fully 
replacing TM production with TF production is not a profitable strategy for either 
the traditional manufacturer or the logistics vendor in the decentralized supply chain. 
0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00

0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
LS-TM3DL
LS-TMTF3DL
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

0.015
0.020
0.025
0.030
LS-TM3DL
LS-TMTF3DL
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

-0.02
0.02
0.04
0.06
LS-TM3DL
LS-TMTF3DL
0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00

0.195
0.200
0.205
0.210
SC-TM3DL
SC-TMTF3DL
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
SC-TM3DL
SC-TMTF3DL
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

0.05
0.10
0.15
SC-TM3DL
SC-TMTF3DL
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However, if the costs of TM are within a certain low range, the integrated supply 
chain can attain better profitability. 
(3) If the product costs and the customization level are high, in the decentralized 
Bertrand supply chain, if the TM product costs are sufficiently low, this strategy is 
beneficial to both the traditional manufacturer and the logistics vendor. However, in 
the decentralized Stackelberg supply chain, this strategy is not profitable to the 
traditional manufacturer, whilst the logistics vendor can attain more profit if the costs 
of TM are low. There exists a low TM product cost setting, and if the TM product 
costs are located in that region, the integrated supply chain can obtain more profit. 
Table 7 Maximized Profit: Comparison by TM Product Cost – TM3DL and TF3DL 
Low Medium High 
   
   
   
   
   
MB-TM3DL
MB-TF3DL
MB-TM3DL
MB-TF3DL
MB-TM3DL
MB-TF3DL
LB-TM3DL
LB-TF3DL
LB-TM3DL
LB-TF3DL
LB-TM3DL
LB-TF3DL
MS-TM3DL
MS-TF3DL
MS-TM3DL
MS-TF3DL
MS-TM3DL
MS-TF3DL
LS-TM3DL
LS-TF3DL
LS-TM3DL
LS-TF3DL
LS-TM3DL
LS-TF3DL
SC-TM3DL
SC-TF3DL
SC-TM3DL
SC-TF3DL
SC-TM3DL
SC-TF3DL
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 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 G' H' ) G3. H3. Q G!" H!" ,& 
Low - - 0.1 0.025 0.02 0.2 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Medium - - 0.2 0.1 0.25 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.01 
High - - 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.35 0.01 
Overall, fully replacing the TM product with the TF product is not a profitable strategy for 
the traditional manufacturer (seen in Table 7). However, in the decentralized Bertrand supply 
chain on the high cost setting, if the TM product costs are very low, introducing the TF 
product means the traditional manufacturer can set a higher margin per TF product. Thus, the 
traditional manufacturer can achieve better profitability. Although the logistics vendor loses 
revenue from TM product sales, his/her profit on the 3DP product increases. And in the 
decentralized Stackelberg supply chain on the high setting, if the costs of the TM product are 
sufficiently low, because the TF price is higher than that of the TM product, the logistics 
vendor can benefit from a higher 3DP product margin. Therefore, the logistics vendor can 
attain better profitability under this scenario. In the integrated supply chain, on the low 
setting, the system cannot generate more profit because of the loss of TM product sales. 
However, on the medium and high settings, although the price of the TF product is higher 
than that of the TM product (the costs of the TF product are higher than for the TM product), 
the new TF product can help the system achieve more 3DP product sales. Therefore, there 
exists a region in which the system can gain more profits on the 3DP product sales than the 
loss incurred on the traditional manufacturer’s product sales.  
The Impact of the TF Product Costs 
PROPOSITION 8. If the traditional manufacturing decides fully use TF product to replace 
TM product for the purpose of coping with the logistics vendor’s 3DP technology, 
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(1) For the low-cost structure and low product customization supply chain, fully 
replacing the TM production by new TF production is a profitable strategy for both 
the traditional manufacturer and the logistics vendor in the decentralized supply 
chain and the integrated supply chain – except when the fixed TF product cost is 
extremely low. 
(2) If the product costs and the customization level are at the medium level, fully 
replacing the TM production by new TF production is a profitable strategy for the 
traditional manufacturer and the logistics vendor in the decentralized Stackelberg 
supply chain. In the decentralized Bertrand supply chain, this strategy is beneficial 
to the traditional manufacturer. However, the logistics vendor can only gain more 
profits if the fixed cost of the TF product is sufficiently low or high. Under this 
scenario, it is profitable for the integrated supply chain. 
(3) If the product costs and the customization level are high, in the decentralized 
Bertrand supply chain, if the fixed TF product cost is sufficiently low or sufficiently 
high, this strategy is beneficial to both the traditional manufacturer and the logistics 
vendor. However, in the decentralized Stackelberg supply chain, this strategy is 
profitable to the traditional manufacturer, whilst the logistics vendor can gain more 
profits if the fixed cost of the TF product is within a specified low or high region. As 
for the integrated supply chain, it can attain more profits if the fixed cost of the TF 
product is in a low or high region. 
 
Table 8 Maximized Profit: Comparison by TF Product Cost – TM3DL and TF3DL 
Low Medium High 
   
   
   
MB-TM3DL
MB-TF3DL
MB-TM3DL
MB-TF3DL
MB-TM3DL
MB-TF3DL
LB-TM3DL
LB-TF3DL
LB-TM3DL
LB-TF3DL
LB-TM3DL
LB-TF3DL
MS-TM3DL
MS-TF3DL
MS-TM3DL
MS-TF3DL
MS-TM3DL
MS-TF3DL
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 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 G' H' ) G3. H3. Q G!" H!" ,& 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 - - 0.2 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 - - 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 - - 0.6 0.6 0.35 0.01 
 
According to above table, in a supply chain on the low setting, overall, fully replacing TM 
production by TF production is profitable to the traditional manufacturer and the logistics 
vendor in the decentralized supply chain and the integrated supply chain. However, if the 
fixed cost of the TF product is extremely low, because the TM product’s variable cost is 
higher than the TF product’s variable cost, the price of the TF product is higher than that of 
the TM product. Therefore, under this scenario, the traditional manufacturer loses profit 
because he/she loses some price-sensitive consumers. Accordingly, the logistics vendor also 
loses profits on the goods delivery service. As for the integrated supply chain, due to their 
being fewer price-sensitive consumers, the system cannot generate more profit than the 
TM3DL supply chain. However, if the fixed cost of the TF product is in the high region, the 
traditional manufacturer can attain more profit on the TF product due to the higher product 
LS-TM3DL
LS-TF3DL
LS-TM3DL
LS-TF3DL
LS-TM3DL
LS-TF3DL
SC-TM3DL
SC-TF3DL
SC-TM3DL
SC-TF3DL
SC-TM3DL
SC-TF3DL
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margin and the logistics vendor can gain more profits on 3DP product sales. Meanwhile, the 
integrated supply chain benefits from the increased 3DP product sales. 
The Impact of the 3DP Product Costs 
PROPOSITION 9. If the traditional manufacturing decides fully use TF product to replace 
TM product for the purpose of coping with the logistics vendor’s 3DP technology, 
(1) For the low-cost structure and low product customization supply chain, fully 
replacing TM production by TF production is a profitable strategy for both the 
traditional manufacturer and the logistics vendor in the decentralized Bertrand 
supply chain and the integrated supply chain – as long as the 3DP product costs are 
not extremely low. In the decentralized Stackelberg supply chain, it is profitable for 
the logistics vendor and it is also profitable for the traditional manufacturer – except 
when the 3DP product costs are extremely low. 
(2) If the product costs and the customization level are at the medium level, in the 
decentralized Bertrand supply chain, this strategy is profitable for the traditional 
manufacturer, but the logistics vendor can only attain more profit if the costs of the 
3DP product are extremely low or the costs of the 3DP product are high. Under the 
decentralized Stackelberg supply chain, this strategy is profitable for the logistics 
vendor, but the traditional manufacturer can also gain more profits – except when 
the 3DP product costs are low. The integrated supply chain can always attain more 
profits. 
(3) If the product costs and the customization level are high, under the decentralized 
Bertrand supply chain, if the costs of the 3DP product are sufficiently low or 
extremely high, it is profitable to both the traditional manufacturer and the logistics 
vendor. Otherwise, both parties cannot benefit from this strategy at the same time. In 
the decentralized Stackelberg supply chain, the traditional manufacturer can gain 
more profits from this strategy. However, the logistics vendor can also obtain more 
profits – except when the fixed 3DP product cost is high and the variable 3DP product 
cost is low. The integrated supply chain can gain more profits if the 3DP product 
costs are located in a considerably low or a considerably high region. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9 Maximized Profit: Comparison by 3DP Product Cost – TM3DL and TF3DL 
Low Medium High 
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 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 G' H' ) G3. H3. Q G!" H!" ,& 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.025 0.02 0.2 - - 0.01 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.1 0.25 0.4 - - 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 - - 0.01 
 
MB-TM3DL
MB-TF3DL
MB-TM3DL
MB-TF3DL
MB-TM3DL
MB-TF3DL
LB-TM3DL
LB-TF3DL
LB-TM3DL
LB-TF3DL
LB-TM3DL
LB-TF3DL
MS-TM3DL
MS-TF3DL
MS-TM3DL
MS-TF3DL
MS-TM3DL
MS-TF3DL
LS-TM3DL
LS-TF3DL
LS-TM3DL
LS-TF3DL
LS-TM3DL
LS-TF3DL
SC-TM3DL
SC-TF3DL
SC-TM3DL
SC-TF3DL
SC-TM3DL
SC-TF3DL
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As shown in above table, in a supply chain on the low setting, if the 3DP product costs are 
low, the new TF product cannot benefit from obvious advantages in terms of product cost 
and product customization. Therefore, the traditional manufacturer cannot generate more 
profits on the new TF product and the logistics vendor loses profits on the associated delivery 
service. However, in the Stackelberg supply chain, because the logistics vendor prices the 
3DP product later, the logistics vendor uses an appropriate price for the 3DP product in terms 
of maximizing his/her profit.  
On the medium supply chain setting, the traditional manufacturer can attain more profit in 
the decentralized Bertrand supply chain. The logistics vendor can only gain more profits 
under two scenarios: a) the 3DP product costs are extremely low, and so the high price TF 
product pushes more consumers to buy the 3DP product; and b) 3DP production is 
considerably costly, and so a portion of the customization-sensitive consumers choose to buy 
the TF product in view of the product’s price. Meanwhile, the logistics vendor benefits from 
the increased TF product delivery service. In the decentralized Stackelberg supply chain, the 
logistics vendor can always generate more profits either from the increased goods delivery 
service or from the increased 3DP product sales. However, when the 3DP product costs are 
low, the traditional manufacturer loses product sales because the TF product cannot attain 
the price advantage. If the 3DP product costs are high, the TF product can bring more profits 
to the traditional manufacturer because it can attract more customization-sensitive consumers 
than the TM product. Overall, the integrated supply chain can derive more profits, either from 
the TF product or the 3DP product.  
On the high supply chain setting, in the decentralized Bertrand supply chain, according to the 
different levels of the 3DP product cost, the results of the comparison of outcomes for the 
traditional manufacturer and the logistics vendor could be summarized into five different 
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scenarios (Figure 1). a) In Region I, the traditional manufacturer can attain more profits from 
the TF product’s high margin and the logistics vendor can make more profits from 3DP 
product sales. b) In Region II, the traditional manufacturer can still make more profits on the 
high TF product margin, but the logistics vendor loses profits on the goods delivery service. 
c) In Region III, both parties lose their profits; although the TF product has a customization 
advantage over the TM product, it has no price advantage. Therefore, under this scenario, the 
traditional manufacturer loses overall revenue on product sales. Besides, the logistics vendor 
cannot make more profit on goods delivery. In addition, when the 3DP price is high, price-
sensitive consumers leave the 3DP product market. d) In Region IV, the TF product has a 
price advantage, and so the traditional manufacturer can make more profit. But the logistics 
vendor’s overall performance is worse due to the loss of the 3DP product sales. e) In Region 
V, the costs of the 3DP product are extremely high; therefore, the new TF product contributes 
more TF product sales revenue to the traditional manufacturer and increased TF product 
delivery revenue to the logistics vendor. Therefore, it is a win-win strategy under this supply 
chain structure. Compared to the decentralized Bertrand supply chain, the insights from the 
decentralized Stackelberg supply chain are simpler. Firstly, the traditional manufacturer can 
always attain more profits because the logistics vendor decides the 3DP product pricing 
strategy later. For example, if the costs of the 3DP product are high, the traditional 
manufacturer prices the TF product high for the purpose of maximizing the TF product’s 
margin. The market demand for the TF product drops, but the logistics vendor can use the 
high-price regime on the 3DP product to maintain his/her income from the logistics delivery 
service. However, the logistics vendor cannot always obtain more profit under the scenario 
where the 3DP product’s fixed cost is high, but the variable cost is low. In this situation, the 
low 3DP pricing strategy causes more price-sensitive consumers to leave the market with 
empty hands. Although the traditional manufacturer derives more profits from the high TF 
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product margin, the logistics vendor loses profit from both the goods delivery service and the 
3DP product sales. 
If the 3DP product costs are sufficiently low or considerably high, the integrated supply 
chain can achieve better profitability. Specifically, if the 3DP product costs are low, the 
new TF product pushes more customization-sensitive consumers to choose the 3DP 
product. This helps the supply chain by bringing benefits from the increased 3DP product 
sales. If the 3DP product costs are high, the TF product can attract more customization-
sensitive consumers than the previous TM product. Therefore, the supply chain can make 
more profit on the traditional manufacturer’s product sales. 
 
Figure 1 3DP Product Cost Level 
The Impact of the Logistics Delivery Cost 
PROPOSITION 0-10. If the traditional manufacturing decides fully use TF product to replace 
TM product for the purpose of coping with the logistics vendor’s 3DP technology, 
(1) In the low-cost structure and low product customization supply chain, this strategy is 
not profitable to either the traditional manufacturer or the logistics vendor in the 
decentralized Bertrand supply chain. However, in the decentralized Stackelberg 
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supply chain, although it is not profitable to the traditional manufacture all the timer, 
if the logistics delivery cost is sufficiently low, it is profitable to the logistics vendor. 
The integrated supply chain cannot achieve better profitability. 
(2) If the product costs and the customization level are at the medium level, generally 
this strategy is profitable to the traditional manufacturer and the logistics vendor if 
the logistics delivery cost is low – in the decentralized Bertrand supply chain. In the 
decentralized Stackelberg supply chain, this strategy benefits the logistics vendor, but 
the traditional manufacturer can only benefit if the delivery cost is low. The 
integrated supply chain can only gain more profits by the introduction of a new TF 
product if the delivery cost is sufficiently low. 
(3) If the product costs and the customization level are high, both the traditional 
manufacturer and the logistics vendor can always gain more profits in the 
decentralized Bertrand supply chain. However, in the decentralized Stackelberg 
supply chain, it is beneficial for the logistics vendor but not for the traditional 
manufacturer. The integrated supply chain can enjoy more profits through this 
strategy. 
On the low-cost structure supply chain setting (Table 10), the logistics delivery cost has no 
impact on the integrated supply chain’s profitability because the introduction of a new TF 
product results in fewer product sales. Meanwhile, in the decentralized Bertrand supply 
chain, neither party can generate more profits because the TF product has no advantages over 
the previous TM product. However, in the Stackelberg supply chain, if the delivery cost is 
sufficiently low, the logistics vendor can still make more profits on TF product delivery to 
cover his/her loss on 3DP product sales. With the medium supply chain setting, if the delivery 
cost is low, the traditional manufacturer can use the TF product with its higher customization 
level to earn more profits than the TM product, whilst the logistics vendor can also generate 
more revenue from the logistics service in the decentralized Bertrand supply chain. But in 
the Stackelberg supply chain, if the logistics cost is high, the logistics vendor can make more 
profit by increasing the 3DP product margin. Overall, the integrated supply chain can only 
gain more profits in the low delivery cost scenarios. With the high supply chain setting, both 
the traditional manufacturer and the logistics vendor benefit from the TF product in the 
decentralized Bertrand supply chain. But in the decentralized Stackelberg supply chain, the 
traditional manufacturer cannot make more profit because the price of the TF product is 
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higher than the TM product. As for the integrated supply chain, either the new high margin 
on the TF product or the increased 3DP product sales can help it achieve more profit. 
Table 10 Maximized Profit: Comparison by Logistics Service Cost – TM3DL and TF3DL 
Low Medium High 
   
   
   
   
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 G' H' ) G3. H3. Q G!" H!" ,& 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.025 0.02 0.2 0.1 0.03 - 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.1 0.25 0.4 0.3 0.3 - 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.35 - 
 
0.005 0.010 0.015
cL
0.0001
0.0002
0.0003
0.0004
MB-TM3DL
MB-TF3DL
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
cL
0.0005
0.0010
0.0015
MB-TM3DL
MB-TF3DL
0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.27
cL
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.010
0.012
MB-TM3DL
MB-TF3DL
0.005 0.010 0.015
cL
0.1893
0.1894
0.1895
0.1896
0.1897
0.1898
0.1899
LB-TM3DL
LB-TF3DL
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
cL
0.0405
0.0410
0.0415
0.0420
LB-TM3DL
LB-TF3DL
0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.27
cL
0.006
0.008
0.010
0.012
0.014
0.016
LB-TM3DL
LB-TF3DL
0.005 0.010 0.015
cL
0.0001
0.0002
0.0003
0.0004
0.0005
MS-TM3DL
MS-TF3DL
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
cL
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
MS-TM3DL
MS-TF3DL
0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.27
cL
0.010
0.015
MS-TM3DL
MS-TF3DL
0.005 0.010 0.015
cL
0.1892
0.1893
0.1894
0.1895
0.1896
0.1897
LS-TM3DL
LS-TF3DL
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
cL
0.025
0.030
0.035
0.040
LS-TM3DL
LS-TF3DL 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.27
cL
-0.015
-0.010
-0.005
0.005
0.010
LS-TM3DL
LS-TF3DL
0.005 0.010 0.015
cL
0.1895
0.1900
0.1905
SC-TM3DL
SC-TF3DL
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
cL
0.041
0.042
0.043
0.044
SC-TM3DL
SC-TF3DL
0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.27
cL
0.015
0.020
0.025
0.030
0.035
SC-TM3DL
SC-TF3DL
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The Impact of the TM Product Customization Level 
PROPOSITION 11.  If the traditional manufacturing decides fully use TF product to 
replace TM product for the purpose of coping with the logistics vendor’s 3DP technology, 
(1) In the decentralized supply chain with the low-cost structure and low TM product 
customization level, both the traditional manufacturer and the logistics vendor can 
gain more profits if the TM product customization level is high. As for the integrated 
supply chain, it can also achieve better profitability if the TM product’s customization 
level is high. 
(2) In the decentralized Bertrand supply chain with the medium cost structure and TM 
product customization level, it is not profitable for either the traditional manufacturer 
or the logistics vendor. However, it is profitable for both parties under the 
decentralized Stackelberg supply chain. The integrated supply chain cannot attain 
more profit under the new TF3DL model. 
(3) If the product costs are high and the TM product customization level is located in a 
high region, this strategy is not profitable to the traditional manufacturer or the 
logistics vendor in the decentralized supply chain. The integrated supply chain cannot 
gain more profits from this strategy. 
As seen in Table 11, with the low supply chain setting, if TM product customization is high, 
using a TF product with a higher customization level (and with a higher product price) results 
in the loss of price-sensitive consumers. Overall, this new TF product strategy has a negative 
impact on the traditional manufacturer’s product sales and the logistics vendor loses profits 
on the goods delivery service. The integrated supply chain cannot achieve better financial 
performance due to the shrunken market demand. 
On the medium supply chain setting, in the decentralized Bertrand supply chain, the new TF 
product has less advantage with regard to pricing strategy. Thus the traditional manufacturer 
prefers to use a high-price regime to maximize its product’s unit margin, which results in a 
decrease in product sales. In addition, it causes the traditional manufacturer and the logistics 
vendor to lose profits. However, under the decentralized Stackelberg supply chain, after the 
logistics vendor receives the high TF price, for the purpose of insuring the traditional delivery 
service, the logistics vendor prices the 3DP product high to push more consumers to buy the 
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TF product. Therefore, both parties can attain better profitability overall. But the integrated 
supply chain cannot generate more profit on product sales. 
On the high supply chain setting, the new TF product results in a loss on product sales, not 
only for the supply chain stakeholders in the decentralized supply chain but also for the 
integrated supply chain, because the TF product has less of a customization and price 
advantage over the previous TM product and the 3DP product. A portion of the price-
sensitive consumers leave the market with empty hands. 
Table 11 Maximized Supply Chain Profit: Comparison by Product Customization Level – TM3DL 
and TF3DL (Decentralized Bertrand Supply Chain) 
Low Medium High 
   
   
   
   
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20

0.0002
0.0004
0.0006
0.0008
0.0010
MB-TM3DL
MB-TF3DL
0.36 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.40

0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.005
0.006
MB-TM3DL
MB-TF3DL
0.52 0.54 0.56 0.58 0.60

0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
MB-TM3DL
MB-TF3DL
0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20

0.1895
0.1900
0.1905
0.1910
LB-TM3DL
LB-TF3DL
0.36 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.40

0.042
0.044
0.046
0.048
LB-TM3DL
LB-TF3DL
0.52 0.54 0.56 0.58 0.60

0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
LB-TM3DL
LB-TF3DL
0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20

0.0002
0.0004
0.0006
0.0008
0.0010
0.0012
MS-TM3DL
MS-TF3DL
0.36 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.40

-0.0010
-0.0005
MS-TM3DL
MS-TF3DL
0.52 0.54 0.56 0.58 0.60

0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
0.025
0.030
0.035
MS-TM3DL
MS-TF3DL
0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20

0.1895
0.1900
0.1905
LS-TM3DL
LS-TF3DL
0.36 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.40

0.032
0.034
0.036
0.038
0.040
LS-TM3DL
LS-TF3DL
0.52 0.54 0.56 0.58 0.60

0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
LS-TM3DL
LS-TF3DL
0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20

0.190
0.191
0.192
0.193
SC-TM3DL
SC-TF3DL
0.36 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.40

0.045
0.050
0.055
SC-TM3DL
SC-TF3DL
0.52 0.54 0.56 0.58 0.60

0.05
0.10
0.15
SC-TM3DL
SC-TF3DL
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 G' H' ) G3. H3. Q G!" H!" ,& 
Low 0.01 0.01 - 0.025 0.02 0.2 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Medium 0.05 0.05 - 0.1 0.25 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 - 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.35 0.01 
 
The Impact of the TF Product Customization Level 
PROPOSITION 12.  If the traditional manufacturing decides fully use TF product to replace 
TM product for the purpose of coping with the logistics vendor’s 3DP technology, 
(1) It is a profitable strategy for the stakeholders in the decentralized supply chain, and 
the integrated supply chain can also benefit when the cost structure and TM product 
customization level of the supply chain are low or medium.  
(2) If the product costs are high and the TM product customization level is in the high 
region, then in the decentralized Bertrand supply chain, this strategy is profitable to 
the traditional manufacturer if the TF product customization level is sufficiently low 
or high. The logistics vendor can also make more profit, but only if the TM product 
customization level is high. It is profitable for the traditional manufacturer and the 
logistics vendor in the decentralized Stackelberg supply chain. The integrated supply 
chain can also gain more profits from this strategy, but only if the TF product 
customization level is considerably high. 
Table 12 Maximized Supply Chain Profit: Comparison by Product Customization Level –TM3DL 
and TF3DL (Decentralized Stackelberg Supply Chain) 
Low Medium High 
   
   
   
0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00

0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
MB-TM3DL
MB-TF3DL
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
MB-TM3DL
MB-TF3DL
0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
MB-TM3DL
MB-TF3DL
0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00

0.190
0.192
0.194
0.196
0.198
LB-TM3DL
LB-TF3DL
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.10
LB-TM3DL
LB-TF3DL
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
LB-TM3DL
LB-TF3DL
0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00

0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
MS-TM3DL
MS-TF3DL
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
MS-TM3DL
MS-TF3DL
0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
MS-TM3DL
MS-TF3DL
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 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 G' H' ) G3. H3. Q G!" H!" ,& 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.025 0.02 - 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.1 0.25 - 0.3 0.3 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 0.3 0.3 - 0.6 0.35 0.01 
On the low and medium supply chain settings (Table 12), although the TF product has the 
advantage in terms of customization, the TF product price is higher than that of the TM 
product. Therefore, the traditional manufacturer loses some price-sensitive consumers. 
Consequently, the traditional manufacturer’s profitability becomes worse. And the logistics 
vendor loses business for its traditional product delivery service. In the integrated supply 
chain, the new TF product cannot generate more profits. In the decentralized Bertrand supply 
chain on the high setting, the impact of the new TF manufacturing strategy could be 
summarized into three different scenarios. Firstly, if the customization level of the TF product 
is extremely low, the new TF product has no advantage with regard to customization, but the 
TF price is higher than for the TM product. Therefore, both the traditional manufacturer and 
the logistics vendor use a high-price regime to maximize the product margin. The traditional 
manufacturer can generate more profit. Although the logistics vendor can attain a higher 
margin for each 3DP product, the market sales of the 3DP product drop. Meanwhile, the 
overall quantity of the TF product is lower than for the TM product. Taking all these results 
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into consideration, the logistics vendor loses profit in this supply chain structure. However, 
if the customization level of the TF product is slightly higher, the TF product has fewer 
consumers. Therefore, the traditional manufacturer also loses profits under this scenario. The 
logistics vendor still cannot make more profit due to the shrunken TF product delivery 
service.  
If the TF product’s customization level is high, the traditional manufacturer prices the TF 
product high and the logistics vendor sets the 3DP product price low to secure 3DP product 
sales. Therefore, the traditional manufacturer can attain more profits due to the high TF 
product price. Meanwhile, the logistics vendor can also gain more profits on the 3DP product 
sales. In the decentralized Stackelberg supply chain, whatever the TF product’s 
customization level is, the logistics vendor always chooses a price to maximize his/her own 
profit. For example, if the TM product customization level is low and the TF product costs 
are high, the traditional manufacturer prices the TF product high to obtain a larger product 
margin. Based on this, the logistics vendor prices the 3DP product high to increase the 3DP 
product margin, which also helps to create more business for the delivery service. Therefore, 
the traditional manufacturer can attain better profitability. Overall, in the integrated supply 
chain, if the TF product customization level is low, product sales decline after the traditional 
manufacturer uses TF product manufacturing, which results in a worse supply chain 
performance. However, if the TF product customization level is higher, TF production 
contributes to the overall performance of the supply chain by a higher product margin. 
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TMTF3DM Model 
The Impact of the TM Product Costs 
PROPOSITION 13.  If the traditional manufacturer tries to offer a TM, TF and 3DP product 
at the same time,  
(1) For the low-cost structure and low product customization supply chain, in the 
decentralized supply chain, it is profitable to the traditional manufacturer but not at 
all profitable to the logistics vendor. The integrated supply chain can also enjoy the 
benefits, unless the fixed TM product cost is extremely low; 
(2) If the product costs and the customization level are at the medium level, it is profitable 
to the traditional manufacturer but not to the logistics vendor. Generally, this strategy 
is beneficial to the integrated supply chain, but there exists a region where both the 
fixed TM and variable TM costs are at a low level, and the integrated supply chain 
cannot obtain more profit.   
(3) If the product costs and the customization level are high, in the decentralized 
Bertrand supply chain, it is profitable to the traditional manufacturer but not 
profitable to the logistics vendor. In the decentralized Stackelberg supply chain, this 
strategy brings more profits to the traditional manufacturer. If both the costs of the 
TM products are sufficiently low, the logistics vendor can also enjoy the benefits of 
this strategy. Overall, the integrated supply chain can also obtain more profits, but 
the integrated supply chain cannot gain more profits if both the TM product costs are 
located in the low regions. 
As shown in Table 13, it is clear that in the decentralized supply chain, it is beneficial to the 
traditional manufacturer to add a 3DP product into his/her manufacturing system because of 
the extended product range. But the logistics vendor loses profits because it can only make 
profit from its logistics delivery service. However, on the high supply chain setting, if the 
costs of the TM product are sufficiently low, the logistics vendor can also make more profit, 
because the logistics vendor can gain more profits on the delivery service. In the integrated 
supply chain, the new TMTF3DM model generally helps the supply chain generate more 
profit on 3DP product sales. Because the traditional manufacturer’s 3DP product price is 
lower than the logistics vendor’s in the TM3DL model, more price sensitive consumers 
would like to choose the traditional manufacturer’s 3DP product. However, if the fixed cost 
of the TM product is low on the low supply chain setting, more consumers select the low-
price TM product instead of the high price 3DP product. Therefore, overall the supply chain 
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cannot make more profit. On the medium and high supply chain settings, if the TM product 
costs are extremely low, there are more TM product buyers. If the costs of the TM product 
are high, some customization-sensitive consumers choose the TF or the 3DP product. 
Therefore, in both scenarios, the integrated supply chain can make more profit. In summary, 
in the supply chain on the high setting, if the TM product costs are low, both the traditional 
manufacturer and the logistics vendor can share the benefits of the traditional manufacturer’s 
3 product line strategy. This strategy also contributes to the industry’s development. 
Table 13 Maximized Profit: Comparison by TM Product Cost – TM3DL and TMTF3DM 
Low Medium High 
   
   
   
   
MB-TM3DL
M-TMTF3DM
MB-TM3DL
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MB-TM3DL
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L-TMTF3DM
LS-TM3DL
L-TMTF3DM
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 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 G' H' ) G3. H3. Q G!" H!" ,& 
Low - - 0.1 0.025 0.02 0.2 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Medium - - 0.2 0.1 0.25 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.01 
High - - 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.35 0.01 
 
The Impact of the TF Product Costs 
PROPOSITION 14.  If the traditional manufacturer tries to offer TM, TF and 3DP products 
at the same time,  
(1) As for the low-cost structure and low product customization supply chain, in the 
decentralized supply chain, it is profitable to the traditional manufacturer but not at 
all profitable to the logistics vendor. The integrated supply chain can also enjoy the 
benefits of this supply chain – except when the fixed TF product cost is extremely low. 
(2) If the product costs and the customization level are at the medium level, it is profitable 
to the traditional manufacturer but not to the logistics vendor. Generally, this strategy 
is beneficial to the integrated supply chain, but there exists a region where both the 
fixed TF and variable TF cost are at a certain low level, and the integrated supply 
chain cannot make more profit.   
(3) If the product costs and the customization level are high, in the decentralized 
Bertrand supply chain, it is profitable to the traditional manufacturer but not 
profitable to the logistics vendor. In the decentralized Stackelberg supply chain, it 
brings more profits to both the traditional manufacturer and the logistics vendor. 
Overall, the integrated supply chain can also gain more profits from this strategy. 
In the decentralized supply chain, it is beneficial to the traditional manufacturer to also offer 
a 3DP product because it helps him/her to achieve full market coverage (Table 14). But the 
logistics vendor loses profits because it can only gain profits from its logistics delivery 
service. On the medium supply chain setting, the insights are almost the same, but if the fixed 
TM product cost is sufficiently low, the integrated supply chain can obtain more profits due 
to the increased TF product sales; and if the fixed TF product cost is high, the new 3DP 
SC-TM3DL
SC-TMTF3DM
SC-TM3DL
SC-TMTF3DM
SC-TM3DL
SC-TMTF3DM
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product offering can force more consumers to buy the 3DP product. Therefore, the integrated 
supply chain can also gain more profits. However, there still exists one situation where the 
fixed TF product cost is located in between the cost of the other products, and the new 3DP 
product cannot help the system make more profit due to the cannibalization effect on the 3DP 
and the TF product. In the market led by the traditional manufacturer, on the high supply 
chain setting, the introduction of a new high price 3DP product by the traditional 
manufacturer can help the traditional manufacturer make more profit and the logistics vendor 
can also make more profit on the increased product delivery service. At the integrated supply 
chain level, this strategy also helps the industry’s development. 
Table 14 Maximized Profit: Comparison by TF Product Cost – TM3DL and TMTF3DM 
Low Medium High 
   
   
   
   
MB-TM3DL
M-TMTF3DM
MB-TM3DL
M-TMTF3DM
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M-TMTF3DM
LB-TM3DL
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LB-TM3DL
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LS-TM3DL
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 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 G' H' ) G3. H3. Q G!" H!" ,& 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 - - 0.2 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 - - 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 - - 0.6 0.6 0.35 0.01 
 
The Impact of the 3DP Product Costs 
PROPOSITION 15.  If the traditional manufacturer tries to offer TM, TF and 3DP products 
at the same time,  
(1) As for the low-cost structure and low product customization supply chain, in the 
decentralized Bertrand supply chain, it is profitable to the traditional manufacturer 
but not at all profitable to the logistics vendor. In the decentralized Stackelberg 
supply chain, it is still profitable to the traditional manufacturer, but the logistics 
vendor can only gain more profits if the fixed 3DP product cost is high and the 
variable 3DP product cost is low or the fixed 3DP product cost is low and the variable 
3DP product cost is high. The integrated supply chain can also enjoy the benefits of 
this strategy, except when the 3DP product costs are extremely low. 
(2) If the product costs and the customization level are at the medium level, in the 
decentralized Bertrand supply chain, it is profitable to the traditional manufacturer 
but not at all profitable to the logistics vendor. In the decentralized Stackelberg 
supply chain, it is still profitable to the traditional manufacturer, but the logistics 
vendor can only gain more profits if the fixed 3DP product cost is high or both the 
fixed 3DP product cost and the variable 3DP product cost are low. The integrated 
supply chain can also enjoy the benefits of this strategy, but only if the 3DP product 
costs are extremely low or generally high. 
(3) If the product costs and the customization level are high, in the decentralized 
Bertrand supply chain, it is profitable to the traditional manufacturer but not at all 
profitable to the logistics vendor. In the decentralized Stackelberg supply chain, it is 
still profitable to the traditional manufacturer, but the logistics vendor can only gain 
more profits if the fixed 3DP product cost is high or both the fixed 3DP product cost 
and the variable 3DP product cost are low. The integrated supply chain can also 
enjoy the benefits of this strategy. 
According to Table 15, in the decentralized Bertrand supply chain, the traditional 
manufacturer is always better off operating the TM, TF, and 3DP product, because s/he can 
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benefit from three different revenue streams. However, the logistics vendor cannot gain more 
profits. Therefore, it is risky for the logistics vendor to lose the 3DP product market. In the 
decentralized Stackelberg supply chain, no matter the 3DP product costs, it is still profitable 
to the traditional manufacturer to operate the three different products. However, on the low 
supply chain setting, the logistics vendor can also enjoy the benefits of this strategy, except 
in two scenarios: a) where the variable 3DP product cost is sufficiently low or b) the fixed 
TF cost is notably high. Specifically, if the variable 3DP product cost is low, then it is easier 
for the traditional manufacturer to set up the 3DP product manufacturing system. Therefore, 
the price of the traditional manufacturer’s 3DP product is considerably low. Accordingly, 
more customization-sensitive consumers choose the 3DP product over the TF product which 
leads to profit being lost on the TM and the TF product delivery service operated by the 
logistics vendor. If the fixed cost of the 3DP product is high, the price of the 3DP product is 
located at a high level, and fewer consumers buy the 3DP product. Therefore, the logistics 
vendor not only loses profits on the 3DP product business but also cannot generate more 
profits on product delivery.  
At the integrated supply chain level, if the 3DP product costs are low, the 3DP product 
cannibalizes the high customization level TF product, and the integrated supply chain loses 
profits overall. On the medium supply chain setting, the logistics vendor can in general also 
make more profit because s/he can gain more profits on goods delivery. However, if a) the 
3DP product costs are extremely low or b) the fixed 3DP product cost is extremely high, the 
logistics vendor cannot make more profit. When the 3DP product costs are low, the more 
customization-sensitive consumers choose the 3DP product over the TF or TM product. 
Therefore, the logistics vendor cannot make more profit on product delivery. When the 3DP 
product’s fixed cost is low, if the logistics vendor loses the 3DP product, s/he cannot generate 
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a significant amount of revenue on 3DP product sales, although s/he can make some more 
profits on goods delivery. As for the integrated supply chain, overall, it is better off when the 
traditional manufacturer starts to operate three different products, although this may not hold 
in some cases. a) When the 3DP product cost is sufficiently low, after the traditional 
manufacturer starts to offer a low-price 3DP product, then the integrated supply chain can 
gain more profits on 3DP product sales. b) If the 3DP product cost is considerably high, the 
traditional manufacturer can use this 3DP product pricing strategy to boost the sales of the 
TF and the TM product. Overall, the integrated supply chain can generate more profits than 
when operating only the TM product. In the supply chain on the high setting, when the 3DP 
product costs are low and when the fixed 3DP product cost is high, the logistics vendor cannot 
gain more profits. It is the same as on the medium supply chain setting. However, the 
integrated supply chain can always make more profit under this supply chain structure 
because there are more consumers who choose the TM/TF product under this scenario. 
Table 15 Maximized Profit: Comparison by 3DP Product Cost – TM3DL and TMTF3DM 
Low Medium High 
   
   
MB-TM3DL
M-TMTF3DM
MB-TM3DL
M-TMTF3DM
MB-TM3DL
M-TMTF3DM
LB-TM3DL
L-TMTF3DM
LB-TM3DL
L-TMTF3DM
LB-TM3DL
LB-TMTF3DL
 451 
   
   
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 G' H' ) G3. H3. Q G!" H!" ,& 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.025 0.02 0.2 - - 0.01 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.1 0.25 0.4 - - 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 - - 0.01 
 
The Impact of the Logistics Delivery Cost 
PROPOSITION 16.  If the traditional manufacturer tries to offer TM, TF and 3DP products 
at the same time,  
(1) For the low-cost structure and low product customization supply chain, the 
traditional manufacturer is always better off operating 3 different products at the 
same time. However, it is not profitable for the logistics vendor. The integrated supply 
chain can always gain more profits. 
(2) If the product costs and the customization level are at the medium level, irrespective 
of the logistics delivery cost, it is profitable to the traditional manufacturer but not to 
the logistics vendor. As for the integrated supply chain, it is beneficial only if the 
logistics delivery cost is sufficiently low.  
(3) If the product costs and the customization level are high, in the decentralized 
Bertrand supply chain, it is profitable to the traditional manufacturer if the logistics 
delivery cost is low – otherwise it is not profitable. It is not profitable to the logistics 
vendor. In the decentralized Stackelberg supply chain, the traditional manufacturer 
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cannot obtain more profits, but the logistics vendor can gain more profits instead. 
This strategy cannot help the improvement of the integrated supply chain. 
With the supply chain on the low setting (Table 16), the traditional manufacturer can generate 
more profits from the 3 product lines. At the same time, although the logistics vendor can 
gain more profits on its product delivery service, it loses profits on the 3DP product. Because 
of the traditional manufacturer’s 3DP product, the logistics vendor uses a high-price regime 
on its logistics delivery service for the purpose of maximizing its overall profits. 
Consequently, the traditional manufacturer has to use a high price on all the product to cover 
his/her high cost of product delivery. Therefore, overall, the integrated supply chain cannot 
gain more profits due to the shrunken product sales. But on the medium supply chain setting, 
if the cost of the delivery service is sufficiently low, the goods delivery price charged by the 
logistics vendor can still be located in the low range. Therefore, the integrated supply chain 
can still obtain more profit under this scenario. In the decentralized Bertrand supply chain, 
on the high setting, if the logistics delivery cost is low, the traditional manufacturer can use 
a low-pricing strategy on the TM, TF and 3DP product. Therefore, the traditional 
manufacturer can make more profit. However, if the logistics delivery costs are high, it 
pushes the traditional manufacturer to use a high-price regime on his/her product. Therefore, 
s/he cannot make more profit due to the loss of price-sensitive consumers. However, in the 
decentralized Stackelberg supply chain, no matter the logistics delivery cost, the average 
price of all three products is high. Therefore, the traditional manufacturer loses its profits on 
product sales overall. However, the logistics vendor benefits from the increased requirement 
for its goods delivery service. As for the integrated supply chain, the system loses profit on 
product sales. 
Table 16 Maximized Profit: Comparison by Logistics Delivery Cost – TM3DL and TMTF3DM 
Low Medium High 
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 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 G' H' ) G3. H3. Q G!" H!" ,& 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.025 0.02 0.2 0.1 0.03 - 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.1 0.25 0.4 0.3 0.3 - 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.35 - 
 
The Impact of the TM Product Customization Level 
PROPOSITION 17.  If the traditional manufacturer tries to offer TM, TF and 3DP products 
at the same time,  
(1) In the low-cost structure and low TF product customization level supply chain, it is 
profitable to the traditional manufacturer but not profitable to the logistics vendor in 
the decentralized supply chain. The integrated supply chain can only gain more 
profits if the TM product customization level is extremely high. 
(2) In the medium-cost structure and medium TF product customization level supply 
chain, the traditional manufacturer is always better off using this strategy, but the 
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logistics vendor always loses profits. The integrated supply chain can also gain more 
profits. 
(3) If the product costs are high and the TF product customization level is located in the 
high region, then this strategy is not profitable to the traditional manufacturer or the 
logistics vendor in the decentralized supply chain. The integrated supply chain also 
cannot gain more profits from this strategy. 
On the low supply chain setting (Table 17), if the TM product customization level is high, 
use of a higher customization level TF product (with a higher product price) results in the 
loss of price-sensitive consumers. Overall, the new TF product strategy has a negative impact 
on the traditional manufacturer’s product sales and the logistics vendor loses profit on the 
goods delivery service. The integrated supply chain cannot generate more profits overall due 
to the TM and the 3DP product having cannibalization effects on the market. Therefore, it is 
not a profitable strategy for the integrated supply chain’s development. However, if the TM 
product customization level is extremely high, the cannibalization effect is not obvious. Thus, 
operating three products with different customization levels can help the system gain more 
consumers which helps the integrated supply chain attain better performance. On the high 
supply chain setting, in the decentralized Bertrand supply chain, this strategy helps the 
traditional manufacturer to take the 3DP product benefits from the logistics vendor. This 
follows from the fact that, in general, market domination can help any party to maximize 
profits (Porter, 1991). However, the integrated supply chain cannot gain more profits through 
this strategy because of the loss on the product delivery service. On the high supply chain 
setting, the overall insights are the same, but the logistics vendor can also obtain more profits 
if the TM product customization level is low. When the TM product customization level is 
low but all the product costs are high, if the traditional manufacturer chooses to operate three 
different products, the logistics vendor can use a high-price regime to save the profit lost on 
the 3DP product. 
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Table 17 Maximized Supply Chain Profit: Comparison by TM Product Customization Level –
TM3DL and TMTF3DM 
Low Medium High 
   
   
   
   
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 G' H' ) G3. H3. Q G!" H!" ,& 
Low 0.01 0.01 - 0.025 0.02 0.2 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Medium 0.05 0.05 - 0.1 0.25 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 - 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.35 0.01 
 
The Impact of the TF Product Customization Level 
PROPOSITION 18.  If the traditional manufacturer tries to offer a TM, TF and 3DP product 
at the same time,  
(1) In the low-cost structure and low TM product customization level supply chain, it is 
profitable to the traditional manufacturer but not to the logistics vendor. The 
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integrated supply chain can also obtain more profits if the TF product customization 
level is high. 
(2) In a supply chain with the medium-cost structure and medium TM product 
customization level, the traditional manufacturer is always better off using this 
strategy, but the logistics vendor always loses profits. The integrated supply chain 
can also attain more profit. 
(3) If the product costs are high and the TM product customization level is located in the 
high region, then in the decentralized Bertrand supply chain this strategy is profitable 
to the traditional manufacturer but not to the logistics vendor. However, in the 
decentralized Stackelberg supply chain, it is profitable to both parties. The integrated 
supply chain can also generate more profits from this strategy. 
According to Table 18, within the supply chain on the low setting, the new 3 product strategy 
can help the traditional manufacturer make more profit, but the logistics vendor loses profit 
on 3DP product sales. However, if the TF product’s customization level is extremely low, 
there is product competition between the TM and TF product. Therefore, the traditional 
manufacturer operating 3 different products hurts the overall sales for the TM product and 
the integrated supply chain cannot attain more profit under this scenario. However, as long 
as the TF product’s customization level is high, the three different products can attract 
consumers with different levels of sensitivity to customization. This helps the supply chain 
attain more profit. On the medium supply chain setting, it is better for the traditional 
manufacturer to handle all three different products for a large range of consumers. At the 
same time, although the logistics vendor can gain more profits on the traditional delivery 
service, s/he loses profits on 3DP product sales. At the supply chain level, the integrated 
supply chain can also benefit from the strategy due to the obvious differentiation between the 
products. Interestingly, in the Stackelberg supply chain, this strategy brings benefits to both 
the supply chain stakeholders and the integrated supply chain. In this scenario, both parties, 
and even the integrated supply chain, can enjoy the benefits of increased product sales.  
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Table 18 Maximized Supply Chain Profit: Comparison by TF Product Customization Level –
TM3DL and TMTF3DM 
Low Medium High 
   
   
   
   
   
 TM Product TF Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 G' H' ) G3. H3. Q G!" H!" ,& 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.025 0.02 - 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.1 0.25 - 0.3 0.3 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 0.3 0.3 - 0.6 0.35 0.01 
 
0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00

0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
MB-TM3DL
M-TMTF3DM
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
MB-TM3DL
M-TMTF3DM
0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
MB-TM3DL
M-TMTF3DM
0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00

0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
LB-TM3DL
L-TMTF3DM
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
LB-TM3DL
L-TMTF3DM
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

0.0050
0.0052
0.0054
0.0056
0.0058
LB-TM3DL
L-TMTF3DM
0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00

0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
MS-TM3DL
M-TMTF3DM
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
MS-TM3DL
M-TMTF3DM
0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
MS-TM3DL
M-TMTF3DM
0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00

0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
LS-TM3DL
L-TMTF3DM
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

0.010
0.015
0.020
LS-TM3DL
L-TMTF3DM
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

-0.015
-0.010
-0.005
0.005
LS-TM3DL
L-TMTF3DM
0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00

0.190
0.195
0.200
0.205
SC-TM3DL
SC-TMTF3DM
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
SC-TM3DL
SC-TMTF3DM
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

0.05
0.10
0.15
SC-TM3DL
SC-TMTF3DM
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TM3DM Model 
The Impact of the TM Product Costs 
PROPOSITION 19.  If the traditional manufacturer tries to offer a TM and 3DP product 
simultaneously,  
(1) With the low/medium cost structure and low/medium product customization level, in 
the decentralized supply chain, it is profitable to the traditional manufacturer but not 
at all profitable to the logistics vendor. This strategy is also not profitable to the 
integrated supply chain. 
(2) If the product costs and the customization level are high, in the decentralized 
Bertrand supply chain, it is profitable to the traditional manufacturer but not 
profitable to the logistics vendor. In the decentralized Stackelberg supply chain, 
depending on different TM product costs, the impacts of the strategy on the traditional 
manufacturer and the logistics vendor are different. However, there exists a situation 
where the 3DP product costs are sufficiently low, and both the traditional 
manufacturer and the logistics vendor can make more profit. The integrated supply 
chain can also share the profits of this strategy when the costs of the 3DP product 
are low. 
 
Table 19 Maximized Profit: Comparison by TM Product Cost – TM3DL and TM3DM 
Low Medium High 
   
   
   
MB-TM3DL
M-TM3DM
MB-TM3DL
M-TM3DM
MB-TM3DL
M-TM3DM
LB-TM3DL
L-TM3DM
LB-TM3DL
L-TM3DM
LB-TM3DL
L-TM3DM
MS-TM3DL
M-TM3DM
MS-TM3DL
M-TM3DM
MS-TM3DL
M-TM3DM
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 TM Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 G' H' ) G!" H!" ,& 
Low - - 0.1 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Medium - - 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.01 
High - - 0.3 0.6 0.35 0.01 
Therefore, according to above table, on the low or medium supply chain setting, if the 
traditional manufacturer starts to engage in 3DP, it is profitable to the traditional 
manufacturer but not to the logistics vendor. This is because the traditional manufacturer can 
gain one more profit stream whilst the logistics vendor loses revenue from the 3DP product. 
For the integrated supply chain, in general, because the logistics vendor uses a high-price 
regime to maximize profits, after the traditional manufacturer starts to offer a 3DP product, 
the actual 3DP product sales shrink. Therefore, the integrated supply chain cannot generate 
more profit.  
In the decentralized Bertrand supply chain on the high setting, it is profitable to the traditional 
manufacturer but not to the logistics vendor for the same reason. However, under the 
decentralized Stackelberg supply chain, there are four different situations, depending on the 
costs of the TM product (Figure 2). a) If the TM costs are sufficiently low (Region I), both 
LS-TM3DL
L-TM3DM
LS-TM3DL
L-TM3DM
LS-TM3DL
L-TM3DM
SC-TM3DL
SC-TM3DM
SC-TM3DL
SC-TM3DM
SC-TM3DL
SC-TM3DM
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the traditional manufacturer and the logistics vendor can gain more profits, because under 
this scenario, the 3DP product price is higher than that of the logistics vendor’s 3DP product, 
and with the lower TM product cost, more price-sensitive consumers choose the TM product. 
Therefore, the traditional manufacturer can generate more profits on the TM product and the 
logistics vendor can also obtain more profits on the goods delivery service. b) If the costs of 
the TM product are located in Region II, the traditional manufacturer cannot make more 
profit on TM product sales because of the low-pricing strategy. However, the logistics vendor 
can still derive more profits from the logistics service. c) If the costs of the TM product are 
in Region III, the traditional manufacturer and the logistics vendor are better off with this 
strategy. As for the traditional manufacturer, the profits generated from the TM and the 3DP 
product are more than the profits s/he can obtain by operating only the TM product. And the 
logistics vendor can also gain more profits on product delivery. d) When the cost of the TM 
product is high, the new high-price 3DP product can help the traditional manufacturer make 
more profit, but the logistics vendor loses the profit on the 3DP product sales. As for the 
integrated supply chain, only if the costs of the TM product are sufficiently low can the 
system generate more profit on the TM and 3DP product sales. Otherwise, the new 3DP 
product cannot help the supply chain to obtain more profit. 
 
Figure 2 Comparison of the Profit by TM Product Costs – TM3DL and TM3DM 
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The Impact of the 3DP Product Costs 
PROPOSITION 20.  If the traditional manufacturer tries to offer a TM and 3DP product 
simultaneously,  
(1) In the decentralized Bertrand supply chain, no matter the 3DP product costs, the 
traditional manufacturer is better off operating the 3DP product, but it has a negative 
impact on the logistics vendor’s profitability. 
(2) In the decentralized Stackelberg supply chain, the traditional manufacturer can also 
obtain more profits by this strategy, whilst the logistics vender does not always lose 
profits. The logistics vendor cannot gain more profits if the 3DP product’s variable 
cost is sufficiently low or the fixed cost of the 3DP product is extremely high. 
(3) As for the integrated supply chain, it can also gain more profits if the costs of the 
3DP product are high; otherwise, this strategy is not profitable to the supply chain. 
As seen in table below, in the decentralized Bertrand supply chain, as long as the traditional 
manufacturer starts to operate the 3DP product on his/her own, s/he can generate more 
profits. The reason behind this is quite clear; the traditional manufacturer can generate profits 
from not only the TM product but also the new 3DP product. And the high 3DP product price 
helps to lead more price-sensitive consumers to buy the low-price TM product. In the 
decentralized Stackelberg supply chain, the traditional manufacturer can still make more 
profit, either from the new 3DP product or the increased TM product sales, depending on the 
cost of the 3DP product. At the same time, the conclusion that the logistics vendor instead 
loses profits does not always hold. a) The logistics vendor only loses profits if the variable 
cost of the 3DP product is sufficiently low, in which case there are more customization-
sensitive consumers who choose the 3DP product. And the traditional manufacturer’s 3DP 
product price is higher than that of the logistics vendor’s 3DP product. Therefore, fewer 
consumers buy the traditional manufacturer’s 3DP product, and the logistics vendor not only 
loses the profit on the 3DP product sales but also loses the profit on the goods delivery 
service. b) If the fixed cost of the 3DP product is extremely high, which means the overall 
cost of the 3DP product is at a high level, fewer consumers buy the 3DP product. After the 
traditional manufacturer starts to operate the 3DP product, the logistics vendor loses the 
profits on the 3DP product sales. As for the integrated supply chain, if the 3DP product costs 
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are high, after the traditional manufacturer adopts a 3DP product, the logistics vendor uses a 
low-price regime on the logistics delivery service for the purpose of lowering the product 
price to lead to increased delivery service requirements. Therefore, the supply chain can 
benefit from the increased sales of the TM and the 3DP product. 
Table 20 Maximized Profit: Comparison by 3DP Product Cost – TM3DL and TM3DM 
Low Medium High 
   
   
   
   
   
MB-TM3DL
M-TM3DM
MB-TM3DL
M-TM3DM
MB-TM3DL
M-TM3DM
LB-TM3DL
L-TM3DM
LB-TM3DL
L-TM3DM
LB-TM3DL
L-TM3DM
MS-TM3DL
M-TM3DM
MS-TM3DL
M-TM3DM
MS-TM3DL
M-TM3DM
LS-TM3DL
L-TM3DM
LS-TM3DL
L-TM3DM
LS-TM3DL
L-TM3DM
SC-TM3DL
SC-TM3DM
SC-TM3DL
SC-TM3DM
SC-TM3DL
SC-TM3DM
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 TM Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 G' H' ) G!" H!" ,& 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 - - 0.01 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 - - 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 - - 0.01 
 
The Impact of the Logistics Delivery Cost 
PROPOSITION 21.  If the traditional manufacturer tries to offer a TM and 3DP product at 
the same time,  
(1) In the supply chain with the low/medium cost structure and low/medium TM product 
customization level, it is always profitable to the traditional manufacturer but not 
profitable to the logistics vendor in the decentralized supply chain. The integrated 
supply chain cannot gain more profits. 
(2) If the product costs are high and the TM product customization level is located in the 
high region, this strategy is profitable to the traditional manufacturer but not 
profitable to the logistics vendor in the decentralized Bertrand supply chain. 
However, in the decentralized Stackelberg supply chain, both parties can always gain 
more profits. And the integrated supply chain can also attain more profit under this 
scenario. 
From this proposition, we can see that no matter the logistics delivery cost, on the low or 
medium supply chain setting, the new strategy can help the traditional manufacturer generate 
more profits either from the new 3DP product or the increased TM product sales (Table 21). 
Although the logistics vendor might make more profit on the delivery service, s/he still loses 
more on the 3DP product. Therefore, from the perspective of the integrated supply chain, it 
is not a profitable strategy in terms of total product sales. But this strategy is a triple-win 
strategy under the Stackelberg supply chain. Under the TM3DL model, the logistics vendor 
sets the price of the 3DP product after s/he receives the TM product price. However, in the 
TM3DM model, the manufacturer decides the price of both products at the same time, and 
so the traditional manufacturer can use the best price for maximizing profit. And under this 
scenario, the logistics vendor’s profits only depend on goods delivery, so s/he uses a high 
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price regime to increase the margin on the delivery service. As a result, both parties can enjoy 
the benefits of this strategy and even the integrated supply chain can achieve better 
profitability on product sales. 
Table 21 Maximized Profit: Comparison by Logistics Delivery Cost – TM3DL and TM3DM 
Low Medium High 
   
   
   
   
   
 TM Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 G' H' ) G!" H!" ,& 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 0.6 0.35 0.01 
0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.010 0.012
cL
0.05
0.10
0.15
MB-TM3DL
M-TM3DM
0.005 0.010 0.015 0.020
cL
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
0.025
0.030
MB-TM3DL
M-TM3DM
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10
cL
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.005
MB-TM3DL
M-TM3DM
0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.010 0.012
cL
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
LB-TM3DL
L-TM3DM
0.005 0.010 0.015 0.020
cL
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
LB-TM3DL
L-TM3DM
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10
cL
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.005
0.006
0.007
LB-TM3DL
L-TM3DM
0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.010 0.012
cL
0.05
0.10
0.15
MS-TM3DL
M-TM3DM
0.005 0.010 0.015 0.020
cL
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
0.025
0.030
MS-TM3DL
M-TM3DM
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10
cL
-0.002
-0.001
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.005
MS-TM3DL
M-TM3DM
0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.010 0.012
cL
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
LS-TM3DL
L-TM3DM
0.005 0.010 0.015 0.020
cL
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
LS-TM3DL
L-TM3DM
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10
cL
-0.020
-0.015
-0.010
-0.005
0.005
LS-TM3DL
L-TM3DM
0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.010 0.012
cL
0.185
0.186
0.187
0.188
0.189
0.190
SC-TM3DL
SC-TM3DM
0.005 0.010 0.015 0.020
cL
0.037
0.038
0.039
0.040
SC-TM3DL
SC-TM3DM
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10
cL
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.010
0.012
0.014
SC-TM3DL
SC-TM3DM
 465 
 
The Impact of the TM Product Customization Level 
PROPOSITION 22.  If the traditional manufacturer tries to offer a TM and 3DP product at 
the same time,  
(1) In the low cost structure supply chain, it is always profitable to the traditional 
manufacturer but not profitable to the logistics vendor in the decentralized supply 
chain. The integrated supply chain cannot gain more profits. 
(2) With the medium cost structure, in the decentralized supply chain, it is always 
profitable to the traditional manufacturer but not profitable to the logistics vendor. 
The integrated supply chain can gain more profits if the TM product customization 
level is high. 
(3) If the product costs are high and the TM product customization level is in the high 
region, this strategy is profitable to the traditional manufacturer and not profitable 
to the logistics vendor in the decentralized Bertrand supply chain if the TM product 
customization level is high. Otherwise, there is no difference. However, in the 
decentralized Stackelberg supply chain, if the TM product customization level is high, 
it is also profitable to the traditional manufacturer but not profitable to the logistics 
vendor. However, when the TM product customization level is low, there is no 
difference to the traditional manufacturer’s profit after s/he offers a 3DP product – 
but the logistics vendor can gain more profits. The integrated supply chain can gain 
more profits if the TM product customization level is high. 
This proposition indicates that under the low-cost supply chain structure, the new high-price 
3DP product helps the traditional manufacturer gain more price-sensitive consumers for the 
TM product (Table 22). Therefore, the traditional manufacturer can make more profit on the 
increased TM product sales. Due to the profit lost on the 3DP product, although the logistics 
vendor gains more business for the delivery service, this strategy still has a negative impact 
on his/her profitability. As for the integrated supply chain, the loss due to the shrunken 3DP 
product sales has a negative impact on its overall profitability. In the medium cost structure 
supply chain, the impacts on the traditional manufacturer’s profitability and the logistics 
vendor’s profitability are the same. However, for the integrated supply chain, if the TM 
product customization level is high, the 3DP product can increase the market demand for the 
TM and the 3DP product, and therefore the integrated supply chain can gain more profits. In 
the high cost decentralized Bertrand supply chain, if the customization level of the TM 
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product is high, the new 3DP product helps the TM product to gain more price-sensitive 
consumers, and therefore the traditional manufacturer can obtain more profits. However, the 
logistics vendor loses 3DP product revenue at the same time. In the decentralized Stackelberg 
supply chain, when the TM product customization level is sufficiently low, the logistics 
vendor can gain more profits from the delivery service. As for the integrated supply chain, 
only if the TM product customization level is high can the supply chain benefit from the new 
TM3DM model due to the increased TM product sales. 
Table 22 Maximized Supply Chain Profit: Comparison by TM Product Customization –TM3DL 
and TM3DM 
Low Medium High 
   
   
   
   
   
 TM Product 3DP Product Delivery 
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
MB-TM3DL
MB-TM3DM
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
MB-TM3DL
MB-TM3DM
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
MB-TM3DL
MB-TM3DM
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
LB-TM3DL
LB-TM3DM
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
LB-TM3DL
LB-TM3DM
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
LB-TM3DL
LB-TM3DM
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
MS-TM3DL
MS-TM3DM
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
MS-TM3DL
MS-TM3DM
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
MS-TM3DL
MS-TM3DM
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
LS-TM3DL
LS-TM3DM
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
LS-TM3DL
LS-TM3DM
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
LS-TM3DL
LS-TM3DM
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

0.19
0.20
0.21
0.22
SC-TM3DL
SC-TM3DM
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

0.2
0.4
0.6
SC-TM3DL
SC-TM3DM
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

0.5
1.0
1.5
SC-TM3DL
SC-TM3DM
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 G' H' ) G!" H!" ,& 
Low 0.01 0.01 - 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Medium 0.05 0.05 - 0.3 0.3 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 - 0.6 0.35 0.01 
 
3DM Model 
The Impact of the TM Product Costs 
PROPOSITION 23.  If the traditional manufacturer tries to use a 3DP product to fully replace 
the TM product,  
(1) For the low/medium cost structure and low/medium product customization supply 
chain, overall, the traditional manufacturer and the logistics vendor cannot generate 
more profits in the decentralized supply chain. However, if the costs of the TM 
product are sufficiently low, the traditional manufacturer can still make more profits. 
The integrated supply chain cannot benefit from this 3DP-only supply chain. 
(2) If the product costs and the customization level are high, in the decentralized 
Bertrand supply chain, it is profitable to the traditional manufacturer and the 
logistics vendor. In the decentralized Stackelberg supply chain, depending on 
different TM product costs, the impacts of the strategy on the traditional 
manufacturer and the logistics vendor are different. There exists a scenario where 
both party can generate more profits. However, for the integrated supply chain, it is 
not a beneficial strategy at all. 
 
Table 23 Maximized Profit: Comparison by TM Product Cost – TM3DL and 3DM 
Low Medium High 
   
   
MB-TM3DL
M-3 DM
MB-TM3DL
M-3 DM
MB-TM3DL
M-3 DM
LB-TM3DL
L-3 DM
LB-TM3DL
L-3 DM
LB-TM3DL
L-3 DM
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 TM Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 G' H' ) G!" H!" ,& 
Low - - 0.1 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Medium - - 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.01 
High - - 0.3 0.6 0.35 0.01 
 
MS-TM3DL
M-3 DM
MS-TM3DL
M-3 DM
MS-TM3DL
M-3 DM
LS-TM3DL
L-3 DM
LS-TM3DL
L-3 DM
LS-TM3DL
L-3 DM
SC-TM3DL
SC-3 DM
SC-TM3DL
SC-3 DM
SC-TM3DL
SC-3 DM
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Figure 3 Profit Comparison by TM Product Costs – TM3DL vs 3DM 
As shown in Table 23, it is obvious that under the low and medium supply chain setting, if 
the costs of the TM product are sufficiently low, it is profitable to the traditional manufacturer 
to fully replace the TM product with the 3DP product. This is because the traditional 
manufacturer can make more profits on the 3DP product sales, even though the overall 
amount of sales reduces. Under the high supply chain setting (Figure 3), if the TM product 
cost is located in Region I, and if the costs of the TM product are low, it is not profitable to 
either the traditional manufacturer or the logistics vendor because of the loss on the TM 
product sales. However, if the cost of the 3DP product is located in Region II, after the 
traditional manufacturer exclusively offers the 3DP product, the traditional manufacturer can 
make more profits due to the high margin on the 3DP product, whilst the logistics vendor can 
make more profits due to the high delivery service price. If the costs of the TM product are 
located in Region III, the traditional manufacturer loses profits on the low-price TM product 
sales, but the logistics vendor can still gain more profits on the high price delivery service. If 
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the TM product costs are much higher, neither party can obtain the profit because of the 
shrunken product sales. At the integrated supply chain level, profit is lost because of the loss 
of TM product sales. 
The Impact of the 3DP Product Costs 
PROPOSITION 24.  If the traditional manufacturer tries to use a 3DP product to fully replace 
the TM product, in the Bertrand supply chain, the traditional manufacturer can gain more 
profits if the 3DP product costs are sufficiently low or high. However, if the TM product cost 
is high, the traditional manufacturer can only make more profits if the 3DP product costs 
are low, whilst the logistics vendor cannot make more profits at all. In the Stackelberg supply 
chain, if the 3DP product costs are sufficiently high and the variable cost is low, the 
traditional manufacturer cannot gain more profits; otherwise, this strategy can bring more 
profits to the traditional manufacturer. The logistics vendor can also gain more profits if the 
variable cost of the 3DP product is high. Overall, the integrated supply chain cannot gain 
any profits. 
 
Table 24 Maximized Profit: Comparison by 3DP Product Cost – TM3DL and 3DM 
Low Medium High 
   
   
   
MB-TM3DL
M-3 DM
MB-TM3DL
M-3 DM
MB-TM3DL
M-3 DM
LB-TM3DL
L-3 DM
LB-TM3DL
L-3 DM
LB-TM3DL
L-3 DM
MS-TM3DL
M-3 DM
MS-TM3DL
M-3 DM
MS-TM3DL
M-3 DM
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 TM Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 G' H' ) G!" H!" ,& 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 - - 0.01 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 - - 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 - - 0.01 
According to above table, in the supply chain on the low/medium setting, both the traditional 
manufacturer and the logistics vendor can gain more profits if the 3DP product is priced low 
(leading to more 3DP product sales) or the 3DP product is priced high (yielding a high 3DP 
product margin). However, if the TM product costs are high, the traditional manufacturer can 
only make more profits if the 3DP product costs are low (yielding a high 3DP product 
margin). In addition, the logistics vendor always loses the profits on product delivery and 
3DP product sales. In the Stackelberg supply chain, if the fixed 3DP product cost is high and 
its variable cost is low, it is not easy for the traditional manufacturer to invest in the 3DP 
product business, and therefore the traditional manufacturer cannot make more profits. 
Otherwise, the traditional manufacturer can generate more profit by offering only a 3DP 
product because of the high price margin. Meanwhile, if the 3DP product’s variable cost is 
low, the logistics vendor cannot make more profit because of the low margin on the 3DP 
LS-TM3DL
L-3 DM
LS-TM3DL
L-3 DM
LS-TM3DL
L-3 DM
SC-TM3DL
SC-3 DM
SC-TM3DL
SC-3 DM
SC-TM3DL
SC-3 DM
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product. As for the integrated supply chain, only offering a 3DP product has a negative 
impact on product sales, and thus the supply chain’s profitability does not show any 
improvement. 
The Impact of the Logistics Delivery Cost 
PROPOSITION 25.  If the traditional manufacturer tries to use a 3DP product to fully 
replace the TM product,  
(1) In the supply chain with the low/medium cost structure and low/medium TM product 
customization level, it is always profitable to the traditional manufacturer but not 
profitable to the logistics vendor in the decentralized supply chain. The integrated 
supply chain cannot gain more profits. 
(2) If the product costs are high and the TM product customization level is located in a 
high region, then in the decentralized Bertrand supply chain, this strategy is 
profitable to the traditional manufacturer but not profitable to the logistics vendor. 
However, under the decentralized Stackelberg supply chain, both parties can always 
gain more profits. And the integrated supply chain can also make more profits, except 
when the TM product customization level is extremely high. 
Basically, the insights from this proposition are straightforward as shown in Table 25. The 
only interesting finding is that when the logistics delivery cost is high, in the supply chain 
with high TM product costs and a high TM product customization level, the integrated supply 
can also enjoy more profits because in the TM3DL model, the integrated supply chain also 
cannot achieve good financial performance. Therefore, after the traditional manufacturer 
starts to sell only the 3DP product, the integrated supply chain can also enjoy the 3DP 
product’s high margin. 
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Table 25 Maximized Profit: Comparison by Logistics Delivery Cost – TM3DL and 3DM 
Low Medium High 
   
   
   
   
   
 TM Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 G' H' ) G!" H!" ,& 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.1 0.03 - 
Medium 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.3 0.3 - 
High 0.1 0.08 0.3 0.6 0.35 - 
 
 
 
 
0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.010 0.012
cL
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
MB-TM3DL
M-3 DM
0.005 0.010 0.015 0.020
cL
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.010
MB-TM3DL
M-3 DM
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10
cL
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
MB-TM3DL
M-3 DM
0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.010 0.012
cL
0.10
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
LB-TM3DL
L-3 DM
0.005 0.010 0.015 0.020
cL
0.020
0.025
0.030
0.035
0.040
LB-TM3DL
L-3 DM
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10
cL
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.005
0.006
0.007
LB-TM3DL
L-3 DM
0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.010 0.012
cL
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
MS-TM3DL
M-3 DM
0.005 0.010 0.015 0.020
cL
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.010
MS-TM3DL
M-3 DM
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10
cL
-0.0020
-0.0015
-0.0010
-0.0005
MS-TM3DL
M-3 DM
0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.010 0.012
cL
0.10
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
LS-TM3DL
L-3 DM
0.005 0.010 0.015 0.020
cL
0.019
0.020
0.021
0.022
LS-TM3DL
L-3 DM
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10
cL
-0.020
-0.015
-0.010
-0.005
LS-TM3DL
L-3 DM
0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.010 0.012
cL
0.184
0.185
0.186
0.187
0.188
0.189
0.190
SC-TM3DL
SC-3 DM
0.005 0.010 0.015 0.020
cL
0.037
0.038
0.039
0.040
SC-TM3DL
SC-3 DM
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10
cL
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.010
0.012
0.014
SC-TM3DL
SC-3 DM
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The Impact of the TM Product Customization Level 
PROPOSITION 26.  If the traditional manufacturer tries to use a 3DP product to fully 
replace the TM product,  
(1) In the supply chain with the low-cost structure and low TM product customization 
level, it is profitable to the traditional manufacturer. Only when the TM product 
customization level is extremely high is this strategy not profitable to the traditional 
manufacturer. The logistics vendor cannot gain more profits under the decentralized 
supply chain. The integrated supply chain cannot generate more profit. 
(2) In the supply chain with the medium cost structure and medium TM product 
customization level, if the TM product customization level is extremely low or high, 
the traditional manufacturer cannot make more profit. Otherwise, this strategy can 
bring more profits to the traditional manufacturer. The logistics vendor cannot make 
more profits in the decentralized supply chain. The integrated supply chain cannot 
generate more profit. 
(3) If the product costs are high and the TM product customization level is located in a 
high region, in the decentralized Bertrand supply chain, neither the traditional 
manufacturer nor the logistics vendor can make more profits. In the decentralized 
Stackelberg supply chain, the traditional manufacturer cannot gain more profits. As 
for the logistics vendor, s/he fails to make more profits only if the TM product 
customization level is located in an extremely low or high region. The integrated 
supply chain cannot attain more profits under this supply chain structure. 
As seen in below table, in the low-cost supply chain, if the TM product customization level 
is high, then if the traditional manufacturer starts to engage in the 3DP business by 
himself/herself, it hurts the TM product business. Thus, it is not profitable to the traditional 
manufacturer to use this strategy. However, if the TM product customization level is low, the 
new 3DP product can lead more customization-sensitive consumers to buy the 3DP product. 
Accordingly, the traditional manufacturer can generate more profit. However, as for the 
integrated supply chain, it cannot attain more profits due to the shrunken TM product sales.  
In the medium cost supply chain, if the TM product customization level is low, operating a 
high customization level 3DP product means the traditional manufacturer has to use a low-
price strategy, and so it has a negative impact on the TM product business. Under this 
scenario, it is not profitable to the traditional manufacturer. However, if the TM product 
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customization level is high, the new 3DP product also has a negative impact on the TM 
product due to the cannibalization effect. Meanwhile, the logistics vendor loses profits on the 
3DP product business, although the profits on goods delivery slightly increase. As for the 
integrated supply chain, after the traditional manufacturer uses the 3DP product strategy, it 
cannot attain more profits because of the shrunken sales of the TM product. 
In the high cost supply chain, where a decentralized Bertrand supply chain is used, it is not 
profitable to either the traditional manufacturer or the logistics vendor because of the low 
TM product sales. In the Stackelberg supply chain, if the TM product customization level is 
low, the new high-price 3DP product pushes the traditional manufacturer to raise the TM 
product price to yield a higher margin, and therefore fewer price-sensitive consumers buy the 
TM product. Consequently, the logistics vendor loses profit from the TM product delivery. 
If the TM product customization level is high, the traditional manufacturer uses a low-price 
strategy on the TM product for the purpose of increasing product sales, but due the loss on 
the 3DP product sale, the logistics vendor cannot attain better financial performance. As for 
the traditional manufacturer, after s/he adopts the 3DP product, it has a negative 
cannibalization effect on the TM product sales. Therefore, it is not profitable to the traditional 
manufacturer. For the integrated supply chain, the shrunken sales of the TM product and the 
3DP product cause worse overall profitability in the system. 
Therefore, under the low and medium supply chain setting, a sensible strategy is to give up 
the traditional manufacturing technology and fully use 3DP manufacturing. 
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Table 26 Maximized Supply Chain Profit: Comparison by TM Product Customization – TM3DL 
and 3DM 
Low Medium High 
   
   
   
   
   
 TM Product 3DP Product Delivery 
 G' H' ) G!" H!" ,& 
Low 0.01 0.01 - 0.1 0.03 0.01 
Medium 0.05 0.05 - 0.3 0.3 0.01 
High 0.1 0.08 - 0.6 0.35 0.01 
 
  
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
MB-TM3DL
MB-3 DM
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
MB-TM3DL
MB-3 DM
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
MB-TM3DL
MB-3 DM
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
LB-TM3DL
LB-3 DM
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

0.05
0.10
0.15
LB-TM3DL
LB-3 DM
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
LB-TM3DL
LB-3 DM
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
MS-TM3DL
MS-3 DM
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
MS-TM3DL
MS-3 DM
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

0.05
0.10
0.15
MS-TM3DL
MS-3 DM
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
LS-TM3DL
LS-3 DM
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
LS-TM3DL
LS-3 DM
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

0.05
0.10
0.15
LS-TM3DL
LS-3 DM
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
SC-TM3DL
SC-3 DM
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
SC-TM3DL
SC-3 DM
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
SC-TM3DL
SC-3 DM
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Appendix D: Proofs of Chapter 6 
Proof of PROPOSITION 6-1.  
Under decentralized supply chain, accordingly to Equation (6.1),  the first-order-conditions 
and the second-order-conditions of ∏ @(A' , A!"):  by A' and A!" are  
⎩⎪⎨
⎪⎧4∏ @(A' , A!"): 4A' = αδ,!" − ,' − 2αδA!" + (−1 + αδ)A& + 2A'(−1 + αδ)αδ 	4 ∏ @(A' , A!"): 4A!" = −1 + αδ − ,!" + ,' + 2A!" − 2A'−1 + αδ  
⎩⎪⎪
⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪
⎧4∏ @(A' , A!")%: 4A'% = 2(−1 + αδ)αδ < 04∏ @(A' , A!")%: 4A!"% = 2−1 + αδ < 04∏ @(A' , A!")%:4A'4A!" = − 2−1 + αδ > 04∏ @(A' , A!")%:4A!"4A' = − 2−1 + αδ > 0
 
So, the determinant of the Hessian Matrix can be written as 
L = MM 2(−1 + αδ)αδ − 2−1 + αδ− 2−1 + αδ 2−1 + αδ MM =
2(−1 + αδ)αδ × O 2−1 + αδP − O− 2−1 + αδP%
= 4αδ(1 − αδ) > 0 
Therefore, this Hessian Matrix is a negative-definite matrix, So, the solution to the first-
order-conditions gives the unique maximizer.  
⎩⎪⎨
⎪⎧4∏ @(A' , A!"): 4A' = αδ,!" − ,' − 2αδA!" + (−1 + αδ)A& + 2A'(−1 + αδ)αδ = 0	4∏ @(A' , A!"): 4A!" = −1 + αδ − ,!" + ,' + 2A!" − 2A'−1 + αδ = 0  
IA'∗ =	12 (αδ + ,' + A&)A!"∗ = 12 (1 + ,!" + A&)  
Then, the logistics vendor’s profit function (6.2) can be updated as 
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J B(A&): = (,& − A&)(−αδ + ,' + A&)2αδ = −αδ,& + ,&,'2αδ + (αδ + ,& − ,')A&2αδ − A&%2αδ 
which is convex in A&, so the first-order-conditions gives the maximum profit. 4∏ B(A&):4A& = αδ + ,& − ,' − 2A&2αδ = 0 A&∗ = 12 (αδ + ,& − ,') 
The final optimal decisions are 
 A&∗ = 12 (αδ + ,& − ,') (6.10) 
 A'∗ = 14 (3αδ + ,& + ,') (6.11) 
 A!"∗ =	14 (2 + αδ + 2,!" + ,& − ,') (6.12) 
 K'∗ = −2αδ,!" − (−1 + αδ)(αδ + ,&) + (1 + αδ),'4(−1 + αδ)αδ  (6.13) 
 K!"∗ = −1 + αδ + ,!" − ,'2(−1 + αδ)  (6.14) 
The maximized profits are J @(A' , A!") =∗: − 116)d(−1 + )d) (4)d,!"% + (−1 + )d)()d(−4 + 3)d)+ 2)d,& − ,&%) − 2(−1 + )d)(3)d + ,&),' + (1 + 3)d),'%− 8)d,!"(1 − )d + ,')) (6.15) J B∗: (A&) = (−αδ + ,& + ,')%8αδ  (6.16) 
For the integrated supply chain, the first-order-conditions and the second-order-conditions of ∏ "!(A' , A!"):  by A' and A!" in Equation (6.3) are 
⎩⎪⎨
⎪⎧4∏ "!(A' , A!"): 4A' = αδ,!" + (−1 + αδ),& − ,' − 2αδA!" + 2A'(−1 + αδ)αδ 	4∏ "!(A' , A!"): 4A!" = −1 + αδ − ,!" + ,' + 2A!" − 2A'−1 + αδ  
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⎩⎪⎪
⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪
⎧4∏ "!(A' , A!")%: 4A'% = 2(−1 + αδ)αδ < 04∏ "!(A' , A!")%: 4A!"% = 2−1 + αδ < 04∏ "!(A' , A!")%:4A'4A!" = − 2−1 + αδ > 04∏ "!(A' , A!")%:4A!"4A' = − 2−1 + αδ > 0
 
So, the determinant of the Hessian Matrix can be written as 
L = MM 2(−1 + αδ)αδ − 2−1 + αδ− 2−1 + αδ 2−1 + αδ MM =
2(−1 + αδ)αδ × O 2−1 + αδP − O− 2−1 + αδP%
= 4αδ(1 − αδ) > 0 
Therefore, this Hessian Matrix is a negative-definite matrix, the solution to the first-order-
conditions gives the unique maximizer of ∏ "!(A' , A!"): . 
⎩⎪⎨
⎪⎧4∏ "!(A' , A!"): 4A' = αδ,!" + (−1 + αδ),& − ,' − 2αδA!" + 2A'(−1 + αδ)αδ = 0	4 ∏ "!(A' , A!"): 4A!" = −1 + αδ − ,!" + ,' + 2A!" − 2A'−1 + αδ = 0  
 A'∗ = 12 (αδ + ,& + ,')	 (6.17) 
 A!"∗ = 12 (1 + ,!" + ,&) (6.18) 
So,  
 K'∗ =	,& − αδ(,!" + ,&) + ,'2(−1 + αδ)αδ  (6.19) 
 K!"∗ = −1 + αδ + ,!" − ,'2(−1 + αδ)  (6.20) 
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J "!(A' , A!")∗: = 14(−1 + αδ)αδ ()d(−1 + )d) − )d,!"% + (−1 + )d),&(−2)d+ ,&) + 2(−1 + )d),&,' − ,'% + 2)d,!"(1 − )d + ,')) 
(6.21) 
 
Proof of PROPOSITION 6-2. Under the decentralized supply chain, it is easy to find out 
that, 
4A&∗4,' = −12 4A&∗4,& = 12 4A&
∗4,!"= e/g 4K'∗4,' = − 1 + )d4)d(1 − )d) < 0 4K!"∗4,' = 12 − 2)d > 0 4A'∗4,' = 14 4A'∗4,& = 14 4A'
∗4,!"= e/g 4K'∗4,& = − 14)d < 0 4K!"∗4,& = e/g 4A!"∗4,' = −14 4A!"∗4,& = 14 4A!"∗4,!" = 12 4K'∗4,!" = 12 − 2)d > 0 4K!"∗4,!" = 1−2 + 2)d < 0 
From Equation (6.15), it is easy to find out that 
(1)  ∏ @(A' , A!")∗:  is concave in ,', therefore, when  4∏ @(A' , A!")∗: 4,' = 4)d,!" + (−1 + )d)(3)d + ,&) − (1 + 3)d),'8)d(−1 + )d) = 0 ,'∗ = 4)d,!" + (−1 + )d)(3)d + ,&)1 + 3)d  
gives the unique minimum value. However, because )d,!" > ,& + ,', therefore,  
If ;,<*#$+(7)+,<)(!,<+*!))+!,< > )d,!" − ,&, that is !; (−1 + )d)(−1 + ,!") < ,& < 1  ∏ @(A' , A!")∗:  decreases in ,'; 
If ;,<*#$+(7)+,<)(!,<+*!))+!,< < )d,!" − ,&, that is 0 < ,& < !; (−1 + )d)(−1 + ,!"), then,  
i) when 0 < ,' < ,'∗ , ∏ @(A' , A!")∗:  decreases in ,';  
ii) when ,'∗ < ,' < 1,	∏ @(A' , A!")∗:  increases in ,'. 
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(2) ∏ @(A' , A!")∗:  is concave in ,&, therefore, when  4∏ @(A' , A!")∗: 4,& = −)d + ,& + ,'8)d = 0 ,&∗ = )d − ,' 
gives the unique minimum value. Because )d,!" > ,& + ,', therefore, ,&∗ > )d,!" − ,', ∏ @(A' , A!")∗:  decreases in ,&. 
(3) ∏ @(A' , A!")∗:  is concave in ,!", therefore, when  4∏ @(A' , A!")∗: 4,!" = 1 − )d − ,!" + ,'−2 + 2)d = 0 ,!"∗ = 1 − )d + ,' 
gives the minimum value. However, because )d,!" > ,& + ,', therefore,  
If 1 − )d + ,' < *!+*",< , that is *"< < ) < 1 and −(−1 + )d)()d − ,') < ,& < )d − ,' ∏ @(A' , A!")∗:  increases in ,!";  
If 1 − )d + ,' > *!+*",< ,  that is 0 < ,& < −(−1 + )d)()d − ,'), then,  
i) when *!+*",< < ,!" < ,!"∗ , ∏ @(A' , A!")∗:  decreases in ,!";  
ii) when ,!"∗ < ,!" < 1,	∏ @(A' , A!")∗:  increases in ,!". 
In detail,  
 
For the logistics vendor’s maximized profit (Equation (6.16)) under the decentralized 
supply chain,  
(1) ∏ B(A&)∗:  is concave in ,', therefore, when  4∏ B(A&)∗: 	4,' = −)d + ,& + ,'4)d = 0 
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,'∗ = )d − ,& 
gives the unique minimum value. Because )d,!" > ,& + ,', therefore, ∏ B(A&)∗:  decreases 
in ,'. 
(2) ∏ B(A&)∗:  is concave in ,&, therefore, when  4∏ B(A&)∗: 	4,& = −)d + ,& + ,'4)d = 0 ,&∗ = )d − ,' 
gives the unique minimum value. Because )d,!" > ,& + ,', therefore, ∏ B(A&)∗:  decreases 
in ,&. 
Proof of PROPOSITION 6-3. Under the integrated supply chain,  
4A'∗4,' = 12 4A!"∗4,' = e/g 4K'∗4,' = − 12)d(1 − )d) < 0 4K!"∗4,' = 12 − 2)d > 0 4A'∗4,& = 12 4A!"∗4,& = 12 4K'∗4,& = − 12)d < 0 4K!"∗4,& = e/g 4A'∗4,!" = e/g 4A!"∗4,!" = 12 4K'∗4,!" = 12 − 2)d > 0 4K!"∗4,!" = 1−2 + 2)d < 0 
 
For the maximized supply chain profit (Equation (6.21)),  
(1) ∏ "!(A' , A!")∗:  is concave in ,', therefore, when  4∏ "!(A' , A!")∗: 4,' = )d,!" + (−1 + )d),& − ,'2)d(−1 + )d) = 0 ,'∗ = )d,!" + (−1 + )d),& 
gives the unique minimum value. Because )d,!" > ,& + ,', therefore,	,'∗ > )d,!" − ,&, ∏ "!(A' , A!")∗:  decreases in ,'. 
(2) ∏ "!(A' , A!")∗:  is concave in ,&, therefore, when  
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4∏ "!(A' , A!")∗: 	4,& = −)d + ,& + ,'2)d = 0 ,&∗ = )d − ,' 
gives the unique minimum value. Because )d,!" > ,& + ,', therefore, ∏ "!(A' , A!")∗:  
decreases in ,&. 
(3) ∏ "!(A' , A!")∗:  is concave in ,!", therefore, when  4∏ "!(A' , A!")∗: 	4,!" = 1 − )d − ,!" + ,'−2 + 2)d = 0 ,!"∗ = 1 − )d + ,' 
gives the minimum value. However, because )d,!" > ,& + ,', therefore,  
If 1 − )d + ,' < *!+*",< , that is  *"< < ) < 1 and −(−1 + )d)()d − ,') < ,& < )d − ,', ∏ @(A' , A!")∗:  ∏ "!(A' , A!")∗:  increases in ,!";  
If 1 − )d + ,' > *!+*",< , that is 0 < ,& < −(−1 + )d)()d − ,'), then,  
i) when *!+*",< < ,!" < ,!"∗ , ∏ "!(A' , A!")∗:  decreases in ,!";  
ii) when ,!"∗ < ,!" < 1,	∏ "!(A' , A!")∗:  increases in ,!". 
 
Proof of PROPOSITION 6-4. 
Under decentralized supply chain, 4A&∗4) = d2 4A'∗4) = 3d4  4A!"∗4) = d4 4A&∗4d = )2 4A'∗4d = 3)4  4A!"∗4d = )4 
Under integrated supply chain, 4A'∗4) = 12 4A!"∗4) = N/A 4A'∗4d = 12 4A!"∗4d = N/A 
Proof of PROPOSITION 6-5.  
Under decentralized supply chain, the first-order-conditions and the second-order-conditions 
of ∏ B(A& , A!")?  by A!" are  
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4∏ B(A& , A!")? 4A!" = j + d − )d + ,!" − ,& − 2A!" + A& + A'd − )d 	4∏ B(A& , A!")%? 4A!"% = 2(−1 + ))d < 0  
So, the solution to the first-order-conditions gives the unique maximizer.  4∏ B(A& , A!")? 4A!" = j + d − )d + ,!" − ,& − 2A!" + A& + A'd − )d = 0 A!"∗ = 12 (j + d − )d + ,!" − ,& + A& + A') 
Then, the traditional manufacturer’s profit function (6.4) can be updated as J @(A')? = (,' + A& − A')()(j + d − )d + ,!" − ,& + A&) + (−2 + ))A')2(−1 + )))d  
which is convex in A', so the first-order-conditions gives the maximum profit. 4∏ @(A')?4A' = (−2 + ))(,' + A& − A')2(−1 + )))d− )(j + d − )d + ,!" − ,& + A&) + (−2 + ))A'2(−1 + )))d = 0 A'∗ = −)j + (−1 + )))d − ),!" + ),& + (−2 + )),' − 2A&2(−2 + ))  
Then, the ∏ B(A& , A!")?  can be rewritten as  
J B(A& , A!")?= − 116(−1 + ))d ( 1(−2 + ))% ((−4 + 3))j + (−4 + ))(−1 + ))d + (−4 + 3)),!"+ (−4 + )),& − (−2 + )),' + 6A& − 2)A&)((−4 + 3))j + (−4 + ))(−1 + ))d + (−4+ 3)),!" + (4 − 3)),& − (−2 + )),' − 2A& + 2)A&)+ 4(,& − A&)(−)j + (−1 + )))d + 2,' + 2A& − )(,!" − ,& + ,' + 2A&))) ) 
Which is convex in A&, therefore, the first-order-conditions gives the maximum profit. 
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4∏ @(A')?4A& = − 14(−2 + ))%)d ()()j − (8 + (−5 + ))))d) + )%,!" − (8 + (−4+ )))),& + (−4 + ))(−2 + )),' + 16A& + 2(−5 + )))A&) = 0 A&∗= )(−)j + (8 + (−5 + ))))d) − )%,!" + (8 + (−4 + )))),& − (−4 + ))(−2 + )),'2(8 + (−5 + ))))  
The final optimal decisions are 
A&∗ = ()(−)j + (8 + (−5 + ))))d) − )%,!" + (8 + (−4 + )))),& − (−4+ ))(−2 + )),')/2(8 + (−5 + )))) (6.22) A'∗ = ()(−(−4 + ))j + (8 + (−5 + ))))d) − (−4 + ))),!" + (−2 + ))%,&+ (−2 + ))%,')/2(8 + (−5 + )))) (6.23) A!"∗=	 (8 − 3))j + 8d + (−5 + )))d + (8 − 3)),!" + (−2 + )),& + (−2 + )),'2(8 + (−5 + ))))  (6.24) K'∗ = (−2 + ))()j + ),!" − ,& − ,')(−1 + )))(8 + (−5 + ))))d  (6.25) K!"∗ = 12(−1 + ))(8 + (−5 + ))))d ((8 + (−7 + ))))j + (−1 + ))(8 + (−5+ ))))d + (8 + (−7 + )))),!" − 6,& − 6,' − (−5 + )))(,&+ ,')) (6.26) 
The maximized profits are J @(A' , A!") =∗? 2(−2 + ))(−)j − ),!" + ,& + ,')%(−1 + )))(8 + (−5 + ))))%d  (6.27) J B∗? (A& , A!")= 14(−1 + )))(8 + (−5 + ))))d ()((−8 + (9 − 2))))j% − 2(−1+ ))(8 + (−5 + ))))jd + (−1 + ))(8 + (−5 + ))))d%) + )(−8+ (9 − 2)))),!"% + (−2 + ))%(2)j − ,& − ,')(,& + ,')+ 2),!"((−8 + (9 − 2))))j − (−1 + ))(8 + (−5 + ))))d+ (−2 + ))%,& + (−2 + ))%,')) 
(6.28) 
 486 
Under the integrated supply chain, the first-order-conditions and the second-order-conditions 
of ∏ "!(A' , A!")?  by A' and A!" in Equation (6.6) are 
⎩⎪⎨
⎪⎧ 4∏ "!(A' , A!")? 4A' = −−),!" + ,& + ,' + 2)A!" − 2A'(−1 + )))d4∏ "!(A' , A!")? 4A!" = (−1 + ))d − ,!" + ,& + ,' + 2A!" − 2A'(−1 + ))d  
⎩⎪⎪
⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪
⎧4∏ "!(A' , A!")%? 4A'% = 2(−1 + )))d < 04∏ "!(A' , A!")%? 4A!"% = 2(−1 + ))d < 04∏ "!(A' , A!")%?4A'4A!" = 2d − )d > 04∏ "!(A' , A!")%?4A!"4A' = 2d − )d > 0
 
So, the determinant of the Hessian Matrix can be written as 
L = MM 2(−1 + )))d 2d − )d2d − )d 2(−1 + ))dMM = 2(−1 + )))d × 2(−1 + ))d − O 2d − )dP
%
= − 4(−1 + )))d% > 0 
Therefore, this Hessian Matrix is a negative-definite matrix, the solution to the first-order-
conditions gives the unique maximizer of ∏ "!(A' , A!")? . 
⎩⎪⎨
⎪⎧ 4∏ "!(A' , A!")? 4A' = −−),!" + ,& + ,' + 2)A!" − 2A'(−1 + )))d = 04∏ "!(A' , A!")? 4A!" = (−1 + ))d − ,!" + ,& + ,' + 2A!" − 2A'(−1 + ))d = 0 
 A'∗ = 12 ()d + ,& + ,')	 (6.29) 
 A!"∗ = 12 (d + ,!") (6.30) 
So,  
 K'∗ =	−),!" + ,& + ,'2(−1 + )))d  (6.31) 
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 K!"∗ = d − )d − ,!" + ,& + ,'2d − 2)d  (6.32) 
 
J "!(A' , A!")∗?= −−(−1 + )))d% + ),!"% + (,& + ,')% − 2),!"(d − )d + ,& + ,')4(−1 + )))d  (6.33) 
Proof of  PROPOSITION 6-6.  
Under the decentralized Y supply chain, it is easy to find out that 4A&∗4,'= 12O−1 + )8 + (−5 + )))P< 0 
4A'∗4,' = (−2 + ))%2(8 + (−5 + ))))> 0 
4A!"∗4,' = −2 + )2(8 + (−5 + ))))< 0 
4A&∗4,&= 12 O1 + )8 + (−5 + )))P> 0 
	4A'∗4,& = (−2 + ))%2(8 + (−5 + ))))> 0 
4A!"∗4,& = −2 + )2(8 + (−5 + ))))< 0 
4A&∗4,!" = − )%2(8 + (−5 + ))))< 0 
4A'∗4,!" = − (−4 + )))2(8 + (−5 + ))))> 0 
4A!"∗4,!" = 8 − 3)2(8 + (−5 + ))))> 0 4A&∗4γ = − )%2(8 + (−5 + ))))< 0 
4A'∗4γ = − (−4 + )))2(8 + (−5 + ))))> 0 
4A!"∗4γ = 8 − 3)2(8 + (−5 + ))))> 0 
and 
4K'∗4,' = − −2 + )(−1 + )))(8 + (−5 + ))))d < 0 
4K!"∗4,'= − 6 + (−5 + )))2(−1 + ))(8 + (−5 + ))))d > 0 
4K'∗4,& = − −2 + )(−1 + )))(8 + (−5 + ))))d < 0 
4K!"∗4,&= − 6 + (−5 + )))2(−1 + ))(8 + (−5 + ))))d > 0 
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4K'∗4,!" = −2 + )(−1 + ))(8 + (−5 + ))))d > 0 4K!"
∗4,!" = 8 + (−7 + )))2(−1 + ))(8 + (−5 + ))))d< 0 4K'∗4γ = −2 + )(−1 + ))(8 + (−5 + ))))d > 0 4K!"∗4γ = 8 + (−7 + )))2(−1 + ))(8 + (−5 + ))))d< 0 
From Equation (6.27), it is easy to find out that 
(1)  ∏ @(A')∗?  is concave in ,', therefore, when  4∏ @(A')∗?4,' = 4(−2 + ))(−)j − ),!" + ,& + ,')(−1 + )))(8 + (−5 + ))))%d = 0 ,'∗ = )(j + ,!") − ,& 
gives the unique minimum value. However, because )d(,!" + j) > ,& + ,', therefore, ,'∗ > )d(,!" + j) − ,&, ∏ @(A')∗?  decreases in ,'. 
(2) ∏ @(A')∗?  is concave in ,&, therefore, when  4∏ @(A')∗?4,& = 4(−2 + ))(−)j − ),!" + ,& + ,')(−1 + )))(8 + (−5 + ))))%d = 0 ,&∗ = )(j + ,!") − ,' 
gives the unique minimum value. Because )d(,!" + j) > ,& + ,', therefore, ,&∗ >)d(,!" + j) − ,', ∏ @(A')∗?  decreases in ,&. 
(3) ∏ @(A')∗?  is concave in ,!", therefore, when  4∏ @(A')∗?4,!" = −4(−2 + ))(−)j − ),!" + ,& + ,')(−1 + ))(8 + (−5 + ))))%d = 0 ,!"∗ = −)j + ,& + ,')  
gives the minimum value. However, because )d(,!" + j) > ,& + ,', therefore, ,!"∗ <*!+*",< − j, ∏ @(A')∗?  increases in ,!". 
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(4) ∏ @(A')∗?  is concave in j, therefore, when  4∏ @(A')∗?4j = −4(−2 + ))(−)j − ),!" + ,& + ,')(−1 + ))(8 + (−5 + ))))%d = 0 j∗ = −),!" + ,& + ,')  
gives the minimum value. However, because )d(,!" + j) > ,& + ,', therefore, j∗ >*!+*",< − j, ∏ @(A')∗?  increases in γ. 
For the logistics vendor’s maximized profit (Equation (6.28)) under the decentralized 
supply chain,  
(1) ∏ B(A& , A!")∗?  is concave in ,', therefore, when  4∏ B(A& , A!")∗? 	4,' = (−2 + ))%()j + ),!" − ,& − ,')2(−1 + )))(8 + (−5 + ))))d = 0 ,'∗ = )(j + ,!") − ,& 
gives the unique minimum value. Because )d(,!" + j) > ,& + ,', therefore, ∏ B(A& , A!")∗?  decreases in ,'. 
(2) ∏ B(A& , A!")∗? is concave in ,&, therefore, when  4∏ B(A& , A!")∗? 	4,& = (−2 + ))%()j + ),!" − ,& − ,')2(−1 + )))(8 + (−5 + ))))d = 0 ,&∗ = )(j + ,!") − ,' 
gives the unique minimum value. Because )d(,!" + j) > ,& + ,'therefore, ∏ B(A& , A!")∗?  
decreases in ,&. 
(3) ∏ B(A& , A!")∗? is concave in ,!", therefore, when  
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4∏ B(A& , A!")∗? 	4,!" = 12(−1 + ))(8 + (−5 + ))))d ((−8 + (9 − 2))))j − (−1 + ))(8+ (−5 + ))))d + (−8 + (9 − 2)))),!" + (−2 + ))%,& + (−2 + ))%,')= 0 ,!"∗= (−8 + (9 − 2))))j − (−1 + ))(8 + (−5 + ))))d + (−2 + ))%,& + (−2 + ))%,'8 + )(−9 + 2))  
gives the unique minimum value. Because )d(,!" + j) > ,& + ,', therefore,  
If (7@+(A7%,),)B7(7)+,)(@+(7C+,),)<+(7%+,)%*!+(7%+,)%*"@+,(7A+%,) < *!+*",< − j, that is when i) 0 <,& < (7)+,),(@+(7C+,),)<%7@+,(A7%,+(7%+,)%<)  and (7)+,),(@+(7C+,),)<%7@+,(A7%,+(7%+,)%<) < ,' + ,& < 1 or ii) (7)+,),(@+(7C+,),)<%7@+,(A7%,+(7%+,)%<) ≤ ,& < 1, ∏ B(A& , A!")∗?  increases in ,!";  
 
If (7@+(A7%,),)B7(7)+,)(@+(7C+,),)<+(7%+,)%*!+(7%+,)%*"@+,(7A+%,) > *!+*",< − j, that is ,& + ,' <(7)+,),(@+(7C+,),)<%7@+,(A7%,+(7%+,)%<) , then,  
i) when *!+*",< − j < ,!" < ,!"∗ , ∏ B(A& , A!")∗?  decreases in ,!";  
ii) when ,!"∗ < ,!" < 1,	∏ B(A& , A!")∗?  increases in ,!". 
(4) ∏ B(A& , A!")∗? 	is concave in j, therefore, when  4∏ B(A& , A!")∗? 	4j = 12(−1 + ))(8 + (−5 + ))))d ((−8 + (9 − 2))))j − (−1 + ))(8+ (−5 + ))))d + (−8 + (9 − 2)))),!" + (−2 + ))%(,& + ,')) = 0 j∗= −(−1 + ))(8 + (−5 + ))))d + (−8 + (9 − 2)))),!" + (−2 + ))%,& + (−2 + ))%,'8 + )(−9 + 2))  
gives the unique minimum value. Because )d(,!" + j) > ,& + ,', therefore,  
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If 7(7)+,)(@+(7C+,),)<+(7@+(A7%,),)*#$+(7%+,)%*!+(7%+,)%*"@+,(7A+%,) < *!+*",< − ,!", that is when i) 0 < ,& < (7)+,),(@+(7C+,),)<%7@+,(A7%,+(7%+,)%<)  and (7)+,),(@+(7C+,),)<%7@+,(A7%,+(7%+,)%<) < ,' + ,& < 1 or ii) (7)+,),(@+(7C+,),)<%7@+,(A7%,+(7%+,)%<) ≤ ,& < 1,   ∏ B(A& , A!")∗?  increases in j;  
If (7@+(A7%,),)B7(7)+,)(@+(7C+,),)<+(7%+,)%*!+(7%+,)%*"@+,(7A+%,) > *!+*",< − ,!",  that is ,& + ,' <(7)+,),(@+(7C+,),)<%7@+,(A7%,+(7%+,)%<) , then,  
i) when *!+*",< − ,!" < j < j∗, ∏ B(A& , A!")∗?  decreases in j;  
ii) when j∗ < j < 1,	∏ B(A& , A!")∗?  increases in j. 
Proof of  PROPOSITION 6-7.  
Under the integrated supply chain,  
4A'∗4,' = 12 4A!"∗4,' = e/g 4K'∗4,' = − 12)d − 2)%d < 0 4K!"∗4,' = 12d − 2)d > 0 4A'∗4,& = 12 4A!"∗4,& = N/A 4K'∗4,& = − 12)d − 2)%d < 0 4K!"∗4,& = 12d − 2)d > 0 4A'∗4,!" = e/g 4A!"∗4,!" = 12 4K'∗4,!" = 12d − 2)d > 0 4K!"∗4,!" = − 12d − 2)d < 0 4A'∗4γ= e/g 
4A!"∗4γ= e/g 4K'∗4γ = e/g 4K!"∗4γ = e/g 
For the maximized supply chain profit (Equation (6.33)),  
(1) ∏ "!(A' , A!")∗?  is concave in ,', therefore, when  4∏ "!(A' , A!")∗? 4,' = −−),!" + ,& + ,'2(−1 + )))d = 0 ,'∗ = ),!" − ,& 
gives the unique minimum value. Because )d(,!" + j) > ,& + ,', therefore, 
If ),!" − ,& > )d(,!" + j) − ,&, that is d < ))+B and ,!" > − B<7)+<, then ∏ "!(A' , A!")∗?  
decreases in ,';  
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If ),!" − ,& < )d(,!" + j) − ,&, that is 1) 0 < d < ))+B and 0 < ,!" < − B<7)+< or 2) ))+B ≤ d < 1, 
i) when 0 < ,' < ,'∗ , ∏ "!(A' , A!")∗?  decreases in ,';  
ii) when ,'∗ < ,' < )d(,!" + j) − ,&,	∏ "!(A' , A!")∗?  increases in ,'. 
 
(2) ∏ "!(A' , A!")∗?  is concave in ,&, therefore, when  4∏ "!(A' , A!")∗? 	4,& = −−),!" + ,& + ,'2(−1 + )))d = 0 ,&∗ = ),!" − ,' 
gives the unique minimum value. Because )d(,!" + j) > ,& + ,', therefore, 
If ),!" − ,& > )d(,!" + j) − ,&, that is d < ))+B and ,!" > − B<7)+<, then ∏ "!(A' , A!")∗?  
decreases in ,&;  
If ),!" − ,& < )d(,!" + j) − ,&, that is 1) 0 < d < ))+B and 0 < ,!" < − B<7)+< or 2) ))+B ≤ d < 1, 
i) when 0 < ,& < ,&∗, ∏ "!(A' , A!")∗?  decreases in ,&;  
ii) when ,&∗ < ,& < )d(,!" + j) − ,&,	∏ "!(A' , A!")∗?  increases in ,&. 
(3) ∏ "!(A' , A!")∗? is concave in ,!", therefore, when  4∏ "!(A' , A!")∗? 	4,!" = −d − )d − ,!" + ,& + ,'2d − 2)d = 0 ,!"∗ = d − )d + ,& + ,' 
gives the minimum value. However, because )d(,!" + j) > ,& + ,', therefore,  
If j + d + ,& + ,' < *!+*",< + )d, that is ,%<%+*!+*",< − j − d > ,& + ,' and 1) ,& <(7)+,),<%7)+,<  and  (7)+,),<%7)+,< < ,& + ,' or 2) (7)+,),<%7)+,< ≤ ,& < )d, ∏ "!(A' , A!")∗?  increases 
in ,!"; 
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If 1 − )d + ,' > *!+*",< − j, that is 1) ,& < (7)+,),<%7)+,<  and ,& + ,' ≤ (7)+,),<%7)+,< , or 2) (7)+,),<%7)+,< < ,& + ,' and ,%<%+*!+*",< − j − d < ,& + ,', or 3) ,%<%+*!+*",< − j − d < ,& +,' and (7)+,),<%7)+,< ≤ ,& 
i) when *!+*",< − j < ,!" < ,!"∗ , ∏ "!(A' , A!")∗?  decreases in ,!";  
ii) when ,!"∗ < ,!" < 1, ∏ "!(A' , A!")∗?  increases in ,!". 
Proof of. PROPOSITION 6-8 
Under integrated supply chain, 4A'∗4) = 12 4A!"∗4) = N/A 4A'∗4d = 12 4A!"∗4d = 12 
Proof of PROPOSITION 6-9.  
Under the decentralized supply chain, according to Equation (6.8),  the first-order-conditions 
and the second-order-conditions of ∏ B(A& , A!")D  in A!" are  4∏ B(A& , A!")D 4A!" = 1 + Q − )d + ,!" − ,& − 2A!" + A& + A'1 − )d 	4∏ B(A& , A!")%D 4A!"% = 2−1 + )d < 0  
So, the solution to the first-order-conditions gives the unique maximizer.  4∏ B(A& , A!")D 4A!" = 1 + Q − )d + ,!" − ,& − 2A!" + A& + A'1 − )d = 0 A!"∗ = 12 (1 + Q − )d + ,!" − ,& + A& + A') 
Then, the traditional manufacturer’s profit function (6.9) can be updated as J @(A')D = 1)d(−1 + )d) O)Qd(−1 + )d) − ()Qd + ,' + A&)A' + A'% + 12)d(Q+ ,' + A& − A')(1 + Q − )d + ,!" − ,& + A& + A')P 
which is convex in A', so the first-order-conditions gives the maximum profit. 
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4∏ @(A')D4A' = )d(−1 − 2Q + )d) − 2,' − 2A& + )d(−,!" + ,& + ,' − 2A') + 4A'2)d(−1 + )d)= 0 A'∗ = )d(−1 − 2Q + )d) − 2,' + )d(−,!" + ,& + ,') − 2A&−4 + 2)d  
Then, the ∏ B(A& , A!")?  can be rewritten as  
J B(A& , A!")? = 1−1 + )d (− 116(−2 + )d)% ((−1 + )d)(−4 + 4Q + )d) + (−4+ 3)d),!" + (−4 + )d),& + (2 − )d),' + 6A& − 2)dA&)((−1 + )d)(−4+ 4Q + )d) + (−4 + 3)d),!" + (4 − 3)d),& + (2 − )d),' − 2A&+ 2)dA&)− (,& − A&)()d(−1 + )d) + 2,' + 2A& − )d(,!" − ,& + ,' + 2A&))4)d ) 
Which is convex in A&, therefore, the first-order-conditions gives the maximum profit. 4∏ @(A')?4A& = 14)d(−2 + )d)% ()d(8 − 4Q + )d(−5 + )d)) + 8,& − 8,' − 16A&− )d()d,!" + (4 − )d),& + (−6 + )d),' + 2(−5 + )d)A&)) = 0 A&∗= )d(8 − 4Q + )d(−5 + )d)) + 8,& − 8,' − )d()d,!" + (4 − )d),& + (−6 + )d),')2(8 + )d(−5 + )d))  
The final optimal decisions are 
A&∗ = ()d(8 − 4Q + )d(−5 + )d)) + 8,& − 8,' − )d()d,!" + (4 − )d),&+ (−6 + )d),'))/2(8 + )d(−5 + )d))  (6.34). A'∗ = ()dY8 + Q(6 − 2)d) + )d(−5 + )d)Z + 4,& + 4,'+ )d(−4 + )d)(−,!" + ,& + ,'))/2(8 + )d(−5 + )d)) (6.35) A!"∗ = (8 + Q(8 − 4)d) + )d(−5 + )d) + (8 − 3)d),!" + (−2 + )d),&− 2,' + )d,')/	2(8 + )d(−5 + )d)) (6.36) K'∗ = )Qd(−1 + )d) + )d(−2 + )d),!" + (2 − )d),& + (2 − )d),')d(−1 + )d)(8 + )d(−5 + )d))  (6.37) 
 495 
K!"∗ = 12(−1 + )d)(8 + )d(−5 + )d)) ((−1 + )d)(8 + )d(−5 + )d)+ 2Q(−4 + )d)) + (8 + )d(−7 + )d)),!" − 6,& − 6,'− )d(−5 + )d)(,& + ,')) (6.38) 
The maximized profits are J @(A') =∗D 12)d(−1 + )d)(8 + )d(−5 + )d))% (−2()Qd(−5 + )d) − 2)d,!"+ 2,& + 2,')()Qd(−1 + )d) + )d(−2 + )d),!" + (2 − )d),&+ (2 − )d),') + )Qd(8 + )d(−5 + )d))((−1 + )d)(8 + )d(−5+ )d) + 2Q(−4 + )d)) + (8 + )d(−7 + )d)),!" − 6,& − 6,'− )d(−5 + )d)(,& + ,'))) 
(6.39) 
J B∗D (A& , A!")= 14)d(−1 + )d)(8 + )d(−5 + )d)) (−)d(−1+ )d)(−8(−1 + Q)% + )(5 + 2Q(−5 + 2Q))d + )%(−1 + 2Q)d%)+ )d(−8 + )d(9 − 2)d)),!"% + (−2 + )d)(,& + ,')(2)Qd(−1+ )d) + (2 − )d),& + (2 − )d),') + 2)d,!"(−(−1 + )d)(8+ )d(−5 + )d) + Q(−8 + 3)d)) + (−2 + )d)%,&+ (−2 + )d)%,')) 
(6.40) 
Under the integrated supply chain, the first-order-conditions and the second-order-conditions 
of ∏ "!(A' , A!")D  by A' and A!" in Equation (6.9) are 
⎩⎪⎨
⎪⎧ 4∏ "!(A' , A!")D 4A' = −−)d,!" + ,& + ,' + 2)dA!" − 2A')d(−1 + )d)4∏ "!(A' , A!")D 4A!" = −1 + )d − ,!" + ,& + ,' + 2A!" − 2A'−1 + )d  
⎩⎪⎪
⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪
⎧4∏ "!(A' , A!")%? 4A'% = 2)d(−1 + )d) < 04∏ "!(A' , A!")%? 4A!"% = 2−1 + )d < 04∏ "!(A' , A!")%?4A'4A!" = − 2−1 + )d > 04∏ "!(A' , A!")%?4A!"4A' = − 2−1 + )d > 0
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So, the determinant of the Hessian Matrix can be written as 
L = MM 2)d(−1 + )d) − 2−1 + )d− 2−1 + )d 2−1 + )d MM =
2(−1 + )))d × 2(−1 + ))d − O− 2−1 + )dP%
= 4)d − )%d% > 0 
Therefore, this Hessian Matrix is a negative-definite matrix, the solution to the first-order-
conditions gives the unique maximizer of ∏ "!(A' , A!")D . 
⎩⎪⎨
⎪⎧ 4∏ "!(A' , A!")D 4A' = −−)d,!" + ,& + ,' + 2)dA!" − 2A')d(−1 + )d) = 04∏ "!(A' , A!")D 4A!" = −1 + )d − ,!" + ,& + ,' + 2A!" − 2A'−1 + )d = 0 
 A'∗ = 12 ()d + ,& + ,')	 (6.41) 
 A!"∗ = 12 (1 + ,!") (6.42) 
So,  
 K'∗ =	−)d,!" + ,& + ,'2)d(−1 + )d)  (6.43) 
 K!"∗ = 1 − )d − ,!" + ,& + ,'2 − 2)d  (6.44) 
 
J "!(A' , A!")∗?= −)d(1 − )d) + )d,!"% + (,& + ,')% − 2)d,!"(1 − )d + ,& + ,')4)d(−1 + )d)  (6.45) 
Proof of PROPOSITION 6-10. Under the decentralized supply chain, we can find out that, 4A&∗4,'= 12 O−1+ )d8 + )d(−5 + )d)P < 0 
4A'∗4,' = (−2 + )d)%2(8 + )d(−5 + )d))> 0 
4A!"∗4,' = −2 + )d2(8 + )d(−5 + )d))< 0 
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4A&∗4,&= 12 O1 + )d8 + )d(−5 + )d)P> 0 
4A'∗4,& = (−2 + )d)%2(8 + )d(−5 + )d))> 0 
4A!"∗4,& = −2 + )d2(8 + )d(−5 + )d))< 0 
4A&∗4,!"= − )%d%2Y8 + )d(−5 + )d)Z< 0 
4A'∗4,!"= − )d(−4 + )d)2Y8 + )d(−5 + )d)Z> 0 
4A!"∗4,!" = 8 − 3)d2(8 + )d(−5 + )d))> 0 
4A&∗4Q = − 2)d8 + )d(−5 + )d)< 0 
4A'∗4Q = )d(3 − )d)8 + )d(−5 + )d)> 0 
4A!"∗4Q = 4 − 2)d8 + )d(−5 + )d)> 0 
and 
4K'∗4,' = 2 − )d)d(−1 + )d)(8 + )d(−5 + )d))< 0 
4K!"∗4,' = − 6 + )d(−5 + )d)2(−1 + )d)Y8 + )d(−5 + )d)Z> 0 4K'∗4,& = 2 − )d)d(−1 + )d)(8 + )d(−5 + )d))< 0 
4K!"∗4,& = − 6 + )d(−5 + )d)2(−1 + )d)Y8 + )d(−5 + )d)Z> 0 4K'∗4,!" = −2 + )d(−1 + )d)(8 + )d(−5 + )d)) > 0 4K!"
∗4,!" = 8 + )d(−7 + )d)2(−1 + )d)(8 + )d(−5 + )d))< 0 4K'∗4Q = 18 + )d(−5 + )d) > 0 4K!"∗4Q = −4 + )d8 + )d(−5 + )d) < 0 
From Equation (6.39), it is easy to find out that 
(1)  ∏ @(A')∗D  is concave in ,', therefore, when  4∏ @(A')∗D4,' = 12)d(−1 + )d)(8 + )d(−5 + )d))% (−)Qd(−1 + )d)(−24 + )d(28+ )d(−9 + )d))) − 8)d(−2 + )d),!" + 8(−2 + )d),& + 8(−2+ )d),') = 0 
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,'∗ = ()Qd(−1 + )d) X−24 + )dY28 + )d(−9 + )d)Z[ + 8)d(−2 + )d),!"− 8(−2 + )d),&)/8(−2 + )d) 
gives the unique minimum value. However, because )d(,!" + Q) > ,& + ,', therefore, ,'∗ < )d(,!" + Q) − ,&, 
i) when 0 < ,' < ,'∗ , ∏ @(A')∗D  decreases in ,';  
ii) when ,'∗ < ,' < )d(,!" + Q) − ,&; ∏ @(A')∗D  increases in ,'. 
(2) ∏ @(A')∗D  is concave in ,&, therefore, when  4∏ @(A')∗D4,& = 12)d(−1 + )d)(8 + )d(−5 + )d))% (−)Qd(−1 + )d)(−24 + )d(28+ )d(−9 + )d))) − 8)d(−2 + )d),!" + 8(−2 + )d),& + 8(−2+ )d),') = 0 ,&∗ = ()Qd(−1 + )d) X−24 + )dY28 + )d(−9 + )d)Z[ + 8)d(−2 + )d),!"− 8(−2 + )d),')/8(−2 + )d) 
gives the unique minimum value. Because )d(,!" + Q) > ,& + ,', therefore, ,&∗ <)d(,!" + Q) − ,',  
i) when 0 < ,& < ,&∗, ∏ @(A')∗D  decreases in ,&;  
ii) when ,&∗ < ,& < )d(,!" + Q) − ,'; ∏ @(A')∗D  increases in ,&. 
(3) ∏ @(A')∗?  is concave in ,!", therefore, when  4∏ @(A')∗?4,!" = 12(−1 + )d)(8 + )d(−5 + )d))% (Q(−1 + )d)(−64 + )d(56 + )d(−13+ )d))) + 8)d(−2 + )d),!" − 8(−2 + )d),& − 8(−2 + )d),') = 0 ,!"∗= −Q(−1 + )d)(−64 + )d(56 + )d(−13 + )d))) + 8(−2 + )d),& + 8(−2 + )d),'8)d(−2 + )d)  
gives the minimum value. However, because )d(,!" + Q) > ,& + ,', therefore, ,!"∗ >*!+*",< − Q,  
i) when *!+*",< − Q < ,!" < ,!"∗ , ∏ @(A')∗D  decreases in ,!";  
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ii) when ,!"∗ < ,!" < 1; ∏ @(A')∗D  increases in ,!". 
(4) ∏ @(A')∗D  is convex in Q, therefore, when  4∏ @(A')∗D4Q = 12(8 + )d(−5 + )d))% ((8 + )d(−5 + )d))% + 4Q(−32 + )d(33+ )d(−10 + )d))) + (−64 + )d(56 + )d(−13 + )d))),!" + 24,&+ 24,' − )d(28 + )d(−9 + )d))(,& + ,')) = 0 Q∗ = 14(−32 + )d(33 + )d(−10 + )d))) (−(8 + )d(−5 + )d))% + (64 − )d(56+ )d(−13 + )d))),!" − 24,& − 24,' + )d(28 + )d(−9 + )d))(,&+ ,')) 
gives the unique maximum value. However, because )d(,!" + Q) > ,& + ,', therefore, ∏ @(A')∗D  decreases in Q; 
  
For the logistics vendor’s maximized profit (Equation (6.40)) under the decentralized 
supply chain,  
(1) ∏ B(A& , A!")∗D  is concave in ,', therefore, when  4∏ B(A& , A!")∗D 	4,'= (−2 + )d)()Qd(−1 + )d) + )d(−2 + )d),!" + (2 − )d),& + (2 − )d),')2)d(−1 + )d)(8 + )d(−5 + )d)) = 0 ,'∗ = )d(Q + Q−2 + )d + ,!") − ,& 
gives the unique minimum value. Because )d(,!" + Q) > ,& + ,', therefore, ,'∗ <)d(,!" + Q) − ,&, 
i) when 0 < ,' < ,'∗ , ∏ B(A& , A!")∗D  decreases in ,';  
ii) when ,'∗ < ,' < )d(,!" + Q) − ,&, ∏ B(A& , A!")∗D  increases in ,'. 
(2) ∏ B(A& , A!")∗D  is concave in ,&, therefore, when  
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4∏ B(A& , A!")∗D 	4,&= (−2 + )d)()Qd(−1 + )d) + )d(−2 + )d),!" + (2 − )d),& + (2 − )d),')2)d(−1 + )d)(8 + )d(−5 + )d)) = 0 ,&∗ = )d(Q + Q−2 + )d + ,!") − ,' 
gives the unique minimum value. Because )d(,!" + Q) > ,& + ,', therefore, ,&∗ <)d(,!" + Q) − ,',  
i) when 0 < ,& < ,&∗, ∏ B(A& , A!")∗D  decreases in ,&;  
ii) when ,&∗ < ,& < )d(,!" + Q) − ,', ∏ B(A& , A!")∗D  increases in ,&. 
(3) ∏ B(A& , A!")∗D is concave in ,!", therefore, when  4∏ B(A& , A!")∗D 	4,!" = 12(−1 + )d)(8 + )d(−5 + )d)) ((1 − )d)(8 + )d(−5 + )d) + Q(−8+ 3)d)) + (−8 + )d(9 − 2)d)),!" + (−2 + )d)%,& + (−2 + )d)%,')= 0 ,!"∗= −(−1 + )d)(8 + )d(−5 + )d) + Q(−8 + 3)d)) + (−2 + )d)%,& + (−2 + )d)%,'8 + )d(−9 + 2)d)  
gives the unique minimum value. Because )d(,!" + Q) > ,& + ,', therefore, ,!"∗ >*!+*",< − Q, 
i) when *!+*",< − j < ,!" < ,!"∗ , ∏ B(A& , A!")∗D  increases in ,!";  
ii) when ,!"∗ < ,!" < 1,	∏ B(A& , A!")∗D  decreases in ,!". 
(4) ∏ B(A& , A!")∗D 	is concave in Q, therefore, when  4∏ B(A& , A!")∗D 	4Q= −8 + Q(8 − 4)d) + )d(5 − )d) + (8 − 3)d),!" + (−2 + )d),& − 2,' + )d,'2(8 + )d(−5 + )d)) = 0 
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Q∗ = −8 + )d(5 − )d) + (8 − 3)d),!" + (−2 + )d),& + (−2 + )d),'−8 + 4)d  
gives the unique minimum value. Because )d(,!" + Q) > ,& + ,', therefore, Q∗ >*!+*",< − ,!", 
i) when *!+*",< − ,!" < Q < Q∗, ∏ B(A& , A!")∗?  decreases in Q;  
ii) when Q∗ < Q < 1,	∏ B(A& , A!")∗?  increases in Q. 
Proof of PROPOSITION 6-11. Under the integrated supply chain,  
4A'∗4,' = 12 4A!"∗4,' = e/g 4K'∗4,' = − 12)d − 2)%d < 0 4K!"∗4,' = 12 − 2)d > 0 4A'∗4,& = 12 4A!"∗4,& = N/A 4K'∗4,& = − 12)d − 2)%d% < 0 4K!"∗4,& = 12 − 2)d > 0 4A'∗4,!" = e/g 4A!"∗4,!" = 12 4K'∗4,!" = 12 − 2)d > 0 4K!"∗4,!" = 12 − 2)d < 0 4A'∗4β = e/g 4A!"∗4β = e/g 4K'∗4β = e/g 4K!"∗4β = e/g 
 
For the maximized supply chain profit (Equation (6.45)),  
(1) ∏ "!(A' , A!")∗D  is concave in ,', therefore, when  4∏ "!(A' , A!")∗D 4,' = −−)d,!" + ,& + ,'2)d(−1 + )d) = 0 ,'∗ = )d,!" − ,& 
gives the unique minimum value. Because )d(,!" + Q) > ,& + ,', therefore, ,'∗ <)d(,!" + Q) − ,&, 
i) when 0 < ,' < ,'∗ , ∏ "!(A' , A!")∗D  decreases in ,';  
ii) when ,'∗ < ,' < )d(,!" + Q) − ,&,	∏ "!(A' , A!")∗D  increases in ,'. 
(2) ∏ "!(A' , A!")∗D  is concave in ,&, therefore, when  
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4∏ "!(A' , A!")∗D 	4,& = −−)d,!" + ,& + ,'2)d(−1 + )d) = 0 ,&∗ = )d,!" − ,' 
gives the unique minimum value. Because )d(,!" + Q) > ,& + ,', therefore, ,&∗ <)d(,!" + Q) − ,', 
i) when 0 < ,& < ,&∗, ∏ "!(A' , A!")∗D  decreases in ,&;  
ii) when ,&∗ < ,& < )d(,!" + Q) − ,',	∏ "!(A' , A!")∗D  increases in ,&. 
(3) ∏ "!(A' , A!")∗D is concave in ,!", therefore, when  4∏ "!(A' , A!")∗D 	4,!" = 1 − )d − ,!" + ,& + ,'−2 + 2)d = 0 ,!"∗ = 1 − )d + ,& + ,' 
gives the minimum value. However, because )d(,!" + j) > ,& + ,', therefore, ,!"∗ >*!+*",< − Q,  
i) when *!+*",< − Q < ,!" < ,!"∗ , ∏ "!(A' , A!")∗D  decreases in ,!";  
ii) when ,!"∗ < ,!" < 1,	∏ "!(A' , A!")∗D  increases in ,!". 
Proof of PROPOSITION 6-13. 
Under integrated supply chain, 4A'∗4) = 12 4A!"∗4) = N/A 4A'∗4d = 12 4A!"∗4d = N/A 
Proof of PROPOSITION 6-14. 
Under the decentralized supply chain, we compare the optimal results of model X and 
model Y, 
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1) We compare the traditional manufacturer’s profit under two model, 
J @(A' , A!")∗: −J @(A')∗?= − 116)d(−1 + )d) Y4)d,!"%+ (−1 + )d)()d(−4 + 3)d) + 2)d,& − ,&%)− 2(−1 + )d)(3)d + ,&),' + (1 + 3)d),'% − 8)d,!"(1 − )d + ,')Z
− 2(−2 + ))(−)j − ),!" + ,& + ,')%(−1 + )))(8 + (−5 + ))))%d  
Therefore, when  
i) 7)E,+@,%7E;+);;,7)!F,%+CA,#7)),&+,' < d < 1, ∏ @(A' , A!")∗: −∏ @(A')∗?  is concave in ,!", therefore, when 4∏ @(A' , A!")∗: −∏ @(A')∗?4,!"
= −8d(−1 + )d + ,!" − ,')−1 + )d + 64(−2 + ))(−)j − ),!" + ,& + ,')(−1 + ))(8 + (−5 + ))))%16d= 0 
,!"∗ = 1−8(−2 + ))) + (−64 + )(144 + )(−137 + )(59 + (−11 + )))))))d (−(−1+ )d)(8(−2 + )))j + (−1 + ))(8 + (−5 + ))))%d − 8(−2 + )),&)+ (16 − 64d + )(−8 + (128 + )(−113 + )(51 + (−11+ ))))))d)),') > 1 
Therefore, when ,!" = 1, we can have the unique minimum value of ∏ @(A' , A!")∗: −∏ @(A' , A!")∗?   
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J @(A' , A!")∗: −J @(A')∗? |*#$G)
= −32(−2 + ))(−)(1 + j) + ,& + ,')%16)d(−1 + ))(8 + (−5 + ))))%
+ (−1 + )d),&% − 2(−1 + )d),&()d − ,') − (1 + 3)d)(−)d + ,')%16)d(−1 + )d)< 0 
So, when ∏ @(A' , A!")∗: −∏ @(A')∗? = 0 
,!") = )%H@(7%+,),+E;<7,H);;+,I7)!F+,(CA+(7))+,),)JK<K X2(−1 + )d)(8(−2 + )))j +
(−1 + ))(8 + (−5 + ))))%d) − 16(−2 + ))(−1 + )d),& − 2O16 − 64d +
) X−8 + X128 + )Y−113 + )(51 + (−11 + ))))Z[ d[P ,' − (−1 + ))(8 +
(−5 + ))))%d(−1 + )d)√o[  
,!"% = 12(8(−2 + ))) + 64d − )(144 + )(−137 + )(59 + (−11 + ))))))d) (2(−1+ )d)(8(−2 + )))j + (−1 + ))(8 + (−5 + ))))%d) − 16(−2+ ))(−1 + )d),& − 2(16 − 64d + )(−8 + (128 + )(−113 + )(51+ (−11 + ))))))d)),' + (−1 + ))(8 + (−5 + ))))%d(−1 + )d)√o) 
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	o = 1(−1 + ))(8 + (−5 + ))))%d%(−1 + )d) ()d(−32(−2 + ))(1 + j)% + 8(−2+ )))(7 + 8j)d + (−64 + )(144 + )(−73 + )(27 + (−11+ )))))))d%) + (−8(−2 + )) + (112 + )(−137 + )(59 + (−11+ ))))))d),&% − 2d(8(−2 + ))(−4 + 3) + 4(−1 + ))j) + (−64+ )(80 + )(−41 + )(27 + (−11 + )))))))d),' + (−8(−2 + ))+ (−16 + (−3 + )))(3 + (−8 + )))))d),'% + 2,&(d(8(−2 + ))(4+ ) + 4j) − (−64 + )(80 + (−3 + )))(35 + (−8 + ))))))d) + (16+ 48d + )(−8 + (−3 + ))(35 + (−8 + ))))d)),')) > 0 
Here, 1 > ,!") > *!+*",< − j > 0 > ,!"%, thus, if ,!" ∈ q*!+*",< − j, ,!")	r, ∏ @(A' , A!")∗: < ∏ @(A')∗? ; If  ,!" ∈ [,!"), 1	], ∏ @(A' , A!")∗: > ∏ @(A')∗? . 
ii) 0 < d < 7)E,+@,%7E;+);;,7)!F,%+CA,#7)),&+,' , ∏ @(A' , A!")∗: −∏ @(A')∗?  is concex 
in ,!", use the same approach, when  4∏ @(A' , A!")∗: −∏ @(A')∗?4,!"
= −8d(−1 + )d + ,!" − ,')−1 + )d + 64(−2 + ))(−)j − ),!" + ,& + ,')(−1 + ))(8 + (−5 + ))))%16d= 0 
,!"∗ = 1−8(−2 + ))) + (−64 + )(144 + )(−137 + )(59 + (−11 + )))))))d (−(−1+ )d)(8(−2 + )))j + (−1 + ))(8 + (−5 + ))))%d − 8(−2 + )),&)+ (16 − 64d + )(−8 + (128 + )(−113 + )(51 + (−11+ ))))))d)),') < 0 
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Therefore, when ,!" = *!+*",< − j, we can have the unique maximum value of ∏ @(A' , A!")∗: −∏ @(A')∗? , 
 
J @(A' , A!")∗: −J @(A')∗? |*#$G*!+*",< 7B
= − 32(−2 + ))(−1 + d)%(,& + ,')%16)d(−1 + ))(8 + (−5 + ))))%d%
− 116)d(−1 + )d) ^(−1 + )d)()d(−4 + 3)d) + 2)d,& − ,&%) − 8(−1+ )d − ,')()jd − ,& − ,') − 2(−1 + )d)(3)d + ,&),' + (1
+ 3)d),'% + 4(−)jd + ,& + ,')%)d _ > 0 
So, under this case, we do also have 1 > ,!") > *!+*",< − j > 0 > ,!"%, thus, when ,!" ∈q*!+*",< − j, ,!")	r, ∏ @(A' , A!")∗: > ∏ @(A')∗? ; When  ,!" ∈ [,!"), 1	], ∏ @(A' , A!")∗: < ∏ @(A')∗? ; 
2) We compare the logistics vendor’s profits under Model X and Model Y, 
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J B∗: (A&) −J B∗? (A& , A!")= 18)d ((−)d + ,& + ,')% − 1(−1 + ))(8 + (−5 + )))) 2()((−8 + (9− 2))))j% − 2(−1 + ))(8 + (−5 + ))))jd + (−1 + ))(8 + (−5+ ))))d%) + )(−8 + (9 − 2)))),!"% + (−2 + ))%(2)j − ,& − ,')(,&+ ,') + 2),!"((−8 + (9 − 2))))j − (−1 + ))(8 + (−5 + ))))d+ (−2 + ))%,& + (−2 + ))%,'))) 
It is convex in ,!", therefore, when  
4∏ B∗: (A&) − ∏ B∗? (A& , A!")4,!"= 12(−1 + ))(8 + (−5 + ))))d ((8 + )(−9 + 2)))j + (−1 + ))(8+ (−5 + ))))d + (8 + )(−9 + 2))),!" − (−2 + ))%,&− (−2 + ))%,') = 0 
,!"∗
= (−8 + (9 − 2))))j − (−1 + ))(8 + (−5 + ))))d + (−2 + ))%,& + (−2 + ))%,'8 + )(−9 + 2))  
So, when ,!"∗ < 0, when ,!" = *!+*",< − j, we can have the maximum value of ∏ B∗: (A&) −∏ B∗? (A& , A!") 
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J B∗: (A&) −J B∗? (A& , A!")|*#$G*!+*",< 7B= 18)d ((−)d + ,& + ,')% − 1(−1 + ))(8 + (−5 + )))) 2()((−8 + (9− 2))))j% − 2(−1 + ))(8 + (−5 + ))))jd + (−1 + ))(8 + (−5+ ))))d%) + (−2 + ))%(2)j − ,& − ,')(,& + ,') + 2)((−8 + (9− 2))))j − (−1 + ))(8 + (−5 + ))))d + (−2 + ))%,&+ (−2 + ))%,')(−j + ,& + ,')d ) + )(−8 + (9− 2))))(−j + ,& + ,')d )%)) < 0 
Thus, ∏ B∗: (A&) − ∏ B∗? (A& , A!") < 0 always holds. 
when ,!"∗ > 0, when ,!" = ,!"∗ , we can have the maximum value of ∏ B∗: (A&) −∏ B∗? (A& , A!") 
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J B∗: (A&) −J B∗? (A& , A!")|*#$G*#$∗= 18)d ((−)d + ,& + ,')% − 1(−1 + ))(8 + (−5 + )))) 2()((−8 + (9 − 2))))j%− 2(−1 + ))(8 + (−5 + ))))jd + (−1 + ))(8 + (−5 + ))))d%) + (−2 + ))%(2)j− ,& − ,')(,& + ,')+ 1(8 + )(−9 + 2)))% ()(−8 + (9− 2))))((−8 + (9 − 2))))j − (−1 + ))(8 + (−5 + ))))d + (−2 + ))%,&+ (−2 + ))%,')%)
+ 2)((−8 + (9 − 2))))j − (−1 + ))(8 + (−5 + ))))d + (−2 + ))%,& + (−2 + ))%,')%8 + )(−9 + 2)) ))< 0 
So, in this case, ∏ B∗: (A&) − ∏ B∗? (A& , A!") < 0 is always true. In summary, the logistics 
vendor’s profit in the Model Y is always lower than Model X. 
3) We compare the optimal prices in the two models, 
A&:∗ − A&?∗ = )()j + ),!" − ,& − ,')2(8 + (−5 + )))) > 0 
Then, 
A':∗ − A'?∗= )(2(−4 + ))j + (8 + (−5 + ))))d + 2(−4 + )),!" − (−3 + )),& − (−3 + )),')4(8 + (−5 + ))))  
If *!+*",< − j < ,!" < 7%(7;+,)B7(@+(7C+,),)<+(7!+,)*!+(7!+,)*"%(7;+,) , A':∗ − A'?∗ > 0 
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If 1 > ,!" > 7%(7;+,)B7(@+(7C+,),)<+(7!+,)*!+(7!+,)*"%(7;+,) , A':∗ − A'?∗ < 0 
 
A!":∗ − A!"?∗ = 14(8 + (−5 + )))) (2(8 − 8j + )(−5 + ) + 3j)) + (−2 + ))(8+ (−5 + ))))d + 2(−2 + ))),!" + (−4 + ))(−3 + )),& − (4+ (−3 + )))),') 
*!+*",< − j < ,!" <− %(@7@B+,(7C+,+!B))+(7%+,)(@+(7C+,),)<+(7;+,)(7!+,)*!7(;+(7!+,),)*"%(7%+,), , A!":∗ − A!"?∗ > 0; 
If 1 > ,!" > − %(@7@B+,(7C+,+!B))+(7%+,)(@+(7C+,),)<+(7;+,)(7!+,)*!7(;+(7!+,),)*"%(7%+,), , A!":∗ − A!"?∗ < 0. 
4) We compare the demands in the two models 
K':∗ − K'?∗ = 14)d ^−4(−2 + ))()j + ),!" − ,& − ,')(−1 + ))(8 + (−5 + ))))
+ −2)d,!" − (−1 + )d)()d + ,&) + (1 + )d),'−1 + )d _ < 0 
K!":∗ − K!"?∗ = 12(−1 + ))(8 + (−5 + ))))d(−1 + )d) ((8 − 8d + )(−7 + )+ (5 + ))d)),!" + (−1 + )d)(−(8 + (−7 + ))))j + (−3 + ))(−2+ )),&) + (−6 + )(5 + )(−1 + d) − 7d) + 8d),') 
Then, we can easily obtain: i) if 0 < d < 7@+F,7,%7@+C,+,%, K!":∗ − K!"?∗ < 0; ii) if 7@+F,7,%7@+C,+,% <d < 1, K!":∗ − K!"?∗ > 0. 
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Proof of PROPOSITION 6-15. 
Under the integrated supply chain, we compare the optimal results of model X and model Y 
at supply chain level, 
1) We compare the integrated supply chain’s profit under two model, 
J "!(A' , A!")∗: −J "!(A' , A!")∗?
= (−1 + d),!"%4(−1 + ))d(−1 + )d) − ,!"((−1 + )d),& + (−1 + d),')2(−1 + ))d(−1 + )d)
+ 14(−1 + ))d(−1 + )d) ((−1 + )d),&% − 2(−1 + )d),&((−1 + ))d− ,') − (−1 + d)((−1 + ))d(−1 + )d) − ,'% )) 
Which is convex in ,!", thus,  
4∏ "!(A' , A!")∗: −∏ "!(A' , A!")∗?4,!" = (−1 + d),!" + ,& + ,' − d(),& + ,')2(−1 + ))d(−1 + )d) = 0 
,!"∗ = (−1 + )d),&−1 + d + ,' > ,& + ,')d − j 
Therefore, when ,!" = ,!"∗ , we can have the unique maximum value of ∏ "!(A' , A!")∗: −∏ "!(A' , A!")∗? = − (7)+<+*!)%;(7)+<) > 0. 
Then, set ∏ "!(A' , A!")∗: −∏ "!(A' , A!")∗? = 0,  
,!") = (−1 + )d),& − (−1 + d + ,&)%√u + (−1 + d),'−1 + d  
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,!"% = (−1 + )d),& + (−1 + d + ,&)%√K + (−1 + d),'−1 + d  
Where u = (7)+<+*!)%(7)+,)<(7)+,<). 
i) If 7)+*!7*!%+*"7*!*"7)+*" < d < 1 , and *!+*"B< < ) < 7)+<+*!+*"7<*"<*! , ,!"∗ > 1 , then, ,!"% < 0 < *!+*",< − j < 1 < ,!"∗ < ,!") , therefore, we can always have ∏ "!(A' , A!")∗: −∏ "!(A' , A!")∗? > 0 
ii) If  *!+*"7*!*"7*"%)7*!+*!%7*"+*!*" < ) < 1 , and *!+*",B < d < 7)+*!+*"7)+,*!+*" , ,!"∗ < 1 , then 0 <*!+*",< − j < ,!"% < ,!") < 1, therefore,  
a. When *!+*",< − j < ,!" < ,!"%, ∏ "!(A' , A!")∗: −∏ "!(A' , A!")∗? < 0; 
b. When ,!"% < ,!" < ,!"),	∏ "!(A' , A!")∗: −∏ "!(A' , A!")∗? > 0; 
c. When ,!") < ,!" < 1,	∏ "!(A' , A!")∗: −∏ "!(A' , A!")∗? < 0. 
2) Now we compare the optimal prices, A':∗ − A'?∗ = 0 
A!":∗ − A!"?∗ = 12 (1 − d + ,&) 
Therefore, if 1 + ,& > d, A!":∗ − A!"?∗ > 0; if 1 + ,& < d, A!":∗ − A!"?∗ < 0. Here, because 0 < d < 1, thus, we can always have A!":∗ − A!"?∗ > 0. 
3) We compare the optimal market demand of two product under Model X and Model 
Y, 
K':∗ − K'?∗ = (−1 + d),!" + ,& + ,' − d(),& + ,')2(−1 + ))d(−1 + )d) < 0 
K!":∗ − K!"?∗ = −(−1 + d),!" + (−1 + )d),& + (−1 + d),'2(−1 + ))d(−1 + )d) > 0 
Proof of PROPOSITION 6-16. 
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Under the decentralized supply chain, we compare the optimal results of model X and 
model Z, 
1) We compare the traditional manufacturer’s profit under two models, 
J @(A' , A!")∗: −J @(A')∗D= − 116)d(−1 + )d) (4)d,!"% + (−1 + )d)()d(−4 + 3)d) + 2)d,&− ,&%) − 2(−1 + )d)(3)d + ,&),' + (1 + 3)d),'% − 8)d,!"(1 − )d+ ,') + 1(8 + )d(−5 + )d))% 8(−2()Qd(−5 + )d) − 2)d,!" + 2,&+ 2,')()Qd(−1 + )d) + )d(−2 + )d),!" + (2 − )d),& + (2− )d),') + )Qd(8 + )d(−5 + )d))((−1 + )d)(8 + )d(−5 + )d)+ 2Q(−4 + )d)) + (8 + )d(−7 + )d)),!" − 6,& − 6,' − )d(−5+ )d)(,& + ,')))) 
Which is concave in ,!",  ,!") = 12(64 + )d(−96 + )d(49 + )d(−10 + )d)))) X−128Q + 240)Qd− 138)%Qd% + 28)!Qd! − 2);Qd; + 2Y8 + )d(−5 + )d)Z%− 2)dY8 + )d(−5 + )d)Z% − 32,& + 16)d,& − 32,' + 16)d,'+ 2Y8 + )d(−5 + )d)Z%,' − (8 + )d(−5 + )d))%√o[ 
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,!"% = 12(64 + )d(−96 + )d(49 + )d(−10 + )d)))) Y−128Q + 240)Qd− 138)%Qd% + 28)!Qd! − 2);Qd; + 2(8 + )d(−5 + )d))%− 2)d(8 + )d(−5 + )d))% − 32,& + 16)d,& − 32,' + 16)d,'+ 2(8 + )d(−5 + )d))%,' + (8 + )d(−5 + )d))%√oZ 
o = 1(8 + )d(−5 + )d))% ((128 + )d(−5 + )d)(29 + )d(−6 + )d))),&% − 2(−1+ )d),&()d(−64 + )d(49 + )d(−10 + )d))) − 4Q(−40 + )d(36+ )d(−9 + )d))) + (64 − )d(49 + )d(−10 + )d))),') + (−1+ )d)(−32)Qd(−3 + )d)(−2 + )d) + )!d!(17 + )d(−10 + )d))+ 4Q%(64 + )d(−68 + )d(23 − 3)d))) + ,'(2(16Q(−3 + )d)(−2+ )d) − )%d%(17 + )d(−10 + )d))) + )d(17 + )d(−10 + )d)),'))) 
And when  4∏ @(A' , A!")∗: −∏ @(A')∗D4,!"
= − 12(−1 + )d)\−1 + )d + ,!" − ,'
+ 1(8 + )d(−5 + )d))% (Q(−1 + )d)(−64 + )d(56 + )d(−13 + )d)))
+ 8)d(−2 + )d),!" − 8(−2 + )d),& − 8(−2 + )d),')] = 0 
,!"∗ = 164 + )d(−96 + )d(49 + )d(−10 + )d))) (−(−1 + )d)((8 + )d(−5 + )d))%+ Q(−64 + )d(56 + )d(−13 + )d)))) + 8(−2 + )d),& + (48+ )d(−72 + )d(41 + )d(−10 + )d)))),') 
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Gives the unique minimum value. Because *!+*",< − ,!" 	< Q < 1, therefore 0 < ,!"∗ < 1, 
and *!+*",< − Q < ,!") < 1 < ,!"%, thus, J @(A' , A!")∗: −J @(A')∗D |*#$G*#$∗= 116(−1 + )d)(64 + )d(−96 + )d(49 + )d(−10 + )d)))) ((128+ )d(−5 + )d)(29 + )d(−6 + )d))),&% − 2(−1 + )d),&()d(−64+ )d(49 + )d(−10 + )d))) − 4Q(−40 + )d(36 + )d(−9 + )d)))+ (64 − )d(49 + )d(−10 + )d))),') + (−1 + )d)(−32)Qd(−3+ )d)(−2 + )d) + )!d!(17 + )d(−10 + )d)) + 4Q%(64 + )d(−68+ )d(23 − 3)d))) + ,'(2(16Q(−3 + )d)(−2 + )d) − )%d%(17+ )d(−10 + )d))) + )d(17 + )d(−10 + )d)),'))) 
Here,   
i) if ∏ @(A' , A!")∗: −∏ @(A')∗D |*#$G*#$∗ > 0, that is Q > Q∗, then ∏ @(A' , A!")∗: −∏ @(A')∗D > 0;  
ii) If ∏ @(A' , A!")∗: −∏ @(A')∗D |*#$G*#$∗ < 0, that is *!+*",< − ,!" < Q < Q∗, 
a. then *!+*",< − Q < ,!" < ,!"), then ∏ @(A' , A!")∗: −∏ @(A')∗D > 0; 
b.  ,!") < ,!" < 1, then ∏ @(A' , A!")∗: −∏ @(A')∗D < 0. 
Set J @(A' , A!")∗: −J @(A')∗D |*#$G*#$∗ = 0 
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Q∗ = 12(−1 + )d)(−64 + )d(68 + )d(−23 + 3)d))) Y−8)d(−3 + )d)(−2+ )d)(−1 + )d) + 2(−1 + )d)(−40 + )d(36 + )d(−9 + )d))),&+ 8(−3 + )d)(−2 + )d)(−1 + )d),' + √((−1 + )d)(64 + )d(−96+ )d(49 + )d(−10 + )d))))((−228 + )d(219 + )d(−62 + 7)d))),&%− 2(−1 + )d)%(−4 + 3)d),&()d − ,') + (−1 + )d)(36 + )d(−23+ 3)d))(−)d + ,')%))Z 
Q∗∗ = − 12(−1 + )d)(−64 + )d(68 + )d(−23 + 3)d))) Y−8)d(−3 + )d)(−2+ )d)(−1 + )d) + 2(−1 + )d)(−40 + )d(36 + )d(−9 + )d))),&+ 8(−3 + )d)(−2 + )d)(−1 + )d),' + √((−1 + )d)(64 + )d(−96+ )d(49 + )d(−10 + )d))))((−228 + )d(219 + )d(−62 + 7)d))),&%− 2(−1 + )d)%(−4 + 3)d),&()d − ,') + (−1 + )d)(36 + )d(−23+ 3)d))(−)d + ,')%))Z 
Here, we can easily find out  Q∗ > Q∗∗ by comparison. 
2) Now we compare the logistics vendor’s profit, 
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J B(A&)∗: −J B(A& , A!")∗D
= 18 (−2 + 4Q + )d + 8Q%(−2 + )d)8 + )d(−5 + )d)
+ 1(−1 + )d)(8 + )d(−5 + )d)) (2(8 + )d(−9 + 2)d)),!"%+ 4,!"((−1 + )d)(8 + )d(−5 + )d) + Q(−8 + 3)d))− (−2 + )d)%,& − (−2 + )d)%,') + (,& + ,')(−2(−1 + )d)(8+ )d(−5 + )d) + 2Q(−2 + )d)) + (5 + )d(−4 + )d)),& + (5+ )d(−4 + )d)),'))) 
Which is convex in ,!",  ,!")= 12(8 + )d(−9 + 2)d)) (2(−2 + )d)%,& + 2(−2 + )d)%,' − (−1 + )d)(2Q(−8+ 3)d) + (8 + )d(−5 + )d))(2
+ √2w)d()d + 2Q(−4 + Q + 2)d)) − (−8Q + 2)d + 4)Qd − ,& − ,')(,& + ,')(−1 + )d)(8 + )d(−5 + )d)) ))) 
,!"%= 12(8 + )d(−9 + 2)d)) (2(−2 + )d)%,& + 2(−2 + )d)%,' + (−1 + )d)(Q(16− 6)d) + (8 + )d(−5 + )d))(−2
+ √2w)d()d + 2Q(−4 + Q + 2)d)) − (−8Q + 2)d + 4)Qd − ,& − ,')(,& + ,')(−1 + )d)(8 + )d(−5 + )d)) ))) 
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If ,<(,<+%L(7;+L+%,<))7(7@L+%,<+;,L<7*!7*")(*!+*")(7)+,<)(@+,<(7C+,<)) < 0, which is )dY)d +2Q(−4 + Q + 2)d)Z − (−8Q + 2)d + 4)Qd − ,& − ,')(,& + ,') > 0, then there is no 
real root, then ∏ B(A&)∗: −∏ B(A& , A!")∗D < 0 is always hold.  
If ,<(,<+%L(7;+L+%,<))7(7@L+%,<+;,L<7*!7*")(*!+*")(7)+,<)(@+,<(7C+,<)) > 0, that is )dY)d +2Q(−4 + Q + 2)d)Z − (−8Q + 2)d + 4)Qd − ,& − ,')(,& + ,') < 0. 
Here, we set ,<(,<+%L(7;+L+%,<))7(7@L+%,<+;,L<7*!7*")(*!+*")(7)+,<)(@+,<(7C+,<)) = 0, we can have  
Q∗ = − 12)d X2)%d% + 4(,& + ,') − 2)d(2 + ,& + ,')+ √28(8 + )d(−9 + 2)d))(−)d + ,& + ,')%[ 
Q∗∗ = 12)d X−2)%d% − 4(,& + ,') + 2)d(2 + ,& + ,')+ √28(8 + )d(−9 + 2)d))(−)d + ,& + ,')%[ 
It is easy to find our *!+*",< − ,!" < Q∗ < 1 < Q∗∗, therefore,  
when Q∗ < Q < 1, )dY)d + 2Q(−4 + Q + 2)d)Z − (−8Q + 2)d + 4)Qd − ,& −,')(,& + ,') > 0, then ∏ B(A&)∗: −∏ B(A& , A!")∗D < 0; 
when, *!+*",< − ,!" < Q < Q∗, )dY)d + 2Q(−4 + Q + 2)d)Z − (−8Q + 2)d + 4)Qd −,& − ,')(,& + ,') < 0. In this case, we can have  ,!") > ,!"%. And when  
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4∏ @(A' , A!")∗: −∏ @(A')∗D4,!"= − 12(−1 + )d)(8 + )d(−5 + )d)) ((1 − )d)(8 + )d(−5 + )d)+ Q(−8 + 3)d)) + (−8 + )d(9 − 2)d)),!" + (−2 + )d)%,&+ (−2 + )d)%,') = 0 
,!"∗
= −(−1 + )d)(8 + )d(−5 + )d) + Q(−8 + 3)d)) + (−2 + )d)%,& + (−2 + )d)%,'8 + )d(−9 + 2)d)  
We can have the maximum value of ∏ B(A&)∗: −∏ B(A& , A!")∗D , J B(A&)∗: −J B(A& , A!")∗D |*#$G*#$∗
= −)d()d + 2Q(−4 + Q + 2)d)) + (−8Q + 2)d + 4)Qd − ,& − ,')(,& + ,')8(8 + )d(−9 + 2)d)) > 0 
Meanwhile, J B(A&)∗: −J B(A& , A!")∗D |*#$G)= 18(−1 + )d)(8 + )d(−5 + )d)) (8Q%(−2 + )d)(−1 + )d)+ 4)Qd(−2 + )d)(−1 + )d) + )%d%(5 + )d(−4 + )d)) + (,&+ ,')(−4Q(−2 + )d)(−1 + )d) − 2)d(5 + )d(−4 + )d)) + (5+ )d(−4 + )d)),& + (5 + )d(−4 + )d)),')) < 0 
and 
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J B(A&)∗: −J B(A& , A!")∗D |*#$G*!+*",< 7L= 18)%d%(−1 + )d)(8 + )d(−5 + )d)) ()%d%(16 + )d(−34 + 2Q%+ )d(25 + )d(−8 + )d)))) − (−2 + )d)(−1 + )d)(8 + )d(−5+ )d))(2)d − ,& − ,')(,& + ,')) < 0 
Therefore,  
a. *!+*",< − Q < ,!" < ,!"% or ,!") < ,!" < 1, then ∏ B∗: (A&) −∏ B∗? (A& , A!") < 0; 
b.  ,!"% < ,!" < ,!"%, then ∏ B∗: (A&) − ∏ B∗? (A& , A!") > 0. 
3) Last, we compare the optimal decisions in following, 
A&:∗ − A&D∗ = )d(4Q + )d,!" − ,& − ,')2(8 + )d(−5 + )d))  
Then,  
if Q > @xy q); (−)d,!" + ,& + ,'), *!+*",< − ,!"r, then A&:∗ − A&D∗ > 0;  
if *!+*",< − ,!" < Q < @xy q); (−)d,!" + ,& + ,'), *!+*",< − ,!"r, then A&:∗ − A&D∗ < 0.We 
annotate Q) = ); (−)d,!" + ,& + ,'). 
A':∗ − A'D∗
= )d(8 + )d(−5 + )d) + 4Q(−3 + )d) + 2(−4 + )d),!" + 3,& + 3,' − )d(,& + ,'))4(8 + )d(−5 + )d))  
If Q > 7@+,<(C7,<)+(@7%,<)*#$+(7!+,<)*!+(7!+,<)*";(7!+,<) , A':∗ − A'D∗ > 0; 
If Q < 7@+,<(C7,<)+(@7%,<)*#$+(7!+,<)*!+(7!+,<)*";(7!+,<) , A':∗ − A'D∗ < 0. 
 521 
We annotate Q% = 7@+,<(C7,<)+(@7%,<)*#$+(7!+,<)*!+(7!+,<)*";(7!+,<) . 
A!":∗ − A!"D∗ = 14(8 + )d(−5 + )d)) (8Q(−2 + )d) + )d(8 + )d(−5 + )d))+ 2)d(−2 + )d),!" − 4,' + (−3 + )d)((−4 + )d),& − )d,')) 
If Q > @xy q− ,<(@+,<(7C+,<))+%,<(7%+,<)*#$7;*"+(7!+,<)((7;+,<)*!7,<*")@(7%+,<) , *!+*",< − ,!"r, A!":∗ − A!"D∗ > 0; 
*!+*",< − ,!" < Q <@xy q− ,<(@+,<(7C+,<))+%,<(7%+,<)*#$7;*"+(7!+,<)((7;+,<)*!7,<*")@(7%+,<) , *!+*",< − ,!"r, A!":∗ − A!"D∗ < 0. 
Here, we annotate Q! = − ,<(@+,<(7C+,<))+%,<(7%+,<)*#$7;*"+(7!+,<)((7;+,<)*!7,<*")@(7%+,<) . 
K':∗ − K'D∗ = − 14(−1 + )d)(8 + )d(−5 + )d)) ((−1 + )d)(8 + 4Q + )d(−5+ )d)) + 2(4 + )d(−3 + )d)),!" + (−3 + )d)%,& − (7 + )d(−4+ )d)),') 
Then, we can easily obtain:  
i) if  
*!+*",< − ,!" < Q <@xy q− (7)+,<)(@+,<(7C+,<))+%(;+,<(7!+,<))*#$+(7!+,<)%*!7(F+,<(7;+,<))*"7;+;,< , *!+*",< − ,!"r, K':∗ − K'D∗ > 0;  
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ii) If 1> Q >@xy q− (7)+,<)(@+,<(7C+,<))+%(;+,<(7!+,<))*#$+(7!+,<)%*!7(F+,<(7;+,<))*"7;+;,< , *!+*",< −,!"r, K':∗ − K'D∗ < 0. 
Then, we annotate 
 Q; = − (7)+,<)(@+,<(7C+,<))+%(;+,<(7!+,<))*#$+(7!+,<)%*!7(F+,<(7;+,<))*"7;+;,< . 
 
K!":∗ − K!"D∗
= 2)d,!" + (−3 + )d)(−2 + )d),& − 2(Q(−4 + )d)(−1 + )d) + ,')2(−1 + )d)(8 + )d(−5 + )d))  
So, 
i) if *!+*",< − ,!" < Q < @xy q%,<*#$+(7!+,<)(7%+,<)*!7%*"%(7;+,<)(7)+,<) , *!+*",< − ,!"r, K!":∗ −K!"D∗ > 0;  
ii) 1 > Q > @xy q%,<*#$+(7!+,<)(7%+,<)*!7%*"%(7;+,<)(7)+,<) , *!+*",< − ,!"r, K!":∗ − K!"D∗ < 0. 
Last, we annotate QC = %,<*#$+(7!+,<)(7%+,<)*!7%*"%(7;+,<)(7)+,<) . 
Proof of PROPOSITION 6-17 
Under the integrated supply chain, we compare the optimal results of model X and model Z 
at supply chain level, 
1) We compare the integrated supply chain’s profit under two model, 
J "!(A' , A!")∗: −J "!(A' , A!")∗D = ,&(2 − 2)d − 2,!" + ,& + 2,')−4 + 4)d < 0 
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Therefore, ∏ "!(A' , A!")∗: −∏ "!(A' , A!")∗D < 0 is always hold. 
2) We compare the optimal decisions in following,  A':∗ − A'D∗ = 0 
A!":∗ − A!"D∗ = ,&2 > 0 
K':∗ − K'D∗ = ,&2 − 2)d > 0 
K!":∗ − K!"D∗ = ,&−2 + 2)d < 0 
Proof of PROPOSITION 6-18. 
Under the integrated supply chain, we compare the optimal results of model Y and model Z 
at supply chain level, 
1) We compare the integrated supply chain’s profit under two model, 
J "!(A' , A!")∗? −J "!(A' , A!")∗D
= (−1 + d)((−1 + ))d(−1 + )d) − (−,!" + ,& + ,')%)4(−1 + ))d(−1 + )d)  
Which is concave in ,!", when 
4∏ "!(A' , A!")∗? −∏ "!(A' , A!")∗D4,!" = 2(−,!" + ,& + ,') = 0 
,!"∗ = ,& + ,' 
We can have the unique maximized value of ∏ "!(A' , A!")∗? −∏ "!(A' , A!")∗D =); (−1 + d) < 0. Therefore, we can always have ∏ "!(A' , A!")∗? −∏ "!(A' , A!")∗D < 0. 
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2) We compare the optimal decisions in following,  A'?∗ − A'D∗ = 0 
A!"?∗ − A!"D∗ = 12 (−1 + d) < 0 
K'?∗ − K'D∗ = −(−1 + d)(,!" − ,& − ,')2(−1 + ))d(−1 + )d)  
K!"?∗ − K!"D∗ = (−1 + d)(,!" − ,& − ,')2(−1 + ))d(−1 + )d)  
Thus, if ,!" − ,& − ,' > 0, then K'?∗ − K'D∗ > 0 and  K!"?∗ − K!"D∗ < 0; if ,!" − ,& −,' < 0, then K'?∗ − K'D∗ < 0 and  K!"?∗ − K!"D∗ > 0. 
 
  
 525 
List of References  
3D systems. (2013). Lotus F1 Team and 3D Systems move together towards race-ready 
mass production of parts. Retrieved August 9, 2018, from 
www.3dsystems.com/files/f1-case-study-update-dec2014.pdf 
3D Systems. (2018a). Ernst Keller Delivers More Products, Faster with Cimatron Mold and 
Tool design software. Retrieved July 17, 2018, from 
https://www.3dsystems.com/customer-stories/ernst-keller-delivers-more-products-
faster-cimatron-mold-and-tool-design-software 
3D Systems. (2018b). Gira Delivers Error-Free Electrode Production with Cimatron 
CAD/CAM Software. Retrieved July 17, 2018, from 
https://www.3dsystems.com/customer-stories/gira-delivers-error-free-electrode-
production-cimatron-cadcam-software 
3D Systems. (2018c). Rezmin Tool & Die Turns to Automation to Wrangle Work Back 
from Overseas Competition. Retrieved July 17, 2018, from 
https://www.3dsystems.com/customer-stories/rezmin-tool-die-turns-automation-
wrangle-work-back-overseas-competition 
3D Systems. (2018d). Shop Races Ahead Using GibbsCAM. Retrieved July 16, 2018, from 
https://www.3dsystems.com/customer-stories/shop-races-ahead-using-gibbscam 
3D Systems. (2018e). Topology Optimization and Direct Metal 3D Printing (DMP) in GE 
Aircraft Engine Bracket Challenge. Retrieved July 16, 2018, from 
https://www.3dsystems.com/learning-center/case-studies/topology-optimization-and-
dmp-combine-meet-ge-aircraft-engine-bracket 
Agrawal, V. V., Ferguson, M. E., Toktay, L. B., & Thomas, V. M. (2012). Is Leasing 
Greener Than Selling? Management Science, 58(3), 523–533. 
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1110.1428 
Akeroyd, A., & Burgess, R. G. (2006). Field Research: A Source-Book and Field Manual. 
Man (5th ed., Vol. 18). New York, USA: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.2307/2801612 
Arns, M., Fischer, M., Kemper, P., & Tepper, C. (2002). Supply chain modelling and its 
analytical evaluation. Journal of the Operational Research Society, 53(8), 885–894. 
https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jors.2601381 
Asiabanpour, B., Mokhtar, A., & Houshmand, M. (2008). Rapid manufacturing. 
Collaborative Engineering: Theory and Practice. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-47321-5_7 
Attaran, M. (2017). The rise of 3-D printing: The advantages of additive manufacturing 
over traditional manufacturing. Business Horizons, 60(5), 677–688. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bushor.2017.05.011 
Aumann, R. J. (1959). Acceptable points in General Cooperative N-Person Games. In A. 
 526 
W. Tuker & R. D. Luce (Eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games (IV, pp. 287–
324). Princeton University Press. 
Axelrod, R. (1997). Advancing the art of simulation in the social sciences. In R. Conte, R. 
Hegselmann, & P. Terna (Eds.), Complexity (Vol. 3, pp. 16–22). Berlin, Heidelberg: 
Springer Berlin Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-
0526(199711/12)3:2<16::AID-CPLX4>3.0.CO;2-K 
Ayre, J. (2016). Honda Shows Off 3D-Printed Customizable EV Concept. Retrieved July 
13, 2018, from https://cleantechnica.com/2016/10/07/honda-shows-off-3d-printed-
customizable-ev-concept/ 
Azadian, F., Murat, A., & Chinnam, R. B. (2015). Integrated production and logistics 
planning: Contract manufacturing and choice of air/surface transportation. European 
Journal of Operational Research, 247(1), 113–123. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2015.06.004 
Bamford, D., Karjalainen, K., & Jenavs, E. (2012). Alternative paradigms for 
manufacturing strategy. International Journal of Operationa and Production 
Management, 15(4), 5–16. https://doi.org/10.1108/01443570510633611 
Basiliere, P. (2017). Accelerating 3D Printing From Prototype to Production. Retrieved 
May 28, 2018, from https://blogs.gartner.com/pete-basiliere/2017/11/21/accelerating-
3d-printing-from-prototype-to-production/ 
Baumers, M., Dickens, P., Tuck, C., & Hague, R. (2016). The cost of additive 
manufacturing: Machine productivity, economies of scale and technology-push. 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 102, 193–201. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2015.02.015 
BBC. (2018a). House of Fraser to close stores in bid to stay afloat. Retrieved May 24, 
2018, from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-43973149 
BBC. (2018b). M&amp;S to close 100 stores by 2022 - BBC News. Retrieved May 24, 
2018, from https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-44197128 
Berdine, G. G., DiPaola, M., & Weinberg, M. (2019). Economic and Regulatory 
Perspectives on Additive Manufacturing. 3D Printing in Orthopaedic Surgery, 41–48. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-323-58118-9.00004-X 
Bergen, M., Heide, J. B., & Dutta, S. (1998). Managing gray markets through tolerance of 
violations: A transaction cost perspective. Managerial and Decision Economics, 
19(3), 157–165. https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-1468(199805)19:3<157::AID-
MDE880>3.0.CO;2-E 
Berman, B. (2012). 3-D printing: The new industrial revolution. Business Horizons, 55(2), 
155–162. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bushor.2011.11.003 
Bertrand, J. W. M., & Fransoo, J. C. (2002). Operations management research 
methodologies using quantitative modeling. International Journal of Operations and 
 527 
Production Management, 22(2), 241–264. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/01443570210414338 
Blackwell, R. D., Miniard, P. W., & Engel, J. F. (2006). Consumer Behavior (10th ed.). 
London, UK: Thomson/South-Western. 
Bogers, M., Hadar, R., & Bilberg, A. (2016). Additive manufacturing for consumer-centric 
business models: Implications for supply chains in consumer goods manufacturing. 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 102, 225–239. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2015.07.024 
Boyaci, T., & Gallego, G. (2010). Supply Chain Coordination in a Market with Customer 
Service Competition. Production and Operations Management, 13(1), 3–22. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1937-5956.2004.tb00141.x 
Bradshaw, S., Bowyer, A., & Haufe, P. (2010). The intellectual property implications of 
low-cost 3D printing. ScriptEd 7(1), 61(1), 1–31. https://doi.org/10.2966/scrip. 
Brannen, J. (2017). Mixing Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Research (3rd ed.). New 
York, USA: Routledge. 
Bräuer, I., & Buscher, U. (2018). A note on ‘Pricing and ordering decisions in a supply 
chain with imperfect quality items and inspection under buyback of defective items.’ 
International Journal of Production Research, 56(15), 5272–5277. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00207543.2017.1399223 
Brennen, B. S. (2018). Doing Qualitative Research. Qualitative Research Methods for 
Media Studies (5th ed.). London: Sage Publications. 
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315435978-2 
Brewer, J., Newman, I., & Benz, C. R. (2006). Qualitative-Quantitative Research 
Methodology: Exploring the Interactive Continuum. Contemporary Sociology (Vol. 
28). Carbondale and Edwardsville, USA.: Southern Illinois University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2654917 
Cachon, G. P., & Netessine, S. (2004). Game Theory in Supply Chain Analysis. In Models, 
Methods, and Applications for Innovative Decision Making (pp. 13–65). 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-7953-5_2 
Cai, H., Xu, L. Da, Xu, B., Xie, C., Qin, S., & Jiang, L. (2014). IoT-Based Configurable 
Information Service Platform for Product Lifecycle Management. IEEE Transactions 
on Industrial Informatics, 10(2), 1558–1567. https://doi.org/10.1109/tii.2014.2306391 
Cavusoglu, H., Cavusoglu, H., & Raghunathan, S. (2007). Selecting a customization 
strategy under competition: Mass customization, targeted mass customization, and 
product proliferation. IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, 54(1), 12–28. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/TEM.2006.889064 
Central Compilation and Translation Press. (2016). the 13Th Five-Year Plan for Economic 
and Social Development of the People ’ S Republic of China and Social Development 
 528 
of ’ S Republic of China the People. Central Compilation and Translation Press. 
https://doi.org/Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 
Chapman, P., Christopher, M., Jüttner, U., Peck, H., & Wilding, R. (2002). Identifying and 
managing supply chain vulnerability. Logistics & Transport Focus, 4(4), 59–70. 
Chen, Y. (2016). Industrial information integration—A literature review 2006–2015. 
Journal of Industrial Information Integration, 2, 30–64. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jii.2016.04.004 
Chen, Z., & Wang, L. (2007). A generic activity-dictionary-based method for product 
costing in mass customization. Journal of Manufacturing Technology Management, 
18(6), 678–700. https://doi.org/10.1108/17410380710763859 
Chiang, W. K., Chhajed, D., & Hess, J. D. (2003). Direct Marketing, Indirect Profits: A 
Strategic Analysis of Dual-Channel Supply-Chain Design. Management Science, 
49(1), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.49.1.1.12749 
Christensen, C. M., Raynor, M., & McDonald, R. (2015). What Is Disruptive Innovation? 
Harvard Business Review, 93(12), 44–53. Retrieved from 
http://www.digitaltonto.com/2009/what-is-disruptive-innovation/ 
Ciampa, F., & Meo, M. (2011). Forgetting footprints, shunning shadows. A critical analysis 
of the “right to be forgotten” in big data practice. SCRIPTed, 8(3), 1950–1958. 
https://doi.org/10.2966/scrip 
Clarke, C. (2005). Automitive Production Systems and Standardisation: from Ford to the 
Case of Mercedes-Benz. Heilbronn: Physica-Verlag. 
Cohen, M. A., & Whang, S. (1997). Competing in Product and Service: A Product Life-
Cycle Model. Management Science, 43(4), 535–545. 
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.43.4.535 
Conner, B. P., Manogharan, G. P., Martof, A. N., Rodomsky, L. M., Rodomsky, C. M., 
Jordan, D. C., & Limperos, J. W. (2014). Making sense of 3-D printing: Creating a 
map of additive manufacturing products and services. Additive Manufacturing, 1. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.addma.2014.08.005 
Cournot, A. A. (1897). Recherches sur Lesprincipes Mathématiques de la Théorie des 
Richesses. (N. T. Bacon & I. Fisher, Eds.). London, UK: Macmillan & Co. LTD. 
Cowan, M. (2018). The world’s first family to live in a 3D-printed home - BBC News. 
Retrieved July 20, 2018, from https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-44709534 
Craighead, C. W., & Meredith, J. R. (2008). Operations Management Research: Evolution 
and Alternative Future Paths. International Journal of Operations & Production 
Management, 28(8), 710–726. https://doi.org/10.1108/01443570810888625 
Creswell, J. W. (2013). Summary for Policymakers. Climate Change 2013 - The Physical 
Science Basis (6th ed., Vol. 53). John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 
 529 
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004 
Croom, S. (2009). Introduction to Research Methodology in Operations Management. In C. 
Karisson (Ed.), Researching Operations Management (1st ed., pp. 42–83). New York, 
USA: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203886816 
Croom, S., Romano, P., & Giannakis, M. (2000). Supply chain management: An analytical 
framework for critical literature review. European Journal of Purchasing and Supply 
Management, 6(1), 67–83. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0969-7012(99)00030-1 
D’Aveni, R. A. (2013, March). 3-D printing will change the world. Harvard Business 
Review, 91(3), 1–5. 
Da Silveira, G., Borenstein, D., & Fogliatto, F. S. (2001). Mass customization: Literature 
review and research directions. International Journal of Production Economics, 72(1), 
1–13. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0925-5273(00)00079-7 
Dangayach, G. S., & Deshmukh, S. G. (2001). Manufacturing strategy Literature review 
and some issues. International Journal of Operations and Production Management, 
21(7), 884–932. https://doi.org/10.1108/01443570110393414 
Davis, S. M. (1989). From “future perfect”: Mass customizing. Planning Review, 17(2), 
16–21. https://doi.org/10.1108/eb054249 
Deal, R. B. (2012). Simulation Modeling and Analysis (2nd Ed.). Technometrics (5th ed., 
Vol. 36). Singapore: Mc Graw-Hill, Inc. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00401706.1994.10485862 
Desiraju, R., & Moorthy, S. (2008). Managing a Distribution Channel Under Asymmetric 
Information with Performance Requirements. Management Science, 43(12), 1628–
1644. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.43.12.1628 
Despeisse, M., Baumers, M., Brown, P., Charnley, F., Ford, S. J., Garmulewicz, A., … 
Rowley, J. (2017). Unlocking value for a circular economy through 3D printing: A 
research agenda. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 115, 75–84. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2016.09.021 
DHL. (2016). 3D Printing and the Future of Supply Chains. DHL Customer Solutions & 
Innovation, November(November), 1–31. Retrieved from 
http://www.dhl.com/content/dam/downloads/g0/about_us/logistics_insights/dhl_trendr
eport_3dprinting.pdf 
Dickinson, C. (2015). Guide to methodology in ergonomics: designing for human use, 
second edition. Ergonomics (2nd ed., Vol. 58). London, UK: CPC Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00140139.2014.1000019 
Dong, L., Shi, D., & Zhang, F. (2017). 3D Printing vs. Traditional Flexible Technology: 
Implications for Operations Strategy. SSRN Electronic Journal, 1–58. 
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2847731 
 530 
Dooley, L. M. (2002). Case Study Research and Theory Building. Advances in Developing 
Human Resources, 4(3), 335–354. https://doi.org/10.1177/1523422302043007 
Easterby-Smith, M., Thorpe, R., & Lowe, A. (2002). Management Research: An 
Introduction (2nd ed.). London: Sage Publications. 
Edwards, R., & Holland, J. (2015). What is Qualitative Interviewing? What is Qualitative 
Interviewing? London, UK: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. 
https://doi.org/10.5040/9781472545244 
Emerging Implant Technologies. (2018). Emerging Implant Technologies. Retrieved July 
16, 2018, from https://www.eit-spine.de/ 
Ernst & Young. (2016). Identify the impact on business and unlock the 3D printing 
potential. Ernst & Young Gmbh. Retrieved from 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-global-3d-printing-report-2016-full-
report/$FILE/ey-global-3d-printing-report-2016-full-report.pdf 
Esmond, R. W., & Phero, G. C. (2014). The additive manufacturing revolution and the 
corresponding legal landscape. Virtual and Physical Prototyping, 10(1), 9–12. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17452759.2014.972661 
Evans, J. R. (1993). Applied Production and Operation Management (Fourth Edi). St. Paul 
MN: West Publishing Company. 
Eyers, D., & Dotchev, K. (2010). Technology review for mass customisation using rapid 
manufacturing. Assembly Automation, 30(1), 39–46. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/01445151011016055 
Eyers, D. R., & Potter, A. T. (2015). E-commerce channels for additive manufacturing: An 
exploratory study. Journal of Manufacturing Technology Management, 26(3), 390–
411. https://doi.org/10.1108/JMTM-08-2013-0102 
Fahimnia, B., Farahani, R. Z., Marian, R., & Luong, L. (2013). A review and critique on 
integrated production-distribution planning models and techniques. Journal of 
Manufacturing Systems, 32(1), 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmsy.2012.07.005 
Faludi, J., Bayley, C., Bhogal, S., & Iribarne, M. (2015). Comparing environmental impacts 
of additive manufacturing vs traditional machining via life-cycle assessment. Rapid 
Prototyping Journal, 21(1), 14–33. https://doi.org/10.1108/RPJ-07-2013-0067 
Farahani, R. Z., Rezapour, S., Drezner, T., & Fallah, S. (2014). Competitive supply chain 
network design: An overview of classifications, models, solution techniques and 
applications. Omega (United Kingdom), 45, 92–118. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.omega.2013.08.006 
Farahani, R. Z., Rezapour, S., & Kardar, L. (2011). Logistics Operations and Management: 
Concepts and Models. London, UK: Elsevier B.V. 
Ferguson, M. E., & Toktay, L. B. (2010). The Effect of Competition on Recovery 
 531 
Strategies. Production and Operations Management, 15(3), 351–368. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1937-5956.2006.tb00250.x 
Fink, A. (2015). How to conduct surveys: A step-by-step guide (6th ed.). New York, USA: 
SAGE Publications. Retrieved from 
https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0,5&q=(Fink,+A.+&+Kosecoff,+J.
+(1985).+How+to+conduct+surveys:+A+step-by-
step+guide.+London,+UK,+Sage+Publications&btnG= 
Fiore, A. M., Lee, S.-E., & Kunz, G. (2003). Apparel, Events and Hospitality Management 
Publications Apparel, Events and Hospitality Management Psychographic Variables 
Affecting Willingness to Use Body-Scanning Psychographic Variables Affecting 
Willingness to Use Body-Scanning. Journal of Business and Management, 9(3), 271–
287. Retrieved from http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/aeshm_pubs%0Ahttp://lib.dr.iastate.edu/ 
Fiore, A. M., Lee, S., & Kunz, G. (2004). Individual differences, motivations, and 
willingness to use a mass customization option for fashion products. European 
Journal of Marketing, 38(7), 835–849. https://doi.org/10.1108/03090560410539276 
Fogliatto, F. S., Da Silveira, G. J. C., & Borenstein, D. (2012). The mass customization 
decade: An updated review of the literature. International Journal of Production 
Economics, 138(1), 14–25. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2012.03.002 
Ford, H. (1926). Today and Tomorrow (Reprint Ed). Cambridge, MA: Productivity Press. 
Ford, S., & Despeisse, M. (2016). Additive manufacturing and sustainability: an 
exploratory study of the advantages and challenges. Journal of Cleaner Production, 
137, 1573–1587. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2016.04.150 
Franke, N., Schreier, M., & Kaiser, U. (2009). The “I Designed It Myself” Effect in Mass 
Customization. Management Science, 56(1), 125–140. 
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1090.1077 
Frohlich, M. T., & Dixon, J. R. (2001). A taxonomy of manufacturing strategies revisited. 
Journal of Operations Management, 19(5), 541–558. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0272-
6963(01)00063-8 
Gao, W., Zhang, Y., Ramanujan, D., Ramani, K., Chen, Y., Williams, C. B., … Zavattieri, 
P. D. (2015). The status, challenges, and future of additive manufacturing in 
engineering. CAD Computer Aided Design, 69, 65–89. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cad.2015.04.001 
Gebler, M., Schoot Uiterkamp, A. J. M., & Visser, C. (2014). A global sustainability 
perspective on 3D printing technologies. Energy Policy, 74(C), 158–167. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2014.08.033 
Gerstner, E., & Hess, J. D. (2008). Pull Promotions and Channel Coordination. Marketing 
Science, 14(1), 43–60. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.14.1.43 
Gibson, I., Rosen, D., & Brent, S. (2015). Additive Manufacturing Technologies-3D 
 532 
Printing, Rapid Prototyping, and Direct Digital Manufacutring (2nd Editio). London: 
Springer Verlag. 
Gilmore, J. H., & Pine, B. J. (1997). The Four Faces of Mass Customization. Harvard 
Business Review, 75(1), 91–101. 
Goldhar, J. D., & Jelinek, M. (1985). Computer Integrated Flexible Manufacturing: 
Organizational, Economic, and Strategic Implications. Interfaces, 15(3), 94–105. 
https://doi.org/10.1287/inte.15.3.94 
González-Maestre, M., & Granero, L. M. (2018). Competition with targeted product 
design: Price, variety, and welfare. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 
59, 406–428. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.02.009 
Grandhi, A., Magar, C., & Roberts, R. (2013). How Technology Can Drive the Next Wave 
of Mass Customization. Retrieved from 
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/business_technology/how_technology_can_drive_t
he_next_wave_of_mass_customization 
Grazia Speranza, M. (2018). Trends in transportation and logistics. European Journal of 
Operational Research, 264(3), 830–836. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2016.08.032 
Gresham, T. (2016). 6 Technologies Guaranteed to Disrupt Your Supply Chain - Inbound 
Logistics. Retrieved May 25, 2018, from 
https://www.inboundlogistics.com/cms/article/6-technologies-guaranteed-to-disrupt-
your-supply-chain/ 
Gross, B. C., Erkal, J. L., Lockwood, S. Y., Chen, C., & Spence, D. M. (2014). Evaluation 
of 3D printing and its potential impact on biotechnology and the chemical sciences. 
Analytical Chemistry, 86(7), 3240–3253. https://doi.org/10.1021/ac403397r 
Gutowski, T. G., Branham, M. S., Dahmus, J. B., Jones, A. J., Thiriez, A., & Sekulić, D. P. 
(2009). Thermodynamic Analysis of Resources Used in Manufacturing Processes. 
Environmental Science & Technology, 43(5), 1584–1590. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511976049.010 
Halassi, S., Semeijn, J., & Kiratli, N. (2019). From consumer to prosumer: a supply chain 
revolution in 3D printing. International Journal of Physical Distribution and Logistics 
Management, 49(2), 200–216. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJPDLM-03-2018-0139 
Handyside, E. (1997). Genba Kanri. Hampshire Brookfield: Gower Publising Limited. 
Hannibal, M., & Knight, G. (2018). Additive manufacturing and the global factory: 
Disruptive technologies and the location of international business. International 
Business Review, 27(6), 1116–1127. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ibusrev.2018.04.003 
Hart, C. W. L. (1995). Mass Customization: Conceptual Underpinnings, Opportunities and 
Limites. International Journal of Service Industry Management, 6(2), 36–45. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/09564239510084932 
 533 
Hayes, R. H., & Wheelwright, S. C. (1979). Link manufacturing process and product life 
cycles. Harvard Business Review, January-Fe, 133–140. Retrieved from 
https://hbr.org/1979/01/link-manufacturing-process-and-product-life-cycles 
Hensley, R. L. (1999). A Review of Operations Management Studies Using Scale 
Development Techniques. Journal of Operations Management, 17(3), 343–358. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0272-6963(98)00051-5 
Hewlett-Packard. (2018). 3D Color Print. Retrieved June 17, 2018, from 
http://www.www8-
hp.com/uk/en/images/fpart1_tcm183_2547854_tcm183_2547767_tcm183-
2547854.jpg 
Hill, T. (2009). Manufacturing Operations Strategy: Texts and Cases (3rd ed.). 
Basingstoke: Macmillan Education UK. 
Hobbs, D. P. (2004). Lean Manufacturing Implementation, a Complete Excution Manual 
for Any Size Manufacturer. New York, USA: Ross Publishing, Inc. 
Hofmann, D. C., Roberts, S., Otis, R., Kolodziejska, J., Dillon, R. P., Suh, J. O., … 
Borgonia, J. P. (2014). Developing gradient metal alloys through radial deposition 
additive manufacturing. Scientific Reports, 4(5357), 1–8. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/srep05357 
Holmström, J., Holweg, M., Khajavi, S. H., & Partanen, J. (2016). The direct digital 
manufacturing (r)evolution: definition of a research agenda. Operations Management 
Research, 9(1–2), 1–10. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12063-016-0106-z 
Holmström, J., Partanen, J., Tuomi, J., & Walter, M. (2010). Rapid manufacturing in the 
spare parts supply chain. Journal of Manufacturing Technology Management, 21(6), 
687–697. https://doi.org/10.1108/17410381011063996 
Holzmann, P., Breitenecker, R. J., Soomro, A. A., & Schwarz, E. J. (2017). User 
entrepreneur business models in 3D printing. Journal of Manufacturing Technology 
Management. https://doi.org/10.1108/JMTM-12-2015-0115 
Hsiao, W. K., Lorber, B., Reitsamer, H., & Khinast, J. (2018). 3D printing of oral drugs: a 
new reality or hype? Expert Opinion on Drug Delivery, 15(1), 1–4. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17425247.2017.1371698 
Hu, S. J. (2013). Evolving paradigms of manufacturing: From mass production to mass 
customization and personalization. Procedia CIRP, 7, 3–8. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.procir.2013.05.002 
Huang, H., He, Y., & Chen, J. (2018). Competitive strategies and quality to counter parallel 
importation in global market. Omega (United Kingdom), 86, 173–197. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.omega.2018.07.009 
Huang, R., Riddle, M. E., Graziano, D., Das, S., Nimbalkar, S., Cresko, J., & Masanet, E. 
(2017). Environmental and Economic Implications of Distributed Additive 
 534 
Manufacturing: The Case of Injection Mold Tooling. Journal of Industrial Ecology, 
21(S1), 130–143. https://doi.org/10.1111/jiec.12641 
Huang, S. H., Liu, P., Mokasdar, A., & Hou, L. (2013). Additive manufacturing and its 
societal impact: A literature review. International Journal of Advanced Manufacturing 
Technology, 67(5–8), 1191–1203. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00170-012-4558-5 
Huang, Z., Li, S. X., & Mahajan, V. (2002). An analysis of manufacturer-retailer supply 
chain coordination in cooperative advertising. Decision Sciences, 33(3), 469–494. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5915.2002.tb01652.x 
ISO/ASTM 52900:2017. (2017). Additive manufacturing — General principles — 
Terminology (ISO/ASTM 52900:2017). BSI Standards Publication. Retrieved from 
https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso-astm:52900:ed-1:v1:en 
Ivan, S., & Yin, Y. (2018). Additive manufacturing impact for supply chain - Two cases. In 
IEEE International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering 
Management (Vol. 2017-December). https://doi.org/10.1109/IEEM.2017.8289931 
Jeuland, A. P., & Shugan, S. M. (2008). Managing Channel Profits. Marketing Science, 
2(3), 239–272. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2.3.239 
Jiang, K., Lee, H. L., & Seifert, R. W. (2006). Satisfying customer preferences via mass 
customization and mass production. IIE Transactions (Institute of Industrial 
Engineers), 38(1), 25–38. https://doi.org/10.1080/07408170500346386 
Kane, M. (2002). The good research guide for small-scale social research projects. Family 
Practice (4th ed., Vol. 16). New York, USA: Open University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/fampra/16.2.207-a 
Kellens, K., Mertens, R., Paraskevas, D., Dewulf, W., & Duflou, J. R. (2017). 
Environmental Impact of Additive Manufacturing Processes: Does AM Contribute to 
a More Sustainable Way of Part Manufacturing? In Procedia CIRP (Vol. 61, pp. 582–
587). Kamakura, Japan: Elsevier B.V. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.procir.2016.11.153 
Kellner, T. (2018). Mind Meld: GE’s 3D Printing Summit Explores Additive 
Manufacturing’s Exponential Future. Retrieved May 25, 2018, from 
https://www.ge.com/reports/just-press-print-ges-3d-printing-summit-explores-
manufacturings-exponential-future/ 
Khajavi, S. H., Partanen, J., & Holmström, J. (2014). Additive manufacturing in the spare 
parts supply chain. Computers in Industry, 65(1), 50–63. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.compind.2013.07.008 
Kim, Y., & Lee, J. (1993). Manufacturing strategy and production systems: An integrated 
framework. Journal of Operations Management, 11(1), 3–15. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0272-6963(93)90029-O 
Koren, Y. (2010). The global manufacturing revolution: product-process-business 
integration and reconfigurable system. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell. 
 535 
Lal, R. (2008). Improving Channel Coordination Through Franchising. Marketing Science, 
9(4), 299–318. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.9.4.299 
Lampel, J., & Mintzberg, H. (1996). Customizing Customization. MIT Sloan Management 
Review, 38, 21–30. 
Laplume, A., Anzalone, G. C., & Pearce, J. M. (2016). Open-source, self-replicating 3-D 
printer factory for small-business manufacturing. International Journal of Advanced 
Manufacturing Technology, 85(1–4), 633–642. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00170-015-
7970-9 
Leng, M., & Parlar, M. (2005). Game theoretic applications in supply chain management: 
A review. Infor, 43(3), 187–220. https://doi.org/10.1080/03155986.2005.11732725 
Levy, D. L. (1995). International Sourcing and Supply Chain Stability. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 26(2), 343–360. 
https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8490177 
Li, J., Wang, S., & Cheng, T. C. E. (2010). Competition and cooperation in a single-retailer 
two-supplier supply chain with supply disruption. International Journal of Production 
Economics, 124(1), 137–150. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2009.10.017 
Li, Y., Jia, G., Cheng, Y., & Hu, Y. (2017). Additive manufacturing technology in spare 
parts supply chain: a comparative study. International Journal of Production 
Research, 55(5). https://doi.org/10.1080/00207543.2016.1231433 
Liao, S., Wu, M.-J., Huang, C.-Y., Kao, Y.-S., & Lee, T.-H. (2014). Evaluating and 
Enhancing Three-Dimensional Printing Service Providers for Rapid Prototyping Using 
the DEMATEL Based Network Process and VIKOR. Mathematical Problems in 
Engineering, 2014, 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1155/2014/349348 
Liechty, J., Ramaswamy, V., & Cohen, S. H. (2003). Choice Menus for Mass 
Customization: An Experimental Approach for Analyzing Customer Demand with an 
Application to a Web-Based Information Service. Journal of Marketing Research, 
38(2), 183–196. https://doi.org/10.1509/jmkr.38.2.183.18849 
Liu, P., Huang, S. H., Mokasdar, A., Zhou, H., & Hou, L. (2014). The impact of additive 
manufacturing in the aircraft spare parts supply chain: Supply chain operation 
reference (scor) model based analysis. Production Planning and Control, 25(13–14), 
1169–1181. https://doi.org/10.1080/09537287.2013.808835 
Long, Y., Pan, J., Zhang, Q., & Hao, Y. (2017). 3D printing technology and its impact on 
Chinese manufacturing. International Journal of Production Research, 55(5), 1488–
1497. https://doi.org/10.1080/00207543.2017.1280196 
Luczun, M. E. (1989). Introduction to quantitative research and analysis. Journal of post 
anesthesia nursing (Vol. 4). London: Sage Publications Ltd. 
https://doi.org/9781848608641 
Lumsakul, P., Sheldrick, L., & Rahimifard, S. (2018). The Sustainable Co-Design of 
 536 
Products and Production Systems. Procedia Manufacturing, 21, 854–861. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.promfg.2018.02.193 
Maanen, J. Van. (2018). Qualitative Methodology. Racism and Cultural Diversity. London: 
Sage Publications. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429479380-42 
Macchion, L., Fornasiero, R., & Vinelli, A. (2017). Supply chain configurations: a model to 
evaluate performance in customised productions. International Journal of Production 
Research, 55(5), 1386–1399. https://doi.org/10.1080/00207543.2016.1221161 
Manners-Bell, J., & Lyon, K. (2012). the Implications of 3D Printing for the Global. 
Transport Intelligence. 
Maskell, D., Heath, A., & Walker, P. (2014). Comparing the Environmental Impact of 
Stabilisers for Unfired Earth Construction. Key Engineering Materials, 600, 132–143. 
https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/kem.600.132 
Mellor, S., Hao, L., & Zhang, D. (2014). Additive manufacturing: A framework for 
implementation. International Journal of Production Economics, 149, 194–201. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2013.07.008 
Meredith, J. (2002). Building operations management theory through case and field 
research. Journal of Operations Management, 16(4), 441–454. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0272-6963(98)00023-0 
Meredith, J. R., Raturi, A., Amoako-Gyampah, K., & Kaplan, B. (1989). Alternative 
research paradigms in operations. Journal of Operations Management, 8(4), 297–326. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0272-6963(89)90033-8 
MINI. (2018). Mimi Yours Customised. Retrieved June 21, 2018, from https://yours-
customised.mini/yourscustomised-responsive/en_GB/content/frequently-asked-
questions 
Mitroff, I. I., & Alpaslan, C. (2014). Preparing for Evil. Harvard Business Review, 81(4), 
109–115. 
Mitroff, I. I., Betz, F., Pondy, L. R., & Sagasti, F. (2008). On Managing Science in the 
Systems Age: Two Schemas for the Study of Science as a Whole Systems 
Phenomenon. Interfaces, 4(3), 46–58. https://doi.org/10.1287/inte.4.3.46 
Mohammed, M. I., Cadd, B., Peart, G., & Gibson, I. (2018). Augmented patient-specific 
facial prosthesis production using medical imaging modelling and 3D printing 
technologies for improved patient outcomes. Virtual and Physical Prototyping, 0(0), 
1–13. https://doi.org/10.1080/17452759.2018.1446122 
Moorthy, K. S. (2006). Theoretical Modeling in Marketing. Journal of Marketing, 57(2), 
92. https://doi.org/10.2307/1252029 
Muggy, L., & Heier Stamm, J. L. (2014). Game theory applications in humanitarian 
operations: a review. Journal of Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain 
 537 
Management, 4(1), 4–23. https://doi.org/10.1108/JHLSCM-07-2013-0026 
Muir, M., & Haddud, A. (2018). Additive manufacturing in the mechanical engineering and 
medical industries spare parts supply chain. Journal of Manufacturing Technology 
Management, 29(2), 372–397. https://doi.org/10.1108/JMTM-01-2017-0004 
Mula, J., Peidro, D., Díaz-Madroñero, M., & Vicens, E. (2010). Mathematical 
programming models for supply chain production and transport planning. European 
Journal of Operational Research, 204(3), 377–390. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2009.09.008 
Mussa, M., & Rosen, S. (1978). Monopoly and product quality. Journal of Economic 
Theory, 18(2), 301–317. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(78)90085-6 
Nash, J. G. (1949). Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 36, 48–49. 
Neuman, W. L. (2005). Social Research Methods (5th ed.). Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Newcastle University. (2018). First 3D printed human corneas. Retrieved July 20, 2018, 
from https://www.ncl.ac.uk/press/articles/latest/2018/05/first3dprintingofcorneas/ 
Niaki, M. K., & Nonino, F. (2017a). Additive manufacturing management: a review and 
future research agenda. International Journal of Production Research, 55(5), 1419–
1439. https://doi.org/10.1080/00207543.2016.1229064 
Niaki, M. K., & Nonino, F. (2017b). Impact of additive manufacturing on business 
competitiveness: A multiple case study. Journal of Manufacturing Technology 
Management, 28(1), 56–74. https://doi.org/10.1108/JMTM-01-2016-0001 
Novshek, W., & Thoman, L. (2006). Demand for customized products, production 
flexibility, and price competition. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 
15(4), 969–998. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2006.00124.x 
O’Toole, J. (2014). Amazon Launches 3-D Printing Store. Retrieved August 14, 2017, from 
http://money.cnn.com/2014/07/29/technology/innovationnation/amazon-3d-
printing/index.html 
Oettmeier, K., & Hofmann, E. (2016). Impact of additive manufacturing technology 
adoption on supply chain management processes and components. Journal of 
Manufacturing Technology Management, 27(7), 944–968. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/JMTM-12-2015-0113 
Oettmeier, K., & Hofmann, E. (2017). Additive manufacturing technology adoption: an 
empirical analysis of general and supply chain-related determinants. Journal of 
Business Economics, 87(1). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11573-016-0806-8 
Ohno, T. (1988). Toyota Production System: Beyond Large-scale Production (1 edition). 
Portland, Oregon: Productivity Press. 
 538 
Overall, C. (2017). Mini To Launch Unique 3D Printed Personalisation Upgrades. 
Retrieved June 17, 2018, from https://www.press.bmwgroup.com/united-
kingdom/article/detail/T0277375EN_GB/mini-to-launch-unique-3d-printed-
personalisation-upgrades?language=en_GB 
Panalpina. (2018). ADDITIVE MANUFACTURING (3D PRINTING). Retrieved July 15, 
2018, from 
http://www.panalpina.com/www/global/en/home/products_solutions/logistics/3d_print
ing.html 
Park, K., Min, H., & Min, S. (2016). Inter-relationship among risk taking propensity, 
supply chain security practices, and supply chain disruption occurrence. Journal of 
Purchasing and Supply Management, 22(2), 120–130. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pursup.2015.12.001 
Parlar, M. (1988). Game Theoretic Analysis of the Substitutable Product Inventory 
Problem with Random Demands. Naval Research Logistics (NRL), 35, 397–409. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/1520-6750(198806)35:3<397::AID-
NAV3220350308>3.0.CO;2-Z 
Patten, M. L., & Patten, M. L. (2018). Introduction to Research Methods. Understanding 
Research Methods. London: Sage Publications. 
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315213033-1 
Patty, R., & Denton, M. A. (2010). The end of project overruns, Lean and byeond for 
engineering, procurement and construction. Boca Ratorn, Florida: Universal 
Publishers. 
Petrick, I. J., & Simpson, T. W. (2014). 3D Printing Disrupts Manufacturing: How 
Economies of One Create New Rules of Competition. Research-Technology 
Management, 56(6), 12–16. https://doi.org/10.5437/08956308x5606193 
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. (1978). The External Control of Organizations: A Resource 
Dependence Perspective. New York: Haper and Row. 
Piller, F. T., Moeslein, K., & Stotko, C. M. (2004). Does mass customization pay? An 
economic approach to evaluate customer integration. Production Planning and 
Control, 15(4), 435–444. https://doi.org/10.1080/0953728042000238773 
Pine, B. J. (1993). Mass Customization: The New Frontier in Business Competition. 
Boston, Mass: Harvard Business School Press. 
Pooley, J. (2013). 3-D printing and the future of stuff. WIPO Magazine (Vol. 2). Retrieved 
from 
http://www.dhl.com/content/dam/downloads/g0/about_us/logistics_insights/dhl_trendr
eport_3dprinting.pdf 
Porter, M. E. (1991). Towards a dynamic theory of strategy. Strategic Management 
Journal, 12(2 S), 95–117. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.4250121008 
 539 
Rachel Yang, B., Ahmadi, R. H., & Monroe, K. B. (1998). Pricing in separable channels: 
The case of parallel imports. Journal of Product & Brand Management, 7(5), 433–
440. https://doi.org/10.1108/10610429810237763 
Rangaswamy, A., & Wind, J. (2001). Customerization: the next revolution in mass 
customization. Journal of Interactive Marketing, 15(1), 13–32. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/1520-6653(200124)15:1<13::AID-DIR1001>3.0.CO;2-# 
Rayna, T., & Striukova, L. (2016). From rapid prototyping to home fabrication: How 3D 
printing is changing business model innovation. Technological Forecasting and Social 
Change, 102, 214–224. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2015.07.023 
Rehnberg, Mä., & Ponte, S. (2018). From smiling to smirking? 3D printing, upgrading and 
the restructuring of global value chains. Global Networks, 18(1), 57–80. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/glob.12166 
Rezapour, S., Farahani, R. Z., Dullaert, W., & Borger, B. De. (2014). Designing a new 
supply chain for competition against an existing supply chain. Transportation 
Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 67, 124–140. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tre.2014.04.005 
Rice, J. B., & Caniato, F. (2003). Building A Secure And Resilient Supply Network. Supply 
Chain Management Review, October(September/ October), 22–31. 
Richardot, A. (2018). 3D printed fashion: Why is additive manufacturing interesting for 
fashion? Retrieved October 21, 2018, from 
https://www.sculpteo.com/blog/2018/01/24/3d-printed-fashion-why-is-additive-
manufacturing-interesting-for-fashion/ 
Riddalls, C. E., & Bennett, S. (2002). Production-inventory system controller design and 
supply chain dynamics. International Journal of Systems Science, 33(3), 181–195. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00207720110092180 
Robson, C., & McCartan, K. (2015). Real world research - A Resource for User of Social 
Research Methods in Applied Settings (4th ed.). Chichester, West Sussex, United 
Kingdom: John Wiley & Sons Ltd. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclinepi.2010.08.001 
Rolls-Royce. (2018). Civil earospace-airlines. Retrieved July 15, 2018, from 
https://www.rolls-royce.com/products-and-services/civil-aerospace/airlines/trent-
7000.aspx#/ 
Ross, M. T., Cruz, R., Hutchinson, C., Arnott, W. L., Woodruff, M. A., & Powell, S. K. 
(2018). Aesthetic reconstruction of microtia: a review of current techniques and new 
3D printing approaches. Virtual and Physical Prototyping, 13(2), 117–130. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17452759.2018.1430246 
Ru, J., Shi, R., & Zhang, J. (2015). Does a store brand always hurt the manufacturer of a 
competing national brand? Production and Operations Management, 24(2), 272–286. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.12220 
 540 
Ruffo, M., & Hague, R. (2007). Cost estimation for rapid manufacturing - Simultaneous 
production of mixed components using laser sintering. Proceedings of the Institution 
of Mechanical Engineers, Part B: Journal of Engineering Manufacture, 221(11), 
1585–1591. https://doi.org/10.1243/09544054JEM894 
Ruffo, M., Tuck, C., & Hague, R. (2006). Cost estimation for rapid manufacturing - Laser 
sintering production for low to medium volumes. Proceedings of the Institution of 
Mechanical Engineers, Part B: Journal of Engineering Manufacture, 220(9), 1417–
1427. https://doi.org/10.1243/09544054JEM517 
Ruffo, M., Tuck, C., & Hague, R. (2007). Make or buy analysis for rapid manufacturing. 
Rapid Prototyping Journal, 13(1), 23–29. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/13552540710719181 
Ryan, M. J., Eyers, D. R., Potter, A. T., Purvis, L., & Gosling, J. (2017). 3D printing the 
future: scenarios for supply chains reviewed. International Journal of Physical 
Distribution and Logistics Management, 47(10), 992–1014. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/IJPDLM-12-2016-0359 
Rylands, B., Böhme, T., Gorkin, R., Fan, J., & Birtchnell, T. (2016). The adoption process 
and impact of additive manufacturing on manufacturing systems. Journal of 
Manufacturing Technology Management, 27(7), 969–989. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/JMTM-12-2015-0117 
Saberi, S., Yusuff, R. M., Zulkifli, N., & Ahmad, M. M. H. M. (2010). Effective factors on 
advanced manufacturing technology implementation performance: A review. Journal 
of Applied Sciences, 10(13), 1229–1242. https://doi.org/10.3923/jas.2010.1229.1242 
Sanchez, F. A. C., Boudaoud, H., Muller, L., & Camargo, M. (2014). Towards a standard 
experimental protocol for open source additive manufacturing. Virtual and Physical 
Prototyping, 9(3), 151–167. https://doi.org/10.1080/17452759.2014.919553 
SATAIR. (2018). Airbus Proprietary Parts-Airbus design parts for your aircraft. Retrieved 
July 15, 2018, from http://www.satair.com/products/airbus-proprietary-parts 
Saunders, S. (2017). Customize Your MINI in 2018 with 3D Printed and Laser Lettered 
Trim. Retrieved June 21, 2018, from https://3dprint.com/198469/mini-yours-
customised-products/ 
Schröder, M., Falk, B., & Schmitt, R. (2015). Evaluation of cost structures of additive 
manufacturing processes using a new business model. In Procedia CIRP (Vol. 30, pp. 
311–316). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.procir.2015.02.144 
Sculpteo. (2018). The Status of 3D Printing 2018. Retrieved from 
https://www.sculpteo.com/media/ebook/State_of_3DP_2018.pdf 
Shamsuzzoha, A., Kankaanpaa, T., Carneiro, L. M., Almeida, R., Chiodi, A., & Fornasiero, 
R. (2013). Dynamic and collaborative business networks in the fashion industry. 
International Journal of Computer Integrated Manufacturing, 26(1–2), 125–139. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/0951192X.2012.681916 
 541 
Shapeways. (2016). Panalpina and Shapeways enter into strategic partnership for 3D 
printing. Retrieved July 23, 2018, from http://www.shapeways.com/presscorner/press-
release/2016-07-26-shapeways-and-panalpina-enter-into-strategic-partnership-for-3d-
printing 
Sher, D., & Tutó, X. (2015). Review of 3D Food Printing. Temes de disseny (Vol. 0). 
Shubik, M. (1985). Game Theory in the Social Sciences. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
Skinner, W. (1969, May). Manufacturing - Missing Link in Corporate Strategy. Harvard 
Business Review, May, 1–4. Retrieved from https://hbr.org/1969/05/manufacturing-
missing-link-in-corporate-strategy 
Slack, N., Chambers, S., & Johnston, R. (2007). Operations Management (Fifth edit). 
England: Pearson Education Limited. 
Smith, R. (2015). 3D Printing And The New Economics Of Manufacturing. Retrieved June 
22, 2018, from https://www.forbes.com/sites/ricksmith/2015/06/22/henry-ford-3d-
printing-and-the-new-economics-of-manufacturing/#4993abdf4d26 
Song, J.-S. J., & Zhang, Y. (2018). Stock or Print? Impact of 3D printing on spare parts 
logistics. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2884459 
Spengler, J. J. (2002). Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy. Journal of Political 
Economy, 58(4), 347–352. https://doi.org/10.1086/256964 
Spira, J. S. (1993). Mass Customization Through Training at Lutron Electronics. 
Computers in Industry, 30(3), 171–174. https://doi.org/10.1108/eb054423 
Stanton, N. A., Salmon, P. M., Walker, G. H., Baber, C., & Jenkins, D. P. (2013). Human 
Factors Methods: A Practical Guide for Engineering and Design (2rd ed.). England: 
CPC Press. 
Strange, R., & Zucchella, A. (2017). Industry 4.0, global value chains and international 
business. Multinational Business Review, 25(3), 174–184. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/MBR-05-2017-0028 
Stratasys. (2018). Smoby Toys. Retrieved August 6, 2018, from 
http://www.stratasys.com/resources/case-studies/consumer-goods/smoby-toys 
Sugawara, E., & Nikaido, H. (2014). Properties of AdeABC and AdeIJK Efflux Systems of 
Acinetobacter baumannii Compared with Those of the AcrAB-TolC System of 
Escherichia coli. Antimicrobial Agents and Chemotherapy (8th ed., Vol. 58). London, 
UK: Sage Publications, Inc. https://doi.org/10.1128/aac.03728-14 
Sulber, D. F. (1995). Bertrand Competition When Rival’s Costs are Unknown. The Journal 
of Industrial Economics, 43(1), 1–11. https://doi.org/10.2307/2950422 
Swamidass, P. M. (1986). Manufacturing strategy: Its assessment and practice. Journal of 
Operations Management, 6(3–4), 471–484. https://doi.org/10.1016/0272-
6963(86)90018-5 
 542 
Swamidass, P. M., & Waller, M. A. (1990). A classification of approaches to planning and 
justifying new manufacturing technologies. Journal of Manufacturing Systems, 9(3), 
181–193. https://doi.org/10.1016/0278-6125(90)90050-R 
Syam, N. B., & Kumar, N. (2006). On Customized Goods, Standard Goods, and 
Competition. Marketing Science, 25(5), 525–537. 
https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.1060.0199 
Takagoshi, N., & Matsubayashi, N. (2013). Customization competition between branded 
firms: Continuous extension of product line from core product. European Journal of 
Operational Research, 225(2), 337–352. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2012.10.001 
Taleizadeh, A. A., Noori-Daryan, M., & Tavakkoli-Moghaddam, R. (2015). Pricing and 
ordering decisions in a supply chain with imperfect quality items and inspection under 
buyback of defective items. International Journal of Production Research, 53(15), 
4553–4582. https://doi.org/10.1080/00207543.2014.997399 
Tang, Y., Mak, K., & Zhao, Y. F. (2016). A framework to reduce product environmental 
impact through design optimization for additive manufacturing. Journal of Cleaner 
Production, 137, 1560–1572. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2016.06.037 
Tashakkori, A. & Teddlie, C. (1998). Mixed methodology: Combining qualitative and 
quantitative approaches. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications. Thousand Oaks, 
CA: SAGE Publications. Thousand Oaks, California, USA: Sage Publications. 
Retrieved from http://www.mendeley.com/research/mixed-methodology-combining-
qualitative-quantitative-approaches-thousand-oaks-ca-sage-publications 
Taylor, M., Kwasnica, V., Reilly, D., & Ravindran, S. (2019). Game theory modelling of 
retail marketing discount strategies. Marketing Intelligence and Planning, 37(5), 555–
566. https://doi.org/10.1108/MIP-11-2018-0489 
Thomas, L. J., Hayes, R. H., & Wheelwright, S. C. (2006). Restoring Our Competitive 
Edge: Competing through Manufacturing. Administrative Science Quarterly (Vol. 30). 
New York: John Wiley & Sons Ltd. https://doi.org/10.2307/2393118 
Thompson, M. K., Moroni, G., Vaneker, T., Fadel, G., Campbell, R. I., Gibson, I., … 
Martina, F. (2016). Design for Additive Manufacturing: Trends, opportunities, 
considerations, and constraints. CIRP Annals - Manufacturing Technology, 65(2), 
737–760. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cirp.2016.05.004 
Tuck, C., Hague, R., & Burns, N. (2007). Rapid manufacturing: impact on supply chain 
methodologies and practice. International Journal of Services and Operations 
Management, 3(1), 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1504/IJSOM.2007.011459 
UPS. (2014). The UPS Store Expands 3D Printing Across the U.S. Retrieved August 10, 
2017, from 
https://pressroom.ups.com/pressroom/ContentDetailsViewer.page?ConceptType=Pres
sReleases&id=1426329652971-975 
UPS. (2015). 3D Printing Services from The UPS Store. Retrieved August 10, 2017, from 
 543 
https://www.theupsstore.com/print/3d-printing 
UPS. (2016). UPS On-Demand 3D Printing Network Expanded To Asia. Retrieved August 
14, 2017, from 
https://www.pressroom.ups.com/pressroom/ContentDetailsViewer.page?ConceptType
=PressReleases&id=1474287337483-522 
UPS. (2017). UPS Industrial Buying Dynamics Study: Buyers Raise the Bar for Suppliers. 
Retrieved from 
http://images.link.pentonmanufacturing.com/Web/PentonManu/%7Bc7ad8a0b-228e-
4d17-b13a-
489048c064f1%7D_17UP11092_IBDS_Brochure_062817_SCOUT_FFF.PDF 
UPS. (2018). Agility for Manufacturers. Retrieved July 23, 2018, from 
https://solversgb.ups.com/materialise/ 
Upton, D. M. (2008). Process Range in Manufacturing: An Empirical Study of Flexibility. 
Management Science, 43(8), 1079–1092. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.43.8.1079 
von Neumann, J., & Morgenstern, O. (1944). Theory of Games and Economic Behavior 
(Sixtieth-a). Woodstock, Oxfordshire, UK: Princeton University Press. 
von Stackelberg, H. (1935). Marktform and Gleichgewicht. The Economic Journal, 
45(178), 334–336. https://doi.org/10.2307/2224643 
Vorst, J. G. A. J. Van Der, & Beulens, A. J. M. (2002). Identifying sources of uncertainty 
to generate supply chain redesign strategies. International Journal of Physical 
Distribution & Logistics Management, 32(6), 409–430. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/09600030210437951 
Vorst, J. G. A. J. Van Der, Beulens, A. J. M., & Beek, P. Van. (2000). Modelling and 
simulating multi-echelon food systems. European Journal of Operational Research, 
122(2), 354–366. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0377-2217(99)00238-6 
Voss, C. A. (2005). Alternative paradigms for manufacturing strategy. International 
Journal of Operations and Production Management, 25(12), 1211–1222. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/01443570510633611 
Voudouris, V. T., & Consulting, A. (2003). Mathematical programming techniques to 
debottleneck the supply chain of fine chemical industries. Computers & Chemical 
Engineering, 20(Supplement 2), S1269–S1274. https://doi.org/10.1016/0098-
1354(96)00219-0 
Wacker, J. G. (2002). A definition of theory: research guidelines for different theory-
building research methods in operations management. Journal of Operations 
Management, 16(4), 361–385. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0272-6963(98)00019-9 
Walker, H., Chicksand, D., Radnor, Z., & Watson, G. (2015). Theoretical perspectives in 
operations management: An analysis of the literature. International Journal of 
Operations and Production Management, 35(8), 1182–1206. 
 544 
https://doi.org/10.1108/IJOPM-02-2014-0089 
Waller, M. A., & Fawcett, S. E. (2014). Click here to print a maker movement supply 
chain: How invention and entrepreneurship will disrupt supply chain design. Journal 
of Business Logistics, 35(2), 99–102. https://doi.org/10.1111/jbl.12045 
Walras, L. (1883). Théorie Mathématique de la Richesse Sociale. OSNABRÜCk: Otto 
Zeller. 
Walter, M., Holmström, J., & Yrjölä, H. (2004). Rapid manufacturing and its impact on 
supply chain management. Proceedings of the Logistics Research Network Annual 
Conference, (November), 12. https://doi.org/10.1115/OMAE201541892 
Wambach, A. (1999). Bertrand competition under cost uncertainty. International Journal of 
Industrial Organization, 17(7), 941–951. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-
7187(98)00008-3 
Watkin, H. (2017). Daimler Now 3D Printing Replacements and Parts for Buses. Retrieved 
June 17, 2018, from https://all3dp.com/daimler-buses-3d-printing/ 
Watkin, H. (2018). Save $300,000, Invest $35,000-General Motors Makes Saves $300,000 
Thanks to Standardizing 3D Printing. Retrieved June 21, 2018, from 
https://all3dp.com/general-motors-makes-saves-300000-thanks-standardizing-3d-
printing/ 
Weller, C., Kleer, R., & Piller, F. T. (2015). Economic implications of 3D printing: Market 
structure models in light of additive manufacturing revisited. International Journal of 
Production Economics, 164(June), 43–56. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2015.02.020 
Westbrook, R., & Williamson, P. (1993). Mass customization:Japan’s new frontier. 
European Management Journal, 11(1), 38–45. https://doi.org/10.1016/0263-
2373(93)90022-A 
Westerweel, B., Basten, R. J. I., & Houtum, G. J. Van. (2018). Traditional or Additive 
Manufacturing? Assessing Component Design Options through Lifecycle Cost 
Analysis. European Journal of Operational Research, 270(2), 570–585. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2018.04.015 
Wilkof, N. (2016). IP and 3D printing: do not ignore the patent aspects. Virtual and 
Physical Prototyping, 11(2), 143–147. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17452759.2016.1179584 
Wohlers Associates. (2016). Wohlers Report 2016 - 3D Printing and Additive 
Manufacturing State of the Industry: Annual Worldwide Progress Report. Retrieved 
from https://wohlersassociates.com/2016report.htm 
Wohlers Associates. (2018). Wohlers Report 2018 - 3D Printing and Additive 
Manufacturing State of the Industry: Annual Worldwide Progress Report. Retrieved 
from https://wohlersassociates.com/2018report.htm 
 545 
Woodson, T., Alcantara, J. T., & Nascimento, M. S. Do. (2019). Is 3D printing an inclusive 
innovation?: An examination of 3D printing in Brazil. Technovation, 80–81(December 
2018), 54–62. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.technovation.2018.12.001 
Wu, T., Blackhurst, J., & O’Grady, P. (2007). Methodology for supply chain disruption 
analysis. International Journal of Production Research, 45(7), 1665–1682. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00207540500362138 
Xia, Y., Yang, M. H., Golany, B., Gilbert, S. M., & Yu, G. (2004). Real-time disruption 
management in a two-stage production and inventory system. IIE Transactions 
(Institute of Industrial Engineers), 36(2), 111–125. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/07408170490245379 
Xiao, T., & Yang, D. (2008). Price and service competition of supply chains with risk-
averse retailers under demand uncertainty. International Journal of Production 
Economics, 114(1), 187–200. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2008.01.006 
Xu, X., Meteyer, S., Perry, N., & Zhao, Y. F. (2015). Energy consumption model of 
Binder-jetting additive manufacturing processes. International Journal of Production 
Research, 53(23), 7005–7015. https://doi.org/10.1080/00207543.2014.937013 
Yin, R. . (2003). Case Study Research and Design. In L. Fargotstein, E. Wells, C. Neve, & 
G. Dickens (Eds.), Sage Publications. Los Angeles, USA: Sage Publications, Inc. 
Zanardini, M., Bacchetti, A., Zanoni, S., & Ashourpour, M. (2016). Additive 
Manufacturing Applications in the Domain of Product Service System: An Empirical 
Overview. In Procedia CIRP (Vol. 47). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.procir.2016.03.048 
Zangiacomi, A., Fornasiero, R., Franchini, V., & Vinelli, A. (2017). Supply chain 
capabilities for customisation: a case study. Production Planning and Control, 28(6–
8), 587–598. https://doi.org/10.1080/09537287.2017.1309718 
Zeltmann, S. E., Gupta, N., Tsoutsos, N. G., Maniatakos, M., Rajendran, J., & Karri, R. 
(2016). Manufacturing and Security Challenges in 3D Printing. JOM, 68(7). 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11837-016-1937-7 
Zhang, B. (2016). UPS pact gives companies access to large-scale 3D printing and virtual 
warehousing. Retrieved July 23, 2018, from http://www.businessinsider.de/ups-sap-
fast-radius-on-demand-3d-printing-2016-11?r=US&IR=T 
Zhang, D. (2006). A network economic model for supply chain versus supply chain 
competition. Omega, 34(3), 283–295. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.omega.2004.11.001 
Zhang, M., & Tseng, M. M. (2007). A product and process modeling based approach to 
study cost implications of product variety in mass customization. IEEE Transactions 
on Engineering Management, 54(1), 130–144. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/TEM.2006.889072 
 
